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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are to expand the use of 
nuclear energy to meet increasing global energy demand, to address nuclear waste 
management concerns and to promote non-proliferation.  Implementation of the GNEP 
requires development and demonstration of three major technologies: 
 
• Light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel separations technologies that will recover 
transuranics to be recycled for fuel but not separate plutonium from other 
transuranics, thereby providing proliferation-resistance; 
• Advanced Burner Reactors (ABRs) based on a fast spectrum that transmute the 
recycled transuranics to produce energy while also reducing the long term 
radiotoxicity and decay heat loading in the repository; and 
• Fast reactor fuel recycling technologies to recover and refabricate the transuranics 
for repeated recycling in the fast reactor system. 
 
 The primary mission of the ABR Program is to demonstrate the transmutation of 
transuranics recovered from the LWR spent fuel, and hence the benefits of the fuel cycle 
closure to nuclear waste management. The transmutation, or burning of the transuranics 
is accomplished by fissioning and this is most effectively done in a fast spectrum. In the 
thermal spectrum of commercial LWRs, some transuranics capture neutrons and become 
even heavier transuranics rather than being fissioned. Only in a fast spectrum can all 
transuranics be effectively fissioned to eliminate their long-term radiotoxicity and decay 
heat.    
 
 The Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) is the first step in demonstrating the 
transmutation technologies.  It directly supports development of a prototype full-scale 
Advanced Burner Reactor, which would be followed by commercial deployment of 
ABRs.  
 
 The primary objectives of the ABTR are: 
 
• To demonstrate reactor-based transmutation of transuranics as part of an advanced 
fuel cycle; 
• To qualify the transuranics-containing fuels and advanced structural materials 
needed for a full-scale ABR;  
• To support the research, development and demonstration required for certification 
of an ABR standard design by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
 The ABTR should also address the following additional objectives: 
 
• To incorporate and demonstrate innovative design concepts and features that may 
lead to significant improvements in cost, safety, efficiency, reliability, or other 
favorable characteristics that could promote public acceptance and future private 
sector investment in ABRs;   
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• To demonstrate improved technologies for safeguards and security; 
• To support development of the U.S. infrastructure for design, fabrication and 
construction, testing and deployment of systems, structures and components for 
the ABRs. 
 
 Based on these objectives, a pre-conceptual design of a 250 MWt ABTR has been 
developed; it is documented in this report. In addition to meeting the primary and 
additional objectives listed above, the lessons learned from fast reactor programs in the 
U.S. and worldwide and the operating experience of more than a dozen fast reactors 
around the world, in particular the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II have been 
incorporated into the design of the ABTR to the extent possible.   
 
In order to demonstrate the transmutation of transuranics, the ABTR is required 
to provide a test environment prototypic of future commercial reactors, which 
implies that the reactor size should be large enough. On the other hand, a high 
power level means more complexity in engineering and higher project construction 
costs. Therefore, trade studies have been conducted which concluded that ~250 
MWt is a reasonable compromise balancing the prototypic irradiation environment 
and the project cost. 
 
 The reactor core design parameters have been selected to be representative of 
commercial-scale reactors, which results in a moderate conversion ratio of ~0.6 and 
a plutonium or transuranics enrichment in the range where extensive irradiation 
databases exist. However, the core has flexibility to accommodate a wide range of 
conversion ratios by changing the assembly design parameters appropriately. 
 
 Based on the past trade studies and lessons learned from operating reactors, the 
pool-type arrangement was selected as the basis for the ABTR pre-conceptual 
design due to its potential for design simplicity, inherent passive safety and 
economics. 
 
The key plant design parameters for the ABTR are summarized in Table 1. The 
overall plant site arrangement is shown in Figure 1.  The major systems – the reactor 
vessel containing the reactor core and the primary heat transport system, the intermediate 
heat transport system with the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers, and the Brayton cycle 
power conversion system – are shown in an elevation view in Figure 2.  
 
The reactor and the primary and secondary heat transport systems are located below 
grade. Note that all of the nuclear components of the plant are located on a nuclear island, 
which is seismically isolated from its foundations, which is also illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Table 1 ABTR Plant Design Parameters 
 
Reactor Power 250 MWt, 95 MWe 
Coolant Sodium 
Coolant Temperature, Inlet/Outlet 355ºC/510ºC 
Driver Fuel Reference: Metal ( ~20% TRU, 80% U) 
Backup: Oxide  
Cladding and Duct Material   HT-9  
Cycle Length 4 months   
Plant Life 30 years with the expectation of life extension 
Reactor Vessel Size 5.8 m diameter, 16 m height 
Structural and Piping Material Austenitic Stainless Steel 
Primary Pump Reference: Electromagnetic 
Backup: Mechanical (centrifugal) 
Power Conversion Cycle Reference: Supercritical CO2 Brayton  
Backup: Steam Rankine  
Thermal Efficiency 38 % 
 
 
The reactor core consists of 24 assemblies in an inner enrichment zone and 30 
assemblies in an outer zone.  Reactivity control and neutronic shutdown are provided by 
7 primary and 3 secondary control rod assemblies.  A total of nine test locations are 
provided -- six for fuel tests and three for material tests.  This core design is the product 
of extensive trade studies involving power rating, conversion ratio, fuel type (metal, 
oxide), fissile material (weapons Pu, TRU from LWR spent fuel), control requirements 
and shutdown margin.  The reference design uses weapons-grade plutonium-based 
ternary metal driver fuel as the initial core and envisions a gradual transition to 
transuranics-containing driver fuel as it is qualified.  It has a TRU conversion ratio of 
0.65. 
 
The primary system is configured in a pool-type arrangement (similar to that used 
successfully in EBR-II), with the reactor core, primary pumps, intermediate heat 
exchangers, and direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) heat exchangers all 
immersed in a pool of sodium coolant within the reactor vessel.  A schematic view of the 
primary system is shown in Figure 3 and some specific dimensions are given in Figure 4. 
The pool-type arrangement was selected because of its inherent simplicity and safety. All 
primary coolant piping is within the sodium pool, which greatly reduces the possibility of 
loss of coolant, and the sodium pool provides a large thermal inertia in the system.  In 
addition, the reactor vessel is a simple structure having no penetrations.  The hot sodium 
at core outlet temperature is separated from the cold sodium at core inlet temperature by a 
structure called the redan.  The reactor vessel is exposed only to cold sodium, so it is not 
subjected to severe thermal transients.  A guard vessel is provided as an additional 
passive safety feature. 
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Figure 1 Overall Site View of the ABTR Plant 
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Figure 3 Schematic View of Primary System 
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Figure 4 Elevation View of Primary System 
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Within the reactor vessel, two primary electromagnetic pumps take suction from the 
lower regions of the cold pool and discharge the sodium into a header that distributes the 
sodium into 3 feeder pipes, which distribute sodium evenly into the inlet plenum.  The 
inlet plenum distributes the primary sodium to the inlet of the core assemblies, which are 
individually orificed for proper flow distribution. The sodium is heated as it flows 
through the core and exits the core assemblies into the outlet plenum. The hot sodium 
then rises into the redan and then enters the inlet of the intermediate heat exchanger 
(IHX).  After the primary sodium transfers its heat to the intermediate sodium, it exits the 
IHX into the lower regions of the cold pool. The IHX is contoured to the shape of the 
annular gap between the redan and the reactor vessel to minimize the overall diameter of 
the reactor vessel. The guard vessel that surrounds the reactor vessel will capture and 
contain any reactor vessel leakage and prevent the IHX inlet, DRACS heat exchangers, 
and core assemblies from being uncovered.  
 
An innovative power conversion system using a Brayton cycle with supercritical CO2 
was selected for the reference design because of its simple layout with relatively few 
components, small turbo-machinery components and the potential for higher cycle 
efficiencies at higher sodium outlet temperatures.  It also offers improved inherent safety 
because the potential for sodium-water chemical reaction is eliminated.   
 
The intermediate sodium exits the IHX and flows to the Na-to-CO2 heat exchanger 
located below grade on the nuclear island.  This heat exchanger is part of the Brayton 
cycle power conversion system. The intermediate sodium heats the supercritical CO2 
which then flows into the turbine-generator performing work and generating electricity. 
The CO2 then goes through a series of recuperator heat exchangers, coolers, and 
compressors before it re-enters the Na-to-CO2 heat exchanger.  The CO2 rejects about 
60% of its heat to a forced draft cooling tower which provides the ultimate heat sink.  A 
schematic diagram of the reference power conversion system is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Removal of decay heat from the reactor core is a fundamental safety function.  In the 
reference ABTR design, normal decay heat removal is through the normal power 
conversion systems.  However, a direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) is 
provided, having both forced flow and natural convection capability.  This system 
removes decay heat from the pool to the atmosphere using heat exchangers located in the 
cold part of the sodium pool and in the atmosphere above grade.  If electrical power is 
available, forced flow can be used; in an emergency, natural convection flow can remove 
the decay heat. 
 
The ABTR will have a short refueling interval so efficient and reliable fuel handling 
is essential.  The reference design provides in-vessel fuel storage cooled by natural 
convection.  Movement of fuel into and out of the core is done using a simple and reliable 
pantograph-type fuel handling machine.  This machine operates with a single rotating 
plug in the vessel head, which simplifies the design of the head and allows a smaller 
reactor vessel diameter, both of which afford cost savings.  Movement of fuel from the 
reactor vessel to the fuel handling building is done using a fuel unloading machine and 
inter-building transfer cask similar to the system used for many years at EBR-II. 
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Figure 5 Overall Thermodynamic Cycle 
 
 
The pre-conceptual design presented in this report reflects the results of extensive and 
detailed design analyses and trade-off studies.  Areas that were the subject of special 
attention in the design analyses include the core design and in-vessel shielding analysis, 
the thermal-hydraulics of the vessel and the in-vessel structures and the various 
components in the heat transport systems.  The performance of the reactor and heat 
transport systems during natural circulation transients and several design basis events was 
considered.  These analyses are documented in Part III of this report. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 Overall Objectives  
 
The goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are to expand the use of 
nuclear energy to meet increasing global energy demand, to address nuclear waste 
management concerns and to promote non-proliferation.  Implementation of the GNEP 
requires development and demonstration of three major technologies: 
 
• Light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel separations technologies that will recover 
transuranics to be recycled for fuel but not separate plutonium from other 
transuranics, thereby providing proliferation-resistance; 
• Advanced Burner Reactors (ABRs) based on a fast spectrum that transmute the 
recycled transuranics to produce energy while also reducing the long term 
radiotoxicity and decay heat loading in the repository; and 
• Fast reactor fuel recycling technologies to recover and refabricate the transuranics 
for repeated recycling in the fast reactor system. 
 
 The primary mission of the ABR Program is to demonstrate the transmutation of 
transuranics recovered from the LWR spent fuel, and hence the benefits of the fuel cycle 
closure to nuclear waste management. The transmutation, or burning of the transuranics 
is accomplished by fissioning and this is most effectively done in a fast spectrum. In the 
thermal spectrum of commercial LWRs, some transuranics capture neutrons and become 
even heavier transuranics rather than being fissioned. Even with repeated recycling, only 
about 30% can be transmuted, which is an intrinsic limitation of all thermal spectrum 
reactors. Only in a fast spectrum can all transuranics be effectively fissioned to eliminate 
their long-term radiotoxicity and decay heat.    
 
 The Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) is the first step in demonstrating the 
transmutation technologies.  It directly supports development of a prototype full-scale 
Advanced Burner Reactor, which would be followed by commercial deployment of 
ABRs.  
 
 The primary objectives of the ABTR are: 
 
• To demonstrate reactor-based transmutation of transuranics as part of an advanced 
fuel cycle; 
• To qualify the transuranics-containing fuels and advanced structural materials 
needed for a full-scale ABR;  
• To support the research, development and demonstration required for certification 
of an ABR standard design by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
 The ABTR should also address the following additional objectives: 
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• To incorporate and demonstrate innovative design concepts and features that may 
lead to significant improvements in cost, safety, efficiency, reliability, or other 
favorable characteristics that could promote public acceptance and future private 
sector investment in ABRs;   
• To demonstrate improved technologies for safeguards and security; 
• To support development of the U.S. infrastructure for design, fabrication and 
construction, testing and deployment of systems, structures and components for 
the ABRs. 
 
 Based on these objectives, a pre-conceptual design of a 250 MWt ABTR has been 
developed; it is documented in this report. In addition to meeting the primary and 
additional objectives listed above, the lessons learned from fast reactor programs in the 
U.S. and worldwide and the operating experience of more than a dozen fast reactors 
around the world, in particular the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II have been 
incorporated into the design of the ABTR to the extent possible.   
 
 
I.2 Plant Design Approach 
 
In order to address the ABTR objectives, the following major design goals governed 
the pre-conceptual design of the ABTR:  
• Demonstrate Transmutation of Transuranics:  The reactor core will be 
designed to demonstrate actinide transmutation in a fast spectrum using the 
plutonium containing fuel as its initial core driver fuel, gradually transitioning 
into transuranics containing fuel, recovered from LWR spent fuel.  It will 
accommodate test positions for irradiation testing of transuranic fuels and non-
fuel materials within the core. 
• Demonstrate Fast Reactor Safety:  The reactor and system design will 
incorporate inherent safety features and shall utilize passive safety systems to the 
maximum extent possible.  The design will incorporate the major features that 
would be expected in a commercial-scale ABR so that safety demonstrations and 
operating experience is applicable to the future ABRs. 
• Demonstrate Cost Reduction Design Features:  The design will emphasize 
simplicity, reliability and long life of its systems, structures and components, and 
will seek innovative design options that reduce cost without compromise of the 
mission or safety.  The design will emphasize ease of operation, inspection and 
maintenance.  The design will be suitable for location on a wide variety of sites. 
  
In order to demonstrate the transmutation of transuranics, the ABTR is required 
to provide a test environment prototypic of future commercial reactors, which 
implies that the reactor size should be large enough. For a smaller plant size, much 
higher fissile enrichment is required due to high neutron leakage, distorting the 
irradiation environment compared to that expected in commercial reactors. On the 
other hand, a high power level means more complexity in engineering and higher 
project construction costs. Therefore, trade studies have been conducted which 
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concluded that ~250 MWt is a reasonable compromise balancing the prototypic 
irradiation environment and the project cost. 
 
 The reactor core design parameters have been selected to be representative of 
commercial-scale reactors, which results in a moderate conversion ratio of ~0.6 and 
a plutonium or transuranics enrichment in the range where extensive irradiation 
databases exist. However, the core has flexibility to accommodate a wide range of 
conversion ratios by changing the assembly design parameters appropriately. 
 
 Once the core envelope has been defined, the next key design decision is 
selection of the overall plant layout option, namely loop-type or pool-type 
arrangement. Based on the past trade studies and lessons learned from operating 
reactors, the pool-type arrangement was selected as the basis for the ABTR pre-
conceptual design. The reasons for this selection are summarized below. 
 
Simplicity  
 
 Assurance of primary system integrity and leak tightness is a major design 
objective. In the pool concept, the primary system coolant boundary is simple and 
regular, resulting in low stresses and high structural reliability. There are no 
penetrations in the reactor vessel wall. Because of the submerged primary piping 
and other major components, small leakages internal to the primary boundary are 
permissible.  By contrast, in the loop concept, the primary pumps and intermediate 
heat exchangers are housed external to the reactor vessel in steel-lined, nitrogen-
inerted cells. The piping normally penetrates the reactor vessel below the top head 
closure and runs in inerted pipeways to and from the steel-lined cells. Elimination of 
these inerted steel-lined primary heat transport system cells and the complex 
network of piping, supports and restraints results in a major simplification of the 
plant design and reduction of containment building size and associated 
commodities. 
 
Inherent Passive Safety  
 
 There is a significant difference between the responses of the pool and loop designs to 
various system transients. The pool system generally is less sensitive than the loop 
system to plant upsets associated with loss of heat sink or loss of forced cooling. This 
reduced sensitivity allows greater opportunity for inherent passive safety features such as 
natural convective flow and negative reactivity feedback to protect the core. The major 
design considerations relate to the thermal inertia, the rate of pump coastdown, and the 
reactivity feedback characteristics of the system. An extended coastdown time, combined 
with the large thermal inertia of the pool system, may well allow reactivity feedback 
mechanisms to accommodate the unprotected transients. Such mechanisms are inherently 
provided by the thermal expansion of the support grid and thermal elongation of the 
control rod drivelines. With these factors properly combined, it may be feasible to design 
a pool system to survive loss of all electric power (and forced coolant flow) without 
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scram and thus significantly further reduce the probability of a serious accident. This is 
much more difficult to achieve in a loop system because following a scram the primary 
pumps must coast down rapidly to avoid serious thermal shock to the reactor nozzles, 
primary piping and downstream components.  
 
 Diverse and redundant decay heat removal capacity can be supplied in either a loop or 
pool system. However, because of the large reactor vessel that contains both primary 
pumps and intermediate heat exchangers, diversity and redundancy can be achieved more 
easily and reliably in the pool system. Also, passive protective systems, including decay 
heat removal, can be provided with simpler engineering solutions. For example, the 
normal primary heat transport system in a pool design can also be used for in-vessel 
passive decay heat removal with proper location of dedicated heat removal systems, 
whereas the loop concept requires an alternative flow path with either check valves or 
changes in direction of coolant circulation. 
 
Economics  
 
 Past design studies based on use of standard stainless steel materials of construction 
have concluded that the pool arrangement costs less than the loop arrangement, both in 
capital cost and in operating costs over the life of the plant. The primary reasons for 
reduced capital cost lie in the smaller reactor containment building and all of the 
associated reductions in plant size. Furthermore, the simplicity of the primary system and 
elimination of the additional inerted steel-lined cells housing various sodium heat 
transport system components contribute significantly to cost savings. The simplicity of 
the pool system translates into a shortened construction schedule, which also contributes 
to capital cost savings. The operating and maintenance costs can be reduced because of 
reduced plant outage times and less radiation exposure to personnel performing 
inspection, testing, and maintenance work. Also, there appears to be greater potential for 
design improvements to reduce cost in the pool system than for the loop system. 
 
 Even though the pre-conceptual pool design described in this report is still 
preliminary and incomplete, the attractiveness of the design is apparent. In essence, it 
maximizes the advantages of the pool concept identified in previous design studies by 
unique design innovations. Specific examples of features unique to the design include: 
 
• A vertical redan which reduces the load on the support structure, eliminates 
complex pump and IHX penetrations, increases the volume of cold sodium in the 
primary vessel, and decreases heat losses to the top closure; 
• A passive cooling system to keep the reactor vessel wall at a low and uniform 
temperature thus reducing costs, enhancing integrity of the primary coolant 
boundary and simplifying the design; 
• Elimination of valves from the primary sodium piping system to improve 
reliability and reduce cost; 
• A reactor support grid incorporating individual inlet modules for reactor 
assemblies and simple hydraulic hold-down providing flexibility and reducing 
vertical space requirements; 
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• Shutdown heat removal system within the reactor vessel which enhances safety 
and reduces the cost of the secondary system; 
• Electromagnetic pump that is expected to simplify the overall plant design and 
improve reliability by eliminating moving parts.  
 
The ABTR design project also focused on incorporating innovative design features 
with the goal of reducing the overall plant costs. Some of the innovative design features 
incorporated into the ABTR plant design include: 
 
• A compact fuel handling system that aids in reducing the reactor vessel size, 
which should translate into an overall primary plant cost reduction; 
• An innovative balance-of-plant option using a supercritical carbon dioxide 
Brayton cycle system that may simplify the power conversion system, reduce the 
commodities associated with balance of plant systems and reduce its overall costs; 
and eliminate the possibility of water-sodium interactions. 
• Seismic isolation of the ‘nuclear island’ so that the need for expensive design 
features to accommodate large earthquakes is reduced and limitations on the 
seismicity of candidate sites can be relaxed.  The pre-conceptual design 
incorporates an innovative multiple friction pendulum system. 
 
 
I.3 Safety Design Approach  
 
The safety goals in nuclear power reactor design and operation are to assure the 
health and safety of the public, to protect the plant operating staff from harm, and to 
prevent plant damage.  Traditionally, these goals have been fulfilled by an approach that 
1) minimizes risk by maximizing safety margins in design and operation, 2) reduces the 
likelihood of potentially harmful events by providing safety systems to deal with 
anticipated events, and 3) provides additional design features to mitigate the harmful 
consequences of low probability events.  This approach is usually identified as “defense 
in depth.” 
 
The basic principle of “defense in depth” is to provide multiple levels of protection 
against release of radioactive material.  One part of defense-in-depth is physical barriers, 
like the multiple barriers to release of radioactivity provided by the fuel cladding, the 
primary coolant system boundary and the reactor containment building.  Generally, active 
or passive safety systems are provided to protect the physical barriers.  These include the 
reactor shutdown systems and the reactor cooling systems.  Inherent characteristics of the 
design, such as negative reactivity feedback and long flow coastdown, may provide an 
additional level of protection.  Emergency planning provides an additional layer of 
defense-in-depth, should the other barriers be threatened.  However, in all instances, the 
“defense in depth” strategy depends on the independence of the protective measures, so 
that no single event can breech more than one protective level. 
 
The ABTR safety design approach implements the “defense in depth” strategy by 
adopting the traditional three levels of safety.  In addition, the ABTR design features 
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have been selected to provide significant safety margin enhancements by inherent passive 
safety responses to upset conditions and equipment failures.   
 
At the first level, the ABTR is designed to operate with a high level of reliability, so 
that accident initiators are prevented from occurring.  The first level of safety is assured 
in part by selection of fuel, cladding, coolant, and structural materials that are stable and 
compatible, and provide large margins between normal operating conditions and limiting 
failure conditions.  Next, the first level of safety is assured by adopting an arrangement of 
components that allows monitoring, inspection, and testing for performance changes or 
degradation.  Finally, the ABTR design provides for repair and replacement of 
components necessary to assure that safety margins are not degraded. 
 
The selection of liquid sodium coolant and metallic fuel with a pool-type primary 
system arrangement provides a highly reliable reactor system with large operational 
safety margins.  The coolant thermo-physical properties provide superior heat removal 
and transport characteristics at low operating pressure with a large temperature margin to 
boiling.  The metallic fuel operates at a relatively low temperature, below the coolant 
boiling point, due to its high thermal conductivity.  The pool-type primary system 
confines all significantly radioactive materials within a single vessel, allows for easy 
removal and replacement of components as well as shutdown heat removal by natural 
circulation. 
 
At the second level of safety, the ABTR is designed to provide protection in the event 
of equipment failure or operating error.  This level of protection is provided by 
engineered safety systems for reactor shutdown, reactor heat removal, and emergency 
power.  Each of these safety-grade back-up systems functions in the event of failure in 
the corresponding operating system, and are subjected to continuous monitoring and 
periodic testing and inspection. 
 
The ABTR design provides an independently powered and instrumented secondary 
reactor shutdown system that operates automatically to reduce reactor power rapidly in 
the event that the primary shutdown system fails.  For shutdown cooling, the ABTR 
design includes a safety-grade emergency heat removal system, independent from the 
normal heat removal system and capable of removing residual decay heat by natural 
circulation.  In addition to the normal off-site power supply, the ABTR is equipped with a 
second independent off-site power connection.  The two off-site power connections are 
supplemented by a safety-grade on-site emergency power supply. 
 
The third level of safety provides additional protection of the public health and safety 
in an extremely unlikely event that is not expected to occur in the life of the plant, or 
which was not foreseen at the time the plant was designed and constructed. 
 
In the ABTR design, the level 3 protections for cooling assurance and containment of 
radioactivity are provided by the reactor guard vessel and the reactor containment 
building.  The reactor guard vessel is designed to hold primary coolant in the event of a 
leak in the primary coolant system.  The reactor guard vessel assures that the reactor core 
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remains covered with sodium and cooled by the emergency heat removal system, even if 
the primary reactor vessel fails.  If primary coolant leaks and oxidizes in the reactor 
building air atmosphere, or if failures of the cladding and the primary system barriers 
lead to release of gaseous fission products, the reactor containment building provides a 
final low-leakage barrier to release of radioactivity to the environment. 
 
The three levels of safety together are the safety design basis for ABTR.  For the 
purposes of subsequent safety design development, qualification, and documentation, it is 
customary during the pre-conceptual design phase to identify general design criteria that 
collectively serve as the basis for safety assessment of the design.  A preliminary cross 
reference and evaluation of existing general design criteria from 10CFR Part 50 
Appendix A, from ANSI/ANS Standard 54.1, and from DOE Order 5480.30 are included 
in Appendix A.   
 
The normal process of safety assessment of a design considers a spectrum of design 
basis accidents (DBAs) as tests of the various safety systems.  These DBAs generally 
assume single failures.  Accidents within the design basis must be accommodated by the 
design and shown to present risks to the public that are within regulatory standards.  
Beyond the design basis, there exists a class of accidents of such low probability that they 
have been termed “hypothetical.”  These events involve multiple failures of safety grade 
systems, and usually are considered to have a frequency of less than 10-6 per reactor year.  
Because of the potentially severe consequences of accidents in this class, they have 
received significant regulatory scrutiny in prior sodium-cooled fast reactor licensing 
reviews for the purpose of characterizing thermal and structural safety margins beyond 
the design basis. 
 
Three beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA) sequences, each involving failure of 
both reactor scram systems, have received attention in past licensing safety assessments.  
In the unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) sequence, it is assumed that power is lost to all 
primary and secondary coolant pumps and the reactor scram systems fail to activate.  In 
the unprotected transient overpower (UTOP) sequence, it is assumed that one or more 
inserted control rods are withdrawn, and the reactor scram systems fail to operate.  In the 
unprotected loss-of-heat-sink (LOHS) accident, it is assumed that heat removal through 
the power conversion system is lost, and the reactor scram systems do not activate.  
Taken collectively, these three accident initiators encompass all the ways that an 
operating reactor can be perturbed, i.e. by a change in coolant flow, by a change in 
reactivity, or by a change in coolant inlet temperature.  
 
The proposed ABTR design is capable of accommodating these beyond design basis 
accident initiators without producing high temperatures and conditions that might lead to 
a severe accident, such as coolant boiling, cladding failures, or fuel melting.  The inherent 
neutronic, hydraulic, and thermal performance characteristics of the ABTR design 
provide self-protection in beyond-design-basis sequences to limit accident consequences 
without activation of engineered systems or operator actions.  This characteristic has been 
termed ‘inherent passive safety.’ 
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The efficacy of such passive safety was demonstrated through two landmark tests 
conducted on the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), namely loss-of-flow without 
scram and loss-of-heat-sink without scram tests. With the automated safety systems 
disabled, the two most demanding accident initiating events were deliberately induced 
with the reactor at full power, first one then the other. Each time the reactor simply 
coasted to a safe low power state without any damage at all to the fuel or any reactor 
component. These tests proved conclusively that passive safety design is achievable for 
metallic fueled fast reactors with sodium cooling.   
 
Within the overall safety framework for ABTR, passive safety serves to provide 
additional margins for public protection in the event of very low probability events whose 
frequency of occurrence is lower than the normal threshold for deterministic assessment.  
The ABTR passive safety performance characteristic assures that no abnormal 
radioactivity releases will occur in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and that 
all of the multiple defense-in-depth barriers (fuel cladding, reactor vessel, containment 
building) for public protection will remain intact, just as for design basis accidents.  The 
passive safety performance of ABTR eliminates the potential for severe accident 
consequences in very low frequency, beyond-design-basis sequences.  Consequently, for 
ABTR, beyond-design-basis accidents need to be considered only in the context of 
probabilistic risk assessments. 
 
Security must now be considered as an integral part of the design.  The inherent and 
passive safety features of the ABTR offer a high level of protection against malevolent 
events, as well as against accidents.  Since the inherent and passive features do not rely 
on operator action, external power or functioning of active components, they remove 
these potential vulnerabilities.  In addition, the location of the reactor vessel, the core, and 
the primary heat transport system below grade within a strong containment structure 
provides protection against external threats. 
 
 
Implications on Licensing Approach 
 
Historically, safety assessment of reactor designs has been based on a deterministic 
approach, in which a set of postulated initiating events are defined and the consequences 
of these events are determined by analysis.  The events to be considered are selected to 
represent challenges to the reactor’s control and safety systems, based on judgment, 
experience and regulatory requirements.  The probability of an initiating event occurring 
is evaluated only qualitatively.  USNRC licensing practice using the deterministic 
approach is highly developed for light-water power reactors and is codified in 10CFR 
Part 50.  The general design criteria found in Appendix A of Part 50 and the related body 
of regulatory guidance have been applied successfully to licensing of the current fleet of 
LWRs.  They were used with modification in licensing of the Fast Flux Test Facility and 
the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project.  However, it is recognized that use of criteria 
designed for LWR technology for new, innovative reactor designs is not efficient, nor 
does it lead to a stable and predictable regulatory process.  In addition, recent trends in 
safety assessment and licensing have led to an increased emphasis on risk informed 
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decision-making, with a consequent emphasis on the use of probabilistic risk assessment 
throughout design, safety assessment, licensing and operation.  All operating nuclear 
power plants are now required to have a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) including both 
internal and external events, and probabilistic insights are now used in some aspects of 
operation and regulation.  
 
The USNRC is now developing a risk-informed, performance based alternative to 
10CFR Part 50 to be used in licensing of future nuclear power plants [1].  The framework 
for this alternative approach is based on the NRC’s Safety Goals Policy and fundamental 
safety principles such as defense-in-depth and safety margins.  It combines probabilistic 
and deterministic elements.  It is technology-independent, with technology-specific 
requirements for particular designs.   
 
Under the new regulatory framework, a probabilistic risk assessment would be an 
integral part of the design process and safety assessment, as well as having a fundamental 
role in the licensing process.  Deterministic criteria and multiple lines of defense against 
undue radioactive release would continue to be required.  Under this approach, a 
probabilistic analysis would be used to establish the event sequences to be considered in 
the licensing process and to classify equipment as to its safety significance.  The selected 
events, called Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) would be analyzed deterministically to 
demonstrate the conservatism of the probabilistic analysis.  The allowable consequences 
of an event would be matched to its frequency quantitatively.   
 
As design work proceeds beyond the pre-conceptual stage, use of probabilistic 
analysis will be central to the design, especially to demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
inherent and passive safety features of the ABTR.  It will also allow a quantitative 
selection of LBEs for deterministic analysis to show compliance with the NRC’s Safety 
Goal Policy.  In previous licensing of sodium-cooled fast reactors, a great deal of 
attention was focused on beyond-design-basis events leading to severe accidents.  
Probabilistic analysis affords the opportunity to show quantitatively that such events have 
a frequency below the lower limit for consideration as LBEs (the current proposal is a 
frequency less than 10-7 per reactor-year); nevertheless, defense-in-depth considerations 
will likely require mitigation features such as low-leakage containment.   
 
At the present time, the approach to be used for licensing of the ABTR is not clear, 
given the project schedule and the likely time frame for introduction of the risk-informed, 
performance-based alternative.  However, it is clear that an approach to design and safety 
assessment using both probabilistic and deterministic methods will be needed.  In the 
longer term, such an approach will surely be needed for ABR licensing, and the ABTR 
licensing offers the opportunity to develop the methods and data needed to support the 
ABR in the future. 
 
Reference 
  
1. NUREG-1860, Framework for Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-
Based Alternative to 10 CFR Part 50, Working Draft, July 2006. 
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PART II 
PLANT DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
II.1  Reactor System 
 
II.1.1 Reactor Core 
 
 The primary goals of the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) are to demonstrate 
the benefits of a closed nuclear fuel cycle and provide a suitable irradiation facility for 
development and qualification of transuranic (TRU) fuels of the Advanced Burner 
Reactor (ABR). Core design studies were performed to develop a reference core design 
that meets these ABTR goals [1]. Various design trade-off studies were performed to 
determine the appropriate power level and conversion ratio. Both metallic and oxide fuel 
forms were considered with TRU feeds from weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) and 
TRU recovered from light water reactor spent fuel (LWR-SF).  
 
 The trade-off study on power level suggested that ~250 MWt is a reasonable 
compromise to allow a low project cost, at the same time providing a reasonable 
prototypic irradiation environment for demonstrating TRU-based fuels. Preliminary 
design studies showed that it is feasible to design the ABTR to accommodate a wide 
range of conversion ratio (CR) by employing different assembly designs. The TRU 
enrichments required for various conversion ratios and the irradiation database suggested 
a phased approach with initial startup using conventional enrichment plutonium-based 
fuel and gradual transitioning to full core loading of transmutation fuel after its 
qualification phase (resulting in ~0.6 CR). The low CR transmutation fuel tests can be 
accommodated in the designated test assemblies, and if fully developed, core conversion 
to low CR fuel can be envisioned. The details of these trade-off studies are discussed in 
Sections III.4.1 and III.4.2. 
 
 Based on the results of these trade-off studies, a reference core design with a rated 
power of 250 MWt was developed for ternary metal alloy (U-TRU-Zr) fuel with WG-Pu 
feed. An alternative design was developed for mixed oxide (UO2-TRUO2) fuel. Since it is 
expected that the ABTR core will be converted gradually into LWR-SF TRU drivers, the 
performance characteristics of the metal and oxide core designs loaded with LWR-SF 
TRU drivers were also evaluated.  
 
 The design descriptions and performance characteristics of the reference metal core 
design are presented in this section. The alternative oxide core design is discussed in 
Section III.4.3. The performances of the LWR-SF TRU fuel and the low CR assembly 
designs are provided in Sections III.4.4 and III.4.5, respectively. 
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II.1.1.1 Core and Assembly Design Description 
 
 Using WG-Pu drivers, a 250 MWt reference core design was developed for ternary 
metal alloy fuel. It is a homogeneous design with 199 assemblies – 54 driver assemblies, 
78 reflector assemblies, 48 shield assemblies, 10 control rod assemblies, and 9 test 
assemblies. Figure II.1-1 shows the reference core configuration. In order to increase the 
flexibility of core loading and the space for irradiation test, nine test assembly locations 
were allocated. The core barrel inner diameter is 2.27 m, and the equivalent core outer 
diameter is 1.31 m. Two independent safety-grade reactivity control systems are 
employed for reactivity control and reactor shutdown. The primary control system 
consists of one central assembly and six assemblies in the fifth row, and the secondary 
control system consists of three assemblies in the third row. Reactivity control for normal 
operation, load following and shutdown is accomplished by bank (uniform) movement of 
seven primary control rod assemblies in the fuel region of the core. 
 
 Enrichment zoning strategy was chosen to flatten the power distribution, and two 
enrichment zones were used to simplify the refueling operation. The 54 driver assemblies 
are divided into two enrichment zones: the inner and outer cores composed of 24 and 30 
driver assemblies, respectively. The fuel enrichments (i.e., TRU fractions) of inner and 
outer cores are 16.5 and 20.7%, respectively. Among the total nine test assembly 
locations, three assemblies located in the fourth row were designated for material test 
assemblies. Since the compositions of these material test assemblies are not known at this 
point, reflector assemblies were used for the core performance calculations. Six fuel test 
assemblies are located in the third and fourth rows. The fuel test assemblies are assumed 
to be identical to the driver fuel assembly except that LWR-SF TRU is used instead of 
weapons grade plutonium. The fuel alloy is U-TRU-10%Zr, and the TRU compositions 
of WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU are presented in Table II.1-1. The LWR-SF TRU 
composition was determined from 10-year cooled LWR spent fuel with 33 MWd/kg 
burnup. 
 
 The design of core assemblies maximizes the use of common structural components, 
with the exception of the assembly internals. All core assemblies use the same hexagonal 
duct and handling socket. Fuel, shield and control rod assemblies use sealed-type pins to 
contain the fuel and absorber materials and fission products. Reflector assemblies contain 
pin bundles of solid HT-9 rods. The bottom of the fuel pins similarly consists of solid 
HT-9 rods for lower axial shielding. Figure II.1-2 shows the assembly schematics and 
fuel pin design data. The key design parameters of the fuel, reflector, shield and control 
assemblies are presented in Table II.1-2. 
 
 The fuel assembly has an overall length of 328 cm and contains 217 fuel pins 
arranged in a triangular pitch array. Fuel pins are made of sealed cladding containing a 
metallic fuel column of 80 cm length. Sodium is filled as the initial thermal bond between 
the fuel column and the cladding. The fuel pin diameter and cladding thickness are 8.00 
mm, and 0.52 mm, respectively. It is noted that this pin size is within the PRISM design 
range of 7.4-8.3 mm. The fuel smeared density is 75%. The fuel pin is helically wrapped 
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with wire to maintain the pin spacing so that the coolant can flow freely through the pin 
bundle. The wire-wrap helical pitch is 20.32 cm.  
 
 
 
 
 Barrel ID = 2.27 m
Equivalent core OD = 1.31 m
Inner Core (24) Outer Core (30)Fuel Test (6)
Primary 
Control (7)
Secondary
Control (3) Reflector (78)
Shield (48)
P
T
T
P
T
P
S
S
T
P
T
T
T
P
S
P
T
T
P
Material Test (3)
 
 
Figure II.1-1 Reference ABTR Core Configuration 
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Table II.1-1 TRU Isotopic Composition (%) 
 
 WG-Pu LWR-SF TRU 
Np-237 0.00 4.60
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
0.01 
93.81 
5.81 
0.35 
0.02
1.35
51.77
23.67
7.80
4.67
Am-241 
Am-242m 
Am-243 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
5.08
0.01
0.88
Cm-243 
Cm-244 
Cm-245 
Cm-246 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.01
0.00
 
 
A 120 cm long fission gas plenum is located above the fuel slug and sodium bond. 
The fuel assemblies are 14.198 cm across the outer hex flats and are positioned within the 
core at a 14.598 cm triangular pitch spacing with a 0.40 cm inter-assembly gap. The 80 
cm high active core starts at 98 cm from the bottom of the assembly. Immediately below 
the core is a 60 cm shield region, with the shield being an integral part of the fuel pin in 
the form of an extended fuel-pin bottom end cap.  
 
The reflector assembly contains 91 solid HT-9 pins arranged in a triangular pitch 
array. The HT-9 pin volume fraction is 76.5 % and the duct volume fraction is 7.8 %, 
yielding the total HT-9 volume fraction of 84.3 %. The shield assembly is mainly 
composed of HT-9 cladding and B4C absorber. It consists of 19 thick HT-9 tubes 
containing boron carbide pellets. The natural boron is used with a smeared B4C pellet 
density of 81%. The resulting B4C and HT-9 volume fractions are 42.3 % and 30.4 %, 
respectively. 
 
The control assemblies consist of an absorber bundle contained within a duct. The 
absorber bundle is a closely packed array of tubes containing compacted boron carbide 
pellets. The natural boron whose B-10 enrichment is 19.9 a/o is used. The pins are 
helically wrapped with wire and bundled into a triangular pitch, hexagonal pattern. The 
bundle of control rods is contained in an interior duct that channels flow through the 
bundle and protects the pins from damage as they slide within the outer fixed duct. The 
outer duct of the control rod assembly has the same external dimensions as the fuel 
assembly duct except for the nosepiece, which has unique discrimination features to 
preclude inadvertent installation into an unassigned core position. The duct directs 
coolant flow to the absorber bundle. The control system is designed to be operated with 
the absorber bundle partially inserted at all times. 
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Figure II.1-2 Fuel Assembly Schematic and Fuel Pin Cross Section 
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Table II.1-2 Assembly Design Parameters 
 
 Fuel Reflector Shield Control 
Assembly data 
− Number of pins 
− Assembly pitch, cm 
− Inter-assembly gap, cm 
− Duct outside flat-to flat distance, cm 
− Duct material 
− Duct thickness, cm 
− Gap between duct and interior duct, cm 
− Interior duct thickness, cm 
− Interior duct inside flat-to-flat distance, cm
 
217 
14.598 
0.400 
14.198 
HT9 
0.300 
- 
- 
- 
 
91 
14.598 
0.400 
14.198 
HT9 
0.300 
- 
- 
- 
 
19 
14.598 
0.400 
14.198 
HT9 
0.300 
- 
- 
- 
 
91 
14.598 
0.400 
14.198 
HT9 
0.300 
0.400 
0.300 
12.198 
Pin data 
− Pin material and type 
− Bond material 
− Overall pin length, cm 
− Pellet smeared density, % TD 
− Pellet diameter, cm  
− Cladding material 
− Clad outer diameter, cm 
− Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 
− Cladding thickness, cm 
− Wire wrap diameter, cm 
 
U-TRU-10Zr 
Na 
260.0 
75.0 
0.603 
HT9 
0.800 
1.130 
0.052 
0.103 
 
HT9-solid pin 
- 
260.0 
- 
1.405 
- 
- 
1.001 
- 
(no wire-wrap) 
 
B4C (natural B) 
He 
260.0 
81.0 
2.288 
HT9 
3.043 
1.001 
0.250 
(no wire-wrap) 
 
B4C (natural B) 
He 
260.0 
85.0 
0.895 
HT9 
1.110 
1.124 
0.070 
0.133 
Volume fraction, % 
− Fuel or Absorber 
− Bond 
− Structure 
− Coolant 
 
33.6 
11.2 
23.1 
32.1 
 
- 
- 
84.3 
15.7 
 
42.3 
9.9 
30.4 
17.3 
 
31.0 
5.5 
26.8 
36.7 
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II.1.1.2 Fuel Cycle Performance Characteristics  
 
Fuel cycle analyses were performed with the DIF3D/REBUS-3 code system [2,3].  
The region-dependent 21-group cross section set generated with the ETOE-2/MC2-
2/SDX code system [4-6] based on ENDF/B-V.2 was used. Using 3-dimensional 
hexagonal-z geometry models, equilibrium cycle analyses were performed with scattered 
loading. The material thermal expansion at operating condition was modeled by adjusting 
the hexagonal pitch, axial meshes, and the fuel and structure volume fractions 
appropriately. The irradiation-induced swelling of metal fuel was considered, and the 
bond sodium was displaced into the lower part of the fission gas plenum. Block nuclide 
depletion was performed by dividing each fuel assembly into five axial depletion zones. 
For flux calculations, the hexagonal-Z nodal diffusion theory option of DIF3D [7] was 
mainly employed. The required TRU enrichment (i.e., TRU fraction in heavy metal) was 
determined from the equilibrium cycle analysis such that the multiplication factor at the 
end of cycle (EOC) is 1.0. Enrichment zoning strategy was employed to flatten the power 
distribution, but no attempt was made yet to optimize the reactivity swing and discharge 
burnup. The fuel cycle length was estimated such that the burnup reactivity swing is 
within the reactivity control capability of the primary control system. The discharge 
burnup was determined by adjusting the fuel residence time such that the peak fast 
fluence is within the fast fluence limit of HT-9 cladding (4.0×1023 n/cm2).  
 
Linear power limits were estimated by simple thermal-hydraulic calculations based 
on a single channel model. The coolant inlet and bulk outlet temperatures were 355 °C 
and 510 °C, respectively. The average flow rate was determined such that the coolant 
temperature rise across the core is 155 °C. A chopped cosine shape was assumed for the 
axial power distribution. Hot channel factors of 2.67, 1.10, and 1.24 were used for the 
film, cladding, and coolant regions, respectively. The fresh fuel thermal conductivity was 
determined as a function of U, Pu, and Zr weight fractions using the correlation for U-Pu-
Zr fuel [8], and a porosity correction factor of 0.5 was applied to take into account the 
irradiation effects. It was noted that this metal fuel correlation significantly 
underestimates the thermal conductivity for high TRU fractions greater than 30%. The 
fuel solidus temperature was also estimated as a function of constituent mole fractions 
using the correlation for U-Pu-Zr fuel [9]. The fuel-cladding eutectic temperature was 
conservatively assumed to be 650 °C. The linear power limit was determined such that 
the peak fuel centerline temperature is lower than the fuel solidus temperature and the 
peak cladding inner-wall temperature is lower than the fuel-cladding eutectic 
temperature. 
 
The start-up core performances characteristics of the reference cores are provided in 
Table II.1-3, which were obtained from REBUS-3 equilibrium cycle calculations without 
recycling the ABTR spent fuel. As mentioned in Section II.1.1.1, WG-Pu was used as 
TRU feed for driver assemblies, while the LWR-SF TRU was used for fuel test 
assemblies. The cycle length was selected as 4 months to limit the burnup reactivity 
swing within the reactivity control capability of the seven primary control assemblies. In 
order to achieve a reasonably high discharge burnup, a 60-month fuel residence time is 
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used for the outer core drivers. The fuel residence time of inner core drivers is set to 48 
months to equalize the average discharge burnup of inner and outer core drivers 
approximately. A 15-batch fuel management scheme is used for outer core drivers, and a 
12-batch scheme is used for inner core drivers. For the simplicity of REBUS-3 
calculations, the fuel cycle management scheme for the inner core drivers was also used 
for test fuel assemblies. It is noted that the small number of drivers makes it difficult to 
achieve a reasonably high discharge burnup with a 1/6- or 1/3-core symmetry fuel 
management, thus a 1/2-core symmetry fuel management scheme was used. 
 
Table II.1-3 Start-up Cycle Performance Characteristics  
 
Cycle length, months 4 
Number of batches (inner core/outer core/test assembly) 12 / 15 / 12 
Fuel form U-Pu-10Zr 
TRU feed (fissile content, %) WG-Pu (94.2) 
TRU enrichment (inner core/outer core/test assembly), % 16.5 / 20.7 / 18.7 
Conversion ratio, fissile/TRU  0.58 / 0.65 
Initial core loading (heavy metal/TRU), MT 4.03 / 0.73 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 59.4 
Power density of active core, kW/l 258.0 
Discharge burnup (average/peak), MWd/kg 97.7 / 130.8 
Peak fast fluence, 1023n/cm2 3.25 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.20 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.53 / 1.52 
Peak linear power, kW/m 38.5 
Linear power limit, kW/m 44.0 
Core average flux, 1015n/cm2-sec 2.38 
Test assembly flux, 1015n/cm2-sec 2.84 
Fast flux fraction 0.70 
 
 
The TRU enrichments are 16.5 and 20.7% for the inner and outer core zones, 
respectively. The resulting TRU conversion ratio is 0.65, and the burnup reactivity swing 
is 1.2 %Δk over the 4-month cycle. The heavy metal and TRU loadings are 4.03 and 0.73 
metric tons, respectively. The specific power density is 59.4 kW/kg, and the power 
density is 258.0 kW/l. The core average total flux is 2.38×1015 /cm2s, and the average flux 
of the fuel test assemblies is 2.84 ×1015 /cm2s. The average discharge burnup is about 98 
MWd/kg, and the local peak discharge burnup is 131 MWd/kg. The peak fast fluence is 
3.25×1023 n/cm2, which is well within the HT-9 cladding limit of 4.0×1023 n/cm2. The 
peak linear power is within the linear power limit with a 14% margin.  
 
Table II.1-4 provides the heavy metal inventories and the mass flow rates of the start-
up core. The annual consumption rates of TRU and total heavy metal are 25.9 and 84.6 
kg, respectively. Two new outer core and two new inner core drivers are needed each 
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cycle. Since there are three cycles per year, the metal fuel production line would need to 
produce 12 new assemblies each year once the ABTR is up and running. The heavy metal 
mass per assembly is 70.1 kg, and the TRU mass per assembly is 11.6 kg for inner core 
drivers and 14.5 kg for outer core drivers. For the assumed fuel management scheme for 
fuel test assemblies, one and one-half assemblies are replaced per year on the average, 
and each test assembly contains 13.1 kg TRU.  
 
Table II.1-4 Start-up Cycle Heavy Metal Inventories and Mass Flow Rates 
 
 Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year 
Isotope BOEC EOEC charge discharge 
U-234 
U-235 
U-236 
U-238 
0.0 
5.2 
0.3 
3289.6 
0.0 
5.0 
0.4 
3270.2 
0.00 
1.52 
0.00 
768.35 
0.01 
0.84 
0.14 
710.29 
Np-237 3.6 3.6 0.89 0.88 
Pu-236 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
0.0 
1.6 
628.6 
80.2 
8.9 
4.0 
0.0 
1.7 
617.0 
83.1 
9.0 
4.0 
0.00 
0.28 
156.83 
13.74 
2.09 
0.96 
0.00 
0.56 
121.80 
22.29 
2.26 
1.03 
Am-241 
Am-242 
Am-243 
3.8 
0.1 
0.7 
3.8 
0.1 
0.8 
1.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.90 
0.05 
0.20 
Cm-242 
Cm-243 
Cm-244 
Cm-245 
Cm-246 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
 Total heavy metal 4027.2 3999.0 945.9 861.3 
Total TRU 732.0 723.4 176.0 150.1 
 
Figure II.1-3 shows the batch-average and fresh assembly power distributions 
determined by REBUS-3 equilibrium cycle calculations with scattered loading. The 
batch-average power estimates the average power of each assembly position by using a 
homogenized mix of all the burned stages of fuel. The real power of each assembly 
position varies over the fuel residence time depending on the burned stage of fuel. The 
fresh assembly power of Figure II.1-3 denotes the power of each assembly position when 
it is occupied by a fresh assembly. It is noted that the power distributions of Figure II.1-3 
were obtained from the neutronics calculations only, in which the gamma energy is 
locally deposited at the position of its creation. (Coupled neutron and gamma heating 
calculations will be performed in the future along with detailed thermal-hydraulic 
analyses.) The results show that the fuel assembly power depends on the position more 
than the burned stage. The higher assembly powers are observed near the core center. It is 
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noted that the enrichment ratio of inner core to outer core was 1.25 and was not 
optimized in this study.  
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Figure II.1-3 Batch-Average and Fresh Assembly Power Distributions (MW) 
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II.1.1.3 Kinetics Parameters and Reactivity Coefficients 
 
Kinetics parameters and reactivity coefficients of the reference core were calculated 
for the core configurations at the beginning of equilibrium cycle (BOEC) and the end of 
equilibrium cycle (EOEC). The coolant, fuel, and structure density coefficients and the 
coolant void coefficient were determined using the VARI3D perturbation code [10]; the 
linear perturbation theory option was used for density coefficients, while the exact 
perturbation theory option was employed for the coolant void coefficient. The effective 
delayed neutron fraction and prompt neutron lifetime were also calculated using the 
VARI3D code. The radial and axial expansion coefficients and the control rod worth 
were determined by direct eigenvalue differences of the base and perturbed conditions 
using the DIF3D code.  
 
Table II.1-5 shows the kinetics parameters and reactivity coefficients estimated for 
the BOEC and EOEC configurations of the reference ABTR metal core. The effective 
delayed neutron fraction (βeff) is 0.0033, and the prompt neutron lifetime is 0.33 μs. The 
radial expansion coefficient represents the reactivity effects of uniform, radial thermal 
expansion of the grid plate (SS-316) that is governed by the coolant inlet temperature. 
The axial expansion coefficient represents the reactivity effects of uniform, axial thermal 
expansion of fuel for the case that the fuel is bonded to the cladding. The radial and axial 
expansion coefficients are about -0.60 cents/°C and -0.05 cents/°C, respectively  
 
The sodium void worth and sodium density coefficient are positive because the 
positive spectral hardening effect over-weighs the negative leakage effect. However, the 
total sodium void worth is only ~1.8$, when the flowing sodium inside the assembly duct 
of all the fuel assemblies is voided in the active core and above. The Doppler coefficient 
is about -0.10 cents/°C, and the voided Doppler coefficient is about -0.07 cents/°C. The 
voided Doppler coefficient is slightly less negative than the flooded Doppler coefficient 
due to hardened neutron spectra.  
 
Table II.1-5 Kinetics Parameters and Reactivity Coefficients  
 
 Unit BOEC EOEC 
Effective delayed neutron fraction  0.0033 0.0033 
Prompt neutron lifetime  μs 0.33 0.33 
Radial expansion coefficient  cent/°C -0.59 -0.60 
Axial expansion coefficient cent/°C -0.06 -0.05 
Fuel density coefficient cent/°C -0.75 -0.76 
Structure density coefficient  cent/°C 0.03 0.03 
Sodium void worth $ 1.75 1.85 
Sodium density coefficient  cent/°C 0.03 0.03 
Doppler coefficient cent/°C -0.10 -0.10 
Sodium voided Doppler coefficient cent/°C -0.07 -0.07 
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II.1.1.4 Spent Fuel Characteristics 
 
To provide necessary data for designing the fuel-unloading machine and shielded fuel 
cask, spent fuel characteristics were estimated. Using the ORIGEN-2 code [11], the 
decay heat, photon and neutron sources were calculated for a time span from charge to 3 
years after discharge. The one-group cross sections determined from REBUS-3 
equilibrium cycle calculations were used for actinide isotopes, and the FFTF one-group 
cross section library of the ORIGEN-2 code package was used for other isotopes. It was 
confirmed that the use of the actinide cross sections derived from REBUS-3 calculations 
yields consistent depletion results between ORIGEN-2 and REBUS-3 calculations (the 
difference in the heavy metal masses at discharge burnup between ORIGEN-2 and 
REBUS-3 calculations was generally less than 1.0%).  
 
It was observed that the decay heat depends more on the TRU feed than on the 
discharge burnup. Table II.1-6 presents the decay heat of ABTR metal fuel assemblies 
depleted up to the peak discharge burnup. To estimate a bounding case, LWR-SF TRU 
feed and low conversion ratio transmutation test fuels were also considered. (The design 
and performance parameters of these transmutation fuels are discussed in Sections III.4.4 
and III.4.5.) The decay heat per assembly at discharge is about 0.23 MW, which is 
equivalent to about 5.5% of the average fission power; the LWR-SF TRU fuel yields a 
slightly higher decay heat relative to the WG-Pu fuel. Compared to the WG-Pu fuel, the 
LWR-SF TRU fuel shows a higher decay heat at charge and after a sufficient time elapse 
because of the higher content of the dominant long-lived decay heat sources (Pu-238, 
Am-241, and Cm-244). Figure II.1-4 shows the decay heat of ABTR discharged fuels as 
a function of post-irradiation decay time for the peak discharge burnup. The first two 
digits of each legend represent the TRU enrichment in percent, and the last three digits 
denote the discharge burnup in MWd/kg. The TRU enrichment denotes the round-off 
number of the values in Table II.1-6. The decay heat decreases rapidly with post-
irradiation decay time, since short-lived fission products are dominant contributors to 
decay heat.  
 
The spontaneous neutron and photon sources were evaluated for the spent metal fuel 
assembly of 24.8% LWR-SF TRU enrichment and 130.6 MWd/kg burnup, which has the 
largest decay heat. The spontaneous neutron source per assembly was about 1.32×109 /sec 
at the peak discharge burnup, and the dominant contributors were Cm-244 (55%) and 
Cm-242 (44%). The half-lives of Cm-244 and Cm-242 are 18.1 years and 162 days, 
respectively, and hence the spontaneous neutron source decreases in proportion to the 
Cm-242 decay during the time of interest for shielding design. Figure II.1-5 shows the 
energy-dependent photon sources per assembly. The photon source per assembly is about 
1.15×1018 /sec at the peak discharge burnup, but it decreases to less than 2.0 % of this 
value after one year decay, because the short-lived fission products are dominant 
contributors to the photon source (~81% at discharge). The average photon energy at the 
peak discharge burnup is ~0.33 MeV, but it varies in the range of 0.25 to 0.40 MeV 
depending on the post-irradiation time.  
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Table II.1-6 Decay Heat of Spent Fuel Assembly with Peak Discharge Burnup 
 
TRU feed WG-Pu LWR-SF TRU 
TRU Conversion ratio Medium(~0.65) 
Low 
(~0.31) 
Medium 
(~0.57) 
Low 
(~0.24) 
Charge TRU enrichment (%) 18.8 34.9 24.8 46.7 
Discharge burnup (MWd/kg) 130.8 130.8 130.6 130.5 
Initial HM/TRU mass per assembly (kg) 70.1/13.2 34.5/12.0 70.1/17.4 34.5/16.1
Fuel residence time (EFPD) 2202 1086 2197 1087 
Decay heat fraction of rated power (%) 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.5 
Fresh fuel 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.34 
0 day 223.8 218.8 230.5 226.4 
1 day 11.0 20.2 25.8 25 
1 month 6.4 5.9 9.8 10.2 
2 month 4.7 4.2 7.8 8.1 
1 year 1.7 1.3 2.9 2.7 
2 year 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.4 
Decay heat  
per assembly 
(kW) 
Time after 
discharge 
3 year 0.6 0.4 1.2 0.9 
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Figure II.1-4 Decay Heat of Spent Fuel  
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Figure II.1-5 Photon Source Spectrum of Spent Fuel  
(24.8% LWR-SF TRU Enrichment and 130.6 MWd/kg Burnup) 
 
II.1.2 Upper Internals Structure 
 
The upper internals structure (UIS) is a package of hardware suspended from the 
rotatable plug to about 3 in. above the core assemblies. The functions of the UIS are to: 
 
1. Support shroud tubes containing the primary and secondary control rod 
drivelines; 
2. Preserve critical alignments between these drivelines and the core lattice, under 
normal and off-normal (including seismic) conditions; 
3. Route and support thermocouples for temperature surveillance of core 
assemblies; 
4. Route and support other instrumentation such as loose-parts monitors and 
delayed-neutron sampling stations; 
5. Produce sufficient coolant mixing to mitigate thermal transients to downstream 
components; 
6. Provide an opening for the In-Vessel Fuel Handling Machine to access inner core 
positions without interfering with the control rod drive lines and the upper core 
instrumentation package. 
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In the present design, outlet thermocouples cover most of the fuel assemblies, and 
some of the reflector assemblies, and no shield assemblies. Instrument posts of several 
different geometric configurations are needed when the requirement exists to monitor all 
heat generating core assemblies. When this requirement is relaxed, however, instrument 
posts can be dispensed with. In addition to the obvious cost reduction, this is an important 
design change because thermal striping studies on the CRBR UIS have shown the 
instrument posts to be the components most vulnerable to thermal fatigue under steady 
state operating conditions. Additional thermal striping tests are needed for confirmation, 
but at this time it is believed that the elimination of instrument posts could allow the 
entire UIS to be constructed of austenitic stainless steel. 
 
Figure II.1-6 illustrates the present reference UIS design. The outer boundary is an 
1.3 meter diameter shroud (essentially the outside diameter of the core assemblies) with 
large-hole penetrations over part of its length. The penetrations release the core effluent 
horizontally to the hot pool from which it travels upward and then to the inlets of the two 
IHXs. Within the shroud are ten 4 in. outer diameter control rod shroud tubes. Three 
inches is the nominal gap between the core assemblies and the bottom of the shroud tubes 
and UIS shroud. The shroud tubes are perforated for the release of coolant to the hot pool 
at an elevation close to the free surface. The radial position of the shroud tubes is fixed by 
at least three horizontal guide plates, welded to the UIS shroud. The lower guide plate is 
close to the core assemblies and is perforated to permit about 85% of the core effluent to 
reach the region between guide plates. The balance either goes up the shroud tubes or 
leaks through the 3 in. peripheral gap. In the region between guide plates are located five 
loose-parts monitors (high-temperature submersible microphones attached to the outside 
of selected shroud tubes) and delayed neutron sampling stations attached to all shroud 
tubes. The latter are part of the failed element detection and location (FEDAL) 
system. With minimal horizontal mixing of core effluent upstream of the sampling 
stations, it is expected that the location of a badly breached fuel element can be 
coarsely identified by the relative signal strengths from these sampling stations. Flow 
tests are necessary to better establish the expected performance of this part of the 
FEDAL system. 
 
The upper guide plate is not perforated except for clearances at the 10 shroud 
penetrations to permit sliding due to differential thermal expansion. The upper 
guide plate is located high within the upper internal structure. Thus, almost all of the 
core effluent is forced to enter the hot pool at least 4 ft below the nominal hot pool 
operating level. This should meet the objective of maintaining a quiet entrainment-
free surface. If future flow tests reveal an undesirable degree of surface agitation, 
the upper guide plate can be dished, concave downward, to further suppress any 
upward flow vectors of sodium leaving the UIS. 
 
Core assembly outlet sodium temperature is monitored by chromel-alumel, 
stainless steel sheathed, ungrounded thermocouples. These thermocouples are 
replaceable and installed in helium-filled wells. The thermocouple wells are positioned 3 
in. above the centerline of adjacent fuel assemblies. The outside surface of the control rod 
shroud tubes serves also to support the delayed neutron sampling lines and the leads and 
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oxygen vent lines for the loose parts-monitoring microphones. In the stagnant zone above 
the upper guide plate, all of these instrument lines are gathered into six instrument 
conduits which penetrate the rotatable plug. 
 
 
 
Figure II.1-6 Schematic of Upper Internal Structure 
 
The UIS design provides backup mechanical hold-down protection, even though this 
is not considered a design requirement. In the event of a hydraulic liftoff of a fuel or 
internal blanket assembly, due to a non-mechanistic failure of the hydraulic hold-down 
system, the assembly would be stopped in 3 in. by the bottom of a shroud or dummy 
shroud tube if the assembly in question is one of the assemblies that are instrumented. 
Any of the others would be stopped by the middle guide plate. Radial reflectors and 
radial shield assemblies have a sufficiently low pressure drop that their liftoff is 
precluded by dead weight. 
 
Aside from being a convenient shape to support surveillance thermocouples, the 
funnel-shaped lower ends of the control rod shroud tubes capture part of the coolant from 
the adjacent assemblies. The drivelines are exposed to this effluent for most of their 
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length, before the coolant is released to the hot pool through holes near the top of the 
shroud tubes. In a hypothetical unprotected loss-of-flow transient, it is expected that this 
hot effluent will cause some beneficial insertion of absorber material into the core by 
thermal expansion of the drivelines. 
 
II.1.3 Lower Internals Structure 
 
The lower internals structure consists of the core barrel, core grid, and the inlet 
plenum structure. The entire assembly is supported on the core support structure as 
shown in Figure II.1-7. 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.1-7 Schematic of Lower Internal Structure 
 
The lower internals structure supports the reactor inlet plenum, the core 
assemblies, the fixed radial shielding, the core barrel, the redan, and various shields, 
brackets and baffles. It is designed to withstand seismic events with acceptable 
stresses and deflections. The lower internals structure contains the inlet coolant 
flow distribution system that controls the rate of flow to the core assemblies. This 
distribution system consists of a doughnut-shaped manifold, or torus, and associated 
  36
 
ducts/piping, that encircles the inlet coolant plenum. For the baseline EM pump 
configuration, the pumps plug directly into the torus. For the mechanical pump 
configuration, the four pumps connect to pipes that are supported by the lower internals 
structure. A total of 12 short, smaller pipes distribute the coolant from the torus into the 
inlet plenum. This plenum or grid assembly currently contains a high pressure plenum 
only. 
 
II.1.4 Core Restraint System 
 
The core restraint system consists of distributed passive hardware features which, 
acting together, must meet the following functional requirements: 
 
1. Establish the positions of the individual core assemblies in the horizontal plane; 
2. Control horizontal movements of core assemblies arising from thermal expansion 
effects, irradiation-induced swelling, and irradiation-enhanced creep, in such a 
way that reactivity effects are acceptable and control rod driveline alignments are 
maintained within specified tolerances; 
3. Accommodate horizontal seismic motions within alignment and stress 
specifications; and  
4. Maintain sufficient clearances in the horizontal plane to allow for fuel handling 
within specified vertical withdrawal and insertion force limits. 
 
The design choices representing the major decisions in the design of a passive core 
restraint system are: 
 
1. Length and stiffness of the core assembly lower adapters; 
2. Lower Internals Structure interface with the core assembly lower adapters -- 
clearances, seals, and number of support points (1 or 2); 
3. Number, location, configuration and height of the core assembly load pads; 
4. Rigidity of the peripheral boundary -- stiff radial shield assemblies or a rigid, 
shaped, core former ring attached to the core barrel; 
5. Allowable vertical core assembly insertion and withdrawal loads. 
 
The major challenge in core restraint design is to find the "design window" which 
contains sufficient clearance for fuel handling (even when core assemblies are bowed due 
to swelling and creep effects) and sufficient tightness or stiffness for adequate radial-
position control. The thermal contraction produced by the cooldown to refueling 
conditions is very important in creating this window of design feasibility. The tool used 
in core restraint design is the NUBOW-3D computer code. It calculates the elastic and 
inelastic effects on the shape of individual core assemblies in a three-dimensional 
representation of the whole core or typical sector thereof, the reactivity effects associated 
with short-or long-term movements from one set of equilibrium positions to another, and 
the side loads at all contact points. Under refueling conditions, the sum of these side 
loads, times the coefficient of friction yields the required initial withdrawal force over 
and above the dead weight. 
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The two core restraint system design strategies are referred to as the "limited free 
bow" approach and the "free-flowering core." The first, used in FFTF and CRBR, 
employs a short lower adapter horizontally restrained in the lower internals structure 
(LIS) at one point (the lower end), and rigid core formers at the two elevations of core 
assembly load pads -- one near the top end and one about 4 in. above the fueled zone. The 
second, used in EBR-II, Phenix and SuperPhenix, employs a long lower adapter 
horizontally restrained in the LIS at two points, and the "fence" of stiff and essentially 
isothermal radial shield assemblies constitutes the peripheral restraint. 
 
The ABTR design borrows features from both approaches. The relatively long lower 
adapter fits into a cylindrical perforated sleeve in the inlet plenum. A ball-and-cone seat 
at the transition from the cylindrical lower adapter to the hexagonal duct provides the 
coolant seal, load support, and a positive horizontal restraint point. Close clearance 
between the bottom of the lower adapter and the lower internal structure sleeve provides 
limited-movement horizontal restraint. 
 
A rigid core former ring at the elevation of the top load pads provides positive 
peripheral restraint. The ring has enough clearance, relative to a tight array of assemblies, 
to permit removal and replacement of individual assemblies by the in-vessel transfer 
machine (IVTM), yet is tight enough so that the freedom of assemblies to move does not 
have adverse reactivity or alignment implications. The inner diameter of the ring is 
shaped so as to achieve flush contact with the outermost assemblies. The core former ring 
is welded to the inner diameter of the core barrel, to which the Upper Internals Structure 
is attached during operation with a system of retractable keys, thus assuring control and 
safety rod drive-train alignments. Each core assembly is equipped with a second load pad 
centered 4 in. above the fueled zone of the reactor, but no peripheral core former ring is 
present at this elevation. Normally the core assemblies contact one another only at the 
two load pads, which completely circumscribe the hexagonal ducts. The duct is 5.590 in. 
across flats and the lattice pitch (also the hot across-flat dimension of the load-pads) is 
5.747 in. The 0.157 in. clearance between ducts is provided to prevent general contact at 
end of life due to swelling, creep (rounding of the flats), and differential bowing, but the 
adequacy of this clearance needs to be confirmed by analysis. 
 
The IVTM, described elsewhere, has certain capabilities important to meeting the 
functional requirements of the core restraint system. The gripper assembly contains a 
"holddown and spreader" feature which facilitates fuel handling even when the core 
assemblies are distorted. The holddown provision prevents inadvertent lifting of any of 
the six assemblies surrounding the one being removed. The spreader feature, pioneered in 
EBR-II, has proven very useful in concentrating available clearances to the immediate 
vicinity of the core assembly being removed or the hexagonal hole into which a new 
assembly is being inserted. All components of the IVTM, and the core assemblies 
themselves, have ample margin beyond the planned administrative limit on 
insertion/withdrawal forces of greater than 1000 lb. excluding dead weight. 
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II.1.5 Reactivity Control and Shutdown System  
 
As mentioned in Section II.1.1, two independent safety-grade reactivity control 
systems were employed: a primary and a secondary system. The primary system is 
required to have sufficient reactivity worth to bring the reactor from any operating 
condition to cold sub-critical at the refueling temperature with the most reactive control 
assembly stuck at the full power operating position. Any operating condition means an 
overpower condition together with a reactivity fault. The maximum worth of a control 
assembly is used as the base of this reactivity fault. The primary system also serves to 
compensate for the reactivity effects of the fuel burnup and axial growth of metal fuel. 
The reactivity associated with uncertainties in criticality and fissile loading is 
accommodated by the primary control system. 
 
The secondary system is required to shut down the reactor from any operating 
condition to the hot standby condition, also with the most reactive assembly inoperative. 
It does not have to duplicate the primary system capability to hold down the excess 
reactivity for the fuel cycle since this excess reactivity is not additional reactivity to be 
overridden at an accident. Although the secondary system must shut down the reactor 
without insertion of the primary control assemblies, it is not necessary to assume that the 
primary assemblies are removed from the core during an accident situation. Since 
reactivity uncertainties are accommodated by the primary system, they are not a part of 
the secondary system requirements. However, the reactivity fault is included in the 
secondary system requirements since the secondary system should override the 
uncontrollable withdrawal of one primary control assembly that is being used for burnup 
control. 
 
The reactivity control requirements include the axial expansion effect and 
temperature defect. The fuel axial growth is expansion with fuel burnup resulting from 
the accumulation of fission products. A 5% axial swelling was assumed for metal fuel. 
Temperature defect is the reactivity change from hot full power critical to zero-power 
refueling temperature. The calculated temperature and power defects are summarized in 
Table II.1-7. The refueling temperature was conservatively assumed 205 °C. 
 
Table II.1-7 Temperature and Power Defects ($)  
 
Hot full power to hot standby Hot standby to cold shutdown 
Contribution 
BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Doppler  0.18 0.18 0.14 0.15 
Axial expansion  0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 
Radial expansion  0.46 0.47 0.89 0.90 
Sodium density -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Total  0.66 0.67 1.08 1.09 
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The reactivity worth was calculated for various combinations of control assemblies 
inserted, and one stuck-rod worth was estimated for each control assembly. The 
maximum single rod reactivity faults were also estimated from the reactivity worth 
curves of primary system control assemblies. To account for the interaction effects of 
control assemblies, the maximum worth of each control assembly was determined by 
withdrawing it from the configuration where all the primary or secondary control 
assemblies are inserted. Table II.1-8 presents the calculated control assembly worth for 
various combinations of control assemblies. Among the primary control assemblies, the 
central control assembly has the largest worth because of higher neutron flux in the core 
center. The estimated worth of the central assembly is ~8$.  
 
Table II.1-8 Control Rod Worth ($)  
 
 Number of 
inserted CRs BOEC EOEC 
Primary System 
- Central rod 
- All CR’s in 5th row 
- Central and 5 CR’s in 5th row 
- All primary rods 
 
1 
6 
6 
7 
6.53
15.95
20.32
23.52
 
6.62 
16.18 
20.61 
23.87 
Secondary System 
- 2 CR’s in 3rd row 
- All secondary rods 
 
2 
3 
10.53
16.38
 
10.68 
16.61 
One Stuck Rod Worth 
- Central rod 
- One of 5th row 
- One of 3rd row 
 
 
7.58
3.21
5.84
 
7.68 
3.26 
5.93 
 
 
Figures II.1-8 and II.1-9 show the primary system reactivity worth curves at BOEC 
and EOEC. The solid curve denotes the core reactivity as a function of control rod tip 
position from the bottom of the active core for the case where all the primary control 
assemblies are moving together. At the full power operating condition, only the fuel cycle 
excess reactivity is held down by the primary control system. As indicated by the dashed 
vertical line, the critical control rod position is 63.4 cm from the bottom of the active 
core. The dashed curve indicates the reactivity worth of the most reactive control 
assembly, which is the central assembly. The reactivity addition by the complete 
withdrawal of the central control assembly is 0.90$. In order to limit the transient over-
power initiator, it is necessary to reduce the central control rod worth or to introduce 
some means to limit the magnitude of rod withdrawal or the rod withdrawal speed. For 
example, the PRISM design introduced a rod stop system to limit the maximum 
withdrawal worth to 0.3$, and the FFTF used a control circuit that limits the rod 
withdrawal speed to 9.8 inch/min. 
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Figure II.1-8 Reactivity Worth of Primary Control System at BOEC 
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Figure II.1-9 Reactivity Worth of  Primary Control System at EOEC 
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 Table II.1-9 summarizes the reactivity worth requirements for both primary and 
secondary control systems. The estimated temperature and power defect from hot full 
power to cold shutdown at BOEC is 1.74$. The overpower margin is allocated to permit 
the reactor to operate at 115% of the rated power, which is equivalent to 15% of the 
power defect. The fuel cycle excess reactivity is 3.77$. Since the fuel cycle analysis was 
performed with expanded core geometry, the reactivity associated with the axial fuel 
growth is added at BOEC. The uncertainties consist of 20% of total temperature defect, 
30% of total burnup reactivity, 20% of fuel axial growth, and an assumption of 1.00$ 
each for criticality prediction and fissile loading (tolerance for manufacture uncertainty). 
The total uncertainty is obtained by statistically combining all the uncertainties.  
 
Table II.1-9 Reactivity Control Requirements ($) 
 
Primary system Secondary system 
 
BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Temperature defect 
 - Full power to hot standby 
 - Hot standby to refueling 
1.74 
      0.66 
      1.08 
1.75 
      0.67 
      1.09 
0.66 
      0.66 
 
0.67 
      0.67 
 
Overpower margin (15%) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Fuel cycle excess reactivity 
 - Burnup reactivity 
 - Fuel axial growth 
3.77 
      3.58 
      0.19 
   
Uncertainties (RMS) 
 - Temperature defect (20%) 
 - Burnup reactivity (30%) 
 - Fuel axial growth (20%) 
 - Criticality prediction  
 - Fissile loading 
1.81 
      0.35 
      1.08 
      0.04 
      1.00 
      1.00 
1.46 
      0.35 
      0.00 
 
      1.00 
      1.00 
  
Reactivity fault 0.90   0.90   
Total 8.32 3.31 1.66 0.77 
 
In Table II.1-10, the reactivity control requirements are compared with the available 
reactivity worth of the control systems. The shutdown margins of the primary and 
secondary systems were determined with the assumption that the most reactive assembly 
is stuck. The shutdown margin of the primary system is 7.63$ at BOEC and 12.88$ at 
EOEC; the shutdown margins are more than adequate. These results suggest that the 
central assembly could be removed to reduce the transient over-power initiator. Simple 
estimation based on the values in Table II.1-8 showed that the shutdown margin of the 
primary system without the central assembly would be ~4.5$ at BOEC and ~9.5$ at 
EOEC.   
 
The control-rod driveline expansion coefficients for reactivity feedback were 
estimated from Figures II.1-6 and II.1-7. Control rod expansion coefficients are governed 
principally by the total rod worth and the insertion depth of the rods. The calculated 
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control-rod expansion coefficients are 30.9 cents/cm at BOEC and 14.5 cents/cm at 
EOEC. 
 
Table II.1-10 Reactivity Control Requirements and Available Reactivity Worth 
 
Primary system Secondary system  BOC EOC BOC EOC 
Number of control assemblies 7 7 3 3 
Reactivity worth of system ($) 23.52  23.87  16.38  16.61  
Worth of 1 stuck assembly ($) 7.58  7.68  5.84  5.93  
Reactivity worth available ($) 15.95  16.18  10.53  10.68  
Maximum requirement ($) 8.32 3.31  1.66 0.77  
Shutdown margin ($) 7.63  12.88  8.87  9.92  
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II.2 Reactor Enclosure System 
II.2.1 Reactor Vessel 
The reactor vessel contains essentially the entire inventory of the radioactive primary 
sodium coolant. It also provides support for the reactor core support structure, redan, 
thermal barriers, shielding and other internal structures. There are no penetrations in the 
reactor vessel; all equipment -- IHXs, pumps, piping, instrumentation, cold traps, fuel 
handling ports, and other components -- penetrate the primary coolant system enclosure 
through the top deck structure. The arrangement is shown in Figures II.2-1 and II.2-2. 
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RING
AIR INTAKE
SUPPLY RING
 
 
Figure II.2-1 Vertical View of Primary System 
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Figure II.2-2 Plan View of the Primary System 
 
The reactor vessel is constructed of austenitic stainless steel. It has an inside diameter 
of 18.3 ft and wall thickness of approximately 2 inches. The overall height of the vessel is 
about 44 ft from its bottom to the top of the deck. The bottom head consists of a 
torospherical shell. The vessel is suspended at its top flange from the same conical 
support skirt which provides support for the deck. The skirt provides separation between 
the reactor vessel and the guard vessel and contains several access ports to permit 
periodic inspection of the area and to provide access to the annulus between the reactor 
vessel and the guard vessel. The reactor vessel is fastened to the support skirt. This detail 
is employed to avoid the structural bi-metallic weld which would otherwise be required 
between the reactor vessel and deck structure. Shear keys are provided at the support 
flange connection to resist seismic loadings. 
 
A major design consideration with most pool reactor vessels results from the 
temperature distribution in the upper (support skirt) region of the vessel. This thermal 
condition arises because the upper part of the vessel is exposed either to the outlet sodium 
temperature (hot pool) or, at least, the cooler inlet sodium, while the top of the vessel 
(support flange) is much closer to room temperature. Many designs employ active 
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cooling of the vessel wall or thermal baffles, or a combination of these. The reference 
design in this study attempts to eliminate, or greatly reduce, this problem by minimizing 
the amount of vessel exposure to the hot, outlet sodium pool. This is done by minimizing 
the surface area of the hot sodium exposed to the reactor vessel and employing a thermal 
baffle. The special shape and configuration of the redan structure and reactor vessel 
baffles described in Sections II.2.5 and II.2.6, respectively, provide these features. 
 
The height of the reactor vessel is established from the fuel assembly length, the 
intermediate heat exchanger length, and the need to keep the intermediate heat exchanger 
inlet covered by sodium during a leak of the reactor vessel where sodium would drain 
into the guard vessel. The “faulted” primary sodium level is indicated in Figure II.2-1. 
The diameter of the reactor vessel is established from the core diameter and IHX 
characteristics with respect to sodium hydraulic and heat transfer requirements and the 
requirement to be able to remove the primary components, such as the IHX, primary 
sodium pumps, and direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) heat exchangers. 
The reactor vessel and its cover are designed to the requirements of the ASME B&PV 
Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NH for the combined loads of the entire volume 
of primary sodium, the primary system equipment, and the core support structure. In 
addition, the design will meet ASME B&PV Code requirements for normal and transient 
thermal loads as well as loads and displacement resulting from design basis earthquakes.  
 
The reactor vessel assembly is designed to: 
 
1. Accommodate high static loads at design temperatures. 
2. Minimize the dead load deflections and thermal bowing of the reactor vessel and 
its cover to facilitate equipment alignment. 
3. Provide a type of structure which can be erected on site to stringent tolerance 
requirements. 
4. Ensure symmetrical radial thermal expansion of the primary tank about the 
vertical center of the entire primary tank assembly. 
 
The reactor vessel contains the reactor core, entire primary coolant, intermediate heat 
exchangers, primary (electromagnetic or mechanical) pumps, DRACS heat exchangers, 
and internal structures. The diameter and overall height of the reactor vessel are 4.6m and 
14.8m, respectively. The reactor vessel and guard vessel are made of austenitic stainless 
steel.  The complete reactor vessel assembly is located below grade in a steel-lined 
concrete cavity of the reactor containment building. The reactor vessel and its cover 
constitute the primary structural boundary that envelopes and supports the reactor core, 
primary sodium coolant, reactor cover gas, auxiliary core components, primary sodium 
pumps, IHXs, and other associated reactor equipment. In addition to providing the 
primary structural boundary, support and containment, the reactor vessel and reactor 
vessel enclosure provide internal and interfacing equipment alignment features. All 
penetrations into the reactor vessel are through the top cover. There is an inert gas (argon) 
blanket between the reactor vessel cover and the bulk sodium free surface.  
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II.2.2 Reactor Vessel Enclosure 
 
The reactor vessel enclosure forms the top closure for the reactor vessel. It supports 
the primary pumps, intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs), cold traps, rotatable plug, the 
direct reactor auxiliary system heat exchangers, and other equipment. The rotatable plug, 
in turn, supports the upper internal structure, in-vessel fuel handling equipment, and the 
control rod drivelines, as well as various instruments needed to monitor inside the reactor 
vessel. 
 
The reactor vessel enclosure is constructed of austenitic stainless steel. The 
enclosure, along with the reactor vessel, is supported by the conical support skirt that 
transfers the entire weight of the enclosure and the reactor vessel to the concrete support 
structure, as illustrated in Figure II.2-3. The enclosure is bolted to the reactor vessel and 
there are seals welded around the interface between the enclosure and the reactor vessel 
to eliminate the release of cover gases through the reactor vessel/enclosure interface. 
 
The reactor vessel enclosure is a solid piece of stainless steel about 10 inches in 
thickness. It is 21.7 feet in outer diameter. Openings are machined in the cover for those 
primary systems components that penetrate through to the primary vessel, such as the 
components mentioned above. Nozzles are welded to these openings that provide support 
for the primary system components and a location for sealing the components to the 
vessel enclosure. Reflective thermal insulation is attached to the bottom of the reactor 
vessel enclosure to reduce the amount of heat being conducted through the enclosure 
itself. Fiberglass insulation is added above the cover to reduce the amount of heat lost to 
the surrounding concrete.  
 
The reactor vessel enclosure fulfills several important functions. These are: 
 
1. The reactor vessel and some portion of the enclosure form the primary coolant 
boundary, and contain all of the radioactive materials produced by the reactor 
during operation. These materials include the sodium coolant and any gaseous or 
solid radioactive materials released from the fuel elements due to cladding failure. 
2. Provides support for two IHXs, four primary pumps, four DRACS heat 
exchangers, two cold traps, the rotatable plug, and various other equipment and 
instrumentation. A gas tight seal is provided between the enclosure and all 
penetrations. 
3. Provides sufficient stiffness to limit the vertical deformation during the safe 
shutdown earthquake (SSE) to a very small number (TBD). 
4. Minimize heat loss to the inside of the reactor building. 
5. Provide adequate rigidity to meet alignment needs for the primary sodium pumps, 
intermediate heat exchangers, rotatable plug, and the upper internal structure. 
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Figure II.2-3 Reactor vessel cover and reactor vessel support skirt 
 
II.2.3 Rotatable Plug 
 
 The principal function of the rotatable plug is to serve as part of the fuel 
handling system. Their number and their size depend largely on the type of other 
components in the fuel handling chain. Specifically, the type of in-vessel transfer 
machine (IVTM) and the location of the fuel transfer point determine the distance 
of lateral movement that the rotatable plugs have to provide. After consideration of 
various options, the fuel handling system described in Section II.7 was chosen. This 
system uses a pantograph-style IVTM, and a transfer point to the vertical fuel 
unloading machine that is located on the reactor vessel enclosure just radially 
outside the rotatable plug. Thus the rotatable plug in concert with the pantograph 
in-vessel fuel handling machine has to provide a lateral movement that covers a 
circle of 8 ft diameter. Further requirements affecting the rotatable plug size are 
derived from the reactor control drive pattern and the upper internals structure 
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(UIS) design. In order to provide the most favorable control drive pattern, the 
option of having a "split" control area has been discarded. Similarly, the "splitting" 
of the UIS presents serious structural and seismic problems.  
 Design features regarding shielding arrangements and the interfaces among the 
rotatable plugs are essentially the same as described for the reactor vessel 
enclosure. The plug has a stressed-skin box-beam structure and contains 12 in. of 
magnetite concrete shielding. The underside of each plug has steel shielding and 
reflective sandwich insulation. Plug interfaces are provided with elastomer seals. The 
UIS is attached to the bottom of the rotatable plug. 
 
 The rotatable plug supports the vertical push-pull IVTM. 
 
The rotatable plug incorporates devices for locking its positions during reactor 
operation, and devices against lift-off due to excessive reactor vessel pressures. 
Equipment associated with, or part of the rotatable plug requires a variety of services--
connections for electricity, control, instrumentation, inert gas etc., that are provided via 
the festoon cable system. 
II.2.4 Guard Vessel 
 
 The guard vessel provides the secondary containment for the primary sodium in the 
very unlikely event that the reactor vessel develops a leak. The guard vessel is sized such 
that the gap (8.5 inches) between it and the reactor vessel is: 
 
1. Wide enough to accommodate in-service inspection devices 
2. Narrow enough to prevent the primary sodium from dropping to an unacceptable 
level within the reactor vessel if the reactor vessel should develop a leak.  The 
sodium level must remain high enough to keep the IHX inlet covered to provide a 
path for natural convection cooling of the core during a leak in the reactor vessel. 
 
 The guard vessel is constructed of austenitic stainless steel. If carbon steel were 
acceptable, it would facilitate the use of magnetically-operated remote devices needed to 
carry out the periodic in-service inspection (ISI) required for the reactor vessel and 
associated structures and components. With austenitic stainless steel, the equipment used 
for ISI would require use of friction or scissors-like devices to scan the entire outer 
surface of the reactor vessel.  
 
Insulation is provided on the exterior of the guard vessel to reduce the heat lost to the 
guard vessel cooling system. A guard cooling shroud is provided on the outside of the 
insulation that forces air to flow around the supporting concrete structure and up over the 
guard vessel insulation to prevent overheating of the concrete support structure during 
normal and off-normal conditions. 
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II.2.5 Redan 
The core barrel and redan assembly, illustrated in Figure II.2-4 is a single integrated 
unit that provides the internal structure for the reactor core assemblies and provides a 
barrier between the hot and cold sodium pools. The core barrel is a right circular cylinder 
fabricated from stainless steel. It is attached to the inlet plenum and lower support 
structure. It also provides support for the core restraint system.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.2-4 Schematic of Redan Structure 
 
The redan is a single integrated unit that separates the hot pool from the cold pool, 
and provides for communication of the hot sodium from the discharge of the reactor core 
to the inlet of the intermediate heat exchanger.  It consists of multiple plates welded 
together that form a contoured shape around the intermediate heat exchangers and the 
upper internal structure.  
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The intermediate heat exchangers and upper internal structure are located within the 
redan. The primary pumps and DRACS heat exchangers are located outside the redan in 
the cold pool. The redan contains the hot sodium from the core outlet and helps to 
minimize leakage from the hot sodium to the cold sodium sides of the redan.  
 
The redan is supported vertically by the lower internal structure and seal welded to 
the core barrel. The redan is one of the permanent structures within the primary reactor 
vessel. A mechanical labyrinth seal between the IHX and redan reduces the leakage of 
hot primary sodium from the hot pool into the cold pool. 
 
II.2.6 Core Support Structure 
 
The core support structure, shown in Figure II.2-5, provides support for the lower 
internals structure, the core assemblies, the core barrel assembly, the primary sodium 
inlet pipes, brackets, and baffles. It is designed to the requirements of the ASME B&PV 
Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NG, Core Support Structures. The core support 
structure consists of a steel web structure that is formed to the contours of the reactor 
vessel bottom head and becomes an integral part of the reactor vessel. All core support 
structure components are under compression, therefore there is no need for performing 
ISI on these components. 
 
Primary Vessel
Bottom Head
Inlet Plenum
Structure
Inlet Sodium
Pipe
Core Support
Structure
Core Grid
Core
Core Assembly
 
Figure II.2-5 Core Support Structure 
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II.2.7 Reactor Containment Boundary 
 
The ABTR primary containment boundary is comprised of the reactor vessel, reactor 
vessel enclosure, the tubes in the intermediate heat exchanger and in the direct reactor 
auxiliary heat exchanger, and the sodium purification piping and components. These 
components maintain the containment for the primary radioactive sodium and form the 
first containment boundary. This initial boundary also includes the instrument thimbles 
and the cover gas piping system.  
 
If this first boundary is breached, then the next secondary confinement is composed 
of the reactor guard vessel, the reactor containment, the intermediate sodium piping and 
sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers, the direct reactor auxiliary cooling system intermediate 
piping and systems, the stainless steel-lined compartments around the reactor vessel 
support, the purification system cell confinement, and the reactor building (which is 
maintained at a negative pressure with HEPA-filtered ventilation).  
 
If there is a breach in a thimble or cover gas system, the gas operates at a slightly 
higher pressure than the sodium and therefore, there will be no release of sodium to the 
environment. The reactor building always operates at a negative pressure compared to the 
outside environment. All effluents are filtered via high-efficiency particulate air filters 
before they are released into the environment.  
 
II.2.8 Integrity of Primary Coolant Boundary 
 
It has been postulated that a structural failure or leak which would develop in the 
reactor vessel could prove to be a major economic setback. The purpose of this 
discussion is to show that current, proven technology can be applied to ensure a leak-tight 
primary coolant boundary over the plant lifetime, reducing the probability of such a leak 
occurring to a very low level. 
 
In the pool-type design, the reactor and the entire radioactive primary coolant are 
contained in a single reactor vessel. This arrangement results in a direct and simple 
containment for the primary sodium, with no penetrations in the reactor vessel wall below 
the primary sodium surface. The ABTR design avoids, wherever possible, the use of 
dissimilar materials and the oftentimes difficult welding techniques associated with these 
dissimilar materials.  
 
The surrounding environment of sodium is common to all of the primary system 
components, which mitigates pipe (duct) expansion stresses and minimizes effects of pipe 
leaks. A very high level of structural and leak-tight integrity of the reactor vessel and its 
surrounding guard vessel is achieved with the use of both proven design features and 
intrinsic characteristics of the sodium system. This basic foundation is supported by 
established fabrication, field construction, and quality control procedures, comprehensive 
testing plus inspections and finally, regular in-service monitoring and surveillance. 
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Inherent characteristics of the sodium system that mitigate potential challenges to the 
reactor vessel include non-corrosiveness of sodium to structural materials. The operating 
pressure of the bulk sodium is very low, generally limited to the hydrostatic head of 
sodium. This leads to low stresses in the reactor vessel structure and permits large design 
margins and the use of thin-walled plates for fabrication which, in turn, enhances the 
reliability of nondestructive examination methods which may be used for in-service 
inspection. 
 
To ensure system safety, design features are included, such as the backup guard 
vessel, that give unimpaired capability for removal of reactor decay heat in the event of 
reactor vessel leakage. 
 
Design features that promote the integrity of both the reactor vessel and the guard 
vessel are viable due to the following basic characteristics of the pool-type arrangement: 
 
1. There are no attachments or penetrations in the shells and bottom head of either 
the reactor vessel or the guard vessel, except for the core support structure. 
2. The vessels have simple geometries, e.g., right circular cylinders and smooth, 
curved bottom heads. 
3. The core support structure is attached to the bottom head of the reactor vessel 
with a set of formed steel webs contoured to the shape of the reactor vessel 
bottom head. This eliminates welds at points of high stress. 
 
In addition, the austenitic stainless steel material, used throughout the reactor vessel 
assembly (with the possible exception of the guard vessel), has several favorable 
characteristics: 
 
1. Excellent compatibility with the sodium coolant. 
2. Excellent ductility/toughness properties, even at total neutron fluences higher than 
expected at the reactor vessel boundaries. 
3. No appreciable high temperature aging degradation with a primary sodium 
coolant temperature of about 510ºC. 
4. Excellent weldability. 
5. High fracture toughness prevents rapid crack propagation and makes a leak-
before-break strategy feasible. 
 
Another unique feature is that the reactor vessel is interfaced with the cold pool, 
which results in a low and approximately constant temperature for the reactor vessel wall, 
and for the guard vessel as well.  This approach has two very important benefits: 
 
1. The reactor vessel temperature is almost always at the low sodium-inlet 
temperature (about 355 to 410EC) except for the upper sections of the reactor 
vessel which sees the increased temperature of the hot sodium pool. 
2.   Deleterious effects of large and frequent temperature transients are avoided by 
maintaining this temperature relatively constant. 
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With regard to radiation damage, adequate shielding in the core barrel as well as the 
distance to the reactor vessel wall results in total neutron fluences well below any level 
which would be of concern during the 60 year design life for the plant. 
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II.3 Primary Heat Transport System 
II.3.1 System Requirements and Description 
 
 The basic function of the primary heat transport system (PHTS) is to transport heat 
from the reactor to the intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) under normal and off-
normal operating conditions. The arrangement of the PHTS is shown in Figures II.2-1 
and II.2-2. 
 
 The PHTS consists of four primary pumps, two intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs) 
and expansion joints between the pumps and the reactor inlet plenum. The four pumps 
and two IHXs are located symmetrically around the reactor. The four pumps are located 
in the cold pool between the redan and the reactor vessel. Each of the two IHXs is located 
within the redan and penetrates through the redan from the hot pool to the cold pool. 
Each of the IHX plena is open to the reactor vessel cover gas at the top and each is closed 
at the bottom by a seal. The sodium level in the plena around each IHX is essentially the 
same as in the main redan. Thus, the IHXs have no primary piping associated with them; 
the hot primary sodium enters the IHX inlet through openings in the IHX shell and is 
discharged to the cold region at the bottom of the IHX. 
 
In this pool configuration the pumps as well as the IHXs are supported from the 
reactor vessel deck which is maintained near ambient temperature. The flexible seal 
between each IHX and the redan accommodates thermal and seismic motions. The 
flexible coupling between the discharge of each pump and the reactor inlet plenum which 
is fixed to the lower core support structure accommodates thermal and seismic motions. 
The flexible coupling is designed to accommodate the small amount of differential 
thermal expansion between the pump and the lower support structure, including the 
differential thermal expansion of these items from shutdown to full power conditions. 
 
A total sodium flow of 107 lbs/hr removes the heat from the core and passes into the 
upper plenum at an average temperature of 510°C. The core effluent mixes with the hot 
sodium in the plenum and flows up into the redan to two IHXs. Approximately 125 
MWt of heat is transferred from the primary to the secondary coolant in each IHX. 
The primary sodium leaves the IHX at 355°C and enters the cold pool region of the 
reactor vessel. Four pumps take the sodium from the cold pool and discharge it 
through inlet piping to the inlet plenum below the reactor core. 
 
The PHTS must satisfy all normal and off-normal conditions specified in the duty 
cycle for the plant. In addition to full power 4-loop operation, the PHTS must provide 
heat removal for 50% power operation when only one IHTS loop is available or 75% 
when one primary pump is out-of-service. The system, along with the core and the IHX, 
is arranged to remove decay heat under natural circulation conditions. Maintainability 
and inspectability are important considerations in the design of the PHTS. 
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II.3.2 Primary Sodium Pump  
 
  Both mechanical and electromagnetic (EM) pumps can be adopted for the ABTR. In 
the ABTR design, the location of the suction of the primary pump is critical to ensure 
sodium circulation under a variety of operating conditions.  In addition, the diameter of 
the pump is an important parameter, since it affects the diameter of the reactor vessel. 
Although there are many different types of mechanical pumps, only centrifugal 
pumps have been used in the sodium cooled fast reactors and therefore are considered as 
the primary candidate.  Similarly, annular linear induction pumps (ALIPs) are considered 
as the primary candidate for the EM pump option.   
II.3.2.1 Mechanical pump 
 
In general, mechanical pumps have a longer history than that of EM pumps.  
Development of mechanical pumps specifically for the sodium cooled reactor application 
started with EBR-I, in which a 500 gpm mechanical pump was used to pump NaK.  Since 
then, essentially all sodium cooled fast reactors have utilized mechanical pumps for the 
primary system, although some EM pumps were used in the secondary systems. 
 
Mechanical pumps have the following advantages over EM pumps:   
1. Mature technology, 
2. High efficiency (70-85 % for those used in nuclear reactors). 
However, mechanical pumps have the following inherent disadvantages when 
compared to EM pumps:  
1. Moving parts are involved, 
2. Expected to be more prone to cavitation, 
3. Need of bearings, 
4. Need of seals for rotating shaft, 
5. Need of penetration through the reactor vessel for rotating shaft, 
6. The existence of a Na/cover gas interface somewhere along the length of the 
rotating shaft, 
7. Only vertical installation is practical. 
 
The operating experience indicates that hydrodynamic and hydrostatic bearings in 
liquid sodium have become less of a problem [1]. Operations of BOR-60, BN-350, and 
BN-600 showed that wear in the bearing was virtually absent and replacements were not 
needed within several tens of thousands of hours of operation.  The single factor 
requiring periodic maintenance that necessitates removal of the pump internals is erosion 
of the impeller due to cavitation for BN-350 and BN-600 [2].   
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The EBR-II mechanical pumps experienced shaft binding after less than 200 hrs of 
operation. Rubbing had occurred between the shaft and lower labyrinth seal.  Although 
the initial cause was not definitely established, possible causes include insufficient initial 
clearance and warping of the shaft prior to operation [3-4].  In FFTF, thermal shock 
deformed the sodium bearing housing, causing a rotation problem.  Other rotation 
problems were caused by condensation of sodium between the shaft and the thermal 
shields and deformation of the shaft due to a non-uniform circumferential temperature 
distribution in the shaft.   
 
In Rapsodie, reduction of the gaps in the sodium bearing due to thermal shock 
produced a rotation problem.  In Phenix, two causes of rotation problems were a failed 
shaft sleeve due to thermal transients and a shifting of the bearing parts. In PFR, the 
separation of the surface of the sodium bearing caused a rotation problem. 
 
In BN-350, condensation of sodium vapor in the narrow gaps hindered start-up of the 
primary pump after long downtime due to incorrect estimate of component temperatures.  
Also, cavitation damage of impellers was reported.  At the end of the reactor lifetime, the 
pump repair interval was extended, due to maturity of sodium technology, to about 10 
years.  In BN-600, during the initial period of operation, several problems relating to 
failures of the primary and secondary pumps due to their increased vibration, shaft 
fissuring, coupler damage, and non-reliable drive performance were experienced.  
Although all problems were later successfully resolved, replacement of the pump shafts 
was required.  In BOR-60, although one primary mechanical pump was replaced due to 
high vibration caused by inappropriate thermal treatment of the shaft components during 
fabrication, maximum operation time for primary and secondary mechanical pumps was 
impressive: 220,000 and 180,000 hrs, respectively [5].  
 
The long history of the mechanical pumps in sodium cooled fast reactors indicates 
that although some minor maintenance would be required on a periodic basis, the overall 
reliability has been demonstrated and the mechanical pump would be a logical choice for 
the ABTR as well. 
 
However, one potential issue unique for the ABTR is that the ABTR reactor vessel is 
much longer than vessels of other previously developed pool type reactors. This is 
schematically illustrated in Figure II.3-1, and the actual design data are summarized in 
Table II.3-1. 
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Figure II.3-1 Schematic comparison of pool type reactor vessels 
 
Table II.3-1 Dimensions for various pool type reactor vessels 
 
Reactor Diameter, m Height, m H/D ratio 
EBR-II 7.92 7.92 1.00 
Phenix 11.82 12.00 1.02 
SuperPhenix 21.00 17.30 0.82 
PFR 12.20 15.20 1.25 
BN-600 12.86 12.60 0.98 
PRISM 9.07 19.35 2.13 
ABTR 5.57 13.37 2.40 
 
This fact drives the mechanical pumps for the ABTR to be longer than the other 
pumps.  In fact, values for the ratio of the pump length to the pump diameter for several 
mechanical pumps used in the above pool type reactors are between approximately 5 and 
6, however, the L/D ratio for the mechanical pump preliminarily designed for the ABTR 
is approximately 15, as compared in Table III.3-2, possibly making satisfactory 
performance of the pump much more difficult to achieve.  The calculational procedure to 
obtain these pump dimensions for an ABTR pump is presented in Section III.1.1.   
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Table III.3-2 Dimensions of mechanical pump for various pool type reactors 
 
         
Reactor 
Flowrate, 
m3/min 
Pump 
head, MPa 
Pump 
diameter, m 
Pump 
length, m 
L/D 
ratio 
EBR-II 19.0 0.54 1.28 6.88 5.4 
PFR 70.7 0.73 1.91 10.80 5.7 
Phenix 67.2 0.70 1.32 8.10 6.1 
SuperPhenix 300.0 0.55 2.50 14.89 6.0 
ABTR 22.1 0.76 0.53 7.85 14.8 
 
As described in Section III.1.1, the mechanical pump was designed using a series of 
nomographs developed by Byron Jackson [6]. In the first nomograph, the specific speed 
and rotation speed are determined.  In the second nomograph, the required power is 
determined.  Then, in the third nomograph, the shaft diameter is determined.  In the 
fourth nomograph, the pump case diameter, which is related to the impeller diameter, is 
determined.  In the fifth nomograph the size of the pump outer barrel is determined, 
however, for the pool type configuration, the outer barrel is not used and the pump casing 
is suspended directly in the pool of Na.  Finally in the sixth nomograph, the suction and 
discharge nozzle diameters are determined.  This procedure estimates only the diameter 
of the pump.  The length of the pump can be estimated from another consideration, 
namely the submergence depth to be greater than 0.9-1.2 m to prevent vortexing [7].  A 
summary of input data is presented in Figure II.3-2. 
 
 
Figure II.3-2 Input data for mechanical pump design nomograph 
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The resulting design parameters are summarized in Table II.3-3, and the ABTR 
mechanical pump is schematically compared with that of EBR-II in Figure III.3-3. 
 
Table III.3-3 Mechanical pump design parameters 
 
Flow rate, m3/s 0.369 
Pump head, psig 110 
Power, kW 336 
Efficiency, % 83.46 
Pump length, m 6.45 
Pump diameter, m 0.533 
Suction nozzle diameter, m 0.406 
Discharge nozzle diameter, m 0.305 
Drive motor length, m 1.4 
Drive motor diameter, m 0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.3-3 Schematic comparison of ABTR and EBR-II pumps 
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II.3.2.2 Electromagnetic Pump 
 
 The first application of EM pump in sodium cooled fast reactor goes back to the 
nuclear powered submarine Seawolf, which used four flat linear induction pumps (FLIPs) 
rated at 3,300 gpm at 85 psi.  These 4 units were operated at 43 % efficiency for 10,000 
hours of maintenance free operation.  The EBR-II used 5000 gpm and 6500 gpm FLIP 
units in the intermediate heat transport system. Although the operating history was 
satisfactory, the pump duct developed fatigue cracks after 1,385 hours of operation.  They 
were caused by low inlet pressure and electrically induced pressure pulsation [3].  In 
DFR, 24 linear induction pumps were used as primary pumps. In BR-10, mechanical 
pumps were replaced with EM pumps, whose reported lifetime was 170,000 hours 
without any major repairs [7].  Among the many different types of EM pump designs, the 
EM pump type most favored for use in reactor systems is the annular linear induction 
pump (ALIP) type.  Electromagnetic pump’s advantages over mechanical pump are as 
follows: 
1. Design using no penetration through the boundary between working fluid and 
ambient, thus a design without seals is possible, 
2. No moving parts are involved, 
3. Installation in any orientation is possible. 
On the other hand, EM pumps have some disadvantages over mechanical pumps. 
1. Lower pumping efficiency (~40 %), 
2. Lesser reactor plant experience, especially for large EM pumps. 
A known issue is that large scale EM pumps tend to cause flow instability.  This topic 
is still being studied; however, the instability may be avoided by selecting the right 
operating parameters [8].  In addition, although no experience of using a large EM pump 
in the nuclear reactor exists, recently an EM pump with a capacity of 160 m3/min (42,267 
gpm) at 280 kPa (40.6 psi) has tested for 2,550 hrs and confirmed applicability of the EM 
pump in the nuclear plants [9]. 
Traditionally, electrical insulators and magnetic materials in ALIPs limited the 
operating temperature of the pump.  Until recently, ALIPs for liquid sodium service 
usually required external cooling to maintain acceptable temperatures in electrical 
insulators and magnetic materials; and removed thermal energy was wasted.  However, 
recent development of high temperature insulators and magnetic materials that can 
operate at as high as 700oC allows operation of EM pumps using those components at 
temperatures as high as 350oC without any cooling [9-11]. This means the ALIPs 
immersed in a pool type reactor can utilize almost 100% of the input power provided to 
the pumps, making low pumping efficiency of the ALIPs less important.  The impact on 
the overall plant efficiency due to the differences in pumping efficiency between 
mechanical and EM pumps is estimated to be only 0.4 % [12].  However, as shown by the 
history of EM pump development depicted in Figure II.3-4, the important developments 
occurred only recently and there exists no experience with ALIPs in sodium primary       
system.   
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Figure II.3-4 History of EM pump development 
 
The ALIP shown in Figure II.3-5 is a standard design obtained using a code 
developed at ANL.  The code is based on the calculational scheme originally developed 
to estimate the performance of various ALIPs, for example, for the EBR-II and TREAT. 
An annular linear induction pump that can be calculated using the current code is a single 
stator design.  A single stator ALIP comprises a core, coolant passage (or duct), coolant 
duct wall, stator core, and coils (see Figure II.3-5).  For the ABTR, however, the pump of 
choice is a return type and includes the return duct that is placed outside of the stator.  All 
magnetic core pieces are assumed to be made of a magnetic material with high saturation 
value, such as Permendur 2V or other cobalt alloy.  Since the coolant bulk outlet 
temperature is 510oC, typical stainless steel can be used for the coolant ducts.  The 
conductor part of the coil is made of copper.  The electrical insulation around the 
conductor is made of mica tape backed with alumina cloth and inorganic silicone-base 
binder, the state of art electrical insulation for high temperature applications.  Integrity of 
a similar coil was experimentally demonstrated at elevated temperatures up to 800oC.   
Similar coils were also used in a large sodium-immersed self-cooled ALIP [9].   
In this design, the magnetic structures do not need to be thermally insulated from the 
coolant duct, due to the low coolant temperature that is well below the curie point of 
Permendur 2V (940oC) [11]. In fact, the coolant duct serves as the heat sink, since some 
of input energy is thermally dissipated as losses within the ALIP during operation and 
needs to be removed to avoid overheating of various components.  Since this thermal 
energy is transferred to the coolant, these thermal losses in the ALIP are completely 
recovered in the system. 
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Figure II.3-5 Schematic of a single stator ALIP 
 
The EM code described in Section III.1.2 does not include end effects, which 
degrade the efficiency of ALIPs [13].  However, for large ALIPs with a large number of 
poles, thus a large number of coils, sufficient tailoring of magnetic field at the ends of the 
pump can be easily achieved without altering the performance of a majority of the coils, 
yielding insignificant pump performance degradation [13].  In addition to the end effect, 
the skin effect will attenuate the electromagnetic field in the coolant, thus reducing the 
performance of the large scale ALIPs, unless a double stator design is employed [12], 
however, the current design code does not include the details of the skin effect.  A 
schematic of a typical double stator ALIP is shown in Figure II.3-6.  
Figure II.3-6It should be noted that the combination of the attenuation of the 
electromagnetic field due to the skin effect and increase of the electromagnetic field due 
to the cylindrical configuration is somewhat balanced, which means that the net effect 
depends on the size of the pump and could be very small [14].  These effects will be 
investigated for more details in future work.  Also noted is that since the ALIP for the 
ABTR must have both inlet and outlet at the bottom of the pump (return configuration), 
the internal hydrodynamic pressure drop of the pump is assumed twice that for a straight 
design ALIP in the code.   
Important inputs for the code are the flow rate, pressure head, the length of the 
pump, various duct dimensions (wall thicknesses), and input voltage.  For the flow rate 
and pressure head inputs, the nominal values for the ABTR design are used.  Based on 
these inputs, the code calculates all other dimensions and parameters for the best 
efficiency.  The calculated parameters include dimensions of the inner core, the duct gap 
size, and the stator assembly including number of coils and poles, mass of each 
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component, and performance parameters including input power, dissipated power in 
components, and efficiency.  Also obtained is the optimum drive frequency.  
 
 
Figure II.3-6 Schematic of a double stator ALIP 
 
Several calculations showed that most heat dissipation occurs in the coolant, duct 
wall, and coils.  This fact allows us to construct a simple 1-D thermal model to 
conservatively estimate the critical temperatures, such as maximum wall and coil 
temperatures to ensure safe operation of the ALIP.  This thermal model is integrated with 
the code for calculating the pump performance. The geometry for the thermal model is 
illustrated in Figure II.3-7.  
 
Figure II.3-7 Heat generations in the ALIP 
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In this thermal model, only radial heat flow is assumed and the outside surface of the 
ALIP is assumed to be thermally insulated for simplicity and assuring conservative 
estimation.  Bulk thermal conductivity of the coil is estimated from the dimensions of the 
coil, thermal conductivity of the coil (copper), and that of insulator (mica). 
For the ABTR, the diameter of the pump is limited to 0.6 m, so that the ALIP can be 
installed in the opening for the mechanical pump designed in the previous section.  The 
key design parameters for the EM pump are summarized in Table II.3-4. (Additional 
detailed data are presented in Section III.1.2. 
 
Table II.3-4 EM pump design parameters 
Power, kW 609 
Efficiency, % 46 
Mass, kg  2271 
Number of Poles 14 
Number of Coils 42 
Temperature, oC 355 
Flow Rate, m3/s 0.369 
Discharge Pressure, psig 110 
Length, m 2.4 
Pump Diameter, m 0.585 
 
II.3.3 Intermediate Heat Exchanger  
 
The intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs) transfer heat from the radioactive sodium 
coolant in the primary heat transport system to the nonradioactive sodium coolant in the 
intermediate heat transport system.  Two sodium-to-sodium heat exchangers rated at 125 
MWt each are used to transfer the 250 MWt core power at full-power conditions 
corresponding to core inlet and outlet temperatures of 355 and 510˚C, respectively.   
 
There are several factors that are important in the evaluation of the overall IHX 
design.  These factors include material of construction, tube configuration (straight vs. 
bent), shell vs. tube-side primary flow, elevation of the IHX within the primary system, 
shape of the IHX (in plan view), primary flow-side pressure drop (i.e., low pressure loss 
is needed to ensure adequate natural convection primary sodium flow during loss-of-flow 
events), and the possible inclusion of a second internal coil near the upper region of the 
IHX to serve as a shutdown heat removal system. The various design choices that have 
been made, along with the underlying rationale for these choices, are described below. 
 
The heat exchanger arrangement selected is a shell-and-tube counter-current flow 
arrangement with the primary flow on the shell-side, and secondary sodium flow on the 
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tube side. Major features of these heat exchangers are graphically depicted in Figure II.3-
8, while key design information is provided in Table II.3-5.  The tube-side secondary 
flow was selected to simplify cleaning of the heat exchanger tubes in the event of a leak 
in the CO2 Brayton cycle system.  Moreover, this configuration maximizes the ability of 
the IHX to accommodate any pressure transients that may arise if a secondary heat 
exchanger tube were to rupture, since for a given tube wall thickness the tubing is much 
stronger in tension (internal pressure source) versus compression (external pressure 
source). 
        
 
Top View 
End View  
(Flattened for Clarity)  
Face View  
40.6 cm OD 
Downcomer  
7.5 cm Thick 
Tube Sheets 
Shell Side Exit 
Nozzles (36 cm)  
55.9 cm OD 
Annular Riser 
Bellows  
Baffle Plates  
(50 % Cut, 45 % 
Perforation)  
Tube Bank  
(1.59 cm OD, 2.23 
cm Triangular Pitch) 
Shell Side 
Entrance Windows 
(20 cm Diameter)  
Shell Side 
Annular Return 
Gap (10 cm)  
 
Figure II.3.-8 Intermediate Heat Exchanger Design 
 
The installation of the IHXs inside the reactor vessel is illustrated in Figure II.3-9.  
Each unit is vertically suspended from two rigid pipes that are welded to the IHX shroud.  
These pipes extend upward from the hot pool and are welded to the underside of a 
removable integral plug in the reactor vessel head.  The IHXs pass through horizontal 
plate sections of the redan, which is contoured (in plan view) to accommodate the 
kidney-shaped IHX design that has been selected to minimize the reactor vessel diameter.   
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 Table II.3.-5 Intermediate Heat Exchanger Design Parameters 
 
Heat transfer capacity 125 MWt 
Thermal design margin +10% 
Heat transfer area 634 m2 
Primary sodium temperature, inlet/outlet 510/355 ˚C 
Primary sodium mass flowrate 628 kg/s 
Secondary sodium temperature, inlet/outlet 333/488 ˚C 
Secondary side sodium mass flowrate 628 kg/s 
Tube outer diameter 1.59cm  
Tube wall thickness  0.889 mm 
Tube pitch 2.23 cm 
Active Tube Length 3.85 m 
Number of tubes 3300 
Tube sheet – area 1.42 m2 
Tube sheet – thickness 75 mm 
Downcomer piping – OD 40.6 cm 
Downcomer piping – thickness 12.7 mm 
Downcomer piping – length 10.8 m 
Outlet piping – OD 55.9 cm 
Outlet piping – thickness 12.7 mm 
Outlet piping – length 6.6 m 
Shell (primary) side pressure drop 12.6 kPa 
Tube (secondary) side pressure drop 5.7 kPa 
Shell height 4.84 m 
Shell outside circumference 4.35 m 
Shell thickness 19 mm 
Cross-sectional area 1.5 m2 
Tube material 9Cr-1Mo  
 
 
Primary sodium enters the shell side of each IHX through a series of 20 cm diameter 
circular openings in the shell approximately 30 cm below the upper tube sheet.  These 
openings allow sodium from the hot plenum to enter the IHX with minimal head loss. 
Also, introduction of the sodium below the upper tube sheet minimizes the thermal shock 
to this relatively thick component during transients.  The sodium then flows downward 
through the shell and vents through a 10 cm wide gap around the lower tube sheet that 
leads to the two parallel 36 cm diameter exit nozzles that discharge directly into the cold 
pool.  
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Figure II.3-9 Illustration of IHX Installation inside the Reactor Vessel  
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The IHX shell contains a seal where it seats on the horizontal deck of the redan to 
prevent sodium bypass from the hot to cold pools.  Minor leakage of these seals is 
permissible.  As shown in Figure II.3-8, the shell side includes a series of horizontally 
mounted, disk and donut-type baffle plates uniformly spaced at 64 cm intervals along the 
length of the tube bank. Aside from providing lateral support for the tubes, these plates 
promote cross-flow and mixing that enhances thermal performance on the shell (primary) 
side.  The plates are made from 6.4 mm steel plate and occlude 50 % of the vertical flow 
path at each plate location.  As shown Table II.3-5, the plates are orificed (45 % 
equivalent porosity) to reduce flow pressure drop; a schematic showing the orifice design 
is provided in Figure II.3-10.  This approach is similar to that used in the GE PRISM 
Mod B IHX design.    
 
 
TUBE SUPPORT PLATE
TUBE DIAMETER, D
FLOW HOLE DIAMETER, D
TUBE PITCH, P
AA
h
 
 
Figure II.3-10 Plan View of Orifice Baffle Plate Design 
 
As shown in Figure II.3-8, cold intermediate sodium enters the IHX through a central 
44.6 cm downcomer.  The downcomer delivers the cold sodium through the lower tube 
sheet into a header manifold, where it then turns 180º and rises through the tube bank in 
counter current flow to the shell side primary sodium.  The hot intermediate sodium exits 
the tubes into an upper header manifold, and then flows through an annular riser which is 
concentric to the downcomer.  The downcomer is double walled with an annular gap for 
thermal insulation between the hot and cold streams.  As shown in Figure II.3-8, both the 
downcomer and the 55.9 cm OD annular riser pipes are equipped with bellows just above 
the shroud to accommodate any differences in thermal expansion between the piping and 
the body of the IHX itself (each unit is rigidly attached to the removable plug in the 
reactor vessel head).  The upper tube sheet is welded to the shroud, while the lower tube 
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sheet floats.  Thus, the design accommodates differential thermal expansion within the 
tube bank also. 
 
The inner wall of the shell operates near the bulk temperature of the sodium in the hot 
plenum.  Since primary sodium flow is on the shell side of the IHX, there is no need for 
an insulating annulus to eliminate heat losses to the bulk sodium or to alleviate high 
thermal stresses in the shell.   
 
Modified 9Cr-1Mo steel was chosen as the material of construction primarily because 
the thermal conductivity is higher than that of the austenitic steels such as Type 304 
stainless steel.  Since the heat transfer in sodium-to-sodium heat exchangers can be 
dominated by the tube wall thermal resistance, using modified 9Cr-1Mo steel results in 
considerable reduction in the required heat transfer area. The use of Type 304 stainless 
steel tubes would result in the need for as much as 20% more heat transfer area as 
compared to modified 9Cr-1Mo tubes with the same design characteristics.  In addition, 
modified 9Cr-1Mo has a lower thermal expansion coefficient compared to Type 304 
stainless steel.  The higher thermal conductivity material results in lower temperature 
differences in component sections and, coupled with the reduced thermal expansion, 
results in lower thermal stresses in structural members.  This is advantageous during 
thermal transients.  Straight tubes are selected to simplify fabrication and reduce flow 
induced vibration problems.   
 
The design of the IHX has been selected such that the primary flow of sodium on the 
shell side provides a low pressure drop.  Low pressure drop on the primary side is 
important from two viewpoints: 1) minimizing the pressure-related structural 
requirements for the IHX shell, and 2) promoting the ability to establish natural 
circulation of the primary sodium in the case of a loss-of-flow event.  Adequate natural 
convection flow for shutdown heat removal is essential. One key element of the DRACS 
shutdown heat removal system relies on natural circulation of the primary sodium 
through the core and IHX to the sodium pool surrounding the core barrel.  Thus, the IHX 
has been sized and positioned to locate the primary sodium inlet below the faulted 
sodium level (primary sodium leak from the primary vessel to the annulus between it and 
the guard vessel).  
 
Aside from the overall thermal-hydraulic design of the IHXs, additional analysis is 
needed to verify that the thermal stresses in various regions of these units will remain 
below acceptable levels to ensure that the plant design lifetime requirement can be met 
without undue risk of stress-related failure(s).  Furthermore, shielding may need to be 
incorporated into the design if calculations indicate excessive activation of the secondary 
sodium by virtue of the close proximity of the IHXs to the core.   
 
Note that as part of the design process, a set of parametric thermal-hydraulic 
calculations were performed that formed the technical basis for sizing of these units so 
that they would fit inside the available space between the redan and reactor vessel inner 
surface, while achieving the desired 125 MWt rating.  In addition, a specialized model 
was developed in order to accurately evaluate flow pressure drop on the shell side of the 
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IHX, including the effect of the orificed baffle plates.  These various design calculations 
are documented in Section III.8.    
 
II.3.4 Internal Piping 
 
There is very little primary piping within the reactor vessel assembly for either the 
mechanical or electromagnetic pump applications. If the electromagnetic pump is 
adopted as the primary pump, there is no internal piping within the reactor vessel. The 
discharge of the EM pump flows into an articulated coupling that connects the EM pump 
to the inlet plenum structure. If the mechanical pump option is adopted as the primary 
pump, it is expected that the coolant that flows through the pump will flow into a multi-
pipe header that connects the articulated coupling to the inlet plenum structure. This 
primary piping would consist of a main header for each pump with multiple pipes leading 
from each pump header into the inlet plenum structure.   The main header is connected to 
a flexible coupling. The other end of the internal piping is welded to the core inlet 
plenum. 
 
Each primary piping assembly is supported to take the appropriate mechanical, 
thermal and hydraulic loads.  The pump hangs from the reactor vessel enclosure and is 
connected to the inlet plenum or inlet pipe header (depending upon pump application) by 
a special, nonrigid, easily disconnected, low leakage articulated coupling. This articulated 
core inlet pipe coupling is shown in Figure II.3-11.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.3-11 Articulated Core Inlet Pipe Coupling 
Bellows
26.00" OD
Ball Joint
Spring
Assembly
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The flexible coupling allows lateral and vertical movement without losing metal-to-
metal contact and accommodates relative displacements between the pump and the inlet 
plenum. The coupling has a slip joint to extend or retract the coupling length with a ball 
joint at the bottom end. The ball joint at the bottom end is unattached and connects with 
the mating seat on the reactor core vessel inlet plenum.  During installation, the pump is 
lowered vertically into the reactor vessel. When the bottom ball joint contacts with the 
mating seat on the inlet plenum, the coupling is compressed, creating spring pressure in 
the coupling. The spring pressure maintains the coupling in position and seals the ball 
joint against the mating joint of the inlet plenum.  
 
The coupling allows the pump to be removed or installed without cutting the inlet 
interface. The coupling can permit some leakage but must provide flexibility to 
accommodate thermal movements, be sufficiently stable to avoid flow induced 
vibrations, and accommodate seismic loads.  No valves or movable flow control devices 
are part of the inlet piping or flexible coupling.  Pipe insulation is not required. 
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II.4 Intermediate Heat Transport System 
II.4.1 System Requirements and Description 
 
The intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) circulates secondary sodium coolant, 
transporting heat from the radioactive sodium in the primary heat transport system 
(PHTS) to the power generation system.  Currently, both supercritical CO2 (S-CO2) 
Brayton and Rankine steam cycle power generation systems are under consideration for 
the ABTR.  Note that the IHTS description provided in this section is based on the 
reference S-CO2 power conversion system.  However, the piping layout would be similar 
for a steam system, with the exception that the printed circuit heat exchangers (PCHEs) 
for the Brayton cycle would be replaced with steam generators for the Rankine cycle.  
 
The IHTS is composed of two completely independent loops, as shown in Figure II.4-
1.  This figure shows the plan view of the piping runs to the secondary PCHEs.  The 
flowrate through both loops is controlled to maintain the primary sodium coolant 
temperature at design operation conditions.  With the exception of the short pipe runs of 
the hot and cold sodium piping connected to the IHX and running from the IHX to the 
PCHEs, the entire IHTS is contained within the S-CO2 generation facility that is part of 
the reactor building. 
 
 
PURIFICATION
SYSTEM
INSTRUMENT
PORT
AUXILIARY
HEATERS(5)
IHX (4)
DRACS (4)
PUMPS (4)
Dump Tanks 
PCHEs 
 
 
Figure II.4-1 Plan View of IHTS Layout 
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The secondary sodium exits the upper portion of the IHX after being heated to 488˚C.  
The sodium then exits the reactor containment and traverses the short distance to the 
adjacent S-CO2 production facility inside the reactor building.  Here, the hot sodium 
enters the bottom of the PCHEs and transfers heat to the S-CO2 before exiting at the top 
of these units.  After exiting at the top of the heat exchangers, the secondary sodium 
circulates to the intermediate electromagnetic (EM) pump where it is pumped back to the 
reactor containment and cold side of the IHX.  The tube walls of the IHX constitute the 
principal barrier for isolation of the activated primary sodium from the sodium in the 
secondary system.  In the unlikely event of an IHX tube leak, sodium leakage will occur 
from the IHTS to the PHTS due to the fact that the secondary system is maintained at a 
pressure of at least 0.6 bar (8.5 psig) in excess of the primary system.  The excess 
pressure is due to sodium hydrostatic head (~7.1 m) that is provided by the higher 
elevation of the secondary loop relative to the primary loop (see Figure II.4-2). Radiation 
detectors on the outlet (hot leg) piping from the IHX monitor for indications of 
contamination of the secondary loop sodium. 
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Fuel Handling
Machine
IHX
AIR EXHAUST
RING
AIR INTAKE
SUPPLY RING
312.03 m
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0.8 m O.D.
Dump Tank 
Hot  Leg 
PCHEs 
Cold Leg 
 
 
 
Figure II.4-2 Elevation View of IHTS Layout 
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Major components in each of the two loops include the EM pump, PCHE, sodium 
storage tank, and the piping connecting these components to each as well as the IHX and 
PCHE.  Design details of the IHX and PCHE units are provided in Sections II.3.3 and 
II.5.1, respectively.  Details regarding the balance of key system components are 
provided below. 
 
Auxiliary systems that connect to the IHTS main loop that are necessary to achieve 
operational requirements include a circulating sodium purification system, trace heating, 
thermal insulation, and instrumentation that monitors key system parameters including 
flowrate (with permanently installed magnetic flowmeter in each cold leg), and 
temperature differential across the IHTS (with thermocouples installed at the PCHE inlet 
and outlet legs). 
II.4.2 Intermediate Sodium Pump 
 
      One sodium pump is used in each IHTS loop.  Each unit is a vertically mounted, 
double stator, EM pump design.  The pump operates in the cold leg at nominally 326 ˚C.  
       
The pump installation location is shown in the plant elevation view provided in 
Figure II.4-2, while design details are summarized in Table II.4-1.  The pump design is 
very similar to the reference primary EM pump (see Section II.3.2), which minimizes the 
developmental requirements for ABTR.  Flowrate through the pump is modulated by 
adjusting the drive voltage and frequency for continuous flow control over the design 
range.   
 
As in previous designs, each pump is installed in a tank with the piping inlet and exits 
at the top and bottom of the tank, respectively.  Both pumps are completely separate so 
that the two IHTS loops can be operated independently to produce the desired operational 
characteristics. 
 
Each pump is self-cooled by transfer of waste heat from electrical heat losses in the 
stators directly to the IHTS sodium.  Since all waste heat is transferred to the intermediate 
sodium, overall efficiency is increased.  This increase is not factored into the calculated 
overall pump efficiency of nominally 40 % that is shown in Table II.4-1. 
 
As noted earlier, the overall pump design is quite similar to the primary EM pump.  
However, motor-generator sets to provide flow coast down capability are not required for 
these units, as opposed to the primary system pumps. 
 
II.4.3 IHTS Piping 
 
The IHTS piping consists primarily of the main system hot and cold legs which make 
the necessary connections between the IHX and the PCHE.  The hot leg piping connects 
to the secondary sodium outlet of the IHX directly to the PCHE sodium inlet.  The IHTS 
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cold leg piping connects the sodium outlet from the PCHE to the EM pump tank inlet and 
then from the pump tank discharge to the secondary cold sodium inlet to the IHX.   
 
 
Table II.4-1 Intermediate Sodium EM Pump Characteristics 
    
Flow rate 0.738 m3/s 
Pump head  0.21 MPa 
Power 406 kW 
Efficiency 37.58 % 
Drive voltage 560 V 
Drive current per phase 579 A 
Drive frequency 17 Hz 
Number of poles 6 
Number of coils 18 
Mass 2531 kg 
Pump height (length) 1.8 m 
Pump diameter 0.807 m 
Inner core - inner diameter 0.140 m 
Inner core - outer diameter 0.21 m 
Duct - inner diameter 0.385 m 
Duct - outer diameter 0.39 m 
Material 304 SS 
    
 
The IHTS piping is constructed from 40.6 cm OD, 1.27 cm thick-walled (16 inch 
Schedule 30) 304 stainless steel piping, primarily because of the lack of corrosion issues 
for sodium and the ease of fabrication with this material.  The use of this piping diameter 
and schedule maintains the sodium flow velocity through the secondary piping system 
below ~ 7 m/sec (actual value is 6.5 m/sec at full power conditions), which is a rule-of-
thumb design criterion for these types of systems.  The use of 304 stainless steel requires 
dissimilar metal welds connecting the austenitic Type 304 stainless steel to the ferritic 
steels used in the IHX.  The welding technology for joining these dissimilar metals is 
well established. 
   
Inside the reactor building, the IHTS piping is enclosed in secondary piping so that in 
the unlikely event of failure of the main system piping, the sodium is contained which 
greatly reduces the possibility of a major sodium leak.  In addition, the reactor building 
containing the IHTS is seismically isolated on the same platform as the reactor itself, 
which eliminates differential motions between these two structures during seismic events. 
This simplifies the design for piping hangers and supports that would otherwise need to 
be equipped with snubbers or other motion-dampening devices if the reactor building 
were not integral to the nuclear island. 
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II.4.4 IHTS Sodium Storage Tank, Expansion Tank, and Cleanup 
System 
 
A small secondary loop is included in the IHTS to maintain sodium volume and to 
provide a purification pathway for the secondary sodium.  The loop supplies sodium from 
a cold trap to the EM pump tank to maintain a constant level of sodium in the IHTS loop.  
The recirculation system uses a fill and overflow approach to maintain the sodium level 
constant.  Spillover into the EM pump tank overflow line flows through the secondary 
piping to the storage tank.  Sodium is then pumped from the storage tank by a small 
recirculation pump through interconnecting piping to the cold trap.  After circulating 
through the trap, the sodium circulates back to the pump tank. 
 
The circulating sodium to the storage tank keeps the tank at system temperature 
during normal operations.  When flow is not available, trace heating is used to keep 
system components above the sodium freezing point. 
 
Pressurized argon cover gas is maintained in the pump tank upper plenum.  
Subsystems must also be provided to control the argon cover gas pressure and supply.  
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II.5 Power Conversion System 
 
II.5.1 Supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle  
II.5.1.1 Supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle Arrangement 
 
The reference power conversion system consists of a Brayton cycle utilizing 
supercritical carbon dioxide (S-CO2) as the working fluid.  The S-CO2 Brayton cycle 
avoids the sodium-water reaction problem that the design and licensing safety evaluation 
must deal with for the conventional Rankine steam cycle.  However, the technology for 
the S-CO2 Brayton cycle is less well developed that that for the Rankine steam cycle. 
 
The S-CO2 Brayton cycle is an innovative power conversion technology for nuclear 
reactors having potential benefits above and beyond gas (e.g., helium) Brayton cycles or 
Rankine steam cycles operating at the same reactor core outlet temperature.  The S-CO2 
Brayton cycle has been under development for several years in the U.S., Japan, Korea, 
and France because it offers significantly improved thermal efficiency as well as reduced 
turbomachinery costs.  The current Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative 
Energy Conversion Program plans to design, assemble, and operate a small-scale (e.g., ~ 
1 MWt heat input) demonstration of the S-CO2 Brayton cycle; two vendors are currently 
investigating approaches to a demonstration. 
 
The benefits of the S-CO2 Brayton cycle follow from the high supercritical carbon 
dioxide density and low work to compress S-CO2 immediately above the critical point 
(Pcrit = 7.377 MPa, Tcrit = 30.98 °C, ρcrit = 468 Kg/m3).  However, the rapid variation in 
thermophysical properties near the critical point impacts the cycle arrangement (i.e., the 
flow split between heat rejection and direct recompression) as well as compressor design, 
recuperator design, and cooler design.  
 
The S-CO2 Brayton cycle is selected as an alternative power converter for the ABTR 
for several reasons including the following: 
 
• Elimination of the potential for energetic sodium-water interactions which result 
in the formation of combustible hydrogen gas; 
• Potential for reduction in power conversion system costs.  The S-CO2 Brayton 
cycle incorporates a turbine and two compressors that are remarkably small 
compared with those of either a Rankine steam cycle or a gas Brayton cycle. The 
small turbine and compressor sizes are expected to significantly reduce the costs 
of the turbomachinery components. Also, the S-CO2 Brayton cycle incorporates 
fewer components than the Rankine cycle – The condenser, feedwater heaters, 
and deaerator are eliminated; 
• Higher thermal efficiency achievable with the S-CO2 Brayton cycle including the 
potential to reach 45 % cycle efficiency with an increase in the ABR core outlet 
temperature to values of some sodium-cooled fast reactor concepts.  A higher 
efficiency enhances the revenue from the sale of electricity.   
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Figure II.5-1 shows a comparison of cycle efficiency versus temperature for a S-CO2 
Brayton cycle and a helium ideal gas Brayton cycle. Over the temperature range of 
interest to the ABTR, the S-CO2 cycle clearly provides a significantly greater efficiency.  
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Figure II.5-1 Comparison of Efficiencies versus Temperature for S-CO2 Brayton Cycle and 
Traditional Helium Ideal Gas Brayton Cycle 
 
Figures II.5-2 and II.5-3 provide schematic illustrations of the S-CO2 Brayton cycle 
coupled to the reactor through an intermediate sodium circuit.  During normal operation, 
the supercritical CO2 at about 20 MPa pressure is heated by the intermediate sodium loop 
in the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers.  It then expands to a lower pressure of about 7.7 
MPa in the turbine where thermal energy is converted to mechanical rotational energy 
that drives the generator as well as the two main compressors that are all located on a 
common shaft (Figure II.5-2).  The CO2 then passes through two recuperators, designated 
the high temperature recuperator (HTR) and low temperature recuperator (LTR), where 
energy is transferred from the hot CO2 to preheat CO2 that has been compressed before it 
returns to the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers.  Preheating the CO2 increases the cycle 
efficiency.  A portion of the expanded low pressure CO2 stream equal to 71 % of the total 
CO2 flow passes through the cooler where heat is rejected from the cycle.  Actual 
pressure, temperature, and flow rate conditions calculated for the cycle as well as the 
primary and intermediate sodium coolant systems are shown in Figure II.5-3.  This figure 
also presents the energy exchange rates in the components.  The largest heat exchange 
rates in the S-CO2 Brayton cycle occur in the HTR and LTR.  Hence, large heat transfer 
areas are required for these two specific components. 
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Figure II.5-2 Schematic Illustration of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Showing Heat Transfer Paths and 
Control Mechanisms 
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Figure II.5-3 S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Temperatures, Pressures, Flow Rates, and Heat Exchange Rates 
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The CO2 is expanded in the turbine such that the pressure at the compressor inlet is 
7.4 MPa which is immediately above the critical pressure (7.377 MPa).  This is done to 
take advantage of the low compressional work for CO2 immediately above the critical 
point.  The low work of compression is the salient feature of the cycle that contributes 
most to its improved efficiency over traditional gas Brayton cycles.  In part, this is due to 
the high density of CO2 immediately above the critical point (Table II.5-1) which is closer 
to that of an ordinary liquid than a gas in a traditional gas Brayton cycle.  Thus, there is 
an incentive to cool the CO2 to as near the critical temperature as feasible.  The general 
dependency of cycle efficiency upon the temperature of CO2 exiting the cooler as well as 
the required size of the cooler is illustrated in Figure II.5-4. 
 
Table II.5-1 Comparison of Densities and Specific Heats 
 
Fluid Location Pressure 
MPa 
Temperature 
oC 
Density 
kg/m3 
Specific Heat 
KJ/kg-K 
S-CO2 Critical point 
Compressor inlet 
Compressor outlet 
Turbine inlet 
Turbine outlet 
7.38 
7.40 
20.00 
19.84 
7.73 
30.98 
31.25 
84.5 
471.5 
362.1 
468 
369 
566 
138 
65.0 
Infinite 
58.5 
2.58 
1.23 
1.15 
Helium Cooler outlet 
Compressor outlet 
2.6 
7.0 
27 
104 
4.17 
8.93 
5.19 
5.19 
Water  0.1 20 998 4.18 
Sodium  0.1 420 828 1.36 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-4 Illustration of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency and Required Cooler Mass vs. 
Compressor Inlet Temperature 
 
The cycle splits the CO2 flow such that only a portion rejects heat in the cooler 
because of the dependency of the specific heat of CO2 upon pressure immediately above 
the critical point.  In particular, the specific heat of CO2 immediately above the critical 
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pressure CO2 from Compressor No.1 entering the low temperature recuperator has a 
specific heat of 2.57 KJ/kg-K.  The low pressure CO2 exiting the low temperature 
recuperator has a specific heat of 1.37 KJ/kg-K.  Splitting the flow reduces the flow rate 
through the low temperature recuperator of the cold stream from Compressor No. 1 
resulting in a CO2 cold stream temperature rise in the low temperature recuperator that 
more closely approaches the temperature drop of the hot stream.  This enhances the S-
CO2 cycle efficiency.  If the CO2 flow were not split, then the CO2 cold stream 
temperature rise would be significantly lower than the CO2 hot stream temperature drop 
resulting in significantly reduced cycle efficiency.  The flow split fraction, currently 
equal to 71 %, is chosen to optimize the cycle efficiency.  Figure II.5-5 shows the effect 
of the flow split fraction upon the calculated S-CO2 Brayton cycle and net plant 
efficiencies; the latter subtracts out the electrical power requirements for the primary and 
intermediate circuit sodium pumps as well as the circulating water pumps.  The 
remaining 29 % of the CO2 flow is directly recompressed in Compressor No. 2 and then 
merged with the remainder of the CO2 flow before passing through the high temperature 
recuperator.  The difference in specific heats between the cold and hot streams is not as 
pronounced over the temperature regime of the high temperature recuperator relative to 
the temperatures of the low temperature recuperator.  A cycle efficiency of 39.1 % is 
calculated for the S-CO2 Brayton cycle with the sodium core outlet temperature of 510°C.  
The plant efficiency is 38.4 %. 
 
Flow Split Between Compressors
36.5
37
37.5
38
38.5
39
39.5
0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76
Fraction of Flow through Compressor #1
Ef
fi
ci
en
cy
, 
%
Cycle
System
 
 
Figure II.5-5 Dependency of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle and Plant Efficiencies upon Flow Split between 
Compressor No. 1 and Compressor No. 2 
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Figure II.5-6 shows a temperature-specific entropy diagram for the S-CO2 Brayton 
cycle.  Beginning at the turbine inlet, the CO2 follows either of two paths through either 
Compressor No. 1 or Compressor No. 2 depending upon whether or not it rejects heat in 
the cooler.  Pressures and temperatures of CO2 at various locations in the S-CO2 Brayton 
cycle are presented in Figure II.5-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-6 Temperature-Specific Entropy Diagram for S-CO2 Brayton Cycle 
 
A more detailed drawing for the S-CO2 Brayton cycle is shown in Figure II.5-8. This 
figure includes the shutdown heat removal path in which the S-CO2 Brayton cycle 
components (i.e., turbine, recuperators, compressors, etc.) are isolated enabling the 
performance of maintenance or repair work on the components.  Under nominal 
shutdown conditions, the CO2 from the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers passes through a 
special shutdown heat removal circuit incorporating a shutdown heat removal cooler 
where heat is rejected and is returned to the heat exchangers by a shutdown cooling 
circuit pump.  The shutdown heat removal circuit is pressurized by means of a 
pressurizer.  Figure II.5-8 also shows the CO2 charging system.  Liquid CO2 is delivered 
to the site by truck and held in a storage tank.  When charging or makeup of the S-CO2 
Brayton cycle is required, the liquid CO2 is vaporized in an evaporator and delivered to 
the S-CO2 Brayton cycle through operation of a charging compressor. Piping is 
manufactured from austenitic stainless steel which has excellent corrosion resistance to 
CO2 at the normal operating temperatures. Figure II.5-8 also includes the locations of 
pressure, temperature, and flow sensing instrumentation. 
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Figure II.5-7 Carbon Dioxide Pressures and Temperatures in S-CO2 Brayton Cycle 
 
 Figure II.5-9 shows both the reactor building and the turbine generator building 
including the arrangement of S-CO2 Brayton cycle components inside of the building.  
The turbine generator building has a main floor and a basement.  The turbine, generator, 
compressors, recuperators, cooler, shutdown compressor, and shutdown heat removal 
components are located on the main floor.  The inventory control tanks are located in the 
basement (Figure II.5-10).  The small size of the power conversion unit, housing the 
turbine and two main compressors, is evident as well as the small size of the turbine 
generator building relative to the reactor building.  The recuperators and coolers are 
distributed among transportable recuperator and cooler modules.  The recuperator and 
cooler modules consist of a compact heat exchanger product known as a printed circuit 
heat exchanger (PCHETM, Heatric, a subsidiary of Meggit (UK), Ltd.).  The turbine 
generator building incorporates a bridge crane for lifting and transporting of components 
and parts.  Ventilation equipment is located adjacent to the building to deliver air for 
cooling of the generator.  The liquid CO2 storage tank and evaporator are also located 
adjacent to the turbine generator building.  The main floor of the turbine generator 
building incorporates holes that enable dense CO2 to sink into the lower level of the 
building, in the event of a CO2 leak.  The four sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers illustrated 
in Figure II.5.2-9 also consist of PCHETMs and are located inside the portion of the 
reactor building located between the reactor and the turbine generator building.  The 
sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers are thus located in the seismically-isolated portion of the 
plant while the turbine generator building is not seismically isolated. 
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Figure II.5-8 Detailed Layout of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Including Instrumentation 
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Figure II.5-9 Illustration of General Arrangement of Reactor Building with Containment and 
Turbine Generator Building Showing Layout of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Components 
 
INVENTORY CONTROL TANKS
 
 
 
Figure II.5-10 Illustration of Arrangement of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Inventory Control Tanks in 
Basement/Subfloor of Turbine Generator Building 
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II.5.1.2 Turbine Generator 
 
The turbine and compressors are located on a common shaft inside of a power 
conversion unit, inside of a common housing. The turbine is a six-stage axial flow 
turbine.  It has a remarkably small size and weight relative to turbines belonging to gas 
(e.g., helium) Brayton cycles or steam turbines of similar power rating.  The small turbine 
size is directly related to the high density of the CO2 (Table II.5-1).  In particular, the 
turbine power reflects the mass flow rate multiplied by the work performed per fluid 
mass.  Because the S-CO2 density is so high, the mass flow rate with S-CO2 is much 
higher than that with an ideal gas such as helium in a gas Brayton cycle or steam in a 
Rankine steam cycle.   
 
Hence, the size of the turbine required to accommodate the S-CO2 mass flow rate is 
small compared with the turbine sizes required for a gas Brayton cycle or a Rankine 
steam cycle operating at the same reactor power level and core outlet temperature.  
Dimensions and conditions for the turbine are presented in Table II.5-2, which are based 
upon pre-conceptual turbine design and optimization analyses in which the number of 
stages is varied to determine an optimal number.  The detailed design analyses are 
presented in Section III.3. 
  
Table II.5-2 Turbine Design Parameters 
 
Power  156.4 MW 
Number of stages 6  
Rotational speed  60 rps 
Length  (stages) 1.02 m 
Length (diffuser) 1.64 m 
Length (total) 2.67 m 
Max diameter 0.87 m 
Hub radius, min/max 27.0/34.1 cm 
Tip radius, min/max 41.4/43.5 cm 
Blade height, min/max 7.3/16.5 cm 
Blade chord, min/max 7.4/11.0 cm 
Max Mach number 0.40  
CO2 temperature, inlet/outlet 471.5/362.1 oC 
CO2 pressure, inlet/outlet 19.84/7.73 MPa 
CO2 flow rate 1377 kg/s 
Efficiency 93.4 % 
CO2 mass 24.1 kg 
 
The turbine is manufactured largely from Inconel-based alloys that are selected for 
their strength and low coefficients of thermal expansion as well as their resistance to 
oxidation by CO2 over the normal operating temperature range. The turbine also 
incorporates a diffuser which increases the overall length beyond that of the rotor and 
stator stages. 
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The generator is a commercial “off-the-shelf” component.  A generator marketed by 
Siemens was selected only as representative. The Siemens turbogenerator is a two-pole 
air-cooled unit designed to the International Standard, IEC 34, and in compliance with 
the harmonized standards according to European Commission machine guideline, 
89/392/EEC. 
 
The generator consists of a base frame, stator core, stator winding, cover, rotor shaft, 
rotor winding, rotor-retaining rings, bearings, and field connections.  The rotor shaft 
consists of forged steel.  It is supported on each end by bearings mounted to the base.  
The base frame and anchoring elements transmit the forces occurring in the machinery to 
the floor.  Other functions of the base include damping of vibration and noise, support of 
the cooling system enclosure, and support of wiring and cabling. 
 
An oil system for lubrication and an excitation system are also required for operation 
and are located inside of the turbine generator building.  Heat losses arising in the 
generator interior are dissipated through air.  The air cooling system is a self-contained 
ducted system.  Air is drawn by axial-flow fans arranged on the rotor via lateral openings 
in the stator housing.  The rotor is directly air cooled with heat losses transmitted directly 
from the winding copper to cooling air.  The stator is indirectly air cooled. 
II.5.1.3 Compressor 
 
The S-CO2 Brayton cycle requires two main compressors.  The two main compressors 
operate at different conditions and therefore have different numbers of stages, 
dimensions, and efficiencies.  In particular, Compressor No.1 receives CO2 that has been 
expanded to a pressure immediately above the CO2 critical pressure and a temperature 
immediately above the CO2 critical temperature.  The pre-conceptual evaluation of the S-
CO2 Brayton cycle has included investigation of both axial flow and centrifugal (i.e., 
radial flow) compressors.  Axial flow compressors were initially considered based upon 
the experience with axial flow steam turbines.  It was found that centrifugal compressors 
offer significant benefits relative to axial flow compressors including: 1) a wider stable 
operating range near the critical point; and 2) fewer stages in each compressor potentially 
further reducing costs.  Figures II.5-11 and II.5-12 illustrate the configuration of single-
stage and two-stage centrifugal compressors.  In a multi-stage centrifugal compressor, the 
exhaust from one stage is ducted to the inlet of the next stage.  The wider operating range 
for centrifugal compressor designs is demonstrated in Figures II.5-13 and II.5-14 which 
compare the pressure ratios and efficiencies versus the relative flowrate (i.e., the flowrate 
normalized by the nominal steady state value) calculated for optimized centrifugal and 
axial pre-conceptual designs.  The operating range is limited by stall at low flowrates and 
choking at high flowrates.  
 
The compressors are mainly fabricated from Inconel alloys and austenitic stainless 
steel for strength, low thermal expansion, and resistance to corrosion by CO2. A charging 
compressor is also provided to add CO2 to the supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle from the 
liquid CO2 storage tank and evaporator. Dimensions and conditions for the two main 
compressors are shown in Tables II.5-3 and II.5-4.  
  89
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-11 Illustration of a Single-Stage Centrifugal Compressor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-12 Illustration of a Two-Stage Centrifugal Compressor 
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Figure II.5-13 Comparison of Performance of Centrifugal and Axial Flow Pre-Conceptual Designs 
for Compressor No. 1 Operating Near the Critical Point 
 
Compressor #2 Performance Map 
(Centrifugal vs. Axial)
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Figure II.5-14 Comparison of Performance of Centrifugal and Axial Flow Pre-Conceptual Designs 
for Compressor No. 2 Directly Recompressing CO2 Away from the Critical Point 
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Table II.5-3 Compressor No. 1 Dimensions and Conditions 
          
               27.89 MW 
 Number of stages               1  
 Rotational speed               60 rps 
 Length                         0.38 m 
 Max diameter                   2.06 m 
 Hub radius min/max              9.8/9.8 cm 
 Impeller radius min/max        56.9/56.9 cm 
 Blade height min/max           1.4/9.0 cm 
 Blade length min/max            31.0/50.8 cm 
 Max Mach number               0.47  
 CO2 temp inlet /outlet         32.79/84.5 oC 
 CO2 pressure inlet /outlet       7.62/20.0 MPa 
 CO2 flow rate                  977.6 kg/s 
 Efficiency                     89.1 % 
 CO2 mass                       62.5 kg 
 
 
Table II.5-4 Compressor No. 2 Dimensions and Conditions 
 
 Power                          27.08 MW 
 Number of stages               2  
 Rotational speed               60 rev/s 
 Length                         0.55 m 
 Max diameter                   2.19 m 
 Hub radius min/max               13.6/21.6 cm 
 Impeller radius min/max        59.1/64.8 cm 
 Blade height min/max            0.9/7.0 cm 
 Blade length min/max            31.5/49.1 cm 
 Max Mach number               0.51  
 CO2 temperature inlet/outlet  90.33/184.6 oC 
 CO2 pressure inlet/outlet        7.63/19.96 MPa 
 CO2 flow rate                  399.3 kg/s 
 Efficiency                     87.5 % 
 CO2 mass                       40.8 kg 
 
 
II.5.1.4 Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger 
 
Each of the two loops of the intermediate sodium circuit incorporates a sodium-to-
CO2 heat exchanger, in which heat is transferred from the sodium in the intermediate 
circuit to the CO2 in the S-CO2 Brayton Cycle.  The sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers 
incorporate compact heat exchanger products known as a printed circuit heat exchanger 
(PCHETM, Heatric a subsidiary of Meggit (UK), Ltd.).  Printed circuit heat exchangers 
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have been selected for the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers, recuperators, and cooler for 
the following reasons: 
 
• Expected long life and low potential for failure (i.e., high reliability). Each PCHE 
is effectively a monolithic block of stainless steel, containing embedded flow 
channels.  The concerns about tube failures typical of shell-and-tube heat 
exchangers are not present.  This reduces the requirements for inspection through 
decrease of the potential for failure of the boundary between the sodium and CO2 
streams; 
• Significantly smaller volume relative to shell-and-tube heat exchangers; 
• The monolithic blocks resulting from diffusion bonding and the microchannel 
flow geometries are compatible with the S-CO2 Brayton cycle high pressures, 
high pressure differences between hot and cold streams, temperature ranges, and 
flow requirements (i.e., low pressure drops through the PCHEs) 
• Heatric claims only slow leakage failure involving the formation of small cracks 
in a PCHE fatigue test only after between 1000 and 2000 startup- and shutdown-
type cycles with 25 oC per millimeter maximum temperature gradients in the 
metal and a high pressure difference between the streams.  After 1000 cycles, they 
obtained interstream gas leaks identified by a very small leakage rate of 1×10-7 
mbar liters per second.  They continued to cycle a PCHE that was leaking and 
obtained more cracks but no unzipping failure.  No solid material was found 
entering the system.  The cracks were too small to be seen with the naked eye and 
had to be observed under a microscope. 
• Any failures should be small cracks giving rise to small intermixing of hot and 
cold streams in a recuperator slightly decreasing the preheating effect and cycle 
efficiency, slow loss of CO2 inventory into water in a cooler, or slow interaction 
of CO2 with sodium and slow loss of CO2 inventory into sodium in a sodium-to-
CO2 heat exchanger. 
 
 Each PCHE is manufactured by diffusion bonding of plates of austenitic stainless 
steel into which semicircular channels have been chemically etched.  Type 316 austenitic 
stainless steel is selected for its resistance to corrosion by both CO2 and sodium.  The 
individual etched plates are assumed to be diffusion bonded together by heating to a 
sufficiently high temperature maintained for a suitable time in the presence of a 
sufficiently high force applied to a stack of plates.  The plate stacking arrangement for a 
general PCHE is illustrated in Figure II.5-15, developed by the PCHE manufacturer, 
Heatric, a subsidiary of Meggitt (UK), Ltd.  The sodium and CO2 streams are assumed to 
flow through alternating rows of semicircular channels as shown in Figure II.5-16, also 
from Heatric.  The sodium and CO2 flow through the alternating rows of channels in 
opposite directions providing for countercurrent heat exchange.  A largely countercurrent 
flow configuration is provided by the Heatric platelet PCHE configuration with zigzag 
semi-circular flow channels illustrated in Figure II.5-17.  Carbon dioxide flows through 
zigzag channels while straight channels are provided for sodium flow.  The zigzag 
channel configuration enhances the heat transfer from the CO2. 
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Figure II.5-15 Illustration of Stacking of Chemically Etched Plates to Form Core of PCHETM by 
Diffusion Bonding (Heatric, a subsidiary of Meggitt (UK), Ltd.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-16 Micrograph of Diffusion-Bonded PCHETM Core with Semi-Circular Channels               
(Heatric, a subsidiary of Meggitt (UK), Ltd.) 
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Figure II.5-17 PCHETM Platelet Configuration with Zigzag Semi-Circular Flow Channels                    
(Heatric, a subsidiary of Meggitt (UK), Ltd.) 
 
The current PCHE manufacturing process limits the width and length of each plate or 
platelet incorporated into a PCHE to 0.6 m by 1.5 m.  Individual PCHE cores can be 
welded together side-by-side to provide a block having more channels; however, cores 
cannot be welded together end-to-end to increase the channel length.  Headers are welded 
onto the completed core. 
 
A deterministic computer code model has been developed at Argonne National 
Laboratory to perform PHCE pre-conceptual design analyses and to calculate PCHE heat 
exchange and pressure drop performance.  An example of four sodium-to-CO2 heat 
exchanger modules consisting of a number of PCHEs is illustrated in Figure II.5-18. 
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Figure II.5-18 Illustration of Four Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchangers Consisting of PCHEs 
 
For the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers, each semicircular channel is selected to have 
a diameter of 2.0 mm, a lateral pitch of 2.4 mm, and a plate thickness of 2.0 mm.  A 
semicircular channel diameter of 2.0 mm is determined on the basis that for this minimal 
size, the effects of oxide layer growth upon austenitic stainless steel due to oxidation by 
CO2 will not significantly degrade either the heat transfer performance or the strength of 
the stainless steel ligaments between the sodium and CO2.  The length of each individual 
PCHE unit is held fixed while the number of PCHE units comprising the four sodium-to-
CO2 heat exchangers is varied to determine how the cycle efficiency depends upon the 
total PCHE mass in the four sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers for different fixed unit 
lengths. The heat exchanger cost is approximately proportional to mass to lowest order.   
 
Table II.5-5 shows the detailed parameters of the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers, 
which are comprised of a total of 64 PCHE units. 
II.5.1.5 Recuperator 
 
The low temperature recuperator (LTR) and high temperature recuperator (HTR) are 
regenerative heat exchangers that provide for preheating of the compressed CO2 before it 
is delivered to the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers using part of the thermal energy of the 
hotter CO2 expanded from the turbine.  Preheating significantly enhances the efficiency 
of the cycle.  The largest heat exchange rates in the S-CO2 Brayton cycle occur in the 
LTR and HTR.  Therefore, large heat transfer areas must be provided for each of the LTR 
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and HTR.  Each recuperator is fabricated by Type 316 stainless steel and consists of a set 
of PCHEs which are selected for use with the S-CO2 Brayton cycle for the same reasons 
as stated for the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers. Each zigzag semicircular channel of the 
HTR is selected to have a diameter of 1.5 mm, a lateral pitch of 2.3 mm, and a plate 
thickness of 2.0 mm.  Dimensions and conditions for the HTR are provided in Table II.5-
6. The HTR is comprised of 64 PCHE units.  
 
 
Table II.5-5 Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger Design Parameters per PCHE Unit  
 
 Heat transfer capacity         3.91 MWt 
 Unit width                    0.60 m 
 Unit height                    0.60 m 
 Unit length                    1.00 m 
 Heat transfer area 133.5 m2 
 Material SS316  
 Semi-cir. channel diameter        2.0 mm 
 Semi-cir. channel pitch           2.4 mm 
 Plate thickness            2.0 mm 
 Number of sodium channels      236  
 Number of CO2 channels         204  
 Void fraction for channels              0.309  
 Sodium temperature, inlet/outlet    488/333 oC 
 Sodium flow rate               21.5 kg/s 
 CO2 temperature, inlet/outlet        323.6/471.5 oC 
 CO2 pressure, inlet/outlet             19.91/19.84 MPa 
 CO2 flow rate                  21.5 kg/s 
 Effectiveness                     94.3 % 
 Metal mass                     1.728 tonnes 
 CO2 mass                       6.5 kg 
 
 
The LTR semicircular channels are also selected to have a diameter of 1.5 mm, a 
lateral pitch of 2.3 mm, and a plate thickness of 2.0 mm.  Figures II.5-33, II.5-34, and 
II.5-35 show the results of pre-conceptual optimization analyses for the LTR from which 
it is determined that a LTR PCHE unit length of 0.8 m optimizes the S-CO2 Brayton 
Cycle efficiency while maintaining a reasonable recuperator effectiveness and CO2 
turbine inlet temperature.  The tradeoff between LTR cost and S-CO2 Brayton Cycle 
efficiency is illustrated in Figure II.5-36.  For the selected point, the LTR consists of 128 
PCHE units.  Dimensions and conditions for the LTR are provided in Table II.5-7. The 
LTR is comprised of 64 PCHE units. 
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Table II.5-6 High Temperature Recuperator Design Parameters per PCHE Unit 
 
 Heat transfer capacity         4.13 MWt 
 Unit width 1.50 m 
 Unit height                    0.60 m 
 Unit length                    0.60 m 
 Heat transfer area 134.6 m2 
 Semi-cir. channel diameter              1.5 mm 
 Semi-cir. channel pitch               2.3 mm 
 Plate thickness                2.0 mm 
 Hot side number of channels            564  
 Cold side number of channels 461  
 Void fraction for channels  0.192  
 Hot side temperature, inlet/outlet    362.1 oC 
 Hot side pressure, inlet/outlet        7.73/7.69 MPa 
 Hot side flow rate             21.5 kg/s 
 Cold side temperature, inlet/outlet   176.7/323.6 oC 
 Cold side pressure, inlet/outlet       19.96/19.91 MPa 
 Cold side flow rate            21.5 kg/s 
 Effectiveness                     91.7 % 
 Metal mass                     3.109 tonnes 
 CO2 mass                       9.6 kg 
 
Table II.5-7 Low Temperature Recuperator Design Parameters per PCHE Unit  
 
 Heat transfer capacity         1.31 MWt 
 Unit width 0.60 m 
 Unit height                    0.60 m 
 Unit length                    0.80 m 
 Heat transfer area 79.4 m2 
 Semi-cir. channel diameter              1.5 mm 
 Semi-cir. channel pitch               2.3 mm 
 Plate thickness                2.0 mm 
 Hot side number of channels             218  
 Cold side number of channels 178  
 Void fraction for channels 0.185  
 Hot side temperature, inlet/outlet    192.1/90.3 oC 
 Hot side pressure, inlet/outlet        7.69/7.63 MPa 
 Hot side flow rate             10.8 kg/s 
 Cold side temperature, inlet/outlet   84.5/173.5 oC 
 Cold side pressure, inlet/outlet       20.00/19.96 MPa 
 Cold side flow rate            7.6 kg/s 
Effectiveness                     94.6 % 
 Metal mass                     1.767 tonnes 
 CO2 mass                       10.0 kg 
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II.5.1.6 Control System 
  
 The S-CO2 Brayton cycle is controlled by means of a combination of control 
mechanisms illustrated in Figure II.5-19.  At power levels near 100 % nominal and for 
sufficiently slow load changes, inventory control is used to control the S-CO2 Brayton 
cycle such that the heat removed from the reactor matches the load demand from the 
electric grid.  For more rapid transients, turbine bypass control is employed.  Inventory 
control involves the removal or addition of CO2 from the cycle.  The purpose is to 
decrease or increase the CO2 flow rate in the circuit without significantly altering the 
cycle efficiency.  By changing the flow rate, the amount of heat transported by the cycle 
is changed without significantly changing the temperatures.  Maintaining the same 
approximate temperatures maintains the same approximate cycle efficiency. 
 
 The inventory control system consists of inventory control tanks and valves that 
remove CO2 from the high pressure part of the cycle between Compressor No. 1 and the 
low temperature recuperator into the inventory control tanks, or that admit CO2 from the 
inventory control tanks to the low pressure part of the cycle between the cooler flow split 
valve and the cooler.   
 
The inventory control tanks are illustrated in Figure II.5-19.  The tanks consist of a 
large number of cylindrical tanks fabricated from piping segments onto which are welded 
hemispherical heads containing nozzles.  In particular, each pipe is a 12-inch Schedule 80 
(0.69 inch wall thickness) austenitic stainless steel pipe 3.0 m long and internally 
polished.  Austenitic stainless steel is selected for its resistance to corrosion by CO2.    
Manifolds connect the pipes together to achieve a single distributed volume.  This 
approach minimizes the cost of the inventory control system volume compared to 
fabrication of a single tank providing the total volume. 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.5-19 Illustration of Inventory Control Tanks 
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For fast control action, such as turbomachinery shaft speed control, turbine bypass 
control is utilized. This control mechanism allows a portion of the flow to bypass the 
turbine, if necessary, in order to reduce the flow rate through the turbine thereby reducing 
the turbine output power. Turbine bypass control is also used when inventory control 
reaches the limiting condition at which the inventory tanks are full.  
 
At all power levels, the flow split of CO2 to the cooler may be varied from the 
nominal value of 71 % as a means of maintaining high cycle efficiency. 
 
II.5.1.7 Cooler and Heat Rejection System 
 
The S-CO2 Brayton cycle heat rejection system consists of a cooler where heat is 
rejected from CO2 to water, a water circulating system involving pumps, and cooling 
towers where heat is rejected from the water to the atmosphere. 
A CO2 temperature and pressure at the inlet to Compressor No.1 of approximately 
31.25°C and 7.4 MPa are selected.  This temperature enhances the cycle efficiency while 
limiting the cooler mass/volume to a reasonable value as shown in Figure II.5-4.  The 
CO2 accelerates in the inlet nozzle of the compressor.  As a result, the temperature and 
pressure of the CO2 decrease while passing through the nozzle.  Thus, the CO2 
temperature and pressure at the cooler outlet is selected to provide the desired conditions 
at the compressor inlet. A cooler outlet temperature of 32.79°C and pressure of 7.62 MPa 
provide the desired compressor inlet temperature and pressure of 31.25°C and 7.4MPa, 
respectively.   Immediately above the critical pressure and temperature, the supercritical 
CO2 specific heat exhibits a spike as shown in Figure II.5-20.   
Within the spike, removal of a given amount of enthalpy results in a relatively smaller 
reduction in temperature.  As the CO2 is cooled within the spike, the behavior is similar to 
that of a phase transition in that energy is removed at an approximately unvarying 
temperature.  This behavior is utilized to achieve the CO2 temperature at the compressor 
inlet of 31.25°C that is very close to but still above the critical temperature (30.98°C) 
without concern of overcooling the CO2 to below the critical temperature. Cooling CO2 
below 31.25 oC would require a significantly larger cooler mass as shown in Figure II.5.-
4. Overcooling the CO2 to below the critical temperature would require heating the CO2 
from subcritical to supercritical conditions as is done in a Rankine cycle.  The S-CO2 
cycle normally operates at temperatures above the critical temperature to avoid the need 
for the “feedwater heaters” that are part of the Rankine cycle. 
The cooler consists of a number of PCHE units.  Each PCHE is selected to 
incorporate 2.0 mm diameter zigzag semicircular channels for countercurrent CO2 and 
water flow.  The channel lateral pitch is selected to equal 2.4 mm and the plate thickness 
1.66 mm.  The CO2 inlet temperature to the cooler is equal to the temperature of CO2 
exiting the low temperature recuperator.  The CO2 cooler outlet temperature is selected to 
equal 32.79°C.  Dimensions and conditions for the cooler are provided in Table II.5-8. 
The cooler is fabricated by Type 316 stainless steel and comprised of 48 PCHE units. 
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Figure II.5-20 Behavior of CO2 Specific Heat Immediately Above the Critical Point 
 
 
The heat rejection system rejects heat to the atmosphere with four commercially-
available, open-evaporative, forced-air counter flow cooling towers.  Internally, each 
cooling tower uses nozzles to evenly distribute water downward over a packing fill.  A 
drift eliminator ensures that the water drops do not leave the cooling tower. The cooling 
tower uses induced draft, axial fans that have a low air inlet speed which creates a highly 
efficient distribution of air.  The location of the fan on the outlet also causes the hot air to 
flow far away, which reduces any recirculation.  Besides the fans, the cooling towers are 
also highly efficient due to the use of film fills, which maximize the contact surface 
between the water and air.  The type of packing can be altered depending on the 
characteristics needed in accordance with the process and surrounding conditions.  
 
The cooling towers have a high efficiency (less than 1 KW electric per 100 KW 
cooling) due to evaporation.  Each unit has a maximum capacity to cool 6300 m3/h of 
water to remove 37.1 MW of thermal energy.  Power for the units is supplied from the 
generator and thus factors into the overall plant efficiency.  Typically, a unit this size is 
14.8 square meters in footprint and 10 meters tall. 
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Table II.5-8 Cooler Design Parameters per PCHE Unit 
 
 Heat transfer capacity         3.04 MWt 
 Unit width 1.50 m 
 Unit height                    0.60 m 
 Unit length                    0.574 m 
 Heat transfer area 188.9 m2 
 Semi-cir. channel diameter              2.0 mm 
 Semi-cir. channel pitch               2.4 mm 
 Plate thickness                1.66 mm 
 CO2 side number of channels             432  
 Water number of channels 529  
 Void fraction for channels  0.350  
 CO2 side temperature, inlet/outlet    90.3/32.8 oC 
 CO2 side pressure, inlet/outlet        7.628/7.621 MPa 
 CO2 side flow rate             20.4 kg/s 
 Water side temperature, inlet/outlet   30.0/35.8 oC 
 Water side pressure, inlet/outlet       0.142/0.101 MPa 
 Water side flow rate            125 kg/s 
 Water pumping power  0.272 MW 
 Effectiveness                     95.4 % 
 Metal mass                     2.608 tonnes 
 CO2 mass                       15.4 kg 
 
 
In order to reduce corrosion in the cooling towers, the manufacturer will use materials 
such as stainless steel, polyester, and synthetics for all components that are in contact 
with water.  Because of this, a long life-span is expected that does not depend on water 
treatment or water cleanings. 
 
The cooling towers each employ modular construction and can be transported to the 
site. Rail or truck (i.e., by common carrier) are typical transportation modes for the 
commercial product.  Once on site, the towers can be quickly assembled and installed on 
an existing concrete foundation. Should a replacement cooling tower be required, another 
tower could be assembled next to the existing unit and lifted in place fully-assembled, 
minimizing the shutdown time for replacement of the cooling tower.  
 
The S-CO2 Brayton cycle heat rejection system also incorporates a special shutdown 
cooler in which heat is rejected from the CO2 to the circulating water during normal 
shutdown of the reactor. 
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II.5.1.8 Carbon Dioxide Release Mitigation System 
 
Carbon dioxide is a toxic substance for humans at concentrations in air above 1.0 
volume % and causes death in humans within one minute for exposure to concentrations 
of 17 to 30 volume %.  In particular, the OSHA time weighted average permissible 
exposure limit is 1.0 volume % concentration in air.  The time weighted average 
temporary exposure limit, usually for exposures of 15 minutes duration, is 3 volume %.  
Exposures of humans at 3 % concentration for an hour will cause mild headache, 
sweating, and dyspnea (i.e., shortness of breath or labored respiration) at rest.  
Concentrations of 4 to 5 % cause headache, dizziness, increased blood pressure, and 
uncomfortable dyspnea within a few minutes.  Exposure at 6 % concentration also causes 
hearing and visual disturbances within one to two minutes.  Unconsciousness or near-
unconsciousness will result from exposure to concentrations of 7 to 10 % for a few 
minutes.  At concentrations between 10 and 15 %, exposures of one to several minutes 
results in dizziness, drowsiness, severe muscle twitching, and unconsciousness.  A 
concentration of 17 to 30 % produces loss of controlled and purposeful activity, 
unconsciousness, convulsions, and death within one minute.  
 
Carbon dioxide has a higher density than air at the same temperature.  Thus, CO2 is a 
heavy gas that will collect in basements and other low areas and spread upon floors or the 
ground.  It is necessary to protect personnel from the effects of accidental CO2 releases. 
 
The Brayton cycle building incorporates a CO2 release mitigation system for small 
CO2 leak rates.  In particular, the turbine generator building has a low pressure capability 
and blowers are provided to remove the gaseous mixture from the building.  The CO2 and 
air removed from the turbine generator building is mixed with outside air to a 
concentration below 1 volume % and is released to the atmosphere through a stack. 
 
II.5.2 Steam Rankine Cycle 
 
As an alternative to the supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle, a Rankine steam cycle power 
conversion system is also under consideration for ABTR.  This system utilizes heat from 
the intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) to produce steam.  The steam is delivered 
to the turbine, which drives the electrical generator.  This is the reference power 
conversion technology for traditional sodium-cooled fast reactors.  The technology is 
well developed and, with the exception of the steam generators, the system components 
are largely off-the-shelf items available from commercial vendors.  However, the 
possibility of sodium/water reactions remains a safety concern with the traditional steam 
cycle.  Sodium and water react exothermically and produce hydrogen, which may ignite 
in the presence of oxygen.  Thus, the steam generator design needs to incorporate a 
sodium water reaction pressure relief system (SWRPRS) to provide for the possibility of 
steam generator tube rupture(s) that would lead to this type of interaction.  At this point 
in the preconceptual design process, attention has been focused on the power production 
side of the system.  The system design will be upgraded to include a SWRPRS in future 
work if the decision is made to carry the steam cycle power conversion system along as 
an alternative to the CO2 Brayton cycle. 
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Steam generator concepts that have been developed over the years include the double-
walled straight tube design that operated successfully for over 30 years for EBR-II, the 
hockey-stick design that was developed by Rockwell for the SAFR concept, and the 
helical coil steam generator (HCSG) that was developed by GE for the PRISM Mod-B 
Concept.  For the purposes of this pre-conceptual design, a modified version of the 
HCSG design is adopted, as it is readily scaled to different reactor power levels. 
 
The main components of the steam generation system include two sodium heated 
steam generators, one for each IHTS loop, a feedwater system, and a steam distribution 
system.  The sodium side of each steam generator is connected to the hot and cold legs of 
the main sodium piping on the secondary (tube) side of each IHTS loop. 
 
The steam cycle selected for application to the ABTR is a superheated cycle with dual 
reheat.  Five feedwater heaters are used to increase cycle efficiency.  The steam generator 
is a once-through design with feedwater entering the bottom of the steam generator at a 
temperature of 216˚C, and superheated steam exiting from the top at a temperature of 454 
˚C.  The high pressure turbine receives steam at 2250 psia, and the low pressure turbine 
exhausts to a condenser at a pressure of 2 inches of mercury.  The power conversion 
system produces approximately 95 MW of electric power.  The steam cycle system 
design parameters are summarized in Table II.5-9. 
 
II.5.2.1 Steam Generator 
 
As noted earlier, a steam generator design similar to that utilized in the GE PRISM 
Mod B plant concept is proposed for the ABTR if a steam cycle is adopted.  The steam 
generator is a helical coil, vertically oriented, sodium-to-water, countercurrent flow, 
shell-and-tube type unit featuring once-through operation.  Two 125 MWt steam 
generators are utilized for ABTR; one for each IHTS loop. 
 
The steam generator design utilizes the identical tube diameter, thickness, and pitch-
to-diameter ratio as for the PRISM Mod B helical-coil design.  Moreover, the tube length 
and helical pitch are the same.  Thus, if the water and sodium mass flowrates per tube are 
conserved, then 92 tubes per unit are selected to achieve the required 125 MWt heat 
exchange rate based on a linear scaling of the PRISM design (viz., 630 tubes for 845 
MWt rating).  A diagram that illustrates key elements of the scaled steam generator 
design is provided in Figure II.5-21, while key design data are summarized in Table II.5-
10.  Aside from the thermal power rating, the thickness of structural elements (i.e., upper 
and lower tube sheets, as well as shell and elliptical head thicknesses) have been scaled to 
approximately preserve peak mechanical stresses for a given pressure loading.  
Moreover, the diameters of inlet and exit piping on both the sodium and steam sides of 
the HCSG have been scaled to approximately preserve flow velocities, which then 
approximately preserves pressure drops at the various points within the steam generator.  
 
 
  104
 
Table II.5-9 Steam Cycle System Design Parameters (PRISM Mod-B Basis) 
 
IHTS Loop Operational Data 
Number of Intermediate Loops 2 
Secondary Loop Heat Capacity 125 MWt 
Loop Hot Leg Temperature 477 ˚C 
Loop Cold Leg Temperature 326 ˚C 
Loop Temperature Drop 151 ˚C 
Loop Sodium Mass Flowrate 645 kg/sec 
Helical Coil Steam Generator (HCSG) Operational Data 
SG Inlet Pressure 167 bar 
SG Feedwater Inlet Temperature 216 ˚C 
SG Feedwater Mass Flowrate 55.9 kg/sec 
Steam Exit Temperature 454 ˚C 
Steam Exit Pressure 155 Bar 
Saturation Temperature at Exit Pressure 345 ˚C 
Steam Exit Superheat  109 ˚C 
 
 
During full power operation, feedwater flow to the steam generator is regulated by a 
15 cm (6 inch) main control valve.  The main feedwater line breaks into four 10 cm (4 
inch) feedwater nozzles located on the bottom head of the unit.  These nozzles supply 
water to the inlet of the steam generator at 216 ˚C temperature and 167 bar pressure.  The 
GE design incorporates flow restrictors with a pressure drop of 6.5 bar at the tube inlets 
to increase static and dynamic flow stability over a wide load range.   
 
After entering the steam generator, the water flows up through the tube side of the 
3.18 cm OD, 98.5 m long tube bank while absorbing energy from the sodium on the shell 
side of the unit in a counter-current flow configuration.  The water then exits the steam 
generator as superheated steam at a temperature of 454 ˚C and pressure of 155 bar 
through four 15 cm diameter (6 inch) steam nozzles located in the top head of the unit.  
These four nozzles are then headered into the 20 cm diameter (8 inch) main steam line 
leading to the turbine generator building.  To aid in plant control and monitoring, 
flowrate and temperature measurements are made both at the feedwater inlet and steam 
exits to the steam generator. 
 
On the shell side of the unit, sodium is headered from the 40.6 cm diameter (16 inch) 
IHTS hot leg supply line from the IHX into four 20.3 cm diameter (8 inch) nozzles that 
provide the pathway for the sodium to enter through the upper elliptical head of the unit.  
The sodium then flows in a counter-current flow configuration on the shell side of the 
heat exchanger while delivering heat to the steam/water mixture on the interior of the 
tubes.   The sodium then exits the steam generator through a single 40.6 cm diameter (16 
inch) pipe that constitutes the cold leg of the IHTS.  
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Figure II.5-21 HCSG Design Characteristics (GE PRISM Mod B basis) 
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Table II.5-10 Scaled Once-Through HCSG Design Data (PRISM Mod-B Basis) 
 
Operational Mode Single Pass 
Configuration  Cross-Flow; Shell and Helical Coil; 
Tube Side Water/Steam Flow 
Number of Tubes 92 
Tube OD 3.18 cm 
Tube ID 2.00 cm 
Overall Tube Length 98.5 m 
Tube Material of Construction 2-1/4 Cr-1 Mo 
Overall Tube Heat Transfer Surface Area 903 m2 
Heat Transfer Surface Area Margin 20% 
Tube Bundle Transverse Pitch 5.72 cm 
Tube Bundle Longitudinal Pitch 4.76 cm 
Tube Pitch Angle 7.55˚ 
Number of Tube Coil Rows 4 
Helical Coil Bundle Height 11.6 m 
Vessel Outside Diameter 199 cm 
Inner Shroud Outside Diameter 97.2 cm 
Steam Generator Height 20.72 m 
Water Side Tube Pressure Drop 11.72 bar 
Inlet Restrictor Pressure Drop 6.55 bar 
Sodium Side Pressure Drop 0.19 bar 
Shell Thickness 3.81 cm 
Elliptical Head Thickness 4.45 cm 
Tube Sheet Thickness 8.89 cm 
 
 
II.5.2.2 Steam Cycle 
 
A Rankine superheated steam cycle power conversion system concept has been 
developed for the ABTR.  Layouts of key system components, piping, and 
instrumentation have been roughed out for the purposes of the ABTR pre-conceptual 
design phase.  The overall system layout is shown in Figure II.5-22, while system piping 
and instrumentation are shown in Figure II.5-23.  The power conversion system, which is 
based on standard technology currently employed in fossil-fueled power plants, includes 
both high pressure, intermediate pressure, and low pressure turbines.  Other key system 
components include a moisture separator and two steam reheaters, as well as three low-
pressure and two high-pressure feedwater heaters.  The pre-conceptual design and 
analysis activities have included a calculation of the overall system electrical production 
cycle efficiency using the plant performance software GateCycle (GE Energy).  For a 
given system configuration, this tool calculates design and off-design performance of 
power plants incorporating Rankine or gas turbine cycles.  Based on the system design 
requirements provided in Table II.5-9, the calculated overall cycle efficiency for the 
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system shown in Figure II.5-22 is 37.8 %.  The system heat balance is shown in Figure 
II.5-24. 
 
The main steam system transports superheated steam from the two steam generators 
through a common steam header pipe to the high-pressure turbine inlet valves.  Steam is 
extracted from the high- and intermediate- pressure turbines and is piped to the steam 
reheaters which condition the steam transported from the intermediate-pressure turbine 
exhaust to the low pressure turbine inlet.  The main steam system includes a turbine 
bypass to the condenser to prevent a reactor trip in the event of a turbine trip. 
II.5.2.3 Auxiliary Systems 
 
Main auxiliary system components include the feedwater and condensate systems, 
and the circulating water system.  The water quality and chemistry of the plant must be 
carefully controlled.  High purity feedwater is required to prevent deposition of 
impurities on heat transfer surfaces and to preclude intergranular stress-corrosion 
cracking of the heat transfer surfaces.  This requires careful attention to the design and 
material selection for each component of the system, i.e., on-line water monitoring, full-
flow filters, full-flow demineralizers, and pH control. 
 
The main function of the condensate system is to condense and collect turbine 
exhaust steam and water, to reject excess heat, to transport the condensate collected at the 
condenser hotwells to the deaerator, and to provide the initial condensate/feedwater 
heating.  The main function of the feedwater system is to transport the feedwater 
collected at the deaerator storage tank to the steam generators at the required flow rate, 
temperature, and pressure for all operating conditions.  This system not only includes the 
feedwater and condensate systems, but also the condensate demineralizer system. The 
function of the demineralizer system is to improve the chemistry of the condensate 
stream in order to make it acceptable for a once-through steam generation system. The 
feedwater and condensate systems are shown in Figure II.5-25.  This design is based on 
standard components commonly used in the power generation industry.  The design and 
maintainability of the feedwater system is as important as the design of the steam 
generator system. 
 
A makeup water system is also provided.  This system supplies makeup water that 
meets the feedwater chemistry requirements.  The makeup water system utilizes standard 
components commonly used in power plants. 
 
The  circulating  water  system  rejects  waste  heat  from  the  main  condenser  
shells  to the atmosphere through a cooling tower.  This system is shown in Figure II.5-
26.  
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Figure II.5-22 ABTR Steam Cycle Power Conversion System 
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Figure II.5-23 Steam Cycle Piping and Instrumentation Drawing 
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Figure II.5-24 Steam Cycle Heat Balance 
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Figure II.5-25 Flow Diagram for the Condensate and Feedwater Systems 
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Figure II.5-26 Flow Diagram for the Circulating Water Systems 
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II.6 Shutdown Heat Removal System 
 
The shutdown heat removal system is completely independent from the normal decay 
heat removal through the intermediate heat transport system, and is activated only when 
the normal heat removal system is disabled.  The system consists of three independent, 
redundant, and diverse heat removal loops, with a fourth provided as a spare.  Each loop 
consists of a small in-vessel direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS), a 
secondary natural draft heat exchanger (NDHX), an expansion tank, and an exterior stack 
that forms the natural draft pathway for dissipating the decay heat to the atmosphere.  A 
schematic diagram showing key elements of the system is shown in Figure II.6-1. 
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Figure II.6-1 Schematic Diagram of Shutdown Heat Removal System 
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The DRACS heat exchangers are positioned directly in the sodium cold pool.  
Moreover, there are no valves or other mechanical devices that isolate the primary 
sodium from the DRACS.  Thus, during full power operation, primary cold pool sodium 
circulates at a modest flow rate through the shell side of the DRACS.  However, when 
activated, buoyancy-driven natural convection flow of the primary sodium through the 
DRACS is initiated.   
 
The core decay heat is transferred by natural convection flow of primary sodium from 
the reactor hot pool through the IHX flow path to the cold pool. Heat from the primary 
sodium cold pool is then transferred through the DRACS to the secondary sodium-
potassium (NaK) eutectic passing through the heat exchanger tubes.  All three loops are 
capable of operating in a natural convection mode, in which buoyancy driven convection 
causes the secondary NaK to circulate through the natural draft heat exchangers where 
the airflow transfers the heat from the NaK to the atmosphere. The secondary NaK flow 
circuits (one for each of the three independent systems) are completely passive without 
any valves or constrictions to limit the flow during normal operation or shutdown 
conditions. 
 
On the tertiary (air) side of the systems, the natural convection circuits are passive 
except for magnetically latched dampers that prevent air flow on the air inlet side of the 
three NDHXs.  Upon loss of electrical power to the electro-magnetic latch, the dampers 
fail by gravity in the open position.  The DRACS are brought into full operation by 
opening of these dampers.   The dampers are designed to provide an air leak rate that 
corresponds to nominally 1 % of the full design flow rate in the closed position, which 
results in a parasitic heat loss of ~ 18 kW during full power operation.  This minor heat 
loss is included in the design to maintain the correct natural convection flow patterns in 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary sides of the system so that proper natural convection 
flow patterns are established immediately upon system activation.  Moreover, continuous 
heat addition to the system is desirable in regions where the ambient temperature can fall 
below the NaK freezing temperature of nominally -13 ˚C. 
 
Alternatively, two of the three DRACS loops are capable of operating in a forced 
convection mode to control (i.e., limit) the heat removal rate from the reactor vessel 
during planned shutdowns (e.g., fuel shuffling operations).  As shown in Figure II.6-1, 
the secondary NaK sides of these two loops are equipped with EM pumps, so that the 
loop flowrates can be modulated by adjusting the applied voltage to the pumps.  The 
tertiary air loops on these two units are also equipped with fans so that the heat removal 
rate through the NDHXs can be adjusted as needed.  The EM pumps and fans are selected 
since these devices have large open flow areas that do not significantly impede natural 
convection when the loops are operated in that manner.  
 
The three DRACS are designed to remove 625 kW each at normal operating 
conditions.  The thermal rating for each DRACS thus corresponds to 0.25 % of the core 
full power rating of 250 MWt.  The three DRACS are thus capable of removing 1.88 MW 
of decay heat at design conditions.  Since the DRACS are located inside the reactor 
vessel, any leakage from the DRACS or ancillary piping will not lead to coolant drain 
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down. The DRACS are annular in shape, and are concentrically mounted around the 
vertical piping that supports the three main (EM) reactor coolant pumps.  This approach 
is adopted to minimize the number of penetrations through the reactor vessel head.    
 
Key design parameters for the DRACS are summarized in Table II.6-1, while a 
drawing that illustrates key features is provided in Figure II.6-2. The DRACS is a shell-
and-tube, counter-current flow-type heat exchanger with primary flow on the shell-side, 
and NaK flow on the tube side. Primary sodium from the cold pool enters the shell side of 
the DRACS though an annular ring opening in the shroud located just below the upper 
tube sheet.  The sodium flows by natural convection down through the tube bundle while 
dissipating heat.  The sodium then returns to the cold pool through a second annular ring 
opening located just above the lower tube sheet.  Cold secondary NaK enters the DRACS 
through a 5.1 cm diameter downcomer.  The downcomer delivers the cold NaK through 
the lower tube sheet into a header manifold, where it then turns 180º and rises through the 
tube bank in counter current flow to the shell side primary sodium.  The hot secondary 
NaK exits the tubes into an upper header manifold, and then flows through an annular 
riser which is concentric to the downcomer.  The downcomer is double walled with an 
annular gap for thermal insulation between the hot and cold streams.   
 
Table II.6-1 DRACS Design Parameters 
 
Heat transfer capacity 625 kWt 
Heat transfer area 4.32 m2 
Primary sodium temperature inlet 510 ˚C 
Primary sodium temperature outlet 355 ˚C 
Primary sodium mass flowrate 3.14 kg/s 
Secondary NaK temperature outlet 484 ˚C 
Secondary NaK temperature inlet 328 ˚C 
Secondary NaK mass flowrate 4.38 kg/s 
Tube outer diameter 2.22 cm  
Tube wall thickness  0.9 mm 
Tube Pitch 3.79 cm 
Active Tube length 2.50 m 
Number of tubes 25 
Upper Tube Sheet - Area 0.032 m2 
Upper Tube Sheet - Thickness 25 mm 
Lower Tube Sheet - Area 0.032 m2 
Lower Tube Sheet - Thickness 25 mm 
Outlet piping – OD 5.1 cm 
Shell OD 30.0 cm 
Shell thickness 6.4 mm 
Material 9Cr-1Mo  
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Figure II.6-2 Details of DRACS Design 
 
Both the downcomer and the annular riser pipes are equipped with bellows just above 
the shroud to accommodate any differences in thermal expansion between the piping and 
the body of the DRACS itself (which is rigidly attached to the vertical piping that 
supports the EM pumps).  The upper tube sheet is welded to the shroud, while the lower 
tube sheet floats.  Thus, the design accommodates differential thermal expansion within 
the tube bank also. 
 
Consistent with the thermal rating of the DRACS, each NaK-to-air NDHX is designed 
to remove 625 kW decay heat.  The unit is a horizontal tube, cross-flow design.  Key 
design parameters are summarized in Table II.6-2.  The unit is equipped with fire 
suppression plate and catch basin to mitigate the effects of a NaK tube bundle leak.  The 
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damper to the unit is magnetically latched to fail open under gravity upon loss of electric 
power.  The unit will also have a manual hand-wheel operation capability. 
 
 
Table II.6-2 NDHX Design Parameters 
 
Heat transfer capacity 625 kW 
Tube length 2.83 m 
HX tube OD 4.22 cm 
Tube wall thickness 3.55 mm 
Fin height 3.2 mm 
Tube horizontal center-to-center spacing 7.62 cm 
Tube vertical center-to-center spacing 10.2 cm 
Stack riser cross-sectional area 8.25 m2 
Stack height 5.0 m 
 
Air flow through each NDHX is induced through a dedicated exhaust stack, one for 
each unit.  Each stack is 5 m high and 8.75 m2 in cross section. The stacks are of 
lightweight steel construction and are insulated.  Each secondary NaK loop contains an 
expansion tank to accommodate changes in system volume due to variations in 
temperature.  The tank has one NaK nozzle on the bottom and one gas nozzle on the top, 
which supplies argon cover gas to the tank and permits pressure control.  The tank is 
located at the high point in the loop.  The resultant NaK static head is sufficient to operate 
the loop with expansion tank cover gas pressures at, or slightly below, atmospheric 
pressure.  In the event of a leak in the DRACS, loss of radioactive primary sodium into 
the secondary NaK loop will not occur.  In the event of a leak in the NDHX, the resultant 
spill is minimized because of the low expansion tank operating pressure.   
 
Design calculations for sizing of the DRACS heat exchangers, as well as scoping 
analyses of system response under a postulated loss of flow/loss of heat sink event, are 
provided in Section III.2. 
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II.7 Fuel Handling System  
 
The fuel handling system (Figures II.7-1 and II.7-2) includes several pieces of 
machinery and mechanisms required to move core assemblies into and out of the primary 
tank and provide an effective means to transfer those assemblies to an external fuel cycle 
facility. 
 
The primary function is to receive, prepare, and load fuel assemblies into the reactor 
core. Subsequently, the system enables the removal of the core assemblies at the end of 
their life, transfer them out of the reactor, and reload the core with fresh assemblies. 
Other functions include rearranging core assemblies, minor loading adjustments, 
refinements, and moving fuel assemblies from the storage rack positions to an unloading 
position. 
 
The fuel handling system includes several major components including the rotatable 
plug, pantograph fuel handling machine (PFHM), storage rack, fuel unloading machine 
(FUM), intra-building casks and intra-building transfer tunnel.  
II.7.1 Rotatable Plug Assembly 
 
Located on the reactor cover is the rotatable plug (Figure II.7-3). It is 3.05 m (10 ft) in 
diameter and located 14.7 cm (5.8”) eccentric of the reactor cover. The primary function 
is to provide the necessary support for the control rod drives and provide the PFHM 
access to all core sub-assembly positions. 
 
It consists of a 38.1 cm (15”) thick solid austenitic stainless steel cover. Above that is 
30.8 cm (12”) of insulating material. Then as part of the deck, is 12” of heavy concrete 
topped off with 30.8 cm (12”) of insulation covered with a stainless steel plate. Below the 
cover are the heat shields. These consist of 56.5 cm (22 ¼”) thick, austenitic stainless 
steel plates with a 2.22 cm (7/8”) gap between the plates.  
 
Also supported from the cover plate are the upper internal structure (UIS) (Figure 
II.7-4) and the PFHM. The UIS gives the control rod guide tubes the necessary support. 
This consists of a 1.32 m (52”) diameter, heavy wall perforated tube with baffle plates. 
The control rod guide tubes penetrate these baffles and extend to just above the reactor 
core. The UIS is slotted to give the PFHM access to all core positions. 
 
The Rotatable Plug is mounted on a motor driven bearing and employs an elastomer 
seal around its perimeter to provide a gas tight seal with the cover.  
 
This seal maintains the integrity of the primary vessel atmosphere while the reactor is 
operating. The rotatable plug is only rotated during fuel handling operations (reactor 
shutdown). Once the reactor is safely shutdown, the control rod drive lines are 
disconnected from the control rods and raised slightly into their respective guide tubes in 
the UIS. Only then can the plug be rotated and the PFHM operated.  
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Figure II.7-1 Schematic of Fuel Handling System 
 
Although a dual rotatable plug design with straight pull fuel handling was considered 
(Figure II.7-5), the single plug design with a PFHM, described above, was chosen as the 
reference design for several reasons. First and predominantly is cost. The complexity of a 
dual plug design and the added number of components dictate approximately twice the 
amount of hardware to operate and maintain over the single plug design. Second is 
reliability. Minimizing the number of components on the reactor cover will result in the 
simplicity of operation. The single plug design achieves this better than a dual plug. Third 
is space. A dual plug system has been found to increase the diameter of the reactor vessel 
by approximately one meter over a single plug system. This translates to added cost also. 
Although a dual rotatable plug design can use a “straight pull” fuel handling machine, the 
benefits of the single rotatable design out weigh any slight disadvantage of a PFHM. The 
dual plug system will be maintained as alternate concept in case the PFHM proves 
unfeasible. 
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Figure II.7-2 Fuel Handling System 
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Figure II.7-3 Rotatable Plug 
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Figure II.7-4 Rotatable Plug Structures 
 
II.7.2 Pantograph Fuel Handling Machine  
 
The primary function of the pantograph fuel handling machine (PFHM) is to transfer 
fresh assemblies (fuel, shield, and reflector) into the core, and to remove spent core 
assemblies from the core barrel. It is also used to place them into a storage rack and place 
or retrieve core assemblies from the transfer position inside the redan (Figure II.7-2).   
 
The PFHM has six motions: rotation, pantograph travel, gripper travel, gripper 
rotation, gripper locking, and hold down travel (Figure II.7-6). It can be positioned over 
any core assembly in the core by a combination of rotating the PFHM, extending or 
retracting the pantograph arm, or rotating the rotatable plug. When extended, the PFHM 
arm extends thru a slot in the UIS to reach the core sub-assemblies (Figure II.7-7). 
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Figure II.7-5  Dual Rotatable Plug Concept 
 
 
The PFHM is located and supported on the rotatable plug. It is secured to the plug 
with a bolted flange to resist any loads associated with the fuel handling operation. Using 
the pantograph arm, the PFHM is capable of reaching up to 1.14 m (45”) from the center 
of rotation. At that distance it is designed to exert up to 28.8 kN (6000 lbs) of force to 
remove or insert a sub-assembly in the core barrel. The PFHM operates using three major 
components: the upper section, support tube, and the pantograph arm that includes the 
gripper. 
 
The upper section is 91.4 cm (36”) diameter and located above the reactor cover 
inside a cylindrical cover. It contains all the necessary drives and controls to operate the 
machine. This is the only area expected to require routine maintenance. The controls used 
are commercially available motion controllers. These include servo motors and resolvers 
for position feedback, linked to computer software with graphical depiction of position 
and administrative controls for every operation. Load sensing and object interference 
detection are accomplished through a system of voltage monitors on the drives. Each 
drive has manual override capability. 
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Figure II.7-6 Pantograph Fuel Handling Machine 
  
 
The support tube section provides the physical support for the pantograph. It also 
houses the linkages required to move the pantograph arm and gripper mechanism. It 
consists of a 45.7 cm (18”) diameter, heavy wall tube with a vertical slot to allow the 
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pantograph arm to retract fully. The support tube section is mounted on a bearing to allow 
full rotation of the pantograph. 
 
 
Figure II.7-7 Pantograph fuel handling machine and upper internal structure 
 
The gripper mechanism, located on the pantograph arm, is driven by a 5.1 cm (2”) 
diameter screw drive and travels vertically 3.48 m (137”) inside 20.3 (8”) diameter guide 
tube. This guide tube, which is fixed to the arm, is used to hold down adjacent fuel 
assemblies (Figures II.7-8 and II.7-9) and spread them slightly allowing the fuel assembly 
to be easily accessed without disturbing adjacent assemblies. This is accomplished by 
lowering the entire PFHM. The gripper mechanism is then lowered to the core assembly 
with its jaws open. On contact with the end of the assembly, a 2.54 cm (1”) diameter 
spline shaft is rotated which operates gears to raise the cam spindle and close the jaws 
around the end (Figure II.7-10). The gripper is then raised, with the core assembly safely 
inside the guide tube. The gripper can then be rotated to re-orient the assembly for 
reinsertion, or removed and replaced. The PFHM is then raised to disengage the guide 
  126
 
tube from the top of the core assembly and can then move on to perform the next 
operation. 
 
 
 
Figure II.7-8 Pantograph fuel handling machine guide tube 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure II.7-9 PFHM Guide Tube Hold Down 
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Figure II.7-10 PFHM Gripper Jaws 
 
Several existing gripper designs were researched and evaluated for potential 
application to ABTR. They were; EBR-II, GE PRISM, ANL PRISM, UKAEA Prototype 
Fast Reactor, AFR-300 concept, MONJU, as well as various modifications to these 
designs (Figure II.7-11). At this time the ABTR reference design is a multi jaw gripper as 
described above. However, an alternate gripper design, similar to the gripper design used 
at MONJU (Figure II.7-12), may also have merit and should be evaluated further for 
adaptability to the PFHM. 
 
It should also be noted that the PFHM is not normally removed from the reactor. 
Although the penetration in the rotatable plug is large enough to facilitate removal of the 
PFHM, only under off normal or maintenance conditions is this expected. 
 
 
Figure II.7-11 PFHM Gripper Concepts 
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Figure II.7-12 MONJU Gripper Design 
II.7.3 Fuel Storage Rack 
 
 The purpose of the rack is to provide a location for fresh fuel assemblies to be 
preloaded into the reactor vessel, and to store spent core assemblies removed from the 
core and allowed to decay in storage before removal from the reactor. Currently, the 
storage rack is located between the outside of the core barrel and the inside wall of the 
redan (Figure II.7-13). The open construction of the rack and its proximity to the redan 
and cold sodium pool induce natural convection of sodium to facilitate adequate cooling 
of spent fuel assemblies. There are a total of 36 positions in the rack. One position is 
located directly below the fuel unloading machine (FUM) that is located on the cover of 
the reactor. This position is used to cue core assemblies that are ready for removal from 
the reactor by the FUM. 
 
II.7.4 Fuel Unloading Machine and Transfer Port 
 
The fuel unloading machine (FUM) uses a shielded cask mounted on a self-propelled 
frame (Figure II.7-14). The frame traverses on rails between the transfer port and the 
inter-building cask (IBC) pit area. The FUM is equipped with a gripper for inserting and 
retrieving core assemblies from the cue position of the storage rack. The bottom of the 
machine has a movable seal to engage with the transfer port or an IBC. Also located in 
this area is a shielded door to maintain an inert atmosphere inside the FUM and protect or 
shield the surrounding area from the radiation from the core assemblies during transport. 
The FUM also provides for proper heating, cooling and an inert gas atmosphere for 
transferring fuel assemblies between the core and an IBC. The heated inert gas is also 
used to blow off residual sodium during spent fuel assembly removal operations and 
return it to the primary vessel. 
 
The transfer port is located on the reactor enclosure. It provides an interface between 
the FUM and the primary vessel. The Transfer Port provides the needed radiation 
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shielding and inert atmosphere seal to prevent oxidation of residual sodium during 
transfer. This seal also assists in maintaining a pure argon atmosphere inside the reactor 
vessel. 
 
 
Figure II.7-13 Storage Rack 
 
An alternate design to the FUM and the storage rack is a concept similar to Phenix 
(Figure II.7-15). In this arrangement, a rotating arm removes a sub-assembly from the 
core barrel and places it in an “internal storage area”. The sub-assembly is allowed to 
decay in this area for a predetermined amount of time. The sub-assembly is then removed 
from the reactor using an immersed handling bucket. This sodium filled bucket holds a 
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sub-assembly which is maneuvered onto an A-framed transfer system. The bucket is 
raised on the A-frame, rotated over a separate sodium pool outside the reactor, and 
lowered into the cooling pool. 
 
Figure II.7-14 Fuel Unloading Machine 
 
II.7.5 Intra-Building Cask  
 
There are two types of lead shielded inter-building casks (IBC). One type of IBC is 
used for fuel subassembly transfers that have had sufficient time to decay in the storage 
rack inside the reactor, such that no active cooling is required to remove decay heat. This 
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type of IBC has the necessary shielding and inert gas atmosphere but without any active 
cooling for the subassembly. Another type has all the same features but with active 
cooling to maintain the core assemblies below a temperature where there would be fuel 
cladding interaction. The IBC is illustrated in Figure II.7-16. 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.7-15 Phenix A-frame transfer concept 
 
An empty IBC is located in the IBC pit area under the travel of the FUM (Figure II.7-
12). The core sub-assemblies that have been irradiated in the reactor are transferred by 
the FUM to the IBC located in the pit. Once filled, the IBC can then be moved by the 
reactor building overhead crane to the intra-building transfer tunnel (IBTT) where it is 
transported from the reactor building. 
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Figure II.7-16 Intra Building Cask 
 
II.7.6  Intra-Building Transfer Tunnel 
 
The intra-building transfer tunnel is a sealed transfer tunnel used to maintain 
containment of the reactor facility while transporting IBC’s to the fuel cycle facility 
(Figure II.7-1).  The tunnel atmospheric pressure is kept slightly below the reactor 
building. Each end of the tunnel is hermetically sealed and has interlocked doors to 
maintain containment. The tunnel door in the reactor facility is opened and an IBC is 
brought from the IBC pit area and placed on the tunnel carriage system. The tunnel door 
is then closed and sealed. This carriage includes a conveyance system to move the IBC 
between facilities. Once the carriage reaches the other end, the door is opened and the 
IBC is removed. At this time another empty IBC can be transferred back to the reactor for 
reloading, or the door can simply be closed and sealed while the empty carriage returns. 
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The intra-building transfer tunnel is located on the nuclear island and therefore utilizes 
the base isolation system. 
II.7.7 Fuel Handling Operation 
 
Prior to reactor startup, fuel assemblies will be preloaded in the core barrel and in the 
storage rack. At the time of core assembly replacement, the reactor is shutdown and the 
control rod drives are disconnected and retracted. The rotatable plug is then unlocked and 
rotated so that the PFHM can access a core position. The arm of the PFHM is extended 
and centered over the assembly. The entire PFHM is then lowered approximately 38.1 cm 
(15”) to engage the hold down tube with the adjacent assemblies. The gripper mechanism 
is then lowered to engage the head of the assembly. The gripper cam spindle is actuated 
and the gripper jaws are locked around the head. The gripper mechanism is then raised 
and the assembly withdrawn from the core into the guide tube. The assembly can then 
rotated and reinserted, or the machine is ready for the next operation. If the assembly is to 
be placed in the Storage Rack, the PFHM is raised to its original position, and by rotating 
the rotatable plug and movement of the PFHM, the spent core assembly is positioned 
over the rack. The PFHM arm is extended over a storage rack position, and the assembly 
is lowered into place. Once safely in the rack, the gripper jaws are released using the cam 
spindle, and the PFHM is free to perform the next operation. 
 
Once the decay heat in an assembly has fallen to a sufficiently low level and is ready 
for removal from the reactors, the assembly is moved from the storage position to the 
transfer position. The PFHM is used to remove the assembly from the rack. It is then 
rotated into position for placement in the transfer position under the FUM. The PFHM 
can be operated within 350 degrees of the Rotatable Plug movement while the reactor is 
shutdown and other fuel handling operations outside the reactor are taking place. 
 
AS the next step in the assembly removal procedure the FUM is positioned over the 
transfer port on the cover. The lower section of the FUM is lowered to engage and seal on 
the transfer port. Once the gap between the doors has been purged with inert gas, the 
shielding doors on both the port and the FUM are opened. The FUM gripper mechanism 
is lowered into the reactor above the transfer position of the storage rack. The gripper is 
then secured onto the assembly and withdrawn into the FUM. As it enters the FUM hot 
inert gas is used to blow off residual sodium and back into the reactor vessel. The 
shielding doors on both the port and the FUM are then closed and purged with gas. Next 
the FUM seal is raised free of the transfer port. While inside the FUM, the assembly is 
kept cool and inerted during transfer. The FUM is then moved off the reactor cover and 
positioned over an empty IBC in the pit area. In the same manor as the transfer port, the 
FUM engages the IBC. Using the gripper inside the FUM, the assembly is placed into the 
IBC. The gripper retracts back into the FUM and all doors are sealed and purged. The 
FUM is now ready for the next transfer operation. 
  
The sealed IBC is then moved by the reactor building overhead crane to the intra-
building transfer tunnel. The tunnel door is opened and the overhead crane places the IBC 
on the tunnel carriage. The interlock door is closed and the carriage carries the IBC to the 
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end of the tunnel and toward the fuel handling facility. The interlocked door at the end is 
opened and the IBC is removed and placed in the assembly washing station where the 
residual sodium is removed. Once the residual sodium is removed, the IBC containing the 
washed core assembly is moved to the air cell where the assembly is removed and placed 
into storage racks awaiting disposition. The IBC can then be returned to the reactor 
building for subsequent fuel handling transfers. 
II.7.8 Refueling Time 
 
In EBR-II, the spent and new fuels were transported between the core and the in-
vessel basket during the normal refueling operation with reactor shutdown (unrestricted 
fuel handling).  The spent assemblies were then unloaded from the reactor vessel to the 
fuel examination facility by the inter-building coffin (IBC) while the reactor was 
operating (restricted fuel handling).  The durations of unrestricted and restricted fuel 
handling procedure in EBR-II are shown in Tables II.7-1 and Table II.7-2, respectively 
[1].  The unrestricted and restricted fuel handling operations took approximately one hour 
and ten hours per subassembly, respectively. 
 
Table II.7-1 Restricted fuel handling in EBR-II  
 
Item  Time(min) 
Preparing   150 
Spent Fuel handling Core to FHM gripper 13 
  FHM gripper to TA 6 
  TA to basket 11 
New Fuel Handling Basket to TA 10 
  TA to FHM gripper 6 
  FHM gripper to core 17 
Concluding   85 
Total   298 
 
 
ABTR stores the new and spent fuels at the positions around the core barrel to reduce 
the diameter of the reactor vessel since the basket storage method used in EBR-II requires 
a large space in the reactor vessel.  Thus ABTR must rotate the plug to load and unload 
fuels to and from the positions around the core barrel with reactor shutdown.  Therefore 
ABTR refueling may take as long as the restricted fuel handling of ten hours per 
subassembly. 
 
 
The number of refueling items depends on the number of core components and their 
number of batches.  ABTR has 24 inner and 30 outer core assemblies with the batch 
numbers of 12 and 15 respectively.  Thus ABTR changes two inner and two outer core 
subassemblies during every refueling.  Including other items such as test fuel assemblies 
and control rods, following items are expected to be exchanged: 
. 
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- Inner core subassembly: 2 
- Outer core subassembly: 2 
- Test Fuel subassembly: 0 or 1 
- Test Material subassembly: 0 or 1 
- Control Rods: 0 or 1 
- Total: 7 (maximum). 
 
 
Table II.7-2 Unrestricted fuel handling in EBR-II  
 
Item  Time(min)
New Fuel Handling Load new assembly in temporary coffin 30
  Transport FUM to temporary coffin 5
  
Load new assembly in FUM and 
Transport FUM to fuel transfer port 130
  Prepare assembly insertion 3
  Assembly insertion 33
  FUM gripper to transfer arm 7
  Transfer arm to basket 12
Spent Fuel Handling Basket to Transfer arm 10
  Transfer arm to FUM 35
  Conclude unloading 5
  Transport FUM to coffin pit 10
  FUM to IBC 15
IBC Handling Transport IBC to FEF 165
  Return IBC to coffin pit 135
Total   595
 
 
The maximum refueling time is estimated to be 70 hours. The refueling time can be 
reduced by installing extra IBC’s, or additional new fuel handling facilities.  An extra 
IBC can reduce the refueling time dramatically since it allows that a parallel operations of 
IBC transportation and fuel transportation between the reactor vessel and IBC. The 
critical path with two IBC’s is the IBC transportation time of 300 minutes, while the 
spent fuel transportation time from the FUM to IBC is 15 minutes.  Therefore, the 
refueling time per subassembly is estimated to be 315 minutes (5 hours 15minutes). 
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Three or more IBC’s can only reduce the refueling time from 315 minutes to 295 
minutes, since the critical path with three IBC’s becomes the fuel transportation time 
between the reactor vessel and the IBC, as shown in Table II.7-3.  Further reduction of 
refueling time with three IBC’s can be achieved by adding a fuel preheating step before 
the temporary coffin (TC) operation.  In the EBR-II refueling scheme, the new fuel was 
preheated at the FUM, and it took 90 minutes.  Thus, preheating an IBC can shorten the 
refueling time by 90 minutes.  In this case, the refueling time per assembly is estimated to 
be 205 minutes, as shown in Table II.7-4.  Instead of three IBC’s, a combination of two 
IBC’s and a new fuel buffer zone in the reactor building yields the shortest refueling time 
of 205 minutes.  The new fuel buffer zone can be used to store fresh fuel for one 
refueling operation, and the fuel preheating operation can be carried out in this facility.  
For example, Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was equipped with a core component 
conditioning station (CCCS).  In FFTF, new fuels were transported from shipping casks 
to the CCCS and preheated in the CCCS prior to entry into the sodium system [2]. 
II.7.9 Spent Fuel Cooling During Transfer Operations 
 
In ABTR, spent fuel is transported from the reactor vessel to the fuel cycle facility 
with an IBC with gas cooling.  The current ABTR design has thirty six (36) in-vessel 
storage (IVS) positions for spent fuel.  The cooling time in the reactor vessel depends on 
the number of refueling items and IVS positions.  In every refueling, four driver 
assemblies and one test fuel assembly are unloaded from the core.  Therefore the cooling 
time in the reactor vessel becomes 7 reactor cycles (28 months).  In this case, the 
maximum decay heat of the spent fuel is estimated to be 1.5 kW per subassembly, as 
shown in Figure II.7-17. 
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Figure II.7-16 Decay Heat of Spent Fuel 
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Table II.7-3 Refueling Chart with two IBCs 
 
Fuel Type Operation time(min) Chart                         
New Fuel To TC 35                           
  TC to FUM and FUM to FTP 130                     
  Insertion to RV 36                 
  FUM to Basket 19                 
Spent Fuel Basket to TA 10                 
  TA to FUM 35                 
  FUM handling 15                 
  FUM to IBC 15                
 IBC IBC transportation 300                           
 
 
 
Table II.7-4 Refueling Chart with three IBCs and new fuel preheating before TC 
 
Fuel Type Operation time(min) Chart               
New Fuel TC 35                 
  TC to FUM and FUM to FTP 40            
  Insertion to RV 36            
  FUM to Basket 19            
Spent Fuel Basket to TA 10            
  TA to FUM 35            
  FUM operation 15            
  FUM to IBC 15                 
 
 
TC: Temporary Coffin 
FHM: Fuel handling Machine 
TA: Transfer Arm 
FTP: Fuel Transfer Port 
IBC: Inter Building Coffin
 
205min 
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An analysis has been performed to determine at what assembly decay heat level the 
assemblies can be moved with the IBCs while relying on passive natural convention 
cooling and radiation alone. This analysis provided in Section III.9 shows that the 
maximum assembly power level which the cladding can be maintained below 600oC by 
combined natural convection and radiation heat transfer mechanisms is ~0.6kW. Thus, 
active cooling of spent fuel during transfer operations will be required. 
II.7.10 New Fuel Cooling During Transfer Operations 
 
ABTR will use pure Plutonium fuel for the initial core loading and gradually install 
TRU fuel with minor actinide content as operations progress.  It means that a new fuel 
has possibility to give high decay heat.  Table II.7-5 shows decay heat levels of various 
ABTR fuel types.  Though the decay heat of the Plutonium fuel is in the range of 0.03 
kW per subassembly, the maximum decay heat of the TRU fuels reaches 0.37 kW per 
subassembly.  Although, this value is much smaller than that of spent fuels, the 
temperature limit of new fuel cladding must be much lower than that of the spent fuel, 
since no damage to the cladding can be tolerated before core loading.  In reference [3], 
the temperature of new fuel cladding is limited to 375°C to maintain the cladding 
temperature below the creep temperature of high Chromium steel.  The same criteria can 
be applied to ABTR since high Chromium steel (HT-9) is also proposed as the cladding 
material.  The analysis provided in Section III.9 shows that the maximum assembly 
power level which the cladding can be maintained below 375 °C by combined natural 
convention and radiation heat transfer mechanisms is ~0.2kW. Thus, active cooling of 
TRU fuel during transfer operations will be required. 
 
Table II.7-5 Decay Heat of New Fuel 
 
Case 19Pu131 35Pu131 25TRU131 47TRU131
TRU enrichment, % 18.81 34.86 24.83 46.70
Peak discharge burnup (MWd/kg) 130.84 130.83 130.55 130.45
Specfic power density (kW/kg) 59.42 120.51 59.42 120.06
Resident time (EFPD) 2202 1086 2197 1087
Total HM mass in core (MT) 4.03 1.98 4.03 1.98
Total driver fuel (including test) 63 63 63 63
HM mass per assembly (kg) 70.06 34.54 70.06 35.54
Decay heat (W/kg) 0.4 0.8 5.3 9.9
Decay heat (kW/assembly) 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.34
Reference 
 
1. EBR-II design descriptions, Volume II, Chapter 5 (1971) 
2. D.M. Romrell, D.M. Art, R.D. Redekopp and J.B. Waldo, “FFTF Fuel Handling 
Experience (1979-1986)”, Proc of Fast Breeder Systems, Richland, Washington, 
Sept. (1987) 
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II.8 Instrumentation and Control Systems  
II.8.1 Flux Monitoring System 
 
The neutron flux monitoring system has several functions: 1) to provide 
measurements that aid in reactor startup and enable efficient plant control, 2), to monitor 
reactivity changes during core loading or servicing and 3) to detect abnormal conditions 
that could threaten the integrity of the fuel.  As part of a test reactor, this system also 
provides neutron flux measurements to characterize irradiation conditions for the test 
fuel.  Thus, the flux monitoring system provides control signals for normal plant 
operation, signals to the plant protection system, and measurements for the fuel testing 
program.  The system is capable of measuring the neutron flux level at all times and 
power levels while the core is loaded with fuel. 
 
The main monitoring system functions over a reactor power range of ∼1W to over 
300 MWt and it consists of three subsystems, each having three redundant neutron 
detectors designed to measure flux over a specific range.  The source range subsystem 
employs detectors with the lowest flux range and is used when the core power is less than 
a few kilowatts.  The detectors are high sensitivity, BF3-filled counters that generate a 
signal proportional to the thermal flux level.  The source range subsystem is used during 
low flux operations such as initial core loading, startup, shutdown, and refueling.  The 
system issues a warning if there is an unplanned approach to criticality such as might 
occur with a refueling error. 
 
The power range subsystem is active when the reactor is near its nominal full power 
rating.  The detectors are fission chambers optimized for high flux levels and a reactor 
power in the range of ∼100 kW to 300 MW.  An intermediate range subsystem with the 
same type of detectors bridges the other two and is used at power levels between about 
∼100 W and 1 MW.  The range overlap between subsystems allows the operator to verify 
detector function before switching to a new subsystem. 
 
The detectors of the main monitoring system are located below the reactor vessel at 
the end of guide tubes that enhance neutron flow to the sensors. (See Figure II.8-1)   Lead 
shielding is used to block gamma rays from 24Na and a layer of borated graphite shields 
the detectors from (γ,n) reactions.  The precise size and orientation of the guide tubes will 
be selected to optimize the sensor signal/noise ratio.  Previous experience with 
Superphénix has shown that such an ex-vessel detector configuration can be designed to 
have very little sensitivity to coolant temperature. 
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Figure II.8-1 Ex-vessel flux monitoring system layout 
 
 
A system of in-vessel flux monitors supplements the main system.  These detectors 
are held within steel thimbles mounted on the rotating plug.  The system includes BF3 
detectors for low flux levels to be used during the initial fueling and startup when the 
reactor shutdown power, along with the neutron flux to the ex-vessel detectors, is at a 
minimum.  These sensors may be retracted from the thimbles for high power operation to 
prevent a loss of sensitivity due to activation.  Additional thimbles can be reserved to test 
detector designs or record flux levels at a particular location as an element of a fuels test. 
II.8.2 Heat Transport Instrumentation System 
  
The instrumentation system provides information on the state of the heat transport 
system so that the operator can control the reactor in a safe, economic, and efficient 
manner.  A subset of the instruments is dedicated to the plant protection system so that 
the reactor can be shut down automatically following excursions beyond accepted 
operating set points. 
 
Temperature 
 
The majority of the sodium coolant temperature measurements are made with 
chromel-alumel, insulated junction type thermocouples.  The sensors are mounted within 
stainless steel thermowells for protection and to provide a robust boundary for the 
sodium.  Both the thermocouples and thermowells are swaged at the tip to create the 
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desired time response for each measuring station.  In addition, the sensors are spring 
loaded against the bottom of the thermowell to improve time response. 
 
Individual thermocouples will be used to measure the outlet temperature of each core 
subassembly.  A total of 66 chromel-alumel type thermocouples are used for the 60 fuel 
and 6 test subassemblies.  These sensors provide protection against local cooling 
deficiencies caused by flow blockages or equipment malfunctions.  Abnormal conditions 
within a subchannel can be indicated by either excessively high temperatures or the 
presence of increased signal noise caused by subchannel boiling.  In addition to the safety 
function, the thermocouples on each assembly permit determination of the core power 
distribution through the use of an energy balance. 
 
Certain system calibration operations benefit from higher sensor accuracy than that 
obtainable with thermocouples.  These include in-situ flow meter calibration and 
measurements to establish an accurate relationship between neutron flux readings and 
core power output.  Higher accuracy is obtained by using resistance temperature detectors 
(RTDs).  Like the thermocouples, the RTDs are mounted within stainless steel 
thermowells for protection against the sodium. 
 
Level 
 
Level is measured in the hot and cold pools, the intermediate loop expansion tanks, 
and the two main system dump tanks.  A subset of the pool sensors is made up of short 
range units to measure level under normal operating conditions when the reactor vessel 
sodium inventory is at its nominal level.  Some of these sensors are reserved for the plant 
protection system to measure hot-to-cold pool level difference.  This is one of the 
methods used to confirm proper operation of the primary pumps.  Other sensors are long 
range, extending down near the bottom of the reactor vessel, and are used for filling and 
draining operations.  Level meters are also used in the intermediate loop to monitor 
sodium inventory and provide an early alert to large-scale leaks.  Each level meter uses 
an inductive sensor mounted within a steel well for protection. 
 
Flow rate 
 
At this conceptual design stage, both mechanical and electromagnetic (EM) type 
pumps are being considered for the main coolant pumps.  If mechanical pumps are 
chosen, the flow rate will be inferred from measurements of motor speed and the pump 
performance curve.  For EM pumps, the flow rate is a function of the supplied current, 
which can be accurately measured with electrical equipment outside the vessel.  Level 
meters in the hot and cold pools are used as backup flow indicators.  For full flow 
operating conditions, the level difference between the hot and cold pools is about 2 m. 
 
Flow rates through the intermediate heat transport loops are measured with permanent 
magnet flow meters located on the cold legs.   A U-shaped magnet assembly provides the 
magnetic field and electrodes attached directly to the pipe wall carry the flow rate signal.  
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The electrodes are made of the same material as the pipe to avoid thermally-induced 
potentials. 
 
Core thermal power 
 
Thermal power of the entire core is found using flow rate and the average temperature 
rise of the coolant: 
avgpcore TcmP Δ= &   
where m& is the core mass flow rate and cp is the specific heat of the sodium.  The power 
outputs of individual subassemblies can be calculated using coolant temperature 
measurements at the subassembly outlets:   
 
ipii TcmP Δ= &α  
where ΔTi is the difference between the measured outlet temperature for the ith 
subassembly and the average inlet temperature.  The parameter αi accounts for the flow 
distribution through the various subassemblies and it is determined by a core design code. 
 
Pressure 
 
The intermediate loop will be operated at a pressure slightly higher than that of the 
primary system so that tube leaks in the IHX will not result in a transfer of radioactive 
sodium from the primary to secondary side.  The operating pressure of the intermediate 
loop will be measured with pressure transducers connected to the main piping via NaK-
filled capillaries.  The pressure of the cover gas within the reactor vessel is measured with 
conventional pressure transmitters. 
II.8.3 Radiation Monitoring System 
 
The radiation monitoring system measures and records radiation levels in the plant 
and surroundings to ensure the safety of plant personnel and the general public during 
normal operating conditions and in the event of a plant malfunction.  The system detects 
and measures the concentrations of airborne radioactivity and monitors activity levels in 
liquid and gaseous effluents.  The system also provides alarms when radiation levels 
exceed acceptable limits. 
 
A portion of the radiation monitoring system serves the plant safety system by 
providing sensor signals that can be used as trips in the event of accidental radiation 
release.  Radiation monitors trigger containment isolation in the event of a sizable 
radiation release within the containment.  The radiation monitoring system is also used to 
survey the reactor cover gas to check for elevated fission gas levels that could indicate 
fuel failures, and to detect fuel handling and criticality accidents. 
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II.8.4 Impurity Monitoring and Analysis System 
 
The overall performance and reliability of the plant can be affected by the level of 
impurities within the sodium coolant.  This occurs through its influence on the properties 
of structural materials and cladding, component performance, the malfunction of 
mechanisms, and other factors.  The role of the impurity monitoring system is to 
continuously measure the sodium impurity level within the pool and intermediate heat 
transport loop.  The impurity monitoring system is able to enhance plant availability and 
economic performance by predicting or preventing problems associated with chemical 
impurities. 
 
The principal measurement system for impurity monitoring is the well-known 
plugging meter.  With this system, a small amount of sodium is shunted to a bypass loop 
where it passes through a temperature-regulated section containing an orifice.  Under a 
constant driving pressure supplied by an electromagnetic pump, the flow rate through the 
bypass loop is determined by the size of the orifice.  Cooling the sodium within the 
temperature-regulated section causes impurities to precipitate and collect within the 
orifice, which reduces the flow rate.  The saturation temperature of the impurities is close 
to the temperature at which the initial decline in flow rate is observed and this 
temperature is an indication of the sodium impurity level.  Once the flow decline is 
detected, the cooling system is deactivated to allow an increase in sodium temperature, 
dissolution of the impurities, and reestablishment of the nominal flow rate in preparation 
of another measurement.   The system automatically cycles between flow rate set points 
and can repeat the measurements indefinitely.  The plugging meter can also be run in a 
continuous, rather than cyclic mode in which the temperature is regulated to maintain 
partial plugging. 
 
Figure II.8-2 shows the basic layout of the impurity monitoring and analysis system.  
Plugging temperature indicators are used for both the pool and intermediate loop.  To 
monitor sodium from the pool, fluid is pumped continuously from the reactor vessel cold 
pool.  A fraction of the flow is shunted to the plugging temperature indicators and 
returned to the sampling line.   A similar system is operated on the intermediate heat 
transport loop cold leg.  Plugging temperature indicators are placed both before and after 
the cold trap to measure the general level of system impurities and to monitor cold trap 
performance. 
 
The plugging temperature indicators can generally provide only the saturation 
temperature of the precipitating impurities, but not their chemical composition.  For a 
more detailed analysis of the coolant, a sodium sampling system is used.   The system 
diverts a portion of the sample stream to a system of valves that permit the collection of 
the sample in a receptacle that is then taken to a laboratory for detailed laboratory 
analysis.  The analysis provides the concentrations of tritium, corrosion products, 
particulates, and fission products.  Because the primary sodium is radioactive, the 
corresponding sodium sampling system must be operated remotely and shielded sample 
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receptacles must be used to protect personnel. A cell is included in the Reactor Building 
for the impurity monitoring and analysis equipment. 
 
 
 
Figure II.8-2 Schematic of impurity monitoring system. 
 
 Figure II.8-2 also shows a cover gas sampling system that is used to monitor the 
impurity level in the argon cover gas within the reactor vessel.  Cover gas is pumped 
continuously in a circuit with a filtering stage to eliminate sodium vapor and aerosols.  A 
portion of the clean gas is shunted to the CSS where sensors such as oxygen and humidity 
sensors measure the air and water content of the gas.  These sensors are able to provide a 
prompt indication of air leakage into the vessel.  The system is also equipped to extract 
samples for laboratory analysis by filling evacuated bottles.  The bottles are shielded to 
protect personnel since fission gases may be present in the cover gas. 
 
II.8.5 Leak Detection System 
 
The leak detection system is required to assure safe reactor operation, protect 
equipment, and enhance plant availability through early fault detection.  This system is 
not required to shutdown the plant, remove decay heat, or prevent off site radiation 
exposure and so it is not classified as a safety system.  The leak detection system is 
required to detect small leaks (10-100 g/hr) within a time frame of tens of hours, and 
large leaks (> 1 kg/min) within minutes.  The system is also designed to provide the 
  145
 
general location of the leak.  A wide assortment of sensors is necessary to monitor the 
diverse elements of the plant and to provide prompt detection. 
 
Leakage faults can be divided into three general categories, each requiring a 
particular set of instruments for fault detection: 
 
• Loss of sodium from the primary system or intermediate heat transport loop into 
the guard vessel or reactor vessel, respectively, depending upon the fault location 
 
• Water leakage from the tube side of the steam generator into sodium 
 
• Sodium leakage between the intermediate heat transport loop and the reactor pool. 
 
The first class of faults is dealt with using a combination of level sensors, cable 
detectors, and an assortment of atmospheric monitors distributed throughout the reactor 
enclosure.  Level sensors in the pool and intermediate loops register large-scale losses of 
sodium.  Cable detectors, which are placed in the guard vessel and below tanks and 
intermediate loop piping, can discern more moderate leaks.  These detectors are stainless 
steel sheathed cables with a central conductor and mineral oxide insulator.  Holes in the 
sheath allow leaked sodium to come in contact with the conductor, causing an electrical 
short between the electrode and sheath which alters the signal from the no fault condition.  
Aerosol detectors are used to identify both small leaks and moderate-sized ones that are 
missed by cable detectors.  Two types of aerosol detectors are employed.  One is a 
sodium ionization detector that uses a hot filament to ionize liquid metal aerosols and 
vapor.  An increase in aerosol concentration produces a corresponding rise in ion current, 
indicating the presence of a leak.  The second type of detector operates as an aerosol 
collection system in which sample gas is passed through a membrane filter at a constant 
flow rate.  Any aerosols present in the sample gas are filtered, which raises the pressure 
drop across the filter and provides an indication of a leak. 
 
Water leakage from the high pressure secondary side into the sodium of the 
intermediate heat transport loop is detected by measuring the level of hydrogen within the 
sodium.  Hydrogen detection is based upon the diffusion of hydrogen through a thin-
walled nickel membrane.  A carrier gas flows by the membrane at a low rate so that an 
equilibrium hydrogen concentration is established within the gas.  The carrier then flows 
to a hydrogen measurement system.  Hydrogen concentration within the sodium is 
proportional to the square root of the measured hydrogen pressure.  The system measures 
hydrogen concentrations in the range of ∼0.1-10 ppm.  Oxygen is measured with ceramic 
electrolytes that act as electrochemical cells to provide a low level voltage signal that can 
be related to oxygen concentration.  These sensors operate on the same principle as 
conventional electrochemical oxygen sensors with one electrode immersed in the sodium 
and the other a reference gas (or oxide).   
 
Leakage between the intermediate heat transport loop and the reactor pool can, in 
principle, occur in either direction through a breach in the IHX.  However, the operating 
pressure of the intermediate loop is, under normal conditions, higher than the pool 
  146
 
pressure to prevent leakage of radioactive sodium into the intermediate loop.  Though 
such leakage is unlikely, radiation monitors on the cold legs between the steam generator 
and IHXs are able to detect this type of leak.  A significant increase in measured activity 
would provide an indication of probable leaks in the IHX.  For the more likely case of 
leakage from the intermediate loop into the pool, level meters are relied upon to show the 
accompanying changes in coolant inventory. 
II.8.6 Data Handling and Signal Transmission System 
 
The data handling and transmission system is a distributed computing system linking 
the plant control system with all remaining aspects of plant monitoring, trending, and 
data analysis.  It also provides remote access to plant data and operational status.  
 
Figure II.8-3 shows the basic architecture of the data handling and signal transmission 
system.  The system uses an Ethernet-based network to link PCs to plant databases 
containing both current and historical plant data.  The databases are updated continually 
by the plant control system (PCS) and are for the use of supervisors, maintenance 
personnel, regulatory agencies, etc.  Though the PCS computers have access to the 
databases via the Ethernet, other computers will not, in general, be able to access the PCS 
via the network.  In general, access to plant data by anyone other than the operators 
within the control room is obtained through the data bases on the LAN and not directly 
through the main control room computers.  Remote access privileges to the PCS 
computers are available to a very limited number of authorized personnel.  In all cases, 
the type of plant data available for access depends upon user privileges.  
II.8.7 Plant Control System  
 
The purpose of the PCS is to maintain the neutron flux, coolant flow rates, and other 
plant processes at levels that meet requirements imposed to ensure safety, efficiency, and 
protection of plant equipment.  The PCS is responsible for plant control during start-up, 
power generation, shutdown, and standby.  It monitors and regulates the neutron flux and 
compensates reactivity changes resulting from fuel burnup, temperature effects, and other 
factors.  The PCS is responsible for coordinating the operation of nuclear island systems 
with those of the power conversion system and the auxiliary systems. 
 
A simplified block diagram showing the PCS architecture is included in Fig. II.8.3.   
The lowest level of the PCS hierarchy is made up of sensors, actuators, and 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) linked through a high-speed data bus.  Low level 
control of the actuators is handled by the PLCs while programming of the PLCs and 
higher level computing functions are managed by computers within the main control 
room.  A main console within the control room provides operator access to the PCS.  
Redundant systems are used to ensure that operators are able to monitor and direct the 
PCS under both normal operating and accident conditions. 
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Figure II.8-3 Schematic of data handling and signal transmission system 
 
II.8.8 Plant Protection System 
 
The plant protection system is designed to shut down the reactor when one or more 
process variables move beyond predetermined thresholds.  The system, therefore, limits 
damage to the reactor, including the fuel, and prevents the release of radioactive materials 
to the environment by retaining them within either the reactor vessel or primary 
containment.  The plant protection system operates independently of the plant control 
system. 
 
The sensors used for the plant protection system are separate from those used for plant 
control.  The following parameters are monitored by the plant protection system and used 
to trip the reactor when an abnormal condition is detected: 
• Neutron flux and coolant temperature at core outlet: Protect against overpower 
transients and prevent high fuel temperatures. 
• Sodium level: Scram the reactor upon low pool level indicating coolant leakage 
from reactor vessel into guard vessel.  Scram the reactor on low level in the 
intermediate heat transport loop expansion tank indicating loss of coolant from the 
loop. 
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• Pump status and rate of change of flow rate: Protect against loss of flow and 
uncontrolled flow changes. 
• Intermediate loop pressure and S/G hydrogen levels: Loss of S/G integrity would 
be indicated by an abnormal pressure increase on the shell side of the S/G and/or 
detection of hydrogen produced by sodium/water reactions. 
• Delayed neutron emission levels in the primary coolant and fission gas 
concentration in the cover gas: These parameters are indicators of fuel integrity. 
• Acoustic signals:  Ultrasonic sensors detect the presence of subcooled boiling, 
which can indicate flow blockages within subassemblies. 
 The plant protection system also allows the reactor to be scrammed manually.  
Switches in the control room can be used by the operator to shutdown the reactor at any 
time. 
 
II.8.9 Communications System 
 
A diverse set of equipment will be available for communication among plant 
personnel and between the plant and outside agencies.  Diversification ensures the ability 
to communicate during both normal plant operations and in the event of severe plant 
disruption.  The communications system consists of: 
 
• Public address system for intra-plant communications.  The system delivers site-
wide or localized messages along with alarms such as fire, high radiation, and 
evacuation alarms. 
• Microwave communications system to provide a wireless link between the plant 
and neighboring DOE facilities. 
• Portable radio systems for two-way communications at any plant location.  These 
systems are used for maintenance operations, traffic control, and fire protection.  
A separate system is used by plant security personnel. 
• Security intercom system for closed communications between security personnel 
at the main security station and remote security stations. 
• Offsite law enforcement radio system for communication with outside law 
enforcement agencies. 
• Conventional telephone network for routine intra-plant and inter-office 
communications. 
II.8.10 Industrial Security and Safeguards System 
 
The industrial security and safeguards system is designed to protect plant equipment 
and personnel, and to prevent the theft of special nuclear materials.  The system is 
designed to defend against the design basis threats specified in regulations.  The key 
requirements for the security and safeguards systems are: 
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• Allow plant access only to authorized personnel and material 
• Prevent the theft of special nuclear materials 
• Prevent the sabotage of critical plant equipment 
• Deter, detect, and delay unauthorized activities and assaults on the plant 
 
II.8.11 Auxiliary Sodium Systems  
 
In order to ensure long term, safe operations of the sodium systems, the chemistry of 
the system must be controlled and monitored by a set of auxiliary systems that are 
common to all liquid metal reactors. Although the chemistry does not affect the nuclear 
operation directly, it is important for the hydrodynamics of the system as well as for the 
corrosion and contamination control. One goal is to ensure stable hydrodynamics on the 
long term to promote an efficient and constant heat transfer, which can be affected by 
oxide formation or mass transfer within the non-isothermal circuit. Another goal is to 
ensure the maintenance and component handling easiness by reducing the activated 
corrosion products. 
 
The following auxiliary sodium systems are included: 
 
• Sodium purification system for purification and monitoring of sodium circuits, 
such as crystallization and plugging indicators 
• Cover gas purification system for purification and monitoring of the argon cover 
gas  
• Sodium sampling and analysis system for contamination monitoring 
• Primary and secondary sodium storage system 
• Sodium reaction system for component handling, cleaning, and decontamination 
(located in the Maintenance Building) 
 
 The sodium purification deals not only with the hydrogen and oxygen impurities 
introduced during the initial startup or maintenance operations, but also with other 
potential source of impurities such as the sodium/CO2 interaction products. 
 
 To minimize the required size of the security force, the plant is divided into nuclear 
and non nuclear areas, each operated with appropriate levels of security.  All safety grade 
components and systems are located within the nuclear island to minimize the area 
requiring the highest level of protection. 
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II.9 Buildings and Structures 
 
Figures II.9-1 shows the overall site plan for the ABTR. Table II.9-1 lists all the site 
buildings and provides their dimensions and footprint. This site plan is independent of the 
ultimate ABTR site and does not take into account any existing facilities at a particular 
DOE site. 
 
Table II.9-1 Site Buildings with Dimensions 
 
Building Name Footprint (ft2) Length (ft) Width (ft) Height (ft)
Security Gate House 900 30 30 16 
Control/Personnel Building 6,319 89 71 30 
Reactor Building 7,832 89 89 - 
Brayton Cycle Building 3,336 72 46 49 
Emergency Generator Building 375 25 15 12 
Balance of Plant Service Building 2,250 50 45 20 
Cooling Towers (each) 2,352 48 48 33 
Radwaste/ Maintenance Facility 6,000 100 60 40/80 
Lift Station 1,200 40 30 16 
Wastewater Treatment Plant 1,200 40 30 16 
Interior Security Perimeter Fence 105,896 435 244 - 
Exterior Security Perimeter Fence 242,704 616 394 - 
 
II.9.1 Reactor Building 
 
The reactor building, as schematically indicated in Figure II.9-2, encloses the entire 
primary reactor system and is constructed on a seismically-isolated basemat structure.  
The building is a reinforced-concrete containment structure that contains an inner reactor 
containment dome, and is designed for a maximum leak rate of 0.1 %/day at an internal 
pressure of 10 psig.  The reactor building is a conventional reactor containment structure 
with the reactor vessel assembly located below grade. All of the primary radioactive 
systems are located below grade within the reactor building. 
 
The major functions of the reactor building are as follows: 
 
• Contain radioactive material following the unlikely event of an accidental 
radioactivity release from the primary reactor system. 
• House and structurally support the reactor vessel, guard vessel, the shield/air 
baffle cooling system, support structure of the primary system and temporary fuel 
handling equipment, biological shielding, and associated equipment and 
structures.  
• Provide adequate space for the operation, maintenance, and removal of equipment 
housed within the containment structure during periodic maintenance. 
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• Facilitate sodium and non-sodium fire protection for all safety equipment; this 
includes separation of redundant systems required for safe shutdown and for 
maintaining the reactor in safe shutdown condition. 
• Provide protection for all safety equipment from the environment and natural 
phenomena such as floods, winds, tornadoes, and earthquakes. 
• Maintain pressure within the containment boundary at less than 0.5 psig negative 
with respect to the exterior, except during pressurization accidents. 
• Limit leakage from the containment boundary to no more than 0.1% of its 
contained volume per day at an internal pressure of 10 psig. 
• Maintain the integrity of the containment boundary during all design loadings, 
including a maximum long term containment atmosphere temperature of 50EC 
under normal operating and design basis accident containment atmosphere 
conditions. 
 
Containment Design Requirements  
 
The reactor building will be designed to the rules of the current ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 2, “Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and 
Containments,” Subsection CC for concrete containment. These rules provide for: 
material, design, fabrication, construction, examination, testing, marking, stamping, and 
preparation of reports for prestressed and reinforced concrete containment. The 
containment components covered by the ASME B&PV Code include: (1) structural 
concrete pressure resisting shells and shell components; (2) shell metallic liners; (3) and 
penetration liners extending the containment liner through the surrounding shell concrete. 
 
Additionally, the reactor building must be designed for natural hazards, such as an 
earthquake, wind and flood.  The design must also conform to the NRC regulatory guides 
(Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100) for seismic and other natural hazards. 
 
Penetrations and Transfer Openings 
 
A large number of penetrations through the reactor building shell are required for 
access of personnel, equipment, freight, electrical conductors, and service fluids.  These 
penetrations are grouped into three broad classifications: large mechanical penetrations, 
small mechanical penetrations, and electrical penetrations.  These penetrations use 
pressure-tight seals consisting of appropriate materials. These seals are protected from the 
building atmosphere since this atmosphere could become hot enough to destroy the seals 
should a major sodium/air reaction occur.  All seals are designed to withstand the same 
maximum pressure of 10 psig for the building.  To provide adequate assurance that the 
total leak rate of the reactor containment boundary remains less than the design value of 
0.1% of the free volume per day, selected penetrations are leak tested annually.  
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Figure II.9-1 Site Plan
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Figure II.9-2 Plan view and vertical views of the reactor building 
 
The large penetrations are comprised of three airlocks (personnel, emergency 
personnel, and equipment airlocks).  The airlocks allow equipment and personnel access 
to the reactor plant while maintaining building containment integrity at all times.  All 
airlocks are cylindrical steel-welded shells that have a sealed door at each end.  The doors 
are electrically or mechanically interlocked to allow only one door at a time to be opened. 
The equipment airlock is the largest of the three; it connects the reactor building to an 
equipment transfer location outside the facility. The personnel airlock is smaller than the 
equipment airlock; it connects the operating floor area of the reactor plant to the 
control/personnel service building and serves as the normal personnel entrance and exit. 
The emergency airlock is the smallest of the three.  It provides an emergency exit from 
the reactor building should the personnel airlock become blocked. All airlock doors are 
periodically pressure tested.  
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Cooling Requirements  
  
The shutdown heat removal system transfers the decay heat from the bulk sodium in 
the reactor vessel directly to the atmosphere through heat exchangers located on the 
outside of the reactor building. Therefore, there are no unusual cooling requirements for 
the reactor building internal atmosphere. A standard heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC) system maintains the internal atmosphere around 22EC at all times. 
II.9.2 Balance of Plant Building System 
 
The balance of plant building is approximately 13m x 22m x 15m high and consists 
of an upper and lower level. The upper level is fabricated on a slab or grate with sheet 
metal over frame construction and no windows. The building’s heating and air 
conditioning system maintains an ambient temperature for the enclosed equipment and 
maintains a slightly negative atmosphere pressure relative to outside. This negative 
pressure ensures that minor CO2 leaks in the Brayton cycle system (if a Brayton cycle 
system is adopted) will be contained within the structure. The building also includes an 
overhead bridge crane with a capacity sufficient to provide maintenance or removal of 
equipment. 
 
All ventilation equipment is located adjacent to the building to deliver air for cooling 
of the generator and ambient temperature control for the building. 
   
The lower level is located below grade. It is sized to contain 2 m3 of CO2. There are 
holes in the upper floor which open to this area. In the event of a leak, this enables dense 
CO2 to sink and collect in the lower level. Sensors on the lower level detect the gas and 
turn on exhaust fans to evacuate the CO2 through a stack for dispersal. Another option 
may be ducts to carry the gas away from the site or to a scrubber device. The lower level 
also contains the inventory control tanks and the letdown tanks which are part of the 
Brayton cycle system on the upper level. Access to this lower level will be for inspection 
of the tanks or maintenance purposes only. 
II.9.3 Control Room and Personnel Building 
 
The reactor control building is a multi-story building adjoining the reactor building. 
This concrete and steel tornado-hardened, Seismic Category 1 structure, houses the 
control room, technical support center, and the central computer for the overall plant.  It 
also includes space for switchgears, cable routing rooms, motor-generator sets, heating, 
ventilating and air conditioning equipment, compressed air and other auxiliary systems. 
Fire protection/suppression systems are also provided. 
II.9.4 Radwaste/Maintenance Building 
 
The radwaste/maintenance building is a slab-on-grade sheet metal high bay structure 
that provides two areas, a waste management area and a maintenance area. The waste 
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management area is sized and designed to handle the collection, treatment, staging and 
shipment for disposal of all regulated wastes generated at the site. Waste will be 
generated from on-going and periodic maintenance work during the life of the plant. 
Equipment will exist in this building to condition the waste streams that are expected to 
be generated from the plant. 
 
The maintenance side of the building provides space and equipment for the routine 
and planned maintenance of the facility and equipment. The maintenance building also 
has a location in the structure where large components will be assembled prior to 
installation in the reactor building. A rail spur provides easy access and delivery of 
components such as the reactor vessel module, primary pumps, intermediate heat 
exchangers, and Balance of Plant system equipment to the maintenance area during 
installation and checkout of the primary and secondary systems. After the facility has 
been constructed, the maintenance building will then have space and equipment for 
performing routine and non-routine maintenance of the reactor primary and secondary 
systems. 
II.9.5 Security Building 
 
 The security building is a single-story reinforced concrete non-seismic category 
structure located outside of the administration and service building with a reinforced 
concrete slab located at grade. The windows are made from bullet-proof glass. 
 
The security building provides a controlled means of access to the plant site to 
prevent inadvertent access, industrial sabotage or the theft of nuclear materials. All 
personnel must pass through this building and be checked by the associated security 
systems for ingress and egress to sensitive plant structures/areas, or areas where 
radioactive materials are stored. The plant security system is monitored and operated 
from this building. A truck trap is located adjacent to this building that allows for security 
force control and containment of trucks requiring access to the site for deliveries or 
pickups.  
II.9.6. Emergency Generator Building 
 
A gas or diesel generator building is located adjacent to the reactor control building. 
It houses a two modular 1 MWe generator that provides emergency power to the primary 
and secondary systems upon demand. The emergency generator buildings are shipped as 
single integrated units that can be quickly installed at that site and made operable to 
support the construction activities during the facility construction, emergency power 
during reactor operations, and as an alternative source of power during reactor 
decommissioning. 
 
II.9.7 Balance of Plant Services Building System 
 
The balance of plant service building provides space for equipment that supports the 
Brayton cycle building, cooling towers, and other services. This includes recirculation 
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pumps, water conditioning equipment, air compressors, electrical switchgears, motor 
control centers, plant heating systems, and other support equipment. 
II.9.8 Lift Station and Waste Treatment Plant Building 
 
 The lift station building provides pumps and filtration system to pump water from the 
river (or other suitable cooling water source) to the plant for use in cooling and domestic 
water services. All wastewaters go through the wastewater treatment plant where the 
water is conditioned prior to being discharged into the river.  
 
II.9.9 Seismic Isolation System  
  
When an earthquake occurs, the seismic waves travel through the ground where the 
reactor is supported causing the reactor structures to shake back and forth with the 
ground.  For this reason, reactor structures must be designed to sustain the inertia force 
generated by the vibration.  The earthquake motion obviously depends on the 
characteristics of the site where the reactor is located.  This makes the seismic design of 
the reactor site-dependent.  However, it is desirable to standardize the reactor structure 
design regardless of seismic conditions.  To make this standardization feasible, the site 
specific seismic design has to be decoupled from the structural design.  This can be 
achieved by incorporating a base isolation system into the reactor structure.  These base 
isolators can be tuned (adjusting its period of vibration) so that the reactor structure will 
experience about the same magnitude of the seismic loading irrespective of the site.      
 
 The fundamental principle of base isolation is to provide a layer with low horizontal 
stiffness between the structure and the foundation so that the structure is decoupled from 
the horizontal components of the earthquake motion.  This layer gives the reactor 
structure a fundamental frequency that is much lower than that of the same reactor 
structure without this soft layer.  Also, this fundamental frequency is much lower than the 
predominate frequencies of the ground motion.  As a result, the ground motion 
transmitted into the structure is modified (the isolator functions as a low pass filter).  The 
high frequency contents in the ground motion will be filtered out along with the high 
energy associated with these frequencies.  Since the base isolator has low horizontal 
stiffness, a large horizontal displacement will take place during the earthquake.  This 
large displacement needs to be accounted for in the structural design; therefore, in ABTR 
a trench with a seismic gap of 90 cm is built around the reactor structure to accommodate 
this horizontal displacement. 
 
There are three technical challenges for designing a base isolation system for ABTR.  
These challenges are listed below. 
 
1. The footprint of the ABTR reactor structure is small.  Therefore, the number of 
base isolators that need to be installed as well as the size of the base isolator are  
limited.  As a result, the load carried by each base isolator is high. The 
preliminary design of ABTR indicates that this load is about 600 metric tons.  If a 
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safety factor of 1.5 is considered, 900 metric tons would be the design load for 
each isolator.   
2. The ABTR site will be used in a remote rural area where the weather temperature 
may be below freezing during winter.  The mechanical properties of the isolator 
must be stable during the temperature change.     
3. The weight of the ABTR reactor structure is not a constant during the entire life 
of the ABTR.  The fundamental natural frequency of the base isolator system 
must be insensitive to this weight change.  
 
Seismic isolators are classified as either elastomeric or sliding.  Elastomeric isolators 
include high-damping rubber bearings (HDR), low-damping rubber bearings (RB) or 
low-damping rubber bearings with a lead core (LRB).  Sliding isolators include flat 
assemblies, the friction-pendulum system (FPS) or the multiple friction-pendulum system 
(MFPS).  The difference between the FPS and MFPS is that the FPS has a single concave 
surface whereas the MFPS consists of two facing concave surfaces. As a result, the 
MFPS can accommodate a larger relative displacement at the isolator level. 
 
In ABTR the sliding isolators are chosen in favor of the elastomeric isolators for the 
following reasons.  
 
1. With a design load of 900 metric tons, the size of the elastomeric isolator would 
be about two meters in diameter.  This may cause difficulties for the manufacturer 
of the rubber bearing because the damping of the rubber bearing comes from a 
chemical compound added into the natural rubber.  The bigger the rubber bearing, 
the longer the curing time.  This makes quality control of the bearing difficult. 
2. The mechanical properties of the rubber bearing will be degraded in a cold 
temperature environment. This is based on the actual performance of rubber 
bearings in real earthquakes.  During the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, the 
rubber bearings installed in the Matsumura Gumi Laboratory building did not 
attenuate the ground motion because the ambient temperature was 0°C, and the 
isolator area was not heated [1]. 
3. The fundamental natural frequency of the elastomeric isolator is a function of the 
weight of the structure.  As a result, the performance of the base isolator system 
depends on the weight of the structure. 
 
Among the sliding isolators, the MFPS is chosen to be used in the ABTR.  The MFPS 
consists of doubled concave sliding surfaces and an articulated slider with a hinge 
mechanism.  The hinge mechanism is to guarantee that the super structure always 
remains vertical during an earthquake.  The system mimics the kinematics of a pendulum, 
forcing the structure to rise slightly as it moves horizontally.  This movement generates a 
restoring force to return the super structure back to its original position.  The energy is 
dissipated by friction.  The isolator is made of stainless steel and is capable of carrying a 
large load.  The fundamental frequency of the isolator is independent of the weight of the 
structure (it depends on the radius of curvature of the concave surface), and the operating 
temperature of the isolator is from -125 °C to 250 °C.  Therefore, the MFPS meets all the 
three challenges mentioned above.  In addition, since the movement of the structure 
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always starts from the mass center of the structure, the torsional response is minimized 
[2].  Note that the MFPS possesses characteristics of both elastomeric and sliding type 
base isolators in reducing the seismic response.  The advantages of MFPS over HDRB 
are summarized below. 
 
1. Period is independent of the structural weight 
2. Design is simpler  
3. Torsional effect is minimum 
4. No buckling concerns 
5. Durable (made of stainless steel) 
6. Wider working temperature range 
7. Quality control is easier 
 
The reactor design can be standardized by incorporating the MFPS in the reactor 
structure.  The period of the MFPS may be adjusted for the same reactor design to be 
used at a different site. 
 
Note that the MFPS is a 2D isolator.  It means that it provides reduction for the 
horizontal seismic loading only.  It does not reduce the vertical seismic loading.  A three-
dimensional seismic isolation is not proposed herein for the following two reasons. 
 
1. The reason for inserting the steel shim plates into the laminated rubber bearing is 
to increase the vertical stiffness of the isolator. However, isolation in the vertical 
direction is achieved by reducing the vertical stiffness. These two ideas contradict 
each other. 
2. The vertical isolators will introduce additional rocking vibration to the structure.  
In 1969, the Swiss Full Base Isolation-3D system was installed for an elementary 
school in Skopje, Yugoslavia.  The building bounced and rocked backwards and 
forwards during an earthquake [3].  Therefore, the vertical isolator is not 
recommended in any building codes.   
 
However, several 3D isolators were developed in Japan recently [4].  These 3D 
isolators are currently under review. The 3D isolators may be proposed in the future if 
they are proved to be effective in reducing the seismic loadings with no adverse side 
effects. 
 
 The seismic isolator used in the ABTR is the multiple friction pendulum system 
(MFPS) shown in Figure II.9-3.  It consists of a lower and an upper sliding surface shown 
in Figure II.9-4, and two sliders (shown in Figure II.9-5) in between the two sliding 
surfaces. Every component is made of stainless steel.  The isolator is designed for a 
vertical load of 900 metric tons.  With a safety factor of 1.5, the allowable vertical load 
for each isolator is 600 metric tons.  The seismic response spectrum used in the design is 
the site-independent response spectrum given in ASCE 4-98 [5] for horizontal motion.  
The response spectrum is scaled to 0.3g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) with 5% 
damping.  The size of the isolator is 100 cm in width by 100 cm in length (square shape) 
with a height of 35 cm. The radius of curvature for the lower and upper sliding surfaces 
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of the isolator is designed such that the period of the isolator is 3 seconds, and the 
maximum allowable seismic displacement is 30 cm.  A moat (silo) with a seismic gap of 
90 cm is built around the reactor structure to accommodate this displacement with 
substantial margin.  Each seismic isolator is inserted at the mid-height of a 120 cm by 
120 cm reinforced concrete column that transfers the weight of the super-structure 
through the isolator to the foundation.  These columns provide a 152 cm high space for 
inspection and maintenance.  Each isolator unit is surrounded by four 50 cm by 50 cm 
concrete pedestals (fail-safe system).  The clearance from the isolator to the pedestal is 85 
cm.  These pedestals function as a physical barrier, in case of a higher than expected 
maximum earthquake.  This is to avoid collision between the reactor structure and the 
moat wall.  These pedestals also serve as temporary supports for the reactor structure 
when an isolator unit needs to be replaced.  In addition, rubber pads will be installed on 
the moat wall in the radial direction to serve as bumpers in case the concrete pedestals 
cannot stop the reactor structure from colliding with the moat wall.  
 
The weight of the ABTR reactor structure is estimated to be 11000 metric tons.  Each 
isolator carries 600 metric tons; therefore, a total of twenty (20) isolators are used to 
support the reactor structure. These isolators are housed in between the basement 
concrete slab and the foundation concrete slab shown in Figure II.9-6. The arrangement 
of these isolators is shown in Figure II.9-7. 
 
References 
 
1. Trevor E Kelly, “Base Isolation Structures – Design Guidelines”, Holmes 
Consulting Group Ltd., July 2001. 
2. C. S. Tsai, T. C. Chiang and B. J. Chen, “Seismic Behavior of MFPS Isolated 
Structure under Near-Fault Sources and Strong Ground Motions with Long 
Predominant Periods”, Seismic Engineering-2003, PVP Vol. 466, ASME, 
Cleveland, Ohio, 2003.  
3. Naeim, F. and Kelly, J. M., Design of Seismic Isolated Structures, John Wiley, 
New York, 1999. 
4. Takahashi, Kenji, et, al, “A Development of 3D Seismic Isolation for Advanced 
Reactor System in Japan – Part 2”, SMiRT 18-K10-2, Beijing, China, 2005 
5. ASCE4-98, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and 
Commentary, ASCE Standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  160
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unit: mm
 
Figure II.9-3 Multiple Friction Pendulum System 
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Figure II.9-4 Lower and Upper Concave Sliding Surface 
unit: mm  
Figure II.9-5 Sliders 
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Figure II.9-6 A Typical MFPS Installation: One MFPS isolator with Four Concrete Pedestal 
Stoppers (Fail-Safe System) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.9-7 Seismic Isolator Layout 
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II.10 Balance of Plant Systems 
II.10.1 Compressed Gas System 
 
 The compressed gas system distributes compressed gases throughout the reactor plant 
from the point of storage or compression to the point of use. Five subsystems are: 
 
• Service Air System 
• Instrument Air System 
• Hydrogen System 
• Carbon Dioxide System 
• Argon Cover Gas System 
 
 The service air system provides compressed air for use by various plant systems such 
as the fuel handling system, maintenance systems, unloading devices, tools, 
miscellaneous cleaning, and inspection services. The system also delivers breathable air 
to required stations. The service air system receives compressed air from the instrument 
air system. The service air system is a distribution system of piping and valves that takes 
compressed air from the instrument air header and distributes it to the users. The service 
air system operates at all times providing compressed air during normal plant operation 
or when the plant is shut down. The service air system is not safety related. 
 
 The instrument air system provides clean, oil-free dry air for operation of instruments 
and controls, pneumatic piston and diaphragm valve operators and air locks in all areas of 
the plant. The instrument air system operates at all times to provide compressed air 
during normal plant operation or when the plant is shutdown, since compressed air is 
required during plant shutdown as well as during normal plant operation. The instrument 
air system also supplies the service air system. The instrument air system is not safety 
related. Safety-related items requiring instrument air are supplied from local safety-class 
accumulators. 
 
 The hydrogen system stores and supplies hydrogen gas to the main generator for 
cooling the generator stator core and rotating field during operation (if needed). The 
hydrogen system is not safety related. 
 
 The carbon dioxide system stores carbon dioxide in liquid form, processes the carbon 
dioxide liquid to carbon dioxide gas, and supplies the gas to the main generator for 
purging. The carbon dioxide system is not safety related. 
 
 The argon cover gas system stores argon in liquid form, processes the argon liquid to 
argon gas,  and supplies the gas to the reactor building and fuel handling facility for inert 
gas operations, such as reactor vessel cover gas, cell inerting, IBC inert gas, and fuel 
unloading machine inert gas, among others. 
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II.10.2 Chilled Water System 
 
 The chilled water system provides chilled water during normal plant operation for air 
conditioning and removal of heat from the following areas or systems: 
 
1. Nuclear island (NI) HVAC and balance of plant (BOP) HVAC system. 
2. Process cooling in the NI maintenance building. 
3. Recirculating gas system. 
 
 The system includes chillers, pumps, expansion tanks, piping, valves, and related 
components. A refrigerant pumpout and storage system is also provided for maintenance. 
The system does not include air cooling coils in air conditioning units nor heat transfer 
equipment in process cooling systems. Cooling water for the chiller condensers is 
provided by the plant service water system. 
 
 The chilled water system is not safety grade and is only needed for routine plant 
operation. The total loads have not been evaluated in detail, but based on previous ALMR 
designs it is estimated that the total cooling load will be 1000 tons of refrigeration. The 
system will consist of three 500 ton cross-connected chiller systems. Two of the systems 
will normally be in operation with one system on standby. 
 
 The chilled water system consists of a single large central system to serve buildings 
with both constant and seasonal cooling loads. The system has three centrifugal chillers 
each of approximately 50 percent total system capacity and connected in parallel so that 
one chiller is available as a standby. Each chiller has a circulating pump, piping, valves 
and controls. The normal chilled water system has a single loop with branches to several 
buildings. The chillers and their accessory equipment are located in the Balance of Plant 
Services Building. The piping supply loop runs from the Balance of Plant Services 
Building through the control building around the reactor containment building with 
branches to the buildings served by the system. Branch piping within the buildings is 
direct return except where long runs would make balancing difficult. 
 
 The type of system selected is consistent with large industrial type systems that are 
commercially available today. The chilled water system described above is sized for a 
pool plant and is therefore smaller than a similar loop-sized plant. The reduced system 
size results from elimination of the primary heat transport system cell cooling load. 
II.10.3 Essential Chilled Water System 
 
 The essential chilled water system provides chilled water for removal of heat during 
plant normal and off-normal operation from the following systems: 
 
1. Portions of the nuclear island (NI) HVAC system. 
2. Portions of the control and personnel services building heat removal system. 
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 The essential chilled water system shall be designed as two independent closed 
chilled water loops each with a 100 percent capacity water chiller, heat exchangers, 
recirculating pump, expansion tank, piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls. The 
components of one loop shall be separated from the components of the other loop, in 
accordance with single failure criteria. The essential chilled water chillers shall be 
designed with a minimum of 25 percent refrigeration margin. The essential chilled water 
system shall be available during or following all normal, upset, emergency, and faulted 
events of plant operation. 
 
 The essential chilled water system supplies and distributes chilled water (42°F) to the 
various components that are required for maintenance of the safe shutdown condition. 
This system operates during normal and emergency plant operation. The essential chilled 
water system has two 100 percent capacity redundant closed loops, each with one 
mechanical refrigeration centrifugal water chiller, one circulating pump, one expansion 
tank, and one air separator, complete with interconnecting piping, valves, 
instrumentation, and controls. Chillers and pumps are located in the Control and 
Personnel Services Building (east and west). Piping loops with separation as required are 
run with branches to the various buildings served. All returns are direct. Temperature 
control valves are located near each piece of equipment served. 
 
 The essential chilled water system described above is smaller compared with loop 
plants. The system size has, however, been reduced by 40% because of the elimination of 
the primary heat transport system cells. 
II.10.4 Radioactive Waste System 
 
The radioactive waste system provides the equipment and facilities for collecting, 
processing, monitoring, storing, and disposing of liquid and solid radioactive wastes. The 
radioactive waste system consists of liquid radioactive waste subsystem and solid 
radioactive waste subsystem. The radioactive waste system is located in the 
radwaste/maintenance building. Equipment within the building will be located and 
arranged in a manner which isolates the operating and maintenance galleries from the 
equipment to achieve as low a level of personnel radiation exposure as is reasonably 
achievable. 
 
 The liquid radioactive waste subsystem collects radioactive liquid waste for 
processing, recycle or disposal; provides sample points and equipment to monitor the 
chemical and radioactive content of liquid wastes; processes and concentrates radioactive 
liquid waste; stores processed or reclaimed liquid for reuse or disposal; and controls 
discharges to assure compliance with applicable regulatory standards. 
 
 The solid radioactive waste subsystem receives and measures the radiation levels of 
small low activity level components from other systems and determines temporary 
storage, processing or disposal requirements; compacts, packages, and prepares 
compactible radioactive solid wastes for disposal; establishes the necessary interfaces 
with other systems for packaging and disposal of large noncompactible radioactive 
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solids; and develops an inventory control system that provides for accountability of 
radioactive materials. 
 
The following general design requirements shall apply: 
 
1. The general system design shall provide as-low-as-reasonably achievable 
(ALARA) radiation protection for maintenance and plant operating personnel 
2. The system shall have the capability to monitor and record discharges to the 
environment. 
3. The equipment and its associated supports are to be classified as nonseismic. 
4. The quality of the discharged water shall comply with the governing water quality 
standards. 
5. Prior to discharge to the environment, a laboratory analysis of all liquids to be 
discharged to the environs shall be performed to assure that the activity 
requirements for such discharges are met. 
6. An acid and caustic solution supply, neutralization and pH control system shall be 
provided, with the capability to adjust the pH of all liquid wastes which are 
collected, prior to further processing. 
7. Receive radioactive sodium generated by the fuel handling and fuel receiving, 
storage and shipping systems. 
8. Provide control functions for the LRWS and SRWS to maintain the design, 
operating and performance parameters during all operating modes. 
 
II.10.5 Nuclear Island Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning 
System 
  
 The nuclear island (NI) heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system 
maintains environmental conditions within design limits throughout the noninert areas of 
the nuclear island buildings, and in conjunction with the radiation monitoring system 
(RMS) and plant protection system (PPS) limits the release of radioactive materials from 
the nuclear island buildings. 
 
The NI HVAC system maintains the temperature, humidity, pressure, and cleanliness 
of the air atmospheres in the various building spaces during normal plant operation; 
maintains, as necessary, the temperature, humidity, pressure, and cleanliness of the air 
atmospheres in the areas containing safety-related equipment during normal plant 
operation and during off-normal conditions; in conjunction with the RMS and PPS, 
maintains the release of airborne radioactive materials to the outside environment below 
acceptable limits during normal operation and off-normal conditions; and limits the 
intake of hazardous airborne materials into certain safety-related and occupied areas, such 
as the control room. 
 
All safety-related ventilation trains shall consist of two redundant 100% capacity 
equipment trains that are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. No single failure 
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of any active component of the safety-related subsystems will result in loss of that 
subsystem's safety-related functions. 
II.10.6 Balance of Plant Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning 
System 
 
The balance of plant (BOP) HVAC system provides heat, ventilation, cooling, 
humidity control, pressure, and control of airborne contamination or any combination of 
these functions to the BOP buildings or portions of buildings as required for proper 
operation of equipment and for personnel comfort. 
 
 The BOP HVAC system consists of several subsystems serving various areas of the 
BOP buildings, each performing specialized functions as required for the area served. 
Each subsystem consists of combinations of various basic components as required to 
satisfy the performance requirements for that sub-system. These basic components 
include air handling units, fans or blowers, cooling and heating coils, filters of various 
efficiencies, duct work, dampers, isolation valves, carbon absorbers, instrumentation and 
controls, and other accessories as required. 
 
 Facilities served by the BOP HVAC system include: 
 
1. Balance of plant building 
2. Fuel handling facility 
3. Nuclear island cooling tower pump house 
4. Fire protection pump house 
5. Switchyard relay house 
6. Circulating water pump house 
7. Balance of plant services building 
8. Radwaste/maintenance building 
9. Gate house 
10. Emergency generator buildings 
11. Water treatment plant 
12. Sewage treatment plant 
13. Well water pump house 
II.10.7 Fire Protection System 
 
The fire protection system provides the means to prevent, control, and mitigate the 
consequences of plant fires through the following general functions - detect fires, or 
incipient fires, activate alarms, suppress fires, extinguish fires, isolate and confine fires, 
protect personnel from smoke and heat and protect safety-related systems and 
components to assure continued readiness and operation. 
 
 The fire protection system is comprised of two subsystems: the sodium fire protection 
system, which addresses sodium or sodium-potassium fires; and the non-sodium fire 
protection system, which addresses fires of non-alkali metal origin or involvement. 
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 The sodium fire protection system provides the means for detecting, locating, 
confining, suppressing, and extinguishing sodium and NaK fires. Special requirements 
imposed by the presence of sodium and NaK in the plant result in employing special fire 
protection methods. These methods include passive catch pans and fire-suppression 
decks, and manually operated portable fire extinguishers. 
 
 Fire detectors and associated instrumentation are used to inform the plant operator of 
the existence and location of a fire. The effectiveness of these fire protection methods for 
limiting fire losses and the spread of airborne contaminants is augmented by fire barriers, 
fire doors, fire dampers, low-leakage penetrations, and similar isolation devices provided 
by the building design, and by the heating and ventilation system. 
 
 The fire protection water supply system provides water at the design pressure and 
quantity to the sprinkler, deluge, and water spray systems, and the yard hydrants. The 
water storage tanks, fire pumps, and hydrants are all nonseismic Category I components. 
One seismically qualified (Seismic Category I) pump, taking its suction from two 
seismically qualified (Seismic Category I) storage tanks, provides water at the design 
pressure and quantity to special service wet standpipes located in buildings and areas of 
the plant containing systems, equipment and components essential for reactor safe 
shutdown. 
II.10.8 Recirculating Gas Cooling System 
 
 The recirculating gas cooling system (RGCS) provides gas cooling capability to the 
inerted fuel handling machine - fuel transfer tubes system in the reactor building and to 
the fuel handling cell in the fuel handling facility. The RGCS provides heat removal from 
cell and equipment by forced circulation in closed loops. 
 
 The RGCS provides heat removal from the inert gas atmospheres of the  fuel handling 
and storage cells in the fuel handling facility and the fuel handling machine in the reactor 
building and intra-building cask system. 
 
 Each RGCS subsystem acts as an extension of the cell pressure and leakage boundary 
and thereby limits potential release of radioactive materials to the environment. 
Connections are provided to the inerted gas system for pressure control and gas sampling 
and to the nuclear island heating, ventilating and air conditioning system for deinerting 
air supply and exhaust. The RGCS is capable of recirculating and cooling cell atmosphere 
air during periods when the cells are deinerted and occupied. 
 
 The fuel handling and storage cells subsystem operates to maintain temperatures 
within the cell. Heat loads include decay heat from fuel assemblies and lighting loads. 
Cell temperatures are also maintained within design limits in the event of a design basis 
fuel handling accident. This subsystem together with the cell liner and penetrations seals, 
maintains a very low leakage barrier to contain the products of a design basis accidental 
release of radioactive materials.  
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The safety-related cooling circuits consist of two-100 percent capacity equipment 
trains that are redundant, separated from each other, and are designed to Seismic 
Category I requirements. No single failure of any active component of a safety-related 
cooling circuit results in loss of the cooling. 
 
II.10.9 Fuel Receiving, Storage, and Shipping System 
 
 The fuel receiving, storage, and shipping system located in the fuel handling facility 
receives, inspects, stores, and prepares new core assemblies, including fuel, reflector, 
control, and radial shield assemblies, for insertion into the reactor; makes selected 
measurements on irradiated core assemblies and prepares irradiated core assemblies for 
shipment to an off-site location; provides inventory control for all core assemblies at all 
times within the plant; and is capable of cooling fuel assemblies for an indefinite period 
during transfer operations. 
 
 Also provided is the instrumentation and control system that is used to operate the 
FRSSS and the fuel handling system. This system interfaces closely with the fuel 
handling system, the reactor service building, and the liquid metal auxiliary system. 
 
 New core assemblies enter the fuel handling facility are unloaded from their shipping 
containers and inspected, and are temporarily stored in the air cell. From the air cell, they 
are transferred to the reactor building for staging prior to core loading. After reactor 
shutdown for refueling, the fresh core assemblies are loading into the reactor vessel and 
stored outside the core barrel in the spent fuel storage positions. 
II.10.10 Feedwater and Condensate System  
 
This system is applicable only for the steam Rankine cycle. The feedwater and 
condensate system collects water from the main turbine and auxiliaries, where its 
available thermal energy has been extracted, conditions it, and returns it to the steam 
generator at design temperature and pressure. The feedwater and condensate system is 
not safety grade. 
 
 The feedwater and condensate system provides high purity feedwater to the steam 
generators. Condensate from the hotwell is delivered via the condensate pumps to the 
deaerating heater after being processed by the condensate polishing subsystem and the 
low-pressure heaters. The deaerating heater storage tanks provide the source of feedwater 
for the main feedwater pumps. The main feed pumps take the fluid, increase the pressure, 
pump it through the high-pressure heater shells to increase the temperature to the 
specified level, and deliver it to the steam generator system where it is converted to 
superheated steam. Some steam is returned to the feedwater heaters via the extraction 
steam subsystem, for heating condensate and feedwater, and to the main feedwater pump 
turbine drives. The exhaust from these turbines, along with the cascaded drains from the 
feedwater low- and high-pressure heaters, is returned to the main condenser. All heater 
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drains are cascaded to the condenser to ensure that feedwater chemistry specifications are 
met. 
 
 The steam generators are not required for shutdown heat removal. Thus, emergency 
feedwater pumps, protected condensate storage, and attendant safety-grade components, 
structures, and buildings are not required. 
 
II.10.11 Main and Auxiliary Steam System 
 
 The main and auxiliary steam system transports the steam produced by the steam 
generators to its point of use and extracts its available thermal energy, primarily in the 
main turbine, but also in auxiliary equipment. Included within this system are those 
systems that are needed to support the operation of the main turbine generator. 
 
 The main steam system takes superheated steam from the steam generator system and 
transports it to the high pressure turbine of the turbine generator. The system includes 
provisions for steam dump to the condenser following a turbine generator load rejection 
or turbine trip to prevent a reactor trip. The steam dump also provides a flow path for 
main steam during plant startup until the steam reaches conditions or quality required for 
other uses.  
 
 The steam dump portion of this system takes steam from the manifold, bypasses the 
turbine, and dumps the steam into the condenser. The steam dump arrangement is a part 
of the turbine bypass system. The steam dump system includes desuperheaters and steam 
dump control valves to desuperheat the steam and control the flow of steam into the 
condenser in accordance with the control of the reactor. 
 
 The extraction steam system conducts steam from the high pressure, the intermediate 
pressure, and the low pressure turbines to the reheat tube bundles in the moisture 
separator/reheaters and the feedwater heaters. The extraction steam system also supplies 
steam to the auxiliary steam system. The extraction steam is required for feedwater 
heating to increase cycle efficiency. The system also removes moisture from the turbine 
to provide water erosion protection for the low pressure turbine blades. The turbine-
generator converts the thermal energy generated in the reactor to electrical energy. The 
turbine is provided with two moisture separator/reheaters with two stages of reheat in 
each moisture separator/reheater unit. 
 
 The generator is a liquid-cooled stator type with a capability of 100 MWe gross at 
rated turbine conditions of inlet steam at 2,200 psig and 850°F exhausting at 1.6 in. of 
mercury absolute mean effective exhaust pressure with zero makeup and five stages of 
extraction. 
 
 The turbine generator auxiliary systems provide supportive services to the turbine-
generator to provide needed cooling, sealing, lubricating, and control functions to sustain 
the operation and assure the maximum efficiency of the turbine generator. 
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 The auxiliary steam system provides steam for various process uses and heating 
throughout the plant during plant startup, normal plant operation, and plant shutdown. 
The auxiliary steam system receives its steam from one of three sources. During normal 
operation, the steam is supplied from the extraction steam system through a pressure 
reducing valve. When the extraction steam pressure is too low, auxiliary steam is 
supplied from the main steam system through a pressure reducing valve. If neither 
extraction steam nor main steam is available, auxiliary steam is supplied by the auxiliary 
boiler. 
II.10.12 Circulating Water System 
 
 The circulating water system provides cooling water flow to the main condenser and 
the turbine plant component cooling water heat exchangers to remove waste heat rejected 
by the turbine-generator cycle. The circulating water rejects this waste heat to the 
atmosphere by means of mechanical draft cooling towers. 
 
 The circulating water system is capable of removing the design heat load placed on 
the turbine condenser or Brayton Cycle heat exchanger. The system also removes the heat 
load rejected through the turbine plant component cooling water heat exchangers. The 
circulating water system is capable of removing the heat load from a 50 percent steam 
dump occurring at summer design condition. The safety classification of the circulating 
water system piping, equipment, and components is non-safety grade. Provisions are 
made to isolate portions of the system for major maintenance without removing the 
generating unit from operation. 
 
 The circulating water system provides cooling water for the main condenser and the 
turbine plant component cooling water heat exchangers. Circulating water pumps in 
separate bays in a pumphouse take suction from a flume connecting the cold water basins 
of the mechanical draft cooling towers. Cooled water is pumped through a pipeline to the 
main condenser and back to the cooling towers. Turbine plant component cooling water 
pumps, in a separate bay, pump water through a pipeline to the turbine plant heat 
exchangers and discharge into the circulating water pipe downstream of the main 
condenser. 
II.10.13 Service Water System 
 
 The service water system consists of three subsystems, namely: the turbine plant 
water, the nuclear island service water, and the turbine plant component cooling water. 
All three of these subsystems are closed loop cooling systems and in total their function 
is to provide cooling for all plant systems and components except the main turbine 
condenser. With the exception of the nuclear island service water subsystem, the heat 
load is rejected to the recirculating water system. The nuclear island service water 
subsystem rejects heat to two separate cooling towers. 
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 The turbine plant water and turbine plant component cooling water subsystems are 
non-safety grade. The nuclear island service water subsystem is safety grade. It is 
possible to isolate portions of the system for major maintenance without removing the 
generating unit from operation. 
 
 The nuclear island service water subsystem shall be designed to meet the single 
failure criteria. 
 
II.10.14 Treated Water System 
 
 The treated water system receives raw water from the well water system and supplies 
various levels of treated water for the entire plant needs. The principle plant water needs 
are: makeup water for the main cooling towers, demineralized water, and potable water. 
 
 This system consists of piping, tanks, valves, instrumentation, and controls necessary 
to supply the quantity and quality of water to operate, maintain, and protect the plant. 
II.10.15 Industrial Waste Water Treatment System 
 
 The waste water treatment system collects, treats, and disposes of all nonradioactive 
liquid plant wastes originating from the plant floor drain system, lube oil storage area 
drains, auxiliary boiler, chemical storage area drains, the makeup water treatment system, 
the condensate polishing system, and sanitary waste system. 
 
 The system is comprised of pumps, tanks, valves, instrumentation, and controls 
necessary to treat the waste water coming from the above nonradioactive liquid plant 
wastewaters. 
II.10.16 Liquid Metal Auxiliaries System 
 
 The liquid metal auxiliaries system receives, melts, and transfers to storage all sodium 
delivered to the site; receives, stores, purifies, and distributes all NaK; provides the 
pumps and piping to transfer sodium and NaK; and provides the pumps and piping to fill 
and drain all sodium and NaK systems. 
 
 Separate, independent, purification capability is provided, as necessary, for the 
primary sodium, and for the sodium in each of the two intermediate heat transport system 
loops. There is no permanent connection between primary sodium components and 
intermediate sodium components. 
 
The sodium and NaK receiving system receives all sodium and NaK needed by the 
plant. The sodium receiving system provides the capability to melt the contents of a 
sodium tank car, or sodium drum, and transfer it to the system to be filled. The capability 
to transfer NaK from drums to storage vessels and to circulate and purify NaK during 
system loading and cleanup is also provided by the system. 
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The primary auxiliary liquid metal system provides purification (cold trapping) for 
sodium used in the reactor vessel and the primary sodium plugging temperature indicator 
system and primary sodium sampling system. 
 
Two NaK-cooled, primary sodium cold traps are supported by shield plugs in 
nozzles in the reactor vessel and immersed in the primary bulk sodium. An EM pump is 
located between the shield plug and the cold trap in each unit. During normal plant 
operation, one trap is in use and the second is on standby. 
 
The intermediate auxiliary liquid metal system provides purification of the sodium in 
each of the two IHTS loops. The system also provides the piping to accomplish the filling 
and draining of each intermediate sodium loop. 
II.10.17 Inert Gas Receiving and Processing System 
 
 The inert gas receiving and processing system provides inert gases and vacuum, as 
required by other systems of the ABTR, including: (1) cover gas, (2) cell-inerting 
atmospheres, (3) valve actuation gas in inerted cells, (4) cooling gas, (5) gas for certain 
seals, for component cleaning, and other services, and (6) vacuum for liquid metal 
transfer and gas analysis purposes. 
  
The argon gas distribution subsystem is composed of liquid argon storage tanks, 
pressure control valves, stop valves, piping, vapor traps, filters, and relief systems. Argon 
is distributed to the reactor building, balance of plant building for use as a cover gas in 
the intermediate heat transport system (IHTS), IHTS cold traps, and SWRPRS rupture 
disc areas (for steam plant applications). Argon is distributed to the auxiliary buildings 
for use as the cover gas for DRACS NaK expansion and drain vessels. All the cover gas 
cell and equipment spaces that require argon use recycled argon to minimize 
consumption. The level of radioactivity in the recycled argon gas is reduced by the 
radioactive argon processing system to a level such that it will not cause a radiation 
hazard. 
 
The nitrogen gas distribution subsystem is composed of liquid nitrogen storage 
tanks, vaporizers, pressure control valves, stop valves, piping, filters, and relief systems. 
Nitrogen gas is used for inerting the annulus between the reactor vessel and the guard 
vessel. It is also used for steam generator water-side purging. 
 
The radioactive argon processing subsystem is composed of a vacuum vessel, 
vacuum compressors, a surge vessel, charcoal absorber vessels, piping, pressure control 
valves, stop valves and particulate filters. It is located in shielded cells in the lower level 
of the reactor building. The radioactive argon processing subsystem cleans up the argon 
gas that is normally vented from the reactor cover gas space, and the FUM and IBC such 
that the gas can be safely recycled with an acceptable radiation hazard to personnel 
external to the recycled helium piping. 
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II.10.18 Other Auxiliary Systems 
II.10.18.1 Reactor Vessel Heating System 
 
Four electrical reactor vessel immersion heaters provide supplementary heating of the 
bulk primary sodium to maintain a minimum sodium temperature of 120EC whenever the 
reactor is not operating at sufficient power to make up for the total heat losses from the 
primary system. Heaters are also required during the initial sodium fill and startup. 
 
Each heater is installed through a heater nozzle in the reactor vessel cover. Power to 
the heaters is supplied from 480V 3-phase AC power or, if necessary, by an emergency 
diesel generator. 
II.10.18.2 Shield and Thimble Cooling System 
 
Normally, the heat induced in the biological shield, air baffle tank, and primary 
support structure, by losses from the reactor vessel bulk sodium, is dissipated by the 
shield cooling system. The shield cooling system consists of two basic systems operating 
in parallel: an air recirculating and cooling system and an exhaust air system. Power is 
normally supplied by the 480V distribution system. If this were to fail, power to the 
exhaust air system would be supplied by an emergency generator, and to the air 
recirculating and cooling system by another diesel generator. This shield cooling system 
also has alternate blowers and air conditioning equipment which is automatically 
switched on if a failure of the primary units were to occur. 
 
A total heat load generated for the most part by heat losses from the reactor vessel 
sodium to the surrounding biological shields, is dissipated by the forced circulation of 
cooling air provided by the shield cooling system. The reactor vessel top support 
structure, the insulated top surface of the reactor vessel cover, and component nozzles are 
cooled primarily by the reactor building air which is drawn into the system and flows 
through ducts to cool these areas.  
 
Recirculated air is made available from the cooling coils and blower and provides 
cooling for the radial and lower biological shields and the reactor vessel. Since the shield 
cooling system operates at a slightly lower pressure than the building atmosphere, a 
certain amount of air in-leakage occurs which simplifies the cooling of certain areas 
which cannot be connected to a closed system. 
 
A thimble cooling system is provided to maintain the neutron detection instruments, 
which are positioned in thimbles (not currently shown) next to the core barrel, at a 
temperature of less than 65EC. Backup cooling includes a standby turbo compressor. If 
this also fails, thimble cooling can be manually transferred to the shield cooling exhaust 
system. Operating power for the thimble cooling system is normally supplied from the 
480V power distribution system. The thimble cooling loads are automatically transferred 
to the emergency diesel generator during a loss of electrical power. If neutron detection 
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instruments can be found that withstand ambient core conditions, then the thimble 
cooling system can be eliminated. 
II.10.18.3 Emergency and Backup Systems 
 
There are emergency and backup systems required to ensure that plant monitoring 
capability is available and for personnel safety under a loss of electrical power situations. 
Backup power is also provided for investment protection in certain parts of the plant to 
reduce the possibility of damage due to high temperatures resulting from off-normal 
conditions. 
 
The emergency and backup systems are integrated with the subsystems that they 
service, and are usually peculiar to that system. The majority of emergency backup 
systems are electrical. These include standby gas or diesel generators, battery backup 
banks, and standby operating components such as pumps, fans, and blowers. The 
subsystems that incorporate these emergency and backup components include: primary 
sodium circulation, shutdown cooling, thimble cooling, and shield cooling. 
  
Flywheels are incorporated into the motor generator sets that provide electrical power 
to the primary EM pumps. The flywheels provide for an appropriate and specific primary 
flow coast down that matches the reduction in power during plant shutdown following a 
scram and assists in the transition from forced flow to convection flow through the 
reactor.  
 
With failure of the main pumps (loss of flow), the reactor will scram, the motor 
generator set flywheel will ensure an appropriate pump coastdown to remove the fission 
product decay heat produced in the reactor. Transition to natural convection will still 
occur assisted by the motor generator set flywheels. The motor generator set flywheels 
are located on the pump motor generators sets to maintain power to the pumps during 
loss of normal and backup power. 
 
The emergency power is supplied by the standby generator. If this power source also 
fails, a storage battery which is connected in parallel with the rectifier output will operate 
the pump effectively for approximately 30 minutes. As the batteries discharge, the 
resulting gradual flow reduction will provide a transition from forced flow to natural 
convection cooling. 
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II.11 Electrical Power Systems  
II.11.1 Power Transmission System 
 
 The power transmission system provides the electrical subsystems for the control and 
distribution of power between the off-site power system and the station service AC power 
systems. The generating station can receive AC power from the main generator; from off-
site backfeed through the main generator step-up transformers; or from off-site ties 
through reserve station service transformers. 
 
 The power transmission system provides the means for the control and transmission 
of generator output power to the utility grid through the main generating step-up 
transformers and the station switchyards. 
 
 The system shall be designed so that power can be supplied from the generator output 
during normal operation, or from the off-site power sources during startup and shutdown, 
or during maintenance or repair of parts of the normal system. An automatic bus transfer 
scheme shall be used to transfer from the unit station service transformer to the off-site 
source for certain loss of power events. The preferred transfer will be to the off-site 
supply feed through the generator step-up transformers. If this latter supply is lost or 
unavailable, station service system will automatically transfer to the reserve power 
supply. The generator load break switch shall be capable of full load current circuit 
interruption and fault current circuit interruption. 
 
 The power transmission system is a nonsafety-grade system and is classified as 
Quality Assurance Group D in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. 
 
 The power transmission system supplies three alternate power connections for the 
plant station service load. A reserve supply is provided from the off-site system, via two 
three-winding reserve station service transformers, each 161 kV to 13.8 kV-4.16 kV. The 
two reserve sources are developed in a 161 kV switchyard. Each reserve source 
connection from the switchyard is installed in a duct bank or in a concrete lined trench, 
set in a sand filled earthen furrow, and bridged with precast concrete covers designed 
with drainage provisions, and protected along roadways, access ways, and removed from 
major building foundations. Either of these installation methods offers accessibility and 
protection and is able to accommodate future circuits. Separation of duct banks (or 
trenches) is required for each reserve source connection (i.e., each has a dedicated 
installation). Within a duct bank (or trench), control circuits are specified as separate 
from power circuits. The electrical power interface of the Class IE AC power systems 
and the power transmission system is located at the Class IE 4 kV switchgear breaker 
terminals. 
II.11.2 Station Power System 
 
 The station power system receives power from the power transmission system, 
provides standby AC and DC power supplies, and distributes power to all building and 
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equipment loads of the power station. It also provides the plant grounding grids for safety 
grounding of electrical circuits and building structures. The electrical load of this system 
is commonly called "the hotel load." 
 
 The station power system shall receive power from the power transmission system 
and provide the transformers and associated switching and control equipment necessary 
to supply the maximum design station electrical power load. 
 
 The station power system shall provide standby AC and DC electrical power capacity 
sufficient to supply essential loads upon complete loss of power at the interfaces between 
the power transmission system and the station power system. 
 
 Those portions of the Station Power System that provide power to Class IE power 
systems as defined in IEEE Standard 308 shall meet the requirements of this Standard. 
 
 The interfaces between the Station Power System and the systems that receive power 
from the Station Power System shall be established by interface agreements between the 
responsible design organizations. These agreements shall be prepared with due 
consideration for minimizing fragmentation of design and construction responsibility. 
Similar interface agreements shall be prepared for connection of structures and 
equipment to the plant grounding grids. 
 
 The station power system provides electrical power to all station loads, grounding for 
electrically energized equipment and plant structures, and lightning protection for the 
plant. This system consists of standard industrial power plant type equipment necessary 
to distribute power to the loads. This equipment includes medium voltage and low 
voltage switchgear buses, medium voltage to low voltage step-down unit substations, 
distribution transformers and panels, station batteries, and standby turbine-generator 
units. 
 
 The station power system is designed to supply the plant loads at the appropriate 
utilization voltages. The nominal bus voltages selected are: 
 
1. 13.8 kVAC, nominal, 3-phase, 3-wire, 60 Hz - Power supply for very large motor-
driven equipment rated 13.2 kVAC, resistive loads, and unit substation 
transformers with transformer primary rated 13.8 kVAC nominal. 
2. 4.16 kVAC, nominal, 3-phase, 3-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for large motor-
driven equipment rated 4.0 kVAC and unit substation transformers with 
transformer primary rated 4.16 kVAC nominal. 
3. 480 VAC/277 VAC, nominal, 3-phase, 4-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for heat 
tracing control panels and plant lighting. 
4. 480 VAC, nominal, 3-phase, 3-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for small motor-driven 
equipment, lighting, heating loads, and welders. 
5. 120/208 VAC, nominal, 3-phase, 4-wire, 60 Hz - power supply for control 
systems, instrumentation, lighting, communications, and small (generally 
fractional horsepower) motor-driven equipment. 
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6. 250 VDC, nominal 2-wire - power supply for DC motor-driven equipment. 
7. 125 VDC, nominal 2-wire - power supply for control systems, instrumentation 
and annunciation. 
8. 120/208 VAC nominal 3-phase, 4-wire, 60 Hz, uninterruptibel power supply for 
control and instrumentation which must be continuously energized under all plant 
operating modes. 
 
 The station power system is radial in configuration, that is, there are no bus ties, 
double-ended substations, or primary selector switches. 
 
 Each medium voltage bus (13.8 kV and 4.16 kV nominal) has at least two 
transferable incoming supplies. One supply is from one of the two Unit station service 
transformers; the second supply is from one of the two Reserve Transformers. Power can 
be supplied to the 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV buses via the Unit station service transformers 
from the main turbine-generator (Plant Power Supply) with the generator circuit breaker 
closed, or from an off-site power source via the generating switchyard and main 
transformer with the generator circuit breaker open or from the reserve transformer. The 
off-site power via the generating switchyard is considered the preferred power supply, 
because it serves as the first access to the utility power transmission grid upon plant trip 
and is consistent with utility terminology. 
 
 The station power system delivers the maximum total continuous plant power 
requirements from the plant, preferred or reserve power supplies. All 480 VAC nominal 
unit substations are fed from medium voltage buses through unit substation transformers; 
and 480 VAC nominal motor control centers are fed from 480 VAC unit substations. 
Voltage at unit substations and motor control center buses is adjusted by no-load tap 
changers at the USS transformers to ensure acceptable voltage regulation. 
 
 The 120/208 VAC and 277/480 VAC nominal power and lighting panels are fed from 
the 480 VAC nominal motor control centers through dry type distribution transformers. 
Voltage at the power and lighting panels is adjusted by no-load tap changers at the 
distribution transformers to ensure acceptable voltage regulation. 
 
 The standby AC power system is divided into two load groups known as Division 1 
and 2 that are powered from two gas turbine-generator units. One generator unit feeds 
Division 1 and one generator unit feeds Division 2. Division 1 and 2 are physically and 
electrically independent power systems. The gas turbine-generator units are housed in 
separate buildings as shown on Fig. II.9-1, and the buildings and equipment are Seismic 
Category I and Safety Grade. Standard LWR practice is to use diesel-generator units for 
on-site standby power. Gas turbine-driven generators are an acceptable alternative for a 
pool-type sodium-cooled fast reactor because the large thermal capacity in the sodium 
pool eliminates the fast starting requirements of the LWR plants. Tests conducted on 
sodium-cooled fast-reactor plants in the United States and in Europe have demonstrated 
that properly designed systems can safely withstand loss of normal power without 
operation of standby generators for extended periods of time. One standby generator has 
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the capacity to supply the Class IE and other essential loads if one generator is 
inoperative during the loss of off-site power. 
 
 A detailed system load analysis of the hotel power requirements has not yet been 
made, however, it is currently estimated that 6MWe is reserved for hotel loads. For 
purposes of comparison, Phenix a 254 MWe plant has a hotel load of 16 MWe. 
II.11.3 Sodium Piping and Equipment Heating and Insulation System 
 
 The sodium piping and equipment heating and insulation system provides the piping 
and equipment insulation and insulation hardware, electrical heaters, the heater mounting 
devices, the electrical power controllers and the temperature sensors, required to insulate 
and heat the sodium or the NaK containing components of the following process systems: 
 
1. Reactor vessel assembly system 
2. Fuel receiving, storage, and shipping system 
3. Intermediate heat transport system 
4. Direct reactor auxiliary cooling systems 
5. Steam generator system 
6. Liquid metals auxiliaries system 
7. Inert gas system 
8. Impurity monitoring and analysis system 
 
 This system also provides a heating system for preheating the reactor vessel prior to 
sodium loading. 
 
 The sodium piping and equipment heating and insulation system provides the 
following heating and insulation functions for those process systems that contain sodium 
or NaK: 
 
1. Preheat the sodium process systems solid metal parts, before the systems are filled 
with liquid metal sodium, from ambient conditions up to 232°C (450°F). 
2. Heat the sodium process systems from plant extended shutdown conditions to 
reactor startup conditions, with the process systems filled with sodium. 
3. The piping and equipment electrical heating system shall provide controlled heat 
to melt sequentially the frozen sodium. 
4. Insulate to limit piping and equipment heat losses to the building and maintain 
insulation surface temperatures at or below 140°F. 
5. The sodium piping and equipment heating and insulation system is nonsafety 
grade. 
 
 Electrical power is used for the piping and equipment heaters. The heating cable is 
either wrapped around the component or piping or placed in zig-zag pattern on the 
surface of the component. The heat rate required by different components is controlled by 
thermocouples which monitor piping and component temperatures and adjust the power 
supplied to the heaters. 
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 The insulation system consists of an inner jacket of stainless steel, insulation layer of 
either mineral or reflective insulation depending on the operating temperature, and an 
outer protective jacket of stainless steel. 
 
 For smaller piping or components, the heaters are wrapped around the component. 
For tanks and large components, the heaters are arranged in banks. 
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II.12 In-Service Inspection  
 
In-service inspection (ISI) is the examination required during the plant operation life 
to early detect potential failures.  Its objectives are to 1) confirm integrity of function of 
parts necessary to safety, and 2) satisfy the needs to protect plant investment and high 
plant availability.  In this regard, the in-service inspection approach for ABTR is 
established in such a way that inspectability of all components of the reactor system is 
ensured.   
 
II.12.1 In-Service Inspection Requirements 
The in-service inspection approach is based on the rules and requirements delineated 
in Division 3, Section XI of the ASME boiler and pressure vessel code, “Rules for 
inspection and testing of components of liquid-Metal cooled plants”.  The code sections 
specify identification and classification of components subject to inspection, provisions 
for accessibility, examination methods and procedures, inspection plans and schedules, 
and repair requirements.   
II.12.1.1 Components Subject to Inspection 
The code specifies inspection requirements for nuclear safety grade components 
containing liquid-metal and cover-gas in liquid-metal cooled nuclear plants.  The rules 
are established based upon anticipated characteristics of the systems which contain 
sodium coolant and protections against failure of the liquid-metal coolant boundaries.  
For example, it is anticipated that, due to the low vapor pressure of sodium and the 
inherent ductility and toughness of the coolant boundary material, reactor internal 
structures will not fail with sudden release of energy.  Also, double walled pipes and 
vessels are used for protection against loss of core cooling, and inert gas is introduced 
within all the plant components containing free liquid metal surfaces.    
Safety grade components of liquid-metal reactor containing other fluids may be 
provided by references to articles in Division 1.   
II.12.1.2 Accessibility 
Providing adequate access for inspection and maintenance is an important factor in 
the reactor design.  Article IMA-1500 of the code specifies that accessibility provisions 
shall be made with the following considerations: 
1. Access for the inspector, examination personnel, and equipment necessary to 
conduct the examination, 
2. Capability for removal and storage of structural members, shielding components, 
insulating materials, and other equipment and components required to perform the 
visual observations, examinations, and tests,  
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3. Installation and support of handling machinery (e.g. hoists or other handling 
equipment) where required to facilitate removal, disassembly, and storage of 
equipment, components, and other examinations, 
4. Performance of alternative or additional examinations to those specified herein in 
the event structural defects or indications are revealed that may require such 
alternative examinations, 
5. Performance of necessary operations associated with repair or replacements of 
system components in the event structural defects or indications are that may 
require such repair or replacements. 
II.12.1.3 Examination Methods 
 
The code specifies four types of examination methods used during in-service 
inspection, namely visual, surface, continuous monitoring, and volumetric examinations.  
 
Visual Examination is the primary method of inspecting for liquid metal retaining 
components.  The code defines the following categories of visual examination:   
1. VTM1:  close range examination to detect discontinuities and imperfections on 
the surface of components, including such conditions as cracks, wear, corrosion, 
or erosion. 
2. VTM2:  examination of exterior surfaces in such a way that accumulation of 
liquids, liquid drops and smoke are discernable.  The removal of external 
covering, such as insulation, is not required for VTM-2 visual examination. 
3. VTM3:  examination to determine the general mechanical and structural 
conditions of components and their supports by verifying parameters such as 
clearance, settings, and physical displacements; and to detect discontinuities and 
imperfections, such as loss of integrity as bolted or welded connections, loose or 
missing parts, debris, corrosion, wear, or erosion.   
 
Continuous monitoring (CM) of the region outside the liquid-metal and cover-gas 
containment boundary can provide detection of leakage.  Other operation parameters, 
such as pressure, coolant flow, temperature, flux, vibration can be monitored to 
supplement other examination methods.   
 
Surface examination is used to detect the presence of surface or near-surface cracks.  
It may be conducted by either a magnetic particle or a liquid penetrant method. 
 
Volumetric examination is used to detect cracks and discontinuities throughout the 
volume of the material.  The recognized techniques are radiographic examination, 
ultrasonic examination, and eddy-current examination. 
 
These examination methods may be substituted by alternative examination methods, a 
combination of methods, or newly developed techniques, if they are demonstrated to be 
equivalent or superior, and accepted by the inspector.   
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II.12.1.4 Inspection Plans and Schedules 
 
The code requires that inspection plans shall be developed, which delineate the 
following:  
 
1. Classification of the components and the boundaries of the system classifications, 
2. Identification of components subject to examination and testing; 
3. The code requirements by category, item number for each component and the 
examination or test to be performed, 
4. The code cases proposed for use and the extent of their application, 
5. Schedule for performance of examination and tests. 
 
It is also required that all the liquid metal retaining components shall be continuously 
monitored for leakage.  These requirements are delineated in this section for reactor 
internals and vessel, and summarized in Table II.12-1.   
 
Reactor internals are required to be inspected via VTM-3 visual examination 
methods. VTM-3 inspection may be conducted via direct or remote visual examination, 
dimensional gauging, and ultrasonic scanning.  The key guidelines principles for the 
inspection requirements are summarized as following. 
 
1. For integrally welded components, observe dimensional or positional 
relationships that ensure a coolable and controllable core geometry and adequate 
coolant circulation. 
2. Observe the location of each removable or non-welded component and verify the 
as-installed location of visible fasteners.   
3. Components for which the applicable requirement above cannot be met shall be 
examined by some other methods capable of determining the general condition 
and functionality of the component.   
 
Reactor vessel is required to be continuously monitored for liquid-metal leakage and 
periodically inspected via VTM-2 visual inspection as.  The visual inspection is required 
for the following weld joints: longitudinal and circumferential shell welds, meridional 
and circumferential head welds, shell-to-flange welds, shell-to-head welds. 
 
The code specifies inspection time intervals during which the inspection should be 
performed.  Accordingly, the inspection schedules for ASME class 1 liquid metal or 
cover gas retaining components may follow the programs given in Table II.12-2 or II.12-
3.  The in-service inspection of the subject components shall be completed during each of 
the inspection intervals for the service lifetime of the plant.  Each inspection interval may 
be decreased or extended by as much as 1 year.  Deferral of inspections to the end of the 
interval is permitted.  During each interval, 100% of the reactor internal structures must 
be examined.  For the reactor vessel, 33% of the vessel welds must be examined, so that 
essentially 100% if the vessel welds are inspected by the end of the third interval.   
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Table II.12-1 In-Service Inspection Plan Requirements for Liquid-metal Cooled Reactor Components 
Schedule & Extent Code 
Item Components Examined ISI Method 1
st inspection
interval 
Successive 
Intervals 
VTM-2 33% 33% B1.10 Reactor Vessel (RV) Cont. monitoring 100% 100% 
B5.10 Reactor Vessel: Circumferential shell welds joining dissimilar metals * Volumetric 100% 100% 
VTM-3 100% 100%  Guard Vessel Cont. monitoring 100% 100% 
F1.10 Reactor Support  - bolts & welds VTM-3 100% 100% 
B12.20 In-vessel components above sodium level VTM-3 100% 100% 
VTM-3 100% 100% 
B12.10 
Integrally welded Reactor Internals:   
    Core support / Retainer/ Inlet manifold and plenum / Thermal 
barriers Cont. monitoring 100% 100% 
B12.20 Removable reactor internal components VTM-3 100% 100% 
 EM Pumps, IHX Cont. monitoring 100% 100% 
B3.10 
B3.20 
 
B3.30 
B3.40 
B6.10 
Reactor Cover (rotating plugs and deck) 
Control rod drive and other above cover mechanisms containing 
cover gas 
Primary cover gas systems - vessel welds, piping welds, valves and 
stem seals, other gas tight components) 
Reactor Closure Bolting 
Cont. monitoring 
External or 
adjacent to 
surface 
monitored 
External or 
adjacent to 
surface 
monitored 
VTM-2 33% (100% for **)
33% 
(100 % for **)
 
 
B8.10 
B8.14 
B9.10 
Liquid metal retaining heat transport loop piping protected by guard 
pipe 
- circumferential / longitudinal welds 
- branch pipe connection welds** 
- piping boundary 
Cont. monitoring 100% 100% 
C2.30 Guard pipes on intermediate liquid metal boundary        - all guard pipe welds  VTM-3 100% 100% 
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Table II.12-2 Inspection Program A (Table IMB-2411-1) 
 
Inspection 
Interval 
Inspection Period, 
Calendar Years of 
Plant Service 
Minimum 
Examinations 
Completed, % 
Maximum 
Examinations 
Credited, % 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
 
3rd 
 
 
 
 
4th 
 
3 
 
7 
10 
 
13 
17 
20 
23 
 
27 
30 
33 
37 
40 
100 
 
33 
100 
 
16 
40 
66 
100 
 
8 
25 
50 
75 
100 
100 
 
67 
100 
 
34 
50 
75 
100 
 
16 
34 
67 
100 
… 
 
 
 
Table II.12-3 Inspection Program B (Table IMB-2411-1) 
 
Inspection 
Interval 
Inspection Period, 
Calendar Years of 
Plant Service 
Minimum 
Examinations 
Completed, % 
Maximum 
Examinations 
Credited, % 
1st 
 
 
 
2nd 
 
 
 
3rd 
 
 
 
4th 
 
3 
7 
10 
 
13 
17 
20 
 
23 
27 
30 
 
33 
37 
40 
16 
50 
100 
 
16 
50 
100 
 
16 
50 
100 
 
16 
50 
100 
34 
67 
100 
 
34 
67 
100 
 
34 
67 
100 
 
34 
100 
… 
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II.12.2 Examination Techniques 
II.12.2.1 Description of Examination Techniques  
 
The following examination techniques are adopted for the conduct of in-service 
inspection of ABTR.   
 
Continuous Monitoring:  The in-service inspection approach heavily utilizes 
continuous monitoring of various operating conditions.  Sodium vapor sensors can 
monitor the presence of sodium vapor in the atmosphere.  Sodium liquid detectors can 
monitor the presence of liquid sodium in bottom of a vessel.  Gas pressure gauge is used 
for leakage test of a vessel by directly pressurizing.  Radiation sensors monitor an area 
for cover-gas leaks.  In addition, various sensors are available for monitoring the 
conditions of reactor internals – flow, pressure, vibration, temperature, coolant level, and 
pump power.  These technologies are readily available.   
Remote Operated Robotic Vehicle (ROV) can be equipped with cameras and light 
sources to inspect parts of the components inaccessible by human, such as reactor/guard 
vessel surfaces and reactor support skirt.  This robotic device should be able to navigate 
in small areas of vertical vessel walls, to precisely position the camera, and to endure 
high temperature and radiation. Currently, this technology is not available on commercial 
basis. 
Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT) can be used for volumetric inspection 
of structural elements, such as reactor vessel.  Compared to ultrasonic transducers, this 
device is particularly suitable for remote inspection because it does not require corpulent 
fluid and is adequate for high temperature use. 
Eddy Current Examination can be used for detection of structural failures in pipes 
and tubes of NSSS systems.   
Periscope/Camera:   Periscope or camera systems, inserted through the access port in 
the reactor head closure, can be used to visually observe the cover gas area within 
containment boundary.  Special provision is needed to keep the camera lens clear from 
sodium vapor build-up. 
Dimensional Gauging Probe:  In areas where dimensional gauging is not possible 
with direct visual observation, positioning mechanisms can be used to indirectly verify 
structural integrity of structural components.  In-vessel fuel handling machine or an 
equivalent indexing mechanism can be used for this purpose.  
Under-Sodium Viewer (USV):  Due to the opacity of sodium, the reactor internals 
below sodium level cannot be observed with optical means. To this end, conceptually, 
under-sodium viewing devices may be effectively utilized to carry out visual inspection 
of the components submerged under sodium.  Typically, these are ultrasonic metrology 
devices that emit high frequency sound waves and receive the reflecting waves to 
perceive environmental objects.  Special design provisions are made to match the 
acoustic impedance with sodium, and to withstand high temperature use.  This device can 
be used for mapping the core, horizontal baffle and vessel liner during and following fuel 
handling, and also be used as a core sweep at the start of refueling.  Currently, the 
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benefits of using this device are uncertain because of the immature state-of-the art of the 
technology. 
II.12.2.2 Evaluation of Examination Techniques 
 
To ensure inspectability of the reactor system, it is important to adopt proven and 
readily available inspection techniques.  While most of the above techniques mature, the 
some techniques are based on immature technology basis, and require improvement.  In 
particular, the following techniques need particular attention. 
 
Under-sodium Viewing  
 
Due to the opacity of the sodium coolant, the under-sodium viewing technique is 
important for ensuring full inspectability of reactor internals and internal components.  
Visual inspection is needed not only for the normal VTM-3 inspection, but also for 
supplemental close-up viewing. With available USV technology, many difficult 
inspection processes will be made possible or simplified.  Otherwise, inspections may 
require complex design provisions and procedures, which may involve draining of 
sodium to expose the parts.   In spite of the apparent benefits, however, the current state-
of-the-art of the technology exhibits some significant limitations against its deployment.   
 
The first limitation attributes from unavailability of high temperature ultrasonic 
transducer.  The typical transducer materials have relatively low Curie temperature, and 
thus they will lose the piezoelectric characteristics in the high temperature environment 
inside the reactor.  Some piezoelectric material, such as LiNbO3 (Lithium Niobate), can 
withstand high temperature, but their sensitivity is known to be impractically low.  In 
addition, the bonding between the piezoelectric element and the face plate tends to fail 
easily at high temperature.   
 
Another limitation attributes from the inaccuracy of measurement.  To make accurate 
ultrasonic measurement, the object’s surface has to be flat and in the transducer should be 
faced normal to the object surface.  It is difficult to measure the pose of the parts with 
curved or oblique surface, especially when it is specular.  Since most parts are of such 
nature, it is not possible to use current ultrasonic techniques for general imaging.  To 
circumvent such technical difficulty, flat plates may be provided at predefined locations 
in order to facilitate accurate positional measurement at these locations.  However, such 
design provisions require substantial installations and may be impractical for general 
purpose inspection.  Due to such difficulties, the current ultrasonic viewing techniques 
have limited success only in ranging mode operation, which intends to identify the 
presence of an object, such as for path clearance during fuel handling.   
 
To this end, technology development is needed to develop sensor configuration for 
high temperature use, and to improve measurement accuracy.  Such improvements may 
be leveraged and improved upon recent advances in sensor and signal processing 
technologies.     
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Remote Operated Robotic Vehicle for Reactor Vessel Inspection 
 
The ASME code requires visual inspection of the reactor vessel (RV) welds.  An 
annular gap is provided between the reactor vessel and the guard vessel (GV), in order to 
allow access for the remote operated robotic vehicle to perform remote visual inspection.  
Since this ISI gap contains sodium in case the reactor vessel leaks, it determines the 
faulted sodium level in the reactor.  Therefore, minimizing the ISI gap will bring about 
significant benefit of reducing the sodium level variations in faulted conditions.  This is a 
significant benefit in terms of reactor design, because it allows for reducing the height of 
the reactor, more compact reactor, and alleviating design requirements for many reactor 
internal components.  In this regard, introducing small size robotic vehicle is a significant 
benefit.   
 
Since no commercially available robotic system can meet the unique requirements of 
reactor vessel inspection, such as having small size, and being tolerant to high 
temperature and radiation.  Recently, reactor vessel inspection robots have been 
developed for a few sodium cooled reactors, such as Monju in Japan and Super Phoenix 
in France, but the developed systems are much larger in size.  Therefore, development of 
a new robotic system is necessary, with emphasis on size-reduction, adaptation to high 
temperature use, and design of the locomotion mechanism and the camera system.  
Recent advances in robotics and inspection technologies may be leveraged for the needed 
development.   
 
II.12.3 In-service Inspection Approach for ABTR 
 
In-service inspection approaches for ABTR are established based on the following 
general guidelines, which is consistent with the ASME code section XI: 
 
- In-service inspection will be conducted during refueling or service outage, 
- Available examination technologies are adopted, 
- Access provisions are provided for all components of the reactor system, 
- Design provisions are made to reduce possible areas and modes of failures, 
- All liquid metal and cover gas containment boundaries will be continuously 
monitored for leakage, 
- Continuous monitoring of reactor operating variables will be utilized to 
supplement or replace other inspection methods, whenever possible, 
- Problem areas observed in the normal in-service inspection will be further 
investigated.  
 
The in-service inspection approaches cover for both normal and supplemental 
inspections.  The supplemental inspections may be follow-up examinations in the event 
the normal inspections indicate deviations from normal operating or structural conditions. 
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II.12.3.1 Approaches for Accessibility 
 
The ABTR design has incorporated access provisions for in-service inspection 
according to the code requirements.  These design provisions include: 
 
1. Annular space (ISI gap) between reactor vessel and guard vessel for inspection, 
2. Entry ports in the reactor support skirt for access to the ISI gap, 
3. Access provisions to allow inspection of reactor deck structure, 
4. Space for installing work platforms and lighting and shielding and insulation 
during inspection and maintenance,  
5. Verification that welds requiring inspection are not in inaccessible locations, 
6. Access provisions for inspection within the reactor vessel.  These provisions 
include access ports in the reactor deck and the rotating plug, passage holes in the 
horizontal baffle plates, and passage to the bottom of the core support structure. 
 
In addition to accessibility, design focus was directed to reducing the possible areas 
and modes of failure.  By reducing the possible failure modes, it is possible to reduce 
inspection requirements.  For example, the core support load path is arranged in such a 
way that critical in-vessel structures are normally in compression, while the principal 
tensile load path is only in the reactor vessel wall, which will be continuously monitored 
for leaks that would indicate crack propagation.   
II.12.3.2 Proposed Inspection Methods and Procedures 
 
This section specifies the in-service inspection approaches for the reactor system 
components, with emphasis given to nuclear safety grade components of the reactor 
internals, the reactor vessel and the reactor closure, which are shown in Figure II.12-1.  
fThe inspection of the non-nuclear safety grade components of the remaining nuclear 
steam generation system, such as intermediate heat transport system and steam generation 
system, is considered far less difficult, and not detailed in this report.   
 
The inspection methods and procedures are established in accordance with possible 
failure modes of associated components.  While the ASME code provides general 
guidelines, each individual examination that makes up the inspection has to be 
established in consideration of its own unique limitations on access and geometry.  Even 
a single component can fail in various ways, and each case may require different 
inspection techniques.  These aspects cannot be generalized, and inspection methods 
must be considered individually associated with possible failure modes.  Therefore, the 
failure modes of the reactor components are first postulated, and subsequently the 
inspection techniques are established that are capable of detecting the onset of these 
failures.  Table II.12-4 presents a list of failure modes and the suggested in-service 
inspection approaches for ABTR.  Both normal examination methods and follow-up 
examination methods are presented for each failure modes.   
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Inspection of Reactor Internals 
 
Normal in-service inspection of reactor internals and internal components require 
VTM-3 visual inspection.  The sodium surface and the in-reactor vessel components 
above the sodium level will be examined using periscope or camera, inserted through the 
multiple access ports in the closure head deck. 
 
 
For components below the sodium level, normal in-service inspection approach is 
based on continuous monitoring, dimensional gauging and under-sodium viewing.  
Continuous monitoring of sodium levels, outlet temperature of a limited number of core 
assemblies, vibration and the pressure in the pump discharge manifold will provide 
indication of the integrity of the pressurized components (core barrel, inlet plenum, and 
primary piping discharge manifolds) in hard-to-access areas of the reactor pool as will 
statistical analysis of primary pump power.   
 
The structural components of the core support and restraints will be inspected with 
dimensional gauging.  Dimensional gauging will be performed by indexing with the fuel 
handling machine or other dedicated indexing mechanism on several specified locations 
on several specified locations on the top of the former ring and other structural 
components in the hot pool.   This technique can determine possible shifts in elevation of 
components. The verification of the proper location of a component, such as the top of 
core barrel, can also imply a proper location for the core support structure.  Figure II.12-2 
               
(a) Reactor vessel and closure        (b) Reactor internal structure 
 
Figure II.12-1 Areas Subject to Inspection  
  191
 
illustrates the concept of dimensional gauging with such indexing mechanisms.  Under-
sodium viewer can also be used to map the core top, and used to investigate the condition 
of many difficult to reach areas.  The under-sodium viewer is inserted through ports in 
the rotating plug, and additional access to vessel internals components are provided 
through ports in the outer radius in the fixed part of the closure head deck.   For accurate 
measurement, gauge blocks and gauge marks are set at key locations to serve as reference 
marks for under-sodium viewer.  The rotating plug can move the fuel-handling machine 
and the under-sodium viewer to various locations inside the reactor vessel.   
 
Large cracks or separation of the reactor vessel liner will be detected by continuous 
monitoring of vessel temperatures and pump well level. The inspection will be 
supplemented with visual inspections, for which camera/periscope will be used for above 
sodium-level portion, and under-sodium viewer will be used for below sodium-level 
portion.   
 
Failures in redan, such as at various connections to storage basket, intermediate heat 
exchanger, and pump wells, are checked by dimensional gauging.  This can be performed 
with fuel handling machine or under-sodium viewer, and indexing various wells and 
penetrations.   
 
Upper internals structure (USS) is associated with various failure modes as delineated 
in Table II.12-4.  Its structural integrity is checked primarily via continuous monitoring 
with acoustic sensors, and use of an under-sodium viewer.   
 
Anomalies in the control rod drives can be tested through periodic test operations and 
by monitoring the drive motor current.   
 
The integrity of the instrument drywells will be verified by continuous monitoring for 
leakage with reactor cover radiation monitors, and visually inspecting for distortion using 
periscope/camera. 
 
Continuous monitoring will be the primary source of information on the operation of 
the primary pumps and intermediate heat exchanger.  For this purpose, cover gas leak 
will be monitored with radiation monitor, and pump oil leakage will be monitored.   
 
DRACS may fail by sodium leakage, sodium blockage, and air-side blockage.  
Currently, the requirements for its inspection are not explicitly specified in the ASME 
code.  To ensure safe and reliable operation, continuous monitoring of the relevant 
operation parameters is recommended.  The detailed scope and procedures shall be 
developed. 
 
Problems observed in the normal in-service inspection will be further investigated by 
follow-up examinations.  These follow-up examinations may include close-up viewing 
with optical instruments and under-sodium viewing of difficult-to-access areas.  Such 
procedures require more extensive access and may involve removal of components and 
lowering sodium level, as delineated in Table II.12-4, supplemental inspection column.  
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Such extensive ordeals may be alleviated if accurate under-sodium imaging technology is 
available.  However, the current state-of-the-art of the technology does not meet such 
expectations. The results of the follow-up examination will be used to verify structural 
failure and plan detailed maintenance procedures.  Maintenance approaches are identified 
for most of the components in the reactor vessel.  Some major structures do not have 
outlined maintenance plan because it is considered improbable that a relevant structural 
failure can be repaired.  
 
 
 
Inspection of Reactor Vessels and Closures 
 
Inspection of the reactor vessel will be conducted via visual examination (VTM-2) of 
all welds and continuous monitoring.  The reactor vessel will be continuously monitored 
for sodium and gas leakage.  Sensors and measurement techniques are readily available 
for this purpose.  The visual inspection is performed using a camera system mounted on a 
remotely operated robotic vehicle.  This robotic device will be installed in the annulus 
between the reactor vessel and the guard vessel, as shown in Figure II.12-3.  Currently, 
there is no commercially available system for this purpose.   
 
VTM-3 visual inspection is required for the guard vessel.  This is conducted using a 
TV camera mounted on the remote operated robotic vehicle.  Continuous monitoring of 
pressure in the reactor vessel/guard vessel annulus will provide initial detection of leak.  
Follow-up examinations will consist of close-up visual examination of the annulus, and 
analyzing a gas sample from the annulus. 
          
(a) Pantograph fuel handling machine       (b) Double-pantograph indexing machine 
 
Figure II.12-2 Dimensional Gauging with Indexing Mechanisms 
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Sodium vapor sensors are adopted to monitor the annulus region between the reactor 
vessel and the guard vessel for sodium vapor.  Sodium liquid detectors monitor the 
presence of liquid sodium in the reactor vessel/guard vessel annulus bottom.  Gas 
pressure gauge is used for leakage test, in which reactor vessel/guard vessel annulus is 
pressurized.  Radiation sensors monitor the reactor closure for cover-gas leaks.  In 
addition, various sensors are utilized to monitor the conditions of reactor internals – flow, 
pressure, vibration, temperature, coolant level, and pump power. 
 
VTM-3 visual inspection is required for normal inspection of the reactor support in 
the head access area.  For this purpose, the reactor support skirt welds and bolts will be 
inspected with remote visual examination using a camera on the remote operated robotic 
vehicle.   
 
       The reactor closure, including the deck and rotatable plug, will be continuously 
monitored for leaks, using radiation detectors in the head access area.  Analysis of reactor 
cover gas and the primary sodium purity will provide follow-up indications. 
 
Further inspection will be performed if abnormal conditions are detected during 
normal inspection.  Such supplemental inspection will involve broader TV viewing to 
pinpoint the problem area, and subsequent close-up visual inspection (VTM-1) and 
volumetric inspection with electromagnetic acoustic transducer to characterize the 
condition of the defects.  
 
 
Remote Operated
Vehicle (ROV)
Camera
Electromagnetic 
Acoustic Transducer 
(EMAT)
Guard Vessel
Reactor Vessel
Sodium 
Level
ISI
Gap
ROV 
Controller
     
Guide RailWinch
Unit
x
y L2
L1
B
R
Reactor
VesselInspection
Unit & Weight
cables
 
 
                 (a) Wheel type ROV                                                         (b) Cable an d Winch Type ROV 
 
Figure II.12-3 Reactor Vessel Inspection with ROV 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (1/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental 
Inspection (SI), if a 
problem is indicated 
  1. Reactor Vessel  Weld crack  
   (below Na level) 
 Weld crack  
   (cover-gas region) 
 Exterior surface deterioration 
1.1 CM:  Sodium leak, 
Radiation, RV/GV 
annulus pressure 
1.2 Periodic visual 
inspection with ROV 
and camera 
VTM-2 inspection on all 
welds plus Continuous 
monitoring 
1.1 Broader TV viewing 
to pinpoint the area 
1.2 VTM-1 inspection 
with zoom lens or 
fiberscope 
1.3 Localized inspection 
w/ ultrasonic transducer 
  2. Guard Vessel  Weld crack 
 Interior surface deterioration 
2.1 CM: Cover gas leak, 
Radiation, Pressure 
2.2  same as 1.2 
VTM-3 inspection for 
low-alloy steel 
2.1 Same as 1.1-1.3.  
2.2 additional inspection 
from the outside  
  3. RV/GV Support  Crack or distortion 3.1 Visual inspection with 
ROV and camera 
Visual VTM-3  3.1 Surface inspections, 
Volumetric inspections, 
and VTM-1 exam. 
4.Reactor Internals 
- Core support  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Massive weld failure 
Support to reactor vessel weld 
failure 
 
 
4.1 Check height of core 
barrel with IVHM or 
USV 
4.2 Measure loads to 
remove fuel assy. 
4.3 Test operation of 
control rods 
 
4.4 same as 1.2 
4.5 same as 4.1 thru 4.3 
 
VTM-3 inspection 
 
 
4.1 Access to the bottom 
of the reactor vessel, 
and use USV in the core 
support region if there 
has been structural 
movement. 
 
 
4.2 Same as 4.1 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (2/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental Inspection 
(SI), if a problem is 
indicated 
 - Shield barrel and   
    inlet plenum 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - Core restraints 
 
 
 
 
Massive or barrel-to-plenum 
weld failure 
Massive plenum top and 
bottom plate failure 
Module sleeve weld failure 
 
Separation of shield barrel 
with weld crack 
Broken retaining pins 
 
 
 
Formal ring breakup 
 
4.6 same as 4.1 thru 4.3 
 
 
4.7 same as 4.1 thru 4.3 
4.8 CM with overcore 
thermocouple 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Vibration/Acoustic 
Sensors for loose part 
4.10 Core outlet temp. for 
flow distribution 
 
4.11 Indexing on shield 
barrel with IVHM and 
USV 
 
4.12 Index reference points 
on the core restraints 
with IVIM 
4.13 Loose parts monitor 
4.14 USV core sweep 
 
4.15 same as 4.12 – 4.14 
VTM-3 inspection 
 
4.3 Same as 4.1 
 
 
4.4 Same as 4.1 
4.5 Examine plate surface 
with USV. 
4.6 Drain Na and examine 
with remote optical 
instruments. 
 
 
4.7 Same as 4.1 
4.8 same as 4.6 
 
 
 
4.9 Examine shield barrier 
below redan using USV 
 
 
4.10 Imaging with USV. 
Further examination will 
require core removal and 
partial drain. 
 
 
4.11 Same as 4.10 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (3/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental Inspection 
(SI), if a problem is 
indicated 
  - Pump well 
- Pump discharge  
     pipes 
 
  - Vessel thermal liner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Well weld failure 
Large Na leak (weld fail at 
pump or plenum) 
Large liner crack 
Separation of liner from vessel 
 
4.16 Examine well position 
with Periscope /camera 
above the Na level.  
Use USV to check 
position below Na 
level. 
 
4.17 Monitor pump well 
level, pump speed, 
pump discharge flow, 
core outlet temperature 
 
 
 
4.18 Monitor pump well 
level and vessel temp. 
4.19 Examine above Na 
level region with 
camera /periscope 
 
4.20 same as 4.18 
4.21 USV of selected 
points on the liner and 
on top of horizontal 
baffle assembly 
 
VTM-3 inspection 
 
4.12 Remove pump, 
examine interior of well 
with camera/periscope 
above Na level, and 
USV below Na surface 
 
 
4.13 Remove pump, 
examine pipes from 
within using USV.   
4.14 If needed, remove 
fuel, drain Na, and 
examine pipe optically 
 
4.15 Remove core, drain 
Na, and examine areas 
with periscope 
 
 
 
4.16 Same as 4.15 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (4/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental Inspection 
(SI), if a problem is 
indicated 
  - Redan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - Instrument drywells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - Inlet modules 
 
 
 
 
Fail at redan connections to 
fuel storage basket, IHX, and 
pump well 
Lower baffle support skirt 
structural failure 
Drywell leakage 
Drywell distortion 
Module weld failure 
Binding on fuel assay 
 
 
4.21 Dimension gauging 
with IVHM and USV 
on the redan and 
various wells and 
penetrations 
4.22 Monitor level in pump 
well  
 
4.23 same as 4.21 
 
 
4.24 CM with reactor 
cover radiation 
monitors 
 
 
 
4.25 Camera/periscope, 
USV 
 
4.26 same as 4.1-4.3 
4.27 CM of core outlet 
temperature 
 
4.28 same as 4.2 
 
VTM-3 inspection 
 
4.17 Remove high burnup 
assemblies, drain Na to 
partially expose the 
redan, and examine with 
optical devices 
 
 
4.18 Same as 4.17 
 
 
4.19 Pressurize drywell 
and check for pressure 
decay 
4.20 Remove probe and 
examine for Na leakage 
 
-- 
 
 
4.21 Remove any hot or 
binding fuel assay, and 
inspect with USV 
 
4.22  Same as 4.21 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (5/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental Inspection 
(SI), if a problem is 
indicated 
 - Upper Internals 
   Structure (UIS) 
UIS support cylinder weld fail 
or distortion 
Distorted control rod drive 
(CRD), shroud tubes, weld & 
bearing failures 
Failure of spokes or 
connection to drywells at 
support plates 
Erosion of UIS surface 
 
 
 
 
Failure of connection pins, 
loose sleeves on instrument 
hold-down, loose shock liner 
plates 
4.29 Examine exposed 
surface above Na level 
with camera/periscope.  
Check location and 
general shape with USV 
below Na level 
 
4.30 Periodic testing of 
CRDs 
4.31 Monitor drive motor 
current 
4.32 Loose part monitor 
4.33 USV core sweep 
 
4.34 same as 4.30-4.33 
 
 
 
4.35 Loose parts monitor 
4.36 analyze particulate 
from Na purification 
sys. for metal particle 
 
4.37 Loose part monitor 
4.38 USV core sweep 
 4.23 Remove core, lower 
Na level, and inspect 
cylinder with remote 
optics and periscope. 
 
 
 
4.24 Remove driveline and 
insert fiber-optic device 
in opening to examine 
shroud tubes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.25 Scan top of core for 
loose parts with USV.  4.26 
Lower Na level, and 
examine underside of redan 
with optics 
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Table II.12-4 Postulated Failure Modes and In-Service Inspection Considerations (6/6) 
 
Component / System Postulated Failure 
Normal Inspection (NI) 
Method, to detect 
problem 
Code Requirements 
(Div.3, Section XI, 
ASME B&PV) 
Supplemental Inspection 
(SI), if a problem is 
indicated 
5. Reactor Cover 
(deck and rotatable 
plug) 
Cover gas seal leakage 
Dip seal loss 
Inflatable seal failure 
4.39 Reactor cover 
radiation monitor 
Continuous monitoring 4.27 Liquid penetrant 
examination of seal and 
support flange. 
4.28 Periodically examine 
and clean seal 
6. Primary Pump Deck seal leak 
Pump shaft seal leak 
Support flange failure 
4.40 Reactor cover 
radiation monitor 
4.41 Pump oil leakage 
monitor 
Continuous monitoring 4.29 Liquid penetrant 
examination of seal and 
support flange 
7. IHX Deck seal leak 
IHX inlet/outlet leak 
IHX to primary Na leak 
4.42 Reactor cover 
radiation monitor 
Continuous monitoring 4.30 Same as 4.28 
8. Primary cover gas Cover gas leak 
Gas valve failure 
4.43 Reactor cover 
radiation monitor 
Continuous monitoring 4.31 Pressure test and 
visual examination of 
piping and seals 
9. DRACS Na Leakage 
Sodium blockage 
Air-side blockage 
4.44 CM (details to be 
developed) 
None 
(NI exceeds Code 
requirements) 
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PART III 
DETAILED DESIGN ANALYSES AND 
TRADE-OFF STUDIES 
III.1 Primary Pump Design Analyses 
III.1.1 Mechanical Pump Design 
 
A schematic of a mechanical pump, indicating major essential components is shown 
in Figure III.1-1.  Since the design called “Fermi” type was considered superior to that 
called “Hallam” (see Figure III.1-2), a Fermi type design was used in this study.  The 
mechanical pump shown in Figure III.1-1 is a Fermi type.  To estimate the size of this 
type of mechanical pumps, Byron Jackson has developed a series of nomographs [1].  A 
size estimation of a mechanical pump for ABTR was done using the nomographs shown 
in Figure III.1-4 Figure III.1-9 Mechanical.  In these nomographs, sodium flow rate, head 
pressure, and operating temperature are needed as inputs (see Figure III.1-3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first nomograph, the specific speed and rotation speed are determined.  In the 
second nomograph, the required power is determined.  Then, in the third nomograph, the 
shaft diameter is determined.  In the fourth nomograph, the pump case diameter, which is 
related to the impeller diameter, is determined.  In the fifth nomograph the size of the 
pump outer barrel is determined, however, for the pool type configuration, the outer 
barrel is not used and the pump casing is suspended directly in the pool of Na.  Finally in 
the sixth nomograph, the suction and discharge nozzle diameters are determined.  A 
summary of those parameters obtained as well as input values are presented in Figure 
III.1-10.  This procedure estimates only the diameter of the pump.  The length of the 
pump can be estimated from another consideration, which is that the submergence depth 
needs to be greater than 0.9-1.2 m to prevent vortexing [2].   
Figure III.1-1 Schematic of mechanical pump
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Figure III.1-2 Key differences between Fermi and Hallam designs 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.1-3 Input data for mechanical pump design nomograph 
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Figure III.1-4 Mechanical pump design nomograph-1 
 
 
Figure III.1-5 Mechanical pump design nomograph-2 
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Figure III.1-6 Mechanical pump design nomograph-3 
 
 
Figure III.1-7 Mechanical pump design nomograph-4 
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Figure III.1-8 Mechanical pump design nomograph-5 
 
 
Figure III.1-9 Mechanical pump design nomograph-6 
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Figure III.1-10 Estimated design parameters for an mechanical pump 
 
III.1.2 Electromagnetic Pump 
 
 The EM pump design optimization studies were carried out using an ANL developed 
code based on the calculational model developed to estimate the performance of various 
ALIPs. At the design operating condition (nominal operating condition for the ABTR 
design) and a given pump length, the code estimates the diameter of the pump without 
return duct, mass, and efficiency of the ALIP.  To optimize some parameters for the 
pump, the code repeatedly calculates the performance of the pump at a fixed operating 
condition and pump length while varying the following parameters: 
1. Diameter of the pump duct, 
2. Number of coils, 
3. Number of coils per pole per phase, 
4. Drive frequency. 
 
In this analysis, the diameter of the pump is limited to within 0.6 m, such that the 
ALIP can be installed in the opening for the mechanical pump design presented in 
Section II.3.2.1.  An example design for a primary pump is shown in Table III.1-1.  
Performance curves are shown in Figure III.1-11 and III.1-12.  
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Table III.1-1 EM Pump design parameters 
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Figure III.1-11 Performance Curve of 2.4 m ALIP 
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Figure III.1-12 Stable Range of Operation for 2.4 m ALIP 
 
The operating point (primary coolant flow rate of 320 kg/s and pressure head of 760 
kPa) is shown as a blue dot in these figures.  It must be noted that stable operation of the 
pump requires that 5.1~<× sRem  where Rem is the magnetic Reynolds number and s is 
the slip defined below [3-4]: 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
a
pLfRem τ
τ
πρ
μπ
2
2 ,  and 
s
fs
v
vv
s
−= ,  
where f is the drive frequency, μ is the magnetic permeability and 0μμ ≅  that is the 
magnetic permeability of vacuum, ρ is the resistivity of the working fluid, Lp is the pole 
pitch, τ is the flow channel height, τa is the total non-magnetic gap height, vs is the 
synchronous velocity defined as fLv ps 2= , and vf is the fluid velocity.   
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Once all dimensions and design parameters are calculated, performance curves of the 
pump as a function of the drive voltage and frequency are generated and compared with 
the system curve (flow rate vs pressure drop curve) for the ABTR design to check the 
stability of the pump at various off-normal conditions.  However, the system curve for the 
ABTR has not yet been developed.  Similar stability analyses were conducted for Small 
Modular Fast Reactor (SMFR) [5], which has somewhat similar hydraulic design 
parameters as those for ABTR, except pressure drop.  In the following, results for the 
SMFR were used to explain the method of stability analysis and significance of it.   
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Figure III.1-13 Comparison of Different Control Methods. 
 
One typical method to control an induction motor is constant V/f control.  In this 
method, the ratio of the drive voltage, V to drive frequency, f is kept constant while the 
drive voltage is reduced from the rated value.  This method is used to provide maximum 
torque at reduced motor speed for an induction motor.  Another method is constant 
frequency control in which the drive frequency is kept constant while changing drive 
voltage.  For hydrodynamic pump applications, since pressure head required at reduced 
flow rate is generally smaller than that at nominal operating conditions, large pressure 
head is not required while the pump operates at the reduced flow rates and thus constant 
frequency method may be suitable.  An example comparison of V/f constant control and f 
constant control is shown in Figure III.1-13. This figure shows that when a flow rate 
greater than the nominal value is required, the V/f constant control cannot meet the 
required pumping characteristics.  For example, the ALIP performance line for the 622 V 
and 100 Hz operation crosses the system curve at a flow rate smaller than that at the 
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nominal condition.  On the other hand, the f constant control provides adequate pumping 
characteristics at a flow rate greater than the nominal value (see the ALIP performance 
line for the 622 V and 90 Hz operation).  However, it is shown that both methods can 
provide satisfactory pumping characteristics at reduced flow rates.  It is also confirmed 
that the coil temperatures are well below the maximum demonstrated temperature of 
1023 K at any operating conditions.  The highest coil temperature occurs when the pump 
is driven at increased drive voltage using the f constant control method (< ~900 K at 622 
V and 90 Hz operation and < ~940 K at 650 V and 90 Hz operation).   
The next figures show the region in which the ALIP operation is stable 
( 5.1~<× sRem ) for V/f constant control (Figure III.1-14) and f constant control (Figure 
III.1-15).  Figure III.1-14 shows that when a flow rate greater than the nominal value is 
required, an ALIP controlled using the V/f constant control method becomes unstable.  
On the other hand, an ALIP controlled using the f constant control method becomes 
unstable, when a flow rate smaller than the nominal value is required, as shown in Figure 
III.1-15.  Table III.1-2 summarizes the applicability of different control methods.   
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Figure III.1-14 Stability Diagram for V/f Constant Control 
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Figure III.1-15 Stability Diagram for f Constant Control 
 
 
Table III.1-2 Applicability of Different Control Methods 
 
Pumping Stability Pumping Stability
V/f Constant Good Good No Good No Good
f Constant Good No Good Good Good
Reduced Flow Rate Increased Flow Rate
 
 
These results indicate that the V/f constant control method is appropriate for ALIP 
operation at reduced flow rates below the nominal operating condition and the f constant 
control method is suitable for ALIP operating at increased flow rates above the nominal 
operating condition (see Figure III.1-16).  Detailed pump operation curves for a 2.75 m 
ALIP using this mixed control method are shown in Figure III.1-17. It has shown that all 
discussions above are also applicable to other pumps with similar size and performances 
as well.  
 
These results show that using the V/f constant control at reduced flow rates below the 
nominal operating condition and the f constant control at increased flow rates above the 
nominal operating condition, the designed ALIPs for various pump lengths are all 
capable of meeting the flow rate-pressure requirements for the SMFR design.  To employ 
this mixed control method, the power supply for the ALIP must be able to vary both 
voltage and frequency simultaneously.  It must be noted that the ALIP may be designed 
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such that the nominal operating condition of the pump is set at 110 % flow rate point and 
the ALIP is controlled using only the V/f constant control in the entire operating range to 
simplify the control scheme.  Once the system curve for the ABTR is developed, a 
similar analysis needs to be performed to confirm that the pump designed for the ABTR 
can be stably operated at all conditions; however, since the size and performance of the 
ABTR pumps are very similar to the SMFR pumps, the analysis is expected to show that 
the ABTR pumps can be stably operated using similar control methods described here.  
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Figure III.1-16 Overall Stability Diagram 
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Figure III.1-17 Pump Operation Curves and System Curve for 2.75 m ALIP 
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III.2 IHX and DRACS Sizing Calculations 
 
As noted in Sections II.3.3 and II.6, thermal hydraulic analyses were performed in 
order to form the technical basis for the sizing of both the IHX and DRACS in-vessel 
heat exchangers and the results are summarized here.  
 
In terms of the thermodynamic analysis required to estimate the overall unit size 
needed to achieve the specified thermal rating, the forced convection heat transfer 
coefficients on the shell and tube sides are calculated using the well-known Lockhart-
Martinelli correlation which was developed on the basis of forced convection heat 
transfer from liquid metals: 
 
0.8e Pr)0.025(Re5.0
k
hD
Nu ⋅+==  
where 
Nu = Nusselt number, 
h = forced convection heat transfer coefficient, 
Pr = Prandlt number = μc/k, 
k = sodium thermal conductivity ~ 69 W/m-K,  
c = specific heat ~ 1283 J/kg-K, 
 Re = Reynolds number = μρ /Du  
D =  equivalent diameter of flow channel = tube ID for tube-side flow, 
 = (4·channel flow area)/wetted perimeter for shell side. 
 
For pitch-to-diameter (P/D) ratios of > 1.1, the above correlation results in errors of 
no more than 10 % on the shell side of the IHX.  
 
Aside from the thermodynamic calculations, the pressure drop on the tube side of the 
heat exchangers is calculated to facilitate pump selection and design considerations.  In 
particular, the pressure drop is calculated using the standard Bernoulli equation 
modification to account for frictional drag as well as tube bank entrance and exit form 
losses; i.e.,  
( ) 2
2
1/ uDfLKKP iexitentrt ρ++=Δ  
where 
 u = flow velocity, 
Kentr = tube entrance loss coefficient (typically taken as ~0.5), 
 Kentr = tube exit loss coefficient (typically taken as ~1.0), 
 f = friction factor evaluated from Blasius correlation = 0.3164/Re1/4, 
 Re = Reynolds number = μρ /uDi  
 Di = tube inner diameter, 
 L = tube bundle length,  
μ = sodium viscosity ~ 2.76·10-4 kg/m-sec, and  
 ρ = sodium density ~ 850 kg/m3. 
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 The pressure drop analysis on the shell side is complicated by the fact that an orificed 
baffle plate design has been adopted in order to minimize pressure drop.  Although well-
established correlations have been developed for evaluating pressure drop for the case of 
impervious plates [1], suitable correlations for the case of orificed plates could not be 
identified in the literature.  On this basis, a correlation was developed and validated 
against other IHX designs that feature orificed baffle plates.  The specific correlation is 
presented below; complete modeling details can be found in reference [2].   
 
For the case of orificed baffle plates, the flow pressure drop is evaluated through the 
following correlation:  
( ) ( ) 73.1
135.0
1
2 co
T
bs FGD
NNCP ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+=Δ μρ                                   
where  
Do = tube outside diameter, 
Gc = mass flux through bundle in cross flow = 
To NDPB
m
)( −
•
, 
Nt = number of tubes in cross-flow, perpendicular to flow direction, 
Nb = number of baffle plates, 
P = tube pitch, 
B = baffle plate pitch (i.e., distance between plates),  
•
m  = shell-side mass flowrate,   
           
⎩⎨
⎧
≥
<−+=
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o
oo
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DPDP
C                                                                     
 
and F is the fraction of the total shell side mass flowrate that remains in a cross-flow 
configuration during flow past an individual baffle plate.  This fraction is evaluated 
through the following transcendental equation:   
    
               865.01 FF ω=−                                                     
where 
                                        ( )[ ]
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and 
 Dh = orifice hole diameter, 
 Kh = orifice hole form loss coefficient ~ 1.5, and 
 Nx = number of tube rows in cross flow, parallel with flow direction. 
 
In terms of the approach for carrying out the parametric calculations, the number of 
heat exchanger tubes is treated as the independent variable. The required tube length is 
then calculated as the key model output, and the minimum heat exchanger cross-sectional 
area is given by tube unit cell cross-sectional area multiplied by the total number of tubes. 
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This approach provides the overall heat exchanger size to be selected on the basis of the 
available cross sectional area, or the available elevation space, whichever is desired.  
  
In terms of the design calculations for the IHX, tube diameter was selected to be 
identical to the PRISM IHX.  For completeness, the calculations were carried for a 
variety of P/D ratios with the temperature differentials on the primary and secondary 
sides fixed at the design levels shown in Table II.3-5.  The thermal conductivity of the 
9Cr-1Mo tubes was taken as 28 W/m-˚C. 
 
The results of the calculations for the IHX are shown in Figures III.2-1 through III.2-
4, which provide the tube sheet planar area, tube length, and pressure drop across the 
shell and tube sides vs. number of heat exchanger tubes for a range of P/D ratios from 1.2 
to 1.8.  To compromise between the planar area of the reactor vessel occupied by the 
IHXs and the primary side pressure drop, an intermediate value of the P/D ratio of 1.4 
was selected for the current design.  Given the equipment distribution within the reactor 
vessel, ~1.6 m2 of cross sectional area is available to accommodate each IHX.  Factoring 
in the shell thickness of 1.9 cm, as well as the downcomer pipe planar area, then the 
available area for the tube sheet is reduced to ~1.5 m2.  Thus, from Figure III.2-1, an IHX 
with a total of ~ 3300 tubes is selected to fit into the available space.  From Figure III.2-
2, for the case of P/D=1.4, the active tube length must be at least 3.5 m to achieve the 
target thermal rating of 125 MW per IHX. For these purposes, the IHX tube length is 
increased to 3.85 m (see Table II.3-5) to provide a 10% design margin in the heat 
exchanger thermal capacity. With the tube length specified, the minimum required 
elevation space to accommodate the IHXs in the vessel plan view is determined.  From 
Figures III.2-3 and III.2-4, the pressure drop across the primary and secondary sides of 
the tube bank are found to be 12.6 and 5.7 kPa, respectively, for the case of P/D = 1.4.  
The primary side pressure drop thus sets the pressure head required to drive the 628 
kg/sec sodium flowrate through the IHX at ~ 1.5 m at full power conditions.   
 
Figures III.2-5 through III.2-7 provide the analogous plots of planar area, tube length, 
and pressure drop across shell and tube sides vs. number of heat exchanger tubes for the 
625 kW DRACS heat exchangers that are incorporated as part of the shutdown heat 
removal system described in Section II.6.  Key design parameters for these units are 
summarized in table II.6-1.   
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Figure III.2-1 IHX tube sheet planar area vs. no. of tubes for various p/d ratios 
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Figure III.2-2 IHX tube length vs. no. of tubes for various p/d ratios 
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Figure III.2-3 IHX secondary (tube) side Δp vs. no. of tubes for various p/d ratios 
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Figure III.2-4 IHX primary (shell) side Δp vs. no. of tubes for various p/d ratios 
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Figure III.2-5 DRACS HX tube sheet planar area vs. number of tubes 
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Figure III.2-6 DRACS HX tube length vs. number of tubes 
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Figure III.2-7 DRACS HX primary (shell) and secondary (tube) side Δp vs. no. of tubes 
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III.3 Supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle 
III.3.1 Turbine Generator 
 
The turbine design and optimization analyses are presented in this section. As shown 
in Figure III.3-1, six stages is selected as the optimal number.  The turbine is 
manufactured largely from Inconel-based alloys that are selected for their strength and 
low coefficients of thermal expansion as well as their resistance to oxidation by CO2 over 
the normal operating temperature range.  The turbine also incorporates a diffuser which 
increases the overall length beyond that of the rotor and stator stages. 
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           Figure III.3-1 Results of Turbine Pre-Conceptual Design and Optimization Analyses
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III.3.2 Compressor 
 
The results of pre-conceptual design and optimization analyses for the compressor are 
presented in Figures III.3-2 and III.3-3.  Pre-conceptual designs having only one and two 
stages have been selected for Compressors No. 1 and 2, respectively.  A comparison of 
performance for single-stage and two-stage pre-conceptual designs for Compressor No.1 
is provided in Figure III.3-4.  It is observed that nearly the same efficiency is attained 
with a single stage as with two stages while the operating range is wider with a single 
stage.  In addition, the amount of alloy materials is reduced decreasing the compressor 
cost.  Similar to the turbine, the compressors possess remarkably small dimensions due to 
the high density of supercritical CO2 and the small number of stages.  The compressors 
are mainly fabricated from Inconel alloys and austenitic stainless steel for strength, low 
thermal expansion, and resistance to corrosion by CO2.  Figures III.3-5 and III.3-6 
provide examples of the optimization of compressor pre-conceptual design as well as 
sensitivity of compressor and cycle efficiencies to the diffuser incidence angle and return 
channel loss coefficient, respectively.  
 
III.3.3 Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger 
 
It is observed from Figures III.3-7 through III.3-9 that a PCHE unit length of 1.0 m 
optimizes the S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency while maintaining a low pressure drop on 
the sodium flow side and a reasonably high turbine inlet temperature on the CO2 side; this 
value is therefore selected for the unit length. For a fixed PCHE unit length, increasing 
the number of PCHE units increases the cycle efficiency.  However, it also increases the 
total cost of the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers.  Thus, there is a tradeoff between cycle 
efficiency and cost.  Figure III.3-10 shows the relationship between the total cost of the 
sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers and the S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency.  A cost of $ 60 
per Kilogram of PCHE metal alloy mass is assumed.  This number should be taken as 
only illustrative to demonstrate the tradeoff involved.  For the selected point, 64 PCHE 
units are incorporated into the sodium-to-CO2 heat exchangers.   
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Figure III.3-2 Results of Compressor No. 1 Pre-Conceptual Design and Optimization Analyses 
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Figure III.3-3 Results of Compressor No. 2 Pre-Conceptual Design and Optimization Analyses 
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Compressor #1 Performance Map 
(Centrifugal, 1 stage vs 2 stages)
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Figure III.3-4 Comparison of Performance Maps for Compressor No. 1  
Single-Stage and Two-Stage Pre-Conceptual Designs 
 
 
 
       
 
 
     Figure III.3-5 Optimization of Diffuser Incidence Angle for Compressor No. 1 Pre-Conceptual 
Design 
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Figure III.3-6 Dependency of Compressor and Cycle Efficiencies upon  
Return Channel Loss Coefficient for Compressor No. 2 
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Figure III.3-7 Dependency of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency upon  
Total Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-8 Dependency of Sodium Side Pressure Drop upon  
Total Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-9 Dependency of CO2 Turbine Inlet Temperature upon  
Total Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-10 Tradeoff  Between Total Sodium-to-CO2 Heat Exchanger Cost and S-CO2 Brayton 
Cycle Efficiency (Assuming Illustrative Cost of $ 60/Kg of PCHE Metal Alloy Mass) 
 
 
III.3.4 Recuperator 
 
Each zigzag semicircular channel of the high temperature recuperator (HTR) is 
selected to have a diameter of 1.5 mm, a lateral pitch of 2.3 mm, and a plate thickness of 
2.0 mm.  Figures III.3-11, III.3-12, and III.3-13 show the results of pre-conceptual design 
and optimization analyses for the HTR from which it is determined that a HTR PCHE 
unit length of 0.6 m optimizes the S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency while maintaining a 
reasonable recuperator effectiveness and CO2 turbine inlet temperature.  The tradeoff 
between HTR cost and S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency is illustrated in Figure III.3-14.  
For the selected point, the HTR consists of 64 PCHE units.  
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Figure III.3-11 Dependency of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency upon  
Total High Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-12 Dependency of High Temperature Recuperator Effectiveness upon  
Total High Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-13 Dependency of Turbine Inlet Temperature upon  
Total High Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-14 Tradeoff Between Total High Temperature Recuperator Cost and S-CO2 Brayton 
Cycle Efficiency (Assuming Illustrative Cost of $ 60/Kg of PCHE Metal Alloy Mass) 
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The low temperature recuperator (LTR) semicircular channels are also selected to 
have a diameter of 1.5 mm, a lateral pitch of 2.3 mm, and a plate thickness of 2.0 mm.  
Figures III.3-15, III.3-16, and III.3-17 show the results of pre-conceptual optimization 
analyses for the LTR from which it is determined that a LTR PCHE unit length of 0.8 m 
optimizes the S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency while maintaining a reasonable recuperator 
effectiveness and CO2 turbine inlet temperature.  The tradeoff between LTR cost and S-
CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency is illustrated in Figure III.3-18.  For the selected point, the 
LTR consists of 128 PCHE units.   
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Figure III.3-15 Dependency of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency upon  
Total Low Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-16 Dependency of Low Temperature Recuperator Effectiveness upon 
 Total High Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-17 Dependency of Turbine Inlet Temperature upon  
Total Low Temperature Recuperator Metal Alloy Mass for Fixed PCHE Unit Length 
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Figure III.3-18 Tradeoff Between Total Low Temperature Recuperator Cost and S-CO2 Brayton 
Cycle Efficiency (Assuming Illustrative Cost of $ 60/Kg of PCHE Metal Alloy Mass) 
 
III.3.5 Cooler 
For a specified cooling water inlet temperature, cooling water flowrate, and CO2 
flowrate, there is a unique PCHE unit length that provides the desired CO2 outlet 
temperature.  Thus, the cooler pre-conceptual design, optimization, and tradeoff analyses 
have been performed to determine an optimal water flowrate and number of PCHE units.  
A water cooler inlet temperature of 30 °C is selected.  Figure III.3-19 shows the required 
PCHE unit length versus the total cooler metal alloy mass as the number of PCHE units is 
varied for different values of the water flowrate.  Figures III.3-20 through III.3-23 present 
the dependencies of the S-CO2 Brayton cycle efficiency, plant efficiency, water side 
pressure drop, and water side pumping power upon the total metal alloy mass.  Similarly, 
Figures III.3-24 and III.3-25 provide the tradeoffs between S-CO2 Brayton cycle 
efficiency and plant efficiency versus total cooler metal alloy mass.  The selected point 
with a water flowrate of 6000 Kg/s corresponds to 48 PCHE units having a length of 0.57 
m which is just less than 0.6 m which is one of the PCHE plate side manufacturing 
limitations.  The resulting water side pressure drop and pumping power requirements are 
low.  Most significantly, the point lies at the location on the plant efficiency versus cooler 
cost curve beyond which further increasing the number of PCHE units and cooler cost 
would only slightly improve the plant efficiency.   
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Figure III.3-19 Cooler PCHE Unit Length versus Total Cooler Metal Alloy Mass for 
 Various Values of the Cooling Water Flowrate 
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Figure III.3-20 S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency versus Total Cooler Metal Alloy Mass for  
Various Values of the Cooling Water Flowrate 
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Figure III.3-21 Plant Efficiency versus Total Cooler Metal Alloy Mass for  
Various Values of the Cooling Water Flowrate 
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Figure III.3-22 Water Side Pressure Drop versus Total Cooler Metal Alloy Mass for 
Various Values of the Cooling Water Flowrate 
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Figure III.3-23 Water Side Pumping Power versus Total Cooler Metal Alloy Mass for  
Various Values of the Cooling Water Flowrate 
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Figure III.3-24 Dependency of S-CO2 Brayton Cycle Efficiency upon Cooler Cost 
(Assuming Illustrative Cost of $ 60/Kg of PCHE Metal Alloy Mass) 
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Figure III.3-25 Dependency of Plant Efficiency upon Cooler Cost 
(Assuming Illustrative Cost of $ 60/Kg of PCHE Metal Alloy Mass) 
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III.4 Core Design Trade-off Studies 
 
The design descriptions and performance characteristics of the reference metal core 
design were discussed in Section II.1.1. As mentioned there, various option and trade-off 
studies were performed to determine the appropriate power level and conversion ratio of 
the reference design. Based on the results of these trade-off studies, the reference core 
design was developed for ternary metal alloy, U-TRU-Zr fuel with WG-Pu feed. An 
alternative design was also developed for mixed oxide, UO2-TRUO2 fuel. The 
performance characteristics of the metal and oxide core designs loaded with LWR-SF 
TRU drivers were evaluated. Additional design studies were performed to develop fuel 
assembly designs that yield a low TRU conversion ratio when employed in the reference 
core configuration. 
 
The results of these trade-off and design studies are presented in this Section. The 
trade-off studies to determine the power level and conversion ratio are discussed in 
Sections III.4.1 and III.4.2, respectively. The alternative oxide core design is discussed in 
Section III.4.3. The performances of the LWR-SF TRU fuel and the low CR assembly 
designs are provided in Sections III.4.4 and III.4.5, respectively. 
 
III.4.1 Trade-off Study for ABTR Power Level Determination 
 
The ABTR reactor size should be large enough to provide a prototypic irradiation 
environment similar to commercial scale Advanced Burner Reactors (ABR’s). On the 
other hand, a smaller reactor size would result in a lower project cost and a shorter 
project schedule. Hence, the reactor size should be selected balancing these 
considerations. Trade-off studies were performed in order to determine an appropriate 
power level. Using a ternary metal fuel (U-TRU-10Zr), fuel cycle analyses were 
performed for 4 different power levels of 125, 250, 400, and 840 MWt. TRU isotopic 
composition of a 10-year cooled LWR spent fuel (LWR-SF) with 33 MWd/kg burnup 
was used in this study. Various assembly designs were examined, including the FFTF, 
PRISM Mod-B/92 and PRISM Mod-B/93 Burner designs. The fuel pin diameter was 
varied in a wide range from 5.8 mm to 10.5 mm. Various core performance parameters 
were examined, including the required TRU enrichment, heavy metal and TRU loadings, 
core volume, conversion ratio, core average and test assembly flux levels, fast fluence to 
burnup ratio, burnup reactivity swing, and specific power.  
 
Core configurations were developed for 4 different power ratings of 125, 250, 440, 
and 840 MWt, based on the SMFR [1], SMFR-2 [2], FFTF [3], and PRISM Mod-B [4] 
designs, respectively. The planar core layouts are shown in Figure III.4-1. For consistent 
comparison, the active core height was fixed to 80 cm, and the number of assemblies 
were adjusted to attain a similar linear power around 26 kW/m except for the 125 MWt 
core, for which a symmetric core configuration with a linear power of ~26 kW/m could 
not be made because of limited assembly locations and thus the resulting linear power 
was somewhat lower (~22 kW/m).  
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Figure III.4-1 Core Configurations for Power Level Trade-off Study (in scale) 
 
Five different assembly designs were developed for the parametric study as provided 
in Table III.4-1. The first three assembly designs were adopted from the FFTF, PRISM 
Mod-B/92 and PRISM Mod-B/93 Burner designs. The fuel pin diameter was varied in a 
wide range from 5.8 mm to 10.5 mm, but the number of fuel pins per assembly was fixed 
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to 217. A similar wire-wrap diameter was used, and thus the pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 
decreases with increasing fuel pin diameter while the assembly size increases with 
increasing pin diameter. The fabricated fuel volume fraction varies from 25.5 to 32.4 %. 
The core average power densities and pin bundle pressure drops of the four cores loaded 
with these assembly designs are shown in Table III.4-2. Except for the 125 MWt core 
that has a lower linear power, the average power densities are similar for the same pin 
diameter and decreases as the pin diameter increases. The pin bundle pressure drop 
increases with decreasing pin diameter. 
 
Table III.4-1 Fuel Assembly Design Parameters 
 
Assembly Design D5.8a) D7.4 D8.3 D9.5 D10.5 
Assembly pitch, cm 12.225 14.735 16.142 17.930 19.416 
Pin diameter, mm 5.842 7.442 8.306 9.5 10.5 
Duct thickness, mm 3.01 4.45 3.94 3.94 3.94 
No. of fuel pins 217 217 217 217 217 
Pitch-to-diameter ratio 1.268 1.199 1.196 1.172 1.155 
Wire wrap diameter, mm 1.42 1.33 1.57 1.57 1.57 
Volume Fraction, % 
  - Fuel 
  - Bond 
  - Structure 
  - Coolant 
 
25.5 
8.5 
23.0 
43.0 
 
27.2 
9.1 
26.9 
36.8 
 
29.3 
9.8 
24.2 
36.7 
 
31.6 
10.5 
23.0 
34.8 
 
32.4 
10.8 
23.4 
33.4 
Remarks FFTF PRISM Mod-B/92 
PRISM 
Mod-B/93   
a) Read as pin diameter is about 5.8 mm 
 
Fuel cycle performance parameters were determined from REBUS-3 calculations. 
Equilibrium cycle analyses with scattered loading were performed using 3-dimensional 
hexagonal-z geometry models. A 3-batch fuel management scheme and a 12-month cycle 
length with 90% capacity factor were used. The characteristics of the equilibrium fuel 
cycle performance are summarized in Table III.4-3 and Figures III.4-2 to III.4-5.  
 
For fixed core size and enrichment, the effective multiplication factor increases with 
increasing fuel volume fraction because of increased infinite multiplication factor and 
reduced leakage. For a given core composition, the effective multiplication factor 
increases with increasing core size due to reduced leakage. As can be seen in Figure III.4-
2, therefore, the TRU enrichment required to achieve the targeted cycle length decreases 
with increasing pin diameter (i.e., fuel volume fraction) and power rating (i.e., core size). 
For a fixed core size, the TRU enrichment required to achieve the core criticality 
decreases with increasing fuel volume fraction, but the product of TRU enrichment and 
fuel volume fraction increases as the fuel volume fraction increases. Similarly, the TRU 
enrichment required to achieve the core criticality decreases with increasing core size, but 
the product of TRU enrichment and core volume increases as the core size increases. As a 
result, the total TRU loading increases with increasing power rating and fuel pin 
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diameter, as shown in Figure III.4-2. The total heavy metal (HM) loading is proportional 
to the fuel volume fraction and the core size. As discussed above, the core configurations 
except for the 125 MWt core were developed to yield the similar power density for the 
same fuel pin size. Thus, for the same fuel pin diameter, the 250 MWt, 400 MWt and 840 
MWt cores produces similar specific powers (see Table III.4-3), and the 125 MWt core 
yields a somewhat lower value. For the same power rating, the specific power density 
decreases as the pin diameter increases. 
 
 
Table III.4-2 Power Density and Pin Bundle Pressure Drop 
 
Core power rating 125 MWt 250 MWt 400 MWt 840 MWt 
Ave. linear power density, kW/m 22.2 26.2 26.4 25.8 
D5.8 368.4 433.7 437.4 427.8 
D7.4 252.9 298.0 300.7 294.3 
D8.3 210.6 248.2 250.5 245.3 
D9.5 170.7 201.2    
Average power 
density (kW/l) 
D10.5 145.5 171.6   
D5.8 37.9 53.3 53.3 49.9 
D7.4 25.9 26.8 36.7 37.9 
D8.3 16.9 24.3 24.1 21.8 
D9.5 12.5 18.0    
Pin bundle 
pressure drop 
(psi) 
D10.5 9.8 14.3   
 
 
The TRU conversion ratio is proportional to the uranium to TRU atomic ratio, thus it 
increases with increasing power rating and fuel pin size (see Figure III.4-3) because the 
TRU fraction decreases with increasing power rating. The ratio of average discharge 
burnup to peak fast fluence decreases with increasing power rating and fuel pin size since 
it is proportional to the TRU enrichment (see Figure III.4-4). For a fixed cycle length, the 
average discharge burnup is proportional to the specific power density, and hence it 
shows the same trend as the specific power density. The burnup reactivity swing 
decreases as the conversion ratio increases, thus it decreases as the power rating and the 
fuel pin size increase. Under the assumption that the maximum reactivity hold-down of 
each primary control rod is $0.8, the cycle length was estimated by limiting the burnup 
reactivity swing within the reactivity control capability of the primary control system. As 
shown in Figure III.4-5, the estimated cycle length increases with increasing power rating 
and fuel pin size.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table III.4-3 Summary of Fuel Cycle Performance Characteristics 
 
Assembly D5.8 D7.4 D8.3 D9.5 D10.5 
Thermal power (MW) 125 250 400 840 125 250 400 840 125 250 400 840 125 250 125 250 
Active core diameter (m) 0.78 1.00 1.22 1.76 0.94 1.21 1.48 2.12 1.03 1.33 1.62 2.32 1.14 1.47 1.24 1.59 
Assembly lattice pitch (cm) 12.22 14.73 16.14 17.93 19.42 
Pin diameter (mm) 5.84 7.44 8.31 9.50 10.50 
Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 1.27 1.20 1.20 1.17 1.16 
Cladding thickness (mm) 0.38 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.70 
Average power density (kW/liter) 368.4 433.7 437.4 427.8 252.9 298.0 300.7 294.3 210.6 248.2 250.5 245.3 170.6 201.2 145.5 171.6 
low enrichment 42.1 37.0 30.3  23.8  32.2  28.4  23.6  19.0  27.5  24.4  20.3  16.6  23.4  20.9  21.6  19.5  
medium enrichment 47.6 41.8 34.3  26.8  36.4  32.1  26.7  21.5  31.1  27.5  23.0  18. 8 26. 5 23.6  24.4  22.  Charge enrichment (%) 
high enrichment 52.6 46.2 37.9 29.7  40.2  35.6  29.5  23.8  34.4  30.4  25.4  20.8  29.3  26.1  27.0  24.3  
Fuel loading (MT) 1.08 1.81 2.88 6.20 1.69 2.86 4.55 9.78 2.20 3.73 5.92 12.73 2.95 5.00 3.55 6.03 
Specific power (kW/kg) 111.5 131.2 132.2 129.2 72.0 84.7 85.3 83.4 55.7 65.53 66.0 64.5 42.4 50.0 25.2 41.5 
Average discharge burnup (MWd/kg) 107.9 126.7 127.4 123.9 69.1 81.2 81.7 79.6 53.4 62.7 63.1 61.5 40.0 47.0 33.2 39.0 
Peak fast fluence (1023 n/cm2) 2.41 3.45 4.02 4.68 1.90 2.67 3.04 3.39 1.66 2.31 2.61 2.84 1.42 1.96 1.25 1.72 
TRU conversion ratio 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.53 0.30 0.41 0.52 0.69 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.79 0.48 0.60 0.54 0.66 
Burnup reactivity swing (Δk) 0.061 0.077 0.078 0.069 0.043 0.049 0.045 0.034 0.033 0.036 0.031 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.019 
Estimated max. cycle length (month)  2.2 3.1 3.0 4.8 3.2 4.8 5.2 9.7 4.0 6.5 7.7 17.3 5.5 5.5 6.9 7.2 
BOEC power peaking factors 1.45 1.50 1.49 1.46 1.50 1.56 1.54 1.48 1.52 1.59 1.56 1.49 1.54 1.62 1.56 1.64 
Average linear power (kW/m) 22.2 26.2 26.4 25.8 22.2 26.1 26.4 25.8 22.2 26.1 26.4 25.8 22.2 26.1 22.1 26.1 
Peak linear power (kW/m) 36.1 45.5 45.7 42.3 36.1 45.0 44.5 40.8 35.8 44.7 43.8 39.9 35.8 44.6 35.8 44.6 
Linear power limit (kW/m) 20.9 29.7 40.0 46.7 35.8 43.3 49.7 47.7 42.7 50.2 51.0 48.6 43.8 52.8 44.2 53.3 
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Figure III.4-2 TRU Enrichment and Loading vs. Power Level 
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Figure III.4-3 TRU Enrichment and Conversion Ratio vs. Power Level 
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Figure III.4-4 Discharge Burnup to Peak Fast Fluence and Average Flux vs. Power Level 
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Figure III.4-5 Estimated Cycle Length and Reactivity Loss vs. Power Level 
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The core average flux level is proportional to the power density and inversely 
proportional to the TRU loading. Thus, the average flux increases as the linear power 
increases and as the TRU enrichment and the fuel pin size decreases. As a result, the 
average flux level increases with increasing power rating and decreasing fuel pin size 
(see Figure III.4-4). For a fixed linear power, the ratio of average flux to TRU conversion 
ratio is inversely proportional to the square of fuel pin radius and1 TRUe− , where TRUe  is 
the TRU enrichment, thus it increases as the fuel pin size and power rating decreases. 
 
In summary, all the performance parameters are monotonically improved with 
increasing power level. However, the TRU conversion ratio, TRU loading, and core size 
also increase with power level; and this is not desirable for the ABTR low cost burner 
mission. Of particular interest for fuels testing duration, the average flux level decreases 
significantly as the power level decreases. It is also noted that the TRU enrichment for 
the cases of small power rating and fuel pin size is higher than 30%, which is beyond the 
current irradiation experience. In addition, since the fuel solidus temperature decreases as 
the TRU fraction increases, the peak linear power limit is violated for some of these 
cases. The maximum average flux level achievable within the linear power limit appears 
to be ~1.9×1015 and ~2.5×1015 n/cm2s for the 125 and 250 MWt cores, respectively. The 
corresponding conversion ratios of the 125 and 250 MWt cores are 0.30 and 0.41, 
respectively. These results suggest that ~250 MWt is a reasonable compromise to allow a 
low project cost, at the same time providing a reasonable test bed for demonstrating the 
ABR design features. 
 
A higher power level would result in a higher average flux level, which would 
reduce the irradiation time of ABR test fuel assemblies, but the construction cost would 
also increase. For example, compared to the proposed power level of 250 MWt, the 400 
MWt power level of FFTF would increase the flux level by only ~16%, but the 
construction cost and schedule would be increased substantially. The heavy metal mass 
flow would also increase by ~60% and hence resulting in additional burden on the startup 
core fabrication capability. Therefore, a reactor size of 250 MWt was selected for the 
ABTR as a good compromise between the construction cost/schedule and the required 
performance characteristics to meet the ABTR mission goals. 
III.4.2 Design Studies of Range of Conversion Ratios  
 
The role of the advanced burner reactor is to transmute the recycled TRU elements 
which are the dominant contributors to spent fuel radio-toxicity, long-term heat and dose. 
In order to demonstrate a high TRU consumption rate, it is desirable to have a low 
conversion ratio (CR). However, a low conversion ratio requires a high TRU enrichment, 
which is beyond the current irradiation experience with plutonium-based fast reactor 
fuels [5-7]. Using U-TRU-Zr ternary metal fuel, initial design studies have been 
performed to evaluate the feasibility of the ABTR design to accommodate a wide range 
of conversion ratios by changing the assembly design only for fixed core configuration 
and assembly pitch. 
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The major design variables to be used in changing the conversion ratio of a given 
core design are the fuel pin size and the number of fuel pins per assembly. The TRU 
conversion ratio is proportional to the uranium to TRU atomic ratio, and hence it 
decreases with increasing TRU enrichment. For a fixed core size, the required TRU 
enrichment to achieve the core criticality and a desired cycle length increases with 
decreasing fuel volume fraction. As the TRU enrichment increases, the linear powers 
limit decreases because of the decreased solidus temperature and reduced thermal 
conductivity of ternary metal fuel. Thus, to achieve a low conversion ratio, a larger 
number of smaller fuel pins needs to be used to reduce the fuel volume fraction while 
maintaining the peak linear power within the appropriate limit. On the other hand, to 
achieve a high conversion ratio, a smaller number of larger fuel pins needs to be used to 
increase the fuel volume fraction.  
 
Using the 250 MWt core design described in Section III.4.1 as a reference design, 
parametric studies were performed to develop the core configuration and assembly 
designs that achieve the conversion ratios of ~0.25, ~0.7, and ~1.05. Various design 
constraints were imposed, including those on the peak linear power, peak fast fluence, 
peak discharge burnup, and burnup reactivity swing. In order to employ wire-wrap 
spacers, the fuel pin pitch-to-diameter ratio was limited to be less than 1.3. To satisfy the 
peak linear power limit for the low conversion ratio core (CR=0.25), the number of fuel 
assemblies was increased to 63 (including 3 test fuel assemblies) from 51 of the reference 
core. In addition, when the TRU enrichment is higher than 30%, the Zr fraction was 
increased to 20 wt. % from a nominal value of 10 wt. % in order to increase the solidus 
temperature. An additional row of reflectors was also introduced to reserve space for the 
blanket assemblies of the high conversion ratio core (CR>1.0). Table III.4-4 provides the 
assembly design data for three conversion ratios, and Figure III.4-6 shows the resulting 
core configurations.  
 
Table III.4-4 Assembly Design Parameters for Different Conversion Ratios 
 
Target conversion ratio Low (~0.25) Medium (~0.7) High (> 1.0) 
Height (core/plenum) , cm 80 / 120 80 / 120 80 / 120 
Pin outer diameter, mm 6.25 9.41 11.0 
Number of fuel pins per assembly 271 169 127 
Assembly lattice pitch, cm 14.834 14.834 14.834 
Inter-assembly gap, mm 4.45 4.0 4.0 
Duct thickness, mm 4.45 3.0 3.0 
Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 1.29 1.11 1.10 
Cladding thickness, mm 0.75 0.41 0.41 
Average linear power, kW/m 16.8 27.1 34.0 
Pin bundle pressure drop, psi 11.5 50.2 51.6 
Volume fraction (driver/blanket), % 
  - Fuel 
  - Bond 
  - Structure 
  - Coolant 
 
18.9 
6.3 
33.1 
41.7 
 
38.5 
12.8 
18.7 
29.9 
 
40.7 / 46.1 
13.6 / 8.1 
17.3 / 17.3 
28.4 / 28.4 
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                            Burner Core                                                             Breeder Core  
Figure III.4-6 Core Configurations for Range of Conversion Ratios 
 
The core is composed of 60 driver assemblies, 3 test fuel assemblies, and 10 control 
assemblies. The 60 driver assemblies were divided into two enrichment zones (inner and 
outer cores) to flatten the power distribution while simplifying the refueling operation. 
Each of inner and outer cores has 30 driver assemblies. Three test assemblies were loaded 
with the ternary fuel used in the driver assemblies with different enrichment. The active 
core is 80 cm high and the gas plenum is 120 cm high. The equivalent active core 
diameter is 1.33 m and the inner diameter of core barrel is 2.59 m. The core is surrounded 
successively by 126 radial reflectors and 54 shield assemblies. For the high conversion 
ratio core (CR>1.0), the innermost row of reflectors (36 assemblies) were replaced with 
radial blankets. Internal blankets were not used to ease the orifice design for appropriate 
flow allocation for different core configurations. A binary metal fuel (U-10Zr) with 
depleted uranium was used for blankets. The fuel smeared density was 85% for blankets 
and 75% for driver assemblies. Fuel pin diameters for the low, medium, and high 
conversion ratios are 6.25, 9.41, and 11.0 mm, respectively. The corresponding numbers 
of fuel pins per assembly are 217, 169, and 127, respectively. For the low conversion 
ratio core, slightly thicker duct and cladding were used to reduce the fuel volume fraction 
further.  
 
Table III.4-5 presents the startup core performance characteristics for the three 
conversion ratio designs, obtained from REBUS-3 equilibrium cycle calculations. In 
these calculations, the LWR-SF was used as TRU feed, without recycling the ABTR 
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spent fuel. The cycle length was adjusted to limit the burnup reactivity swing within the 
reactivity control capability of the seven primary control rods. The number of batches 
(i.e., fuel residence time) was adjusted to maximize the discharge burnup within the fast 
fluence limit of HT-9 cladding (4.0×1023/cm2) and the discharge burnup limit (150 
MWd/kg). The cycle lengths of low, medium, and high conversion ratio designs are 3, 6, 
and 12 months, respectively. A 10-batch fuel management scheme was used for the low 
and medium conversion ratio designs. For the high conversion ratio design, 5- and 10-
batch schemes were used for drivers and blankets, respectively. The calculated TRU 
conversion ratios are 0.25, 0.72, and 1.03 for the low, medium, and high conversion ratio 
designs, respectively. 
 
Table III.4-5 Start-up Core Performance Characteristics of Various Conversion Ratios  
 
Target conversion ratio Low (~0.25) Medium (~0.7) High (>1.0) 
Cycle length, months 3 6 12 
Number of batches (driver/blanket) 10  10  5 / 10 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 40.6/45.9/50.8 17.8/20.1/22.2 16.5/18.7/20.4 
Conversion ratio, fissile/TRU  0.33 / 0.25 0.77 / 0.72 1.05 / 1.03 
HM loading (driver/blanket), Mt 2.08  5.05  5.37 / 3.80 
TRU loading, Mt 0.93 1.00 1.08 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 114.8 47.7 41.3 
Power density of active core, kW/l 236.1 237.7 219.1 
Discharge burnup (ave./peak), MWd/kg 94.3 / 138.8 78.4 / 122.4 67.9 /  108.0 
Peak fast fluence(driver/blanket), 1023/cm2 2.08  3.82 3.51 / 3.81 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.65 0.89 1.03 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.53 / 1.51 1.62 / 1.60 1.66 / 1.62 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.15 / 1.15 1.10 / 1.10 1.07 / 1.06 
Peak linear power, kW/m 29.6 48.1 58.8 
Linear power limit, kW/m 31.1 57.0 70.2 
Core average flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.61 2.18 2.00 
Test assembly flux, 1015/cm2-sec 3.32 2.81 2.57 
 
 
Table III.4-6 presents the recycled core performance characteristics for the three 
conversion ratio designs, obtained from REBUS-3 equilibrium cycle calculations. In 
these calculations, the recycled TRU from the ABTR spent fuel was used as the primary 
TRU feed, and the TRU recovered from 10-year cooled LWR spent fuel with 33 
MWd/kg burnup was used as the makeup feed. For the reprocessing of ABTR spent fuel, 
one-year cooling time and half-year reprocessing time were assumed. The same cycle 
lengths and number of batches as the start-up cores were used. The fissile fractions of the 
charged TRU for the low, medium, and high conversion designs were 37.7, 55.3, and 
72.4%, respectively, while that of the LWR spent fuel was 59.5%. The difference in the 
fissile fraction of charged TRU increases the TRU enrichment of the low conversion ratio 
core by ~29% relative to the start-up core and decreases it by ~13% for the high 
  248
 
conversion ratio design. The TRU enrichment of the medium conversion ratio core 
increased only slightly. The changes of the TRU enrichment and the fissile fraction in 
charged TRU alter the conversion ratios of the recycled cores relative to the start-up 
cores. For the low conversion ratio core, the TRU conversion ratio decreases to 0.18 from 
0.25 because of the increased TRU enrichment, but the fissile conversion ratio increases 
to 0.44 from 0.33 because of the reduced fissile fraction in charged TRU. By the same 
reasons, the fissile conversion ratio increases from 0.77 to 0.83 for the medium 
conversion ratio core, and the TRU conversion ratio decreases to 0.81 from 1.03 for the 
high conversion ratio core. The TRU conversion ratio of the medium conversion ratio 
core is not changed noticeably because of similar TRU enrichments, and the fissile 
conversion ratio of the high conversion ratio core is reduced slightly because of similar 
fissile loadings.  
 
 
Table III.4-6 Recycled Core Performance Characteristics of Various Conversion Ratios 
 
Target conversion ratio Low (~0.25) Medium (~0.7) High (>1.0) 
Cycle length, months 3 6 12 
Number of batches (driver/blanket) 10  10  5 / 10 
Fissile fraction of charged TRU, % 37.7 55.3 72.4 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 52.4/59.2/65.5 18.2/20.6/22.8 14.3/16.2/17.9 
Fissile/TRU conversion ratio 0.44 / 0.18 0.83 / 0.72 1.04 / 0.81 
HM loading (driver/blanket), Mt 2.08  5.05 5.37 / 3.80 
TRU loading, Mt 1.21 1.03 0.96 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 114.8 47.7 41.2 
Power density of active core, kW/l 236.2 237.6 217 
Discharge burnup (ave./peak), MWd/kg 94.3 / 139.8 78.4 / 123.0 67.7 / 107.2 
Peak fast fluence(driver/blanket), 1023/cm2 2.03 3.84 3.53 / 3.85 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.29 0.78 1.1 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.55 / 1.53 1.62 / 1.61 1.65 / 1.61 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.12 / 1.12 1.09 / 1.09 1.07 / 1.07 
Peak linear power, kW/m 29.2 47.8 58.4 
Linear power limit, kW/m 29.3 57.2 69.6 
Core average flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.58 2.2 2.03 
Test assembly flux, 1015/cm2-sec 3.24 2.83 2.61 
 
Tables III.4-7, III.4-8, and III.4-9 summarize the heavy metal inventories and mass 
flow rates of the low, medium and high conversion ratio cores, respectively. For the start-
up core that uses the external feed only without recycling the ABTR spent fuel, the 
required TRU mass per year is 398.1 kg, 209.4 kg, and 205.4 kg for the low, medium, 
and high conversion ratio cores, respectively. The TRU consumption rate is 60.0 kg/year 
for the low conversion ratio core and 20.4 kg/year for the medium conversion ratio core. 
For the recycled core, the required external TRU mass per year is reduced to 66.4 kg, 
20.1 kg, and 0.0 kg for the low, medium and high conversion ratio cores, respectively. 
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In summary, the results indicate that it is feasible to design the ABTR to 
accommodate a wide range of conversion ratios by employing different assembly 
designs. A low conversion ratio increases the TRU consumption rate from ~20 kg/year 
(CR=0.72) to ~60 kg/year (CR=0.25) at 250 MWt power level. Because of much faster 
burnup reactivity loss, however, appropriate means for reactivity compensation must be 
employed (e.g., shorter cycles with more frequent refueling or increased number of 
control assemblies). More importantly, a TRU enrichment of ~50% is required, which is 
beyond the current irradiation experience. It is also noted that the TRU inventory 
requirement plays an important role in the dynamics of removing TRU from the current 
interim storage and the repository waste; the inventory is larger than the annual TRU 
burning rate and dominates the TRU feed requirement. 
 
The TRU enrichments of the medium conversion ratio core are within the plutonium 
enrichments of the U-Pu-10Zr ternary fuel used in the EBR-II and FFTF metal-fuel 
irradiation test programs. Thus, the ABTR core will be based on conventional enrichment 
plutonium-based fuel for the initial core, gradually transitioning to full core loading of 
transmutation fuel after its qualification phase (resulting in ~0.6 CR). The low CR 
transmutation fuel tests can be accommodated in the designated test assemblies, and if 
fully developed, core conversion to low CR fuel can be envisioned. If necessary, this low 
conversion ratio core can be converted into a breeder in the future by employing driver 
assemblies with high fuel volume fraction and by replacing the innermost row of reflector 
with blanket assemblies.  
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Table III.4-7 Heavy Metal Inventories and Mass Flow Rates of Low Conversion Ratio Core 
 
 Start-up Core Recycled Core 
 Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year Inventory Mass flow, kg/year 
Isotope BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External
U-234 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 
U-235 2.0 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 
U-236 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
U-238 1152.6 1146.6 471.5 447.6 471.5 872.3 867.9 356.8 338.8 356.8 
Np237 39.7 38.6 18.1 13.4 18.1 27.8 27.0 12.6 9.5 3.0 
Pu-236 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pu-238 17.5 18.4 5.3 9.0 5.3 56.1 55.7 23.4 21.7 0.9 
Pu-239 456.9 445.0 205.6 157.8 205.6 355.3 346.7 158.4 124.1 34.3 
Pu-240 234.0 233.4 94.4 92.0 94.4 426.2 422.1 177.6 161.4 15.7 
Pu-241 68.0 66.0 31.2 23.1 31.2 72.5 71.7 30.6 27.2 5.2 
Pu-242 47.4 47.4 18.8 19.0 18.8 124.6 123.9 51.2 48.1 3.1 
Am-241 47.1 46.2 20.3 17.0 20.3 64.7 63.4 28.3 23.1 3.4 
Am-242 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.8 4.8 1.9 1.9 0.0 
Am-243 9.3 9.4 3.6 3.9 3.6 40.8 40.7 16.6 16.0 0.6 
Cm-242 1.6 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 2.2 2.5 0.1 1.1 0.0 
Cm-243 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Cm-244 2.2 2.3 0.7 1.1 0.7 22.6 22.7 8.8 9.2 0.1 
Cm-245 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 5.8 5.8 2.3 2.3 0.0 
Cm-246 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 1.2 1.2 0.0 
Total HM 2079.9 2058.9 870.5 786.5 870.5 2081.0 2060.1 870.5 786.8 423.8 
TRU 925.0 910.0 398.1 338.1 398.1 1206.7 1190.1 513.1 447.0 66.4 
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Table III.4-8 Heavy Metal Inventories and Mass Flow Rates of Medium Conversion Ratio Core 
 
 Start-up Core Recycled Core 
 Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year Inventory Mass flow, kg/year 
Isotope BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External 
U-234 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 
U-235 6.4 6.1 1.7 0.9 1.7 6.4 6.0 1.6 0.9 1.6 
U-236 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 
U-238 4040.2 4008.5 836.3 772.9 836.3 4013.5 3981.6 831.1 767.3 831.1 
Np237 40.2 38.7 9.5 6.5 9.5 16.2 15.7 3.7 2.8 0.9 
Pu-236 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pu-238 20.1 21.4 2.8 5.3 2.8 27.2 27.0 5.7 5.2 0.3 
Pu-239 517.8 512.8 108.1 98.1 108.1 521.0 515.8 108.9 98.5 10.4 
Pu-240 243.0 241.8 49.6 47.2 49.6 299.4 296.9 62.0 57.2 4.8 
Pu-241 65.1 61.8 16.4 9.9 16.4 41.4 40.8 8.8 7.7 1.6 
Pu-242 49.5 49.4 9.9 9.8 9.9 55.6 55.1 11.5 10.6 1.0 
Am-241 48.9 47.9 10.7 8.6 10.7 33.5 32.8 7.4 5.9 1.0 
Am-242 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.4 2.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Am-243 9.9 10.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 17.5 17.4 3.6 3.4 0.2 
Cm-242 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Cm-243 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cm-244 2.5 2.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 8.8 8.8 1.7 1.8 0.0 
Cm-245 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Cm-246 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Total 
HM 5047.4 5005.2 1047.3 963.1 1047.3 5047.9 5005.7 1047.3 963.0 852.9 
TRU 1000.0 989.8 209.4 189.0 209.4 1027.2 1017.1 214.5 194.4 20.1 
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Table III.4-9 Heavy Metal Inventories and Mass Flow Rates of High Conversion Ratio Core 
 
 Start-up Core Recycled Core 
 Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year Inventory Mass flow, kg/year 
Isotope BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External BOEC EOEC Charge Discharge External 
U-234 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
U-235 13.2 12.2 2.5 1.5 2.5 13.4 12.3 2.6 1.5 2.6 
U-236 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 
U-238 8082.0 7996.2 1280.6 1194.9 1280.6 8208.9 8119.6 1307.7 1218.4 1307.7 
Np237 41.5 39.0 9.3 6.8 9.3 7.1 7.1 1.3 1.4 0.0 
Pu-236 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pu-238 18.5 20.6 2.7 4.9 2.7 8.9 8.9 1.8 1.8 0.0 
Pu-239 602.9 613.6 106.1 116.7 106.1 683.6 687.7 124.9 129.0 0.0 
Pu-240 241.7 240.3 48.7 47.3 48.7 206.5 207.8 40.5 41.8 0.0 
Pu-241 66.1 59.9 16.1 9.9 16.1 20.2 20.7 3.9 4.3 0.0 
Pu-242 48.5 48.4 9.7 9.6 9.7 11.7 11.7 2.3 2.4 0.0 
Am-241 49.6 48.0 10.5 8.9 10.5 12.2 12.0 2.5 2.3 0.0 
Am-242 1.1 1.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Am-243 9.5 9.7 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.8 2.8 0.6 0.6 0.0 
Cm-242 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Cm-243 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cm-244 2.2 2.5 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
Cm-245 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Cm-246 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 
HM 9179.2 9094.8 1488.5 1404.2 1488.5 9178.9 9094.5 1488.5 1404.2 1310.2 
TRU 1083.0 1085.2 205.4 207.5 205.4 955.8 961.5 178.3 184.0 0.0 
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III.4.3 Alternative Core Design for Oxide Fuel  
III.4.3.1 Oxide Fuel Assembly Design 
 
The reference ABTR core design presented in Section II.1.1 was developed using a 
ternary metal fuel. An alternative ABTR design was developed for mixed oxide, UO2-
TRUO2 fuel based on the same core configuration as the reference metal core design. The 
key design parameters of the oxide fuel assembly are compared with those of the metal 
fuel assembly in Table III.4-10. 
 
Compared to the metal fuel, the active core height of the oxide fuel was increased to 
90 cm from 80 cm to reduce the peak linear power density within the linear power limit. 
The gas plenum of the oxide fuel was proportionally increased to 135 cm from 120 cm. 
The fuel volume fraction of the oxide fuel is about 23.8% higher than that of the metal 
fuel because of the higher fuel smeared density. The smeared density of the mixed oxide 
fuel is 88.4% TD (theoretical density), while that of the metal fuel is 75%. The density of 
oxide fuel pellet was assumed 95% TD, and the gap between fuel pellet and cladding was 
assumed 0.12 mm.  
 
 
Table III.4-10 Comparison of Key Design Parameters of Metal and Oxide Fuel Assemblies 
 
 Metal fuel Oxide fuel   
Assembly data 
- Number of fuel pins 
- Assembly pitch, cm 
 
217 
14.598 
 
217 
14.598 
Pin data 
- Fuel form 
- Bond material 
- Height (core/plenum), cm 
- Overall pin length, cm 
- Fuel smeared density, % TD 
- Pin diameter, cm 
- Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 
- Cladding thickness, cm 
 
U-TRU-10Zr 
Na 
80 / 120 
260.0 
75.0 
0.800 
1.13 
0.052 
 
(U,TRU)O2 
He 
90 /135 
285.0 
88.4 
0.800 
1.13 
0.052 
Volume fraction, % 
- Fuel 
- Bond 
- Structure 
- Coolant 
 
33.6 
11.2 
23.1 
32.1 
 
41.6 
3.1 
23.1 
32.1 
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III.4.3.2 Fuel Cycle Performance Characteristics   
 
The start-up core performances characteristics of the oxide fuel core are compared 
with the metal fuel core in Table III.4-11. The WG-Pu was used as TRU feed for driver 
assemblies, while the LWR-SF TRU was used for fuel test assemblies. The axial 
irradiation swelling of oxide fuel was neglected, while 5% axial swelling was assumed 
for metal fuel. For the estimation of the linear power limit of oxide fuel, the thermal 
conductivity and melting temperature correlations of Reference 8 were used, and the 
porosity correction factor of 0.86 was applied for thermal conductivity. 
 
 
Table III.4-11 Comparison of Start-up Cycle Performance Characteristics  
between Metal and Oxide Cores 
 
 Metal core Oxide core 
Cycle length, months 4 4 
No. of batches (IC/OC/test) 12 / 15 / 12 12 / 15 / 12 
Equivalent core diameter /barrel ID, m 1.31 / 2.27 1.31 / 2.27 
Fuel form U-Pu-10Zr UO2-PuO2 
TRU feed (fissile content, %) WG-Pu (94.2) WG-Pu (94.2) 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 16.5/18.7/20.7 19.2/21.7/24.0 
Fissile/TRU conversion ratio 0.58 / 0.65 0.56 / 0.64 
HM/TRU loading, Mt 4.03 / 0.73 3.67 / 0.78 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 59.4 64.9 
Power density of active core, kW/l 258.0 241.3 
Discharge burnup (average/peak), MWd/kg 97.7 / 130.8 106.7 / 146.6 
Peak fast fluence, 1023n/cm2 3.25 2.67 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.20 1.35 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.53 / 1.52 1.61 / 1.60 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.13 / 1.13 1.15 / 1.15 
Peak linear power, kW/m 38.5 38.4 
Linear power limit, kW/m 44.0 42.0 
Core average flux, 1015n/m2-sec 2.38 2.21 
Test assembly flux, 1015n/cm2-sec 2.84 2.67 
Fast flux fraction 0.70 0.60 
 
 
Compared to the metal fuel core, the lower heavy metal density of oxide fuel 
decreases the heavy metal loading by ~9% despite a 23.8% larger fuel volume fraction. 
The lower heavy metal inventory increases the specific power from 59.4 kW/kg to 64.9 
kW/kg. The increased active core height reduces the average power density from 258 
W/cm3 to 241 W/cm3. The higher specific power density increases the average discharge 
burnup from 98 MWd/kg to 107 MWd/kg, but the lower power density reduces the core 
average flux level by ~8%. The neutron spectrum of the oxide fuel core is significantly 
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softer than that of metal fuel core, and thus the fast flux fraction is reduced to 0.60 from 
the value 0.70 of the metal fuel core. Combined with the lower flux level, the softer 
spectrum reduces the peak fast fluence from 3.25×1023 n/cm2 to 2.67×1023 n/cm2. The 
lower density oxide fuel core increases the average TRU enrichment from 18.8% to 
21.8%, which results in slightly higher TRU (780 kg as compared to 730 kg in the metal 
core) despite a ~9% smaller heavy metal inventory. The combined effects of the 
increased TRU enrichment and the softer spectrum result in similar fissile and TRU 
conversion ratios. The burnup reactivity swing of the oxide core is ~10% larger than that 
of the metal fuel core. The peak linear power of the oxide core is similar to that of the 
metal fuel core, but the linear power limit is slightly lower for the oxide fuel because of 
the low thermal conductivity of the oxide fuel and the helium bonding. 
 
Table III.4-12 provides the comparison of the heavy metal inventories and the mass 
flow rates between the metal and oxide fuel cores. Compared to the metal fuel core, the 
oxide fuel core increases the TRU consumption rate from 25.9 kg/year to 26.8 kg/year. 
The heavy metal mass per assembly is reduced to 64.2 kg from 70.1 kg. The TRU mass 
per assembly is increased to 12.3 kg from 11.6 kg for inner core drivers and to 15.4 kg 
from 14.5 kg for outer core drivers. For the assumed fuel management scheme for fuel 
test assemblies, each test assembly contains 13.9 kg TRU. 
 
III.4.3.3 Kinetics Parameters and Reactivity Coefficients 
 
Table III.4-13 compares the kinetics parameters and reactivity coefficients estimated 
for the BOEC and EOEC configurations of the reference ABTR metal and oxide cores. 
The softer spectrum of the oxide fuel yields a slightly smaller βeff (0.0032 as compared to 
0.0033 of the metal core), since the neutron importance increases with increasing energy. 
The prompt neutron lifetime is 0.42 μs for the oxide fuel core and 0.33 μs for the metal 
fuel core. Since the prompt neutron lifetime is proportional to the bi-linearly weighted 
average of the inverse of neutron velocity, the softer neutron spectrum of the oxide fuel 
yields a significantly longer prompt neutron lifetime.  
 
The radial expansion coefficient represents the reactivity effects of uniform, radial 
thermal expansion of the grid plate that is governed by the coolant inlet temperature. It is 
about -0.60 cents/°C for the metal fuel core and about -0.55 cents/°C for the oxide fuel 
core. The radial expansion coefficient is more negative for the metal fuel core, since the 
axial leakage increase resulting from the radial core expansion is larger because of a 
shorter core height. The axial expansion coefficient represents the reactivity effects of 
uniform, axial thermal expansion of fuel for the case that the fuel is bonded to the 
cladding. It is slightly more negative for the oxide fuel core, since the radial leakage 
increase resulting from the axial core expansion is slightly larger because of slightly 
smaller fuel atom densities.  
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Table III.4-12 Comparison of Start-up Cycle Heavy Metal Inventories and Mass Flow  
between Metal and Oxide Cores 
 Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
 Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year Inventory, kg Mass flow, kg/year 
Isotope BOEC EOEC charge discharge BOEC EOEC charge discharge
U-234 
U-235 
U-236 
U-238 
0.0 
5.2 
0.3 
3289.6 
0.0 
5.0 
0.4 
3270.2 
0.00 
1.52 
0.00 
768.35 
0.01 
0.84 
0.14 
710.29 
0.0 
4.5 
0.3 
2889.2 
0.0 
4.3 
0.4 
2870.2 
0.0 
1.3 
0.0 
678.0 
0.0 
0.7 
0.1 
620.9 
NP237 3.6 3.6 0.89 0.88 3.6 3.5 0.9 0.8 
Pu-236 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
0.0 
1.6 
628.6 
80.2 
8.9 
4.0 
0.0 
1.7 
617.0 
83.1 
9.0 
4.0 
0.00 
0.28 
156.83 
13.74 
2.09 
0.96 
0.00 
0.56 
121.80 
22.29 
2.26 
1.03 
0.0 
1.9 
660.3 
93.3 
10.4 
4.4 
0.0 
2.0 
646.8 
97.5 
10.6 
4.4 
0.0 
0.3 
166.7 
14.6 
2.2 
1.0 
0.0 
0.7 
126.1 
27.2 
2.9 
1.2 
Am-241 
Am-242 
Am-243 
3.8 
0.1 
0.7 
3.8 
0.1 
0.8 
1.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.90 
0.05 
0.20 
4.0 
0.1 
0.8 
4.0 
0.1 
0.8 
1.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
0.2 
Cm-242 
Cm-243 
Cm-244 
Cm-245 
Cm-246 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
Total HM 4027.2 3999.0 945.9 861.3 3673.3 3645.1 866.3 781.9 
TRU 732.0 723.4 176.0 150.1 779.2 770.3 187.0 160.2 
 
The sodium void worth and sodium density coefficient are positive because the 
positive spectral hardening effect over-weighs the negative leakage effect. However, the 
total sodium void worth is only ~1.4$ for the oxide fuel core and ~1.8$ for the metal fuel 
core, when the flowing sodium inside the assembly duct of all the fuel assemblies is 
voided in the active core and above. The oxide fuel core shows ~30% less positive 
sodium void worth and density coefficient, since the positive spectral hardening effect is 
reduced due to the moderation provided by oxygen. The Doppler coefficient is about -
0.10 cents/°C for the metal fuel core and -0.20 cents/°C for the oxide fuel core. The 
voided Doppler coefficients become slightly less negative due to hardened neutron 
spectra. The oxide core shows significantly more negative Doppler coefficients than the 
metal fuel core because of significantly softer spectrum as shown in Figure III.4-7. 
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Table III.4-13 Comparison of Kinetics Parameters and Reactivity Coefficients  
between Metal and Oxide Cores 
Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core   
  Unit BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Effective delayed neutron fraction  0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 0.0032 
Prompt neutron lifetime  μs 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.42 
Radial expansion coefficient  cent/°C -0.59 -0.60 -0.55 -0.56 
Axial expansion coefficient cent/°C -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
Fuel density coefficient cent/°C -0.75 -0.76 -0.51 -0.58 
Structure density coefficient  cent/°C 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Sodium void worth $ 1.75 1.85 1.32 1.40 
Sodium density coefficient  cent/°C 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Doppler coefficient cent/°C -0.10 -0.10 -0.20 -0.20 
Sodium voided Doppler coefficient cent/°C -0.07 -0.07 -0.16 -0.16 
 
 
Figure III.4-7 Neutron Spectra of Metal and Oxide Fuel Cores 
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III.4.3.4 Reactivity Control Requirements and Shutdown Margins 
 
The calculated temperature and power defects of metal and oxide fuels are compared 
in Table III.4-14. It is noted that the Doppler effect is noticeably larger for the oxide fuel 
core because of the significantly larger Doppler coefficient and the much higher fuel 
temperature. As a result, the total temperature defect of the oxide fuel is significantly 
higher than that of the metal fuel. Table III.4-15 presents the calculated control assembly 
worth for various combinations of control assemblies. As can be seen, the control 
assembly worth is larger in the oxide core because of a significantly softer spectrum. 
Among the primary control assemblies, the central control assembly has the largest worth 
because of higher neutron flux in the core center. The estimated worth of the central 
assembly is ~9.5$ for the oxide fuel core and ~8$ for the metal fuel core.  
 
Figures III.4-8 and III.4-9 show the primary system reactivity worth curves of the 
oxide fuel core at BOEC and EOEC. As indicated by the dashed vertical lines in Figures 
II.1-8 and III.4-8, the critical control rod position is 63.4 cm for the metal fuel core and 
67.8 cm for the oxide fuel core. The dashed curve indicates the reactivity worth of the 
most reactive control assembly, which is the central assembly. The reactivity addition by 
the complete withdrawal of the central control assembly is increased to 1.03$ for the 
oxide fuel core from 0.90$ for the metal fuel core. In order to limit the transient over-
power initiator, it is necessary to reduce the central control rod worth or to introduce 
some means to limit the magnitude of rod withdrawal or the rod withdrawal speed. 
 
Table III.4-16 summarizes the reactivity worth requirements for both primary and 
secondary control systems. The estimated temperature and power defects from hot full 
power to cold shutdown at BOEC are 1.74$ and 2.71$ for the metal and oxide fuel cores, 
respectively. The overpower margin is allocated to permit the reactor to operate at 115% 
of the rated power, which is equivalent to 15% of the power defect. The fuel cycle excess 
reactivity is 3.77$ for the metal fuel core and 4.21$ for the oxide fuel core. Since the fuel 
cycle analysis was performed with expanded core geometry, the reactivity associated 
with the axial fuel growth is added at BOEC. The uncertainties consist of 20% of total 
temperature defect, 30% of total burnup reactivity, 20% of fuel axial growth, and an 
assumption of 1.00$ each for criticality prediction and fissile loading (tolerance for 
manufacture uncertainty). The total uncertainty is obtained by statistically combining all 
the uncertainties.  
 
In Table III.4-17, the reactivity control requirements are compared with the available 
reactivity worth of the control systems. The oxide fuel core has slightly larger shutdown 
margins compared with the metal fuel core. The shutdown margin of the primary system 
is 8.15$ at BOEC and 14.12$ at EOEC. The shutdown margin of the secondary system is 
9.36$ at BOEC and 10.54$ at EOEC. For both the metal and oxide fuel cores, shutdown 
margins are more than adequate. These results suggest that the central assembly could be 
removed to reduce the transient over-power initiator. Simple estimation based on the 
values in Table III.4-15 showed that the shutdown margin of the primary system without 
the central assembly would be ~4.5$ at BOEC and ~9.5$ at EOEC for both the metal and 
oxide fuel cores. 
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The control-rod driveline expansion coefficients for reactivity feedback were 
estimated from Figures III.4-8 and III.4-9. Control rod expansion coefficients are 
governed principally by the total rod worth and the insertion depth of the rods. The 
calculated control-rod expansion coefficients of the oxide fuel core are 32.9 cents/cm and 
13.7 cents/cm at BOEC and EOEC, respectively. 
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Table III.4-14 Comparison of Temperature and Power Defects between Metal and Oxide Fuel Cores 
 
 Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
Hot full power to hot 
standby 
Hot standby to cold 
shutdown 
Hot full power to hot 
standby 
Hot standby to cold 
shutdown Contribution 
BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Doppler ($) 0.18  0.18 0.14  0.15  1.05  1.05  0.30  0.30  
Axial expansion ($) 0.05  0.04  0.09  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.09  0.09  
Radial expansion ($) 0.46  0.47  0.89  0.90  0.43  0.43  0.82  0.84  
Sodium density ($) -0.02  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  
Total ($) 0.66  0.67  1.08  1.09  1.51  1.52  1.20  1.21  
 
 
Table III.4-15 Comparison of Control Rod Worth ($) between Metal and Oxide Fuel Cores 
 
Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core  Number of 
inserted CRs BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Primary System 
• Central rod 
• All CR’s in 5th row 
• Central and 5 CR’s in 5th row 
• All primary rods 
 
1 
6 
6 
7 
 
6.53 
15.95 
20.32 
23.52 
 
6.62 
16.18 
20.61 
23.87 
 
7.56 
18.29 
23.66 
27.63 
 
7.66 
18.59 
24.02 
28.06 
Secondary System 
• 2 CR’s in 3rd row 
• All secondary rods 
 
2 
3 
 
10.53 
16.38 
 
10.68 
16.61 
 
12.13 
19.15 
 
12.29 
19.41 
One Stuck Rod Worth 
• Central rod 
• One of 5th row 
• One of 3rd row 
 
 
 
7.58 
3.21 
5.84 
 
7.68 
3.26 
5.93 
 
9.33 
3.97 
7.03 
 
9.46 
4.04 
7.12 
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Figure III.4-8 Reactivity Worth of Primary Control System of Oxide Core at BOEC 
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Figure III.4-9 Reactivity Worth of Primary Control System of Oxide Core at EOEC 
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Table III.4-16 Comparison of Reactivity Control Requirements ($) between Metal and Oxide Fuel Cores 
 
Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
Primary system Secondary system Primary system Secondary system  
BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Temperature defect 
 - Full power to hot standby 
 - Hot standby to refueling 
1.74 
      0.66 
      1.08 
1.75 
      0.67 
      1.09 
0.66 
      0.66 
 
0.67 
      0.67 
 
2.71 
      1.51 
      1.20 
2.73 
      1.52 
      1.21 
1.51 
      1.51 
 
1.52 
      1.52 
 
Overpower margin (15%) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Fuel cycle excess reactivity 
 - Burnup reactivity 
 - Fuel axial growth 
3.77 
      3.58 
      0.19 
   
4.21 
      4.21 
      0.00 
   
Uncertainties (RMS) 
 - Temperature defect (20%) 
 - Burnup reactivity (30%) 
 - Fuel axial growth (20%) 
 - Criticality prediction  
 - Fissile loading 
1.81 
      0.35 
      1.08 
      0.04 
      1.00 
      1.00 
1.46 
      0.35 
      0.00 
 
      1.00 
      1.00 
  
1.97 
      0.54 
      1.26 
      0.00 
      1.00 
      1.00 
1.52 
      0.55 
      0.00 
 
      1.00 
      1.00 
  
Reactivity fault 0.90   0.90   1.03   1.03   
Total 8.32 3.31 1.66 0.77 10.15 4.47 2.76 1.75 
 
  
 
  263
 
Table III.4-17 Comparison of Reactivity Control Requirements and Available Reactivity Worth 
 
Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
Primary system Secondary system Primary system Secondary system  
BOC EOC BOC EOC BOC EOC BOC EOC 
Number of control assemblies 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3 
Reactivity worth of system ($) 23.52  23.87  16.38  16.61  27.63  28.06  19.15  19.41  
Worth of 1 stuck assembly ($) 7.58  7.68  5.84  5.93  9.33  9.46  7.03  7.12  
Reactivity worth available ($) 15.95  16.18  10.53  10.68  18.29  18.59  12.13  12.29  
Maximum requirement ($) 8.32 3.31  1.66 0.77  10.14  4.47  2.76  1.75  
Shutdown margin ($) 7.63  12.88  8.87  9.92  8.15  14.12  9.36  10.54  
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III.4.4 Performances with LWR Spent Fuel TRU  
 
The reference metal core design discussed in Section II.1.1 and the alternative oxide 
core design discussed in Section III.4.3 were developed using weapons-grade plutonium 
feed, since it is unlikely to recover enough TRU for the ABTR start-up core loading from 
the LWR spent fuel under the current time schedule. It is expected that the ABTR core 
will be converted gradually into LWR-SF TRU drivers, thus the performance 
characteristics of the ABTR reference and alternative core designs loaded with LWR-SF 
TRU drivers were evaluated. The assembly designs and core configurations described in 
Sections II.1.1 and III.4.3 were used, but the required TRU enrichments to achieve the 
same cycle length were re-calculated.  
 
The heavy metal inventories and TRU consumption rates of the reference ABTR 
designs for two different TRU feed streams (i.e., WG-Pu and LWR-SF) are compared in 
Table III.4-18. The start-up cycle performance characteristics of the metal and oxide fuel 
cores are summarized in Tables III.4-19 and III.4-20, respectively. As discussed in 
Section III.4.3, the heavy metal inventory of the oxide fuel core is smaller than that of the 
metal fuel core for both TRU feeds, because of the lower heavy metal density. For each 
fuel form, the WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU cores have similar performance characteristics 
(e.g., discharge burnup, flux level, peak fast fluence, specific power density, etc.) because 
of the same heavy metal loading. However, the low fissile content of the LWR-SF TRU 
fuel increases the required TRU enrichment by 32 to 33% to maintain the same cycle 
length; the average TRU enrichment increases from 18.8 to 24.8% for the metal core and 
from 21.8 to 29.1% for the oxide core. The increased TRU enrichment decreases the 
TRU conversion ratio from 0.65 to 0.57 for the metal core and from 0.64 to 0.55 for the 
oxide core, but the reduced fissile content increases the fissile conversion ratio by ~10 %. 
The decreased TRU conversion ratio increases the TRU consumption rate from 26 to 32 
kg/year for the metal core and from 27 to 34 kg/year for the oxide core, and the increased 
fissile conversion ratio decreases the burnup reactivity swing by ~0.2 %Δk.  
 
Table III.4-18 Heavy Metal Inventories and TRU Consumption Rates of Metal and Oxide Fuel 
ABTR Cores for WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU Drivers 
 
 Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
External TRU source WG-Pu LWR SF WG-Pu LWR SF 
HM inventory   (BOEC/EOEC), kg 4027/3999 4029/4001 3673/3645 3675/3647
TRU inventory (BOEC/EOEC), kg 732/723 975/964 779/770 1046/1035
TRU consumption rate (kg/yr) 25.9 32 26.8 34.3
HM mass per assembly, kg 70.1 70.1 64.2 64.2
Inner core 11.6 15.3 12.3 16.4
Outer core 14.5 19.1 15.4 20.5TRU mass per   assembly, kg 
Fuel test 13.1 17.3 13.9 18.6
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Table III.4-19 Start-up Cycle Performance Characteristics of Metal Fuel Core  
for WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU Drivers 
 
External TRU source WG-Pu LWR-SF TRU 
Fuel form U-Pu-10Zr U-TRU-10Zr 
TRU feed (fissile content, %) WG-Pu (94.2) LWR-SF (59.6) 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 16.5/18.7/20.7 21.8/24.7/27.3 
Fissile/TRU conversion ratio 0.58 / 0.65 0.64 / 0.57 
HM/TRU loading, Mt 4.03 / 0.73 4.03 / 0.97 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 59.4 59.4 
Power density of active core, kW/l 258.0 258.2 
Discharge burnup (ave./peak), MWd/kg 97.7 / 130.8 97.7 / 130.6 
Peak fast fluence, 1023/cm2 3.25 3.28 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.20 1.02 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.53 / 1.52 1.64 / 1.63 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.13 / 1.13 1.12 / 1.11 
Peak linear power density, kW/m 38.5 40.8 
Linear power limit, kW/m 44.0 47.0 
Core average flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.38 2.34 
Test assembly flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.84 2.84 
Fast flux fraction 0.70 0.70 
 
Table III.4-20 Start-up Cycle Performance Characteristics of Oxide Fuel Core 
 for WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU Drivers 
External TRU source WG-Pu LWR-SF TRU 
Fuel form UO2-PuO2 UO2-TRUO2 
TRU feed (fissile content, %) WG-Pu (94.2) LWR-SF (59.6) 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 19.2 / 21.7 / 24.0 25.6 / 28.9 / 32.0 
Fissile/TRU conversion ratio 0.56 / 0.64 0.61 / 0.55 
HM/TRU loading, Mt 3.67 / 0.78 3.68 / 1.05 
Specific power of active core, kW/kg 64.9 64.9 
Power density of active core, kW/l 241.3 241.5 
Discharge burnup (ave./peak), MWd/kg 106.7 / 146.6 106.7 / 146.4 
Peak fast fluence, 1023/cm2 2.67 2.73 
Burnup reactivity swing (%Δk) 1.35 1.13 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.61 / 1.60 1.73 / 1.71 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.15 / 1.15 1.13 / 1.12 
Peak linear power density, kW/m 38.4 40.5 
Linear power limit, kW/m 42.0 41.5 
Core average flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.21 2.16 
Test assembly flux, 1015/cm2-sec 2.67 2.67 
Fast flux fraction 0.60 0.61 
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III.4.5 Low Conversion Ratio Core Designs  
 
The reference metal and oxide fuel core designs were based on conventional 
enrichment plutonium-based fuel for the initial core, foreseeing gradual transition to full 
core loading of transmutation fuel after its qualification phase (resulting in ~0.6 CR). The 
low CR transmutation fuel tests can be accommodated in the designated test assemblies, 
and if fully developed, core conversion to low CR fuel can be envisioned. Thus, 
additional design studies were performed to develop fuel assembly designs that yield a 
low TRU conversion ratio when employed in the reference core configuration. To 
achieve the targeted low conversion ratio of ~0.25, the TRU enrichment should be 
increased significantly. In order to increase the TRU enrichment in such a way that the 
initial excess reactivity is within the reactivity control capability of the primary control 
system, the fuel volume fraction and the cycle length were reduced. For the metal fuel, 
the Zr mass fraction was increased from 10% to 20% to compensate the decreasing 
melting temperature of metal fuel with increasing TRU fraction.  
 
Table III.4-21 presents the assembly design parameters of the low conversion ratio 
assemblies. The fuel pin diameter was reduced from 8.00 mm to 6.25 mm, and the fuel 
pin pitch-to-diameter ratio was increased from 1.13 to 1.28. The cladding thickness was 
increased from 0.52 mm to 0.75 mm, and the wire-wrap diameter was increased from 
1.03 mm to 1.73 mm. This wire-wrap is thicker than conversional wire-wrap designs, and 
the assembly design change from wire-wrap to grid spacer may need to be considered. 
The resulting fuel volume fraction was decreased from 33.6% to 19.5% for the metal fuel 
and from 41.6% to 24.2% for the oxide fuel. The structure volume fraction was increased 
from 23.1% to 31.6%, and the coolant volume fraction was increased from 32.1% to 
42.4%. In order to limit the burnup reactivity swing within the reactivity control 
capability of the primary control system, the cycle length was reduced to 2 months from 4 
months. 
 
Table III.4-22 compares the heavy metal inventories and TRU consumption rates of 
the low CR core designs for two different TRU feed streams. Table III.4-23 summarizes 
the start-up core performances characteristics, which were obtained from REBUS-3 
equilibrium cycle calculations without recycling the ABTR spent fuel. The performance 
characteristics of WG-Pu and LWR-SF TRU feeds are compared. As can be seen, the low 
conversion ratio assembly designs with the LWR-SF TRU feed yield a TRU conversion 
ratio of 0.24 for the metal fuel core and 0.28 for the oxide fuel core. The conversion 
ratios obtained with WG-Pu fuel are somewhat higher; 0.31 for the metal fuel core and 
0.36 for the oxide fuel core. It is noted that the oxide fuel core has a larger heavy metal 
loading than the metal fuel core because of the increased Zr fraction in the metal fuel 
assembly. Compared to the reference medium CR core designs, the heavy metal loading 
is reduced from 4.03 to 1.98 MT for the metal fuel core and from 3.67 to 2.15 MT for the 
oxide fuel core, because of the reduced fuel volume fractions. As a result, the specific 
power density is increased about two times. The increased specific power combined with 
the reduced cycle length from 4 months to 2 months yields a similar discharge burnup. 
The low conversion ratio roughly doubles the LWR-SF TRU enrichment from 25% to 
47% for the metal fuel core, but only from 29% to 45% for the oxide fuel. Thus the 
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LWR-SF TRU loading is reduced from 0.98 to 0.90 MT for the metal core and from 1.05 
to 0.95 MT for the oxide core.   The combined effects of the decreased conversion ratio 
and reduced cycle length increases the burnup reactivity swing by ~0.1% Δk for the metal 
fuel core but decreases that by ~0.1% Δk for the oxide fuel core. The decreased 
conversion ratios roughly double the TRU consumption rate for both the metal and oxide 
fuel cores.  
 
Table III.4-21 Fuel Assembly Design Parameters of Low Conversion Ratio Cores 
 
 Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
Fuel Form U-TRU-20Zr UO2-TRUO2 
Height (core/plenum), cm 80 / 120 90 / 135 
Fuel smeared density, % TD 75 88.4 
Pin diameter, mm 6.25 6.25 
Number of fuel pins 271 271 
Assembly lattice pitch, cm 14.598 14.598 
Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 1.28 1.28 
Average linear power, kW/m 17.7 16.6 
Pin bundle pressure drop, psi 20.5 21.2 
Volume fraction, % 
  - Fuel 
  - Bond 
  - Structure 
  - Coolant 
 
19.5 
6.5 
31.6 
42.4 
 
24.2 
6.5 
31.6 
42.4 
 
 
Table III.4-22 Heavy Metal Inventories and TRU Consumption Rates of Low CR Cores  
 
 Metal fuel core Oxide fuel core 
External TRU source WG-Pu LWR SF WG-Pu LWR SF 
HM inventory   (BOEC/EOEC), kg 1984/1970 1985/1971 2151/2137 2152/2138
TRU inventory (BOEC/EOEC), kg 663/654 903/893 691/683 948/938
TRU consumption rate (kg/yr) 55.0 61.4 50.4 57.8
HM mass per assembly, kg 34.5 34.5 37.3 37.3
Inner core 10.6 14.2 10.9 14.8
Outer core 13.2 17.7 13.7 18.5TRU mass per assembly, kg Fuel test  11.9 16.0 12.3 16.8
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Table III.4-23 Fuel Cycle Performances Characteristics of Low Conversion Ratio Cores 
 
 Metal Core Oxide Core 
Fuel form U-Pu-20Zr U-TRU-20Zr UO2-PuO2 UO2-TRUO2 
TRU feed  WG-Pu LWR-SF WG-Pu LWR-SF 
Cycle length, months 2 2 2 2 
No. of batches (IC/OC/etc) 12/15/12 12/15/12 12/15/12 12/15/12 
TRU enrichment (IC/test/OC), % 30.6 / 34.6 / 38.3 41.1 / 46.4 / 51.3 29.3 / 33.1 / 36.6 39.6 / 44.7 / 49.5 
Fissile/TRU conversion ratio 0.28 / 0.31 0.32 / 0.24 0.32 / 0.36 0.36 / 0.28 
Zr mass fraction, % 20.0 20.0 - - 
HM/TRU loading in core, MT 1.98 / 0.66 1.98 / 0.90 2.15 / 0.69 2.15 / 0.95 
HM/TRU mass per assembly, kg 34.5 / 11.9 34.5 / 16.0 37.3 /  12.3 37.3 / 16.6 
Core specific power, kW/kg  120.5 120.0 111.5 111.5 
Core power density, kW/l 256.8 257.1 240.2 240.4 
Burnup (average/peak), MWd/kg 99.1 / 130.8 99.1 / 130.5 91.7 / 123.8 91.7 /123.3 
Specific power density, MW/t 120.5 120.1 111.5 111.5 
Peak fast fluence, 1023/cm2 1.75 1.76 1.50 1.52 
Burnup reactivity swing, %Δk 1.31 1.14 1.24 1.06 
Power peaking factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.48 / 1.46 1.59 / 1.58 1.54 / 1.53 1.65 / 1.64 
Stage factor, BOEC/EOEC 1.13 / 1.13 1.12 / 1.12 1.13 / 1.13 1.11 / 1.11 
Peak linear power density, kW/m 29.5 31.6 28.8 30.5 
Linear power limit, kW/m 32.3 31.9 39.6 38.9 
Core average flux, 1015/cm2sec 2.75 2.67 2.54 2.47 
Test assembly flux, 1015/cm2sec 3.23 3.21 3.02 3.00 
Fast flux fraction 0.68 0.67 0.61 0.62 
Decay heat fraction of rated power, % 5.3 5.5 - - 
Decay heat at discharge, kW/assembly 219 226 - - 
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III.5 In-Vessel Shielding Analysis 
 
Preliminary in-vessel shielding analyses were performed to estimate 1) the fission 
power of spent ABTR fuels located in the in-vessel storage, 2) the neutron irradiation 
damage of the in-vessel structures, and 3) the secondary sodium activation in the 
intermediate heat exchangers. Using the TWODANT transport code [1], the neutron flux 
distributions were calculated for the BOEC and EOEC configurations. R-Z geometry 
models and S16 angular discretization were used. For neutron damage calculation, 28-
group dpa (displacement per atom) cross sections were generated using the NJOY code 
[2] based on the ENDF/B-VI data. The time integrations were evaluated using the 
average values of BOEC and EOEC fluxes.  
 
Figure III.5-1 shows the RZ geometry model used in the TWODANT calculations. 
In this preliminary analysis, the inside of the core barrel assembly was modeled in detail, 
but only major components were modeled outside the core barrel assembly. The core 
barrel is made of SS-316, and its radius and thickness are 120 cm and 2.54 cm, 
respectively. The in-vessel spent fuel storage is located outside the core barrel; there are 
36 positions for the fresh or spent fuel assemblies, including the fuel unloading machine 
retrieval position. The distance from the outside of the core barrel to the center of the 
spent fuel storage positions is about 36.5 cm and the distance between the centers of the 
spent fuel storage positions is 27.4 cm. It was assumed that all the storage positions are 
occupied by spent fuel assemblies. The spent fuels were represented by a homogenized 
region, and the unloading machinery was ignored. 
 
Four primary pumps and eight auxiliary heaters were homogenized together and 
located at 223.0 cm from the reactor center. Two intermediate heat exchangers (IHX) are 
homogenized and located at 239.0 cm from the core center and elevated to 340.0 cm from 
the bottom of reactor. Four direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) and other 
internal structures were not modeled. The modeled components were assumed a 
homogeneous mixture of SS-316 and sodium. The volume fractions of the structural 
material and sodium were determined to conserve the total mass of the structural 
materials. The calculated volume fractions of the structural material of the pump 
(including auxiliary heaters) and IHX are 37.2% and 10.7%, respectively. The reactor 
vessel is made of SS-316, and its radius and thickness are 278.5 cm and 5.08 cm, 
respectively. The radius and thickness of the guard vessel are 330.0 cm and 2.54 cm, 
respectively, and it is made of SS-304. 
 
Table III.5-1 provides the regionwise power distribution determined from the 
neutronics calculations only, in which the gamma energy is locally deposited at the 
position of its creation. Most of the power is generated inside the core, but non-negligible 
amount of power is generated outside the core. The spent fuel assemblies located in the 
in-vessel storage generates ~0.5% of the rated power. The fission power generated by 
each spent fuel assembly is ~33 kW, which is ~0.8% of the average assembly power in 
the core. As discussed in Section II.1.1, the decay heat of a spent fuel decreases below 
~15 kW in a few days after discharge. Thus the fission power is the dominant contributor 
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to the power generated in spent fuels. This result suggests that appropriate coolant flow 
needs to be directed to the spent fuels stored in the in-vessel spent fuel storage. 
 
Sodium
Low structure
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reflector
Gas Plenum
Upper structure
IHX
Reflector
Shield
Barrel
Spent fuel
Pump
Guard vessel
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213.8 cm
278.5 cm
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Figure III.5-1. RZ Model for In-Vessel Shielding Analysis 
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Table III.5-1 Regionwise Power Distribution of Reference ABTR Design 
 
  Inner 
core 
Outer 
core Test fuel 
Spent 
fuel Other 
BOEC 118 104 21.2 1.16 4.77 Power (MW) 
 EOEC 117 105 21.4 1.18 4.73 
BOEC 47.4 41.8 8.5 0.47 1.91 Power fraction 
(%) EOEC 46.9 42.2 8.6 0.47 1.89 
BOEC 4.93 3.48 3.53 0.032 - Assembly power 
(MW) EOEC 4.88 3.51 3.57 0.033 - 
BOEC 428.5 311.3 286.2 2.75 - Peak power 
density (W/cm3) EOEC 411.8 303.6 279.7 2.78 - 
 
 
The neutron irradiation damage of the in-vessel structures is the loss of ductility and 
fracture resistance due to the atom displacement within the material. The dpa is used to 
measure the neutron irradiation damage instead of the traditional fluence calculations, 
since it provides a simpler correlation with ductility that is generally only material 
dependent. It is recommended to ensure that the neutron fluence on the reactor vessel and 
core support structure during its service life does not reduce the residual total elongation 
of the material below 10%. For SS-316, based on the presently available data, this 
condition corresponds to ~5 dpa.  
 
The neutron irradiation damages of the in-vessel structures are summarized in Table 
III.5-2, which were calculated for an assumed life time of 30 years with 90% capacity 
factor. As can be seen, the grid plate experiences the highest peak dpa. This peak value 
occurs at the center of the top surface of grid plate and is 4.4 dpa. In the inside of the grid 
plate, it is reduced to ~3 dpa. The peak fast fluence of the grid plate (1.1×1022 n/cm2) is 
only ~20% of the fast fluence inside the grid plate of the 4S design (~6×1022 n/cm2). 
These results suggest that the in-vessel structure damages are well within the limits. It is 
noted that the fast fluence per dpa is consistent with the experimental value of ~2×1021 
n/cm2 obtained in EBR-II [3]. 
 
Table III.5-2 In-Vessel Structure Irradiation Damage 
 
  Grid plate Core barrel Reactor vessel Guard vessel
Average 1.2E+21 2.1E+21 6.8E+18 5.2E+17 Fast fluence 
(n/cm2) Peak 1.1E+22 2.3E+21 1.5E+19 1.1E+18 
Average 0.49 0.82 3.0E-3 2.5E-4 
Dpa 
Peak 4.40 0.88 6.4E-3 5.2E-4 
Average 2.4E+21 2.6E+21 2.3E+21 2.1E+21 Fast fluence 
per dpa Peak 2.5E+21 2.6E+21 2.3E+21 2.1E+21 
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The secondary sodium activation in the intermediate heat exchangers was estimated. 
Sodium in nature is composed entirely of Na-23. A (n,γ) reaction in sodium produces 
radioactive Na-24 that has a 14.95-hour half life and emits both 1.4 and 2.8-MeV gamma 
rays. A (n,2n) threshold reaction produces Na-22 that has a 2.604-year half life and emits 
a 1.3 MeV gamma. The activation products are produced in the reactor and decay out 
outside the reactor. Thus, the activity of an activation product in the secondary sodium 
leaving the reactor can be determined as  
1 2(1 ) /(1 )t tR e eλ λα − −= − −  
where 
R =  average production rate per cm3 
λ =  decay constant 
1t =  transit time in IHX 
2t =  transit time over intermediate heat transfer (IHT) loop. 
 
Using the characteristics of the secondary sodium loop shown in Table III.5-3, the 
sodium activation in the IHX was estimated. No IHX shielding was considered, and 21-
group fluxes and Na-23 cross sections were used. Table III.5-4 shows the estimated 
activations of the secondary sodium. As can be seen, Na-24 is the dominant activation 
product, and its specific activity is ~0.3 Ci/kg. Considering that the secondary sodium 
activation was to be held below 0.07 μCi/kg in CRBRP [3], the IHX must be shielded 
from neutrons in order to reduce the secondary sodium activity. 
 
Table III.5-3 Secondary Sodium Loop Characteristics 
 
 IHX Secondary loop 
Mass flow rate (kg/s) 629.3 
Volumetric flow rate (m3/s) 0.74 
Volume (m3) 4.27 9.70 
Transit time (s) 5.8 13.1 
 
 
 
Table III.5-4 Secondary Sodium Activation in IHX 
 
 Na-24 Na-22 
 BOEC EOEC BOEC EOEC 
Volumetric activity, 
mCi/cm3 0.26 0.27 4.82E-10 4.96E-10 
Specific activity, Ci/kg 0.30 0.31 5.67E-10 5.83E-10 
Total activity, Ci 2.49E+06 2.57E+06 4.68E-03 4.81E-03 
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III.6 Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis 
 
A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis was performed to assess at steady-
state flow patterns in the primary reactor system, sodium pool temperature distributions, 
and temperature distributions in the reactor vessel and the reactor vessel closure 
structures. For these analyses the CFD code STAR-CD was used. 
 
The CFD model has about 2,330,000 computational cells, and includes the reactor 
pumps, the  reactor plenum, the reactor core, lower reflector, upper shield, radial 
reflector, and radial shielding, the core barrel, the redan, the intermediate heat exchangers 
(IHXs), the reactor vessel, the guard vessel, the DRACS heat exchangers inside the 
sodium pool, the structures that form the closure of the reactor vessel, and the Argon gas 
space between the reactor and guard vessel and between the reactor vessel closure and the 
concrete support structures. To preserve the magnitude of the coolant velocities in the 
core, the core region was modeled as a cylindrical ring of fluid having the same flow area 
as the actual core. A more realistic representation would be to model the core as a porous 
region with volume porosity. At this time STAR-CD does not have this capability.  The 
reactor pumps were modeled as momentum sources. The heat generation in the core was 
modeled as a volumetric heat source, and the IHXs and the DRACS were modeled as 
volumetric heat sinks. The redan was modeled as a solid of zero thickness that allows 
heat transfer by conduction between the hot and cold sodium pool, and heat transfer by 
radiation to the reactor vessel and the structures above the sodium pool through the 
Argon cover gas. Because at this time the STAR-CD code does not allow radiation from 
a liquid surface, a solid of zero thickness and zero thermal resistance was placed on the 
top of the sodium pool (separating the sodium from the Argon cover gas). The emissivity 
of this solid was set equal to that of the sodium pool surface [1].  
 
Because the auxiliary cooling systems have not been sized yet, an adiabatic boundary 
condition was used on the outside surface of the guard vessel, and a temperature of 90oC 
was used on the concrete surfaces that form the model boundaries. 
 
Figure III.6-1 shows the flow in the lower plenum (top view). Sodium from the 
outlet of the pump-pipes flows towards the center of the plenum, and from there it flows 
upwards into the core. Figure III.6-2 shows the sodium flow in the hot pool. The main 
flow pattern is a strong upward flow towards the inlet of the IHXs. The small flow 
reversal at the inlet of the hot pool is an artifact due to the simulation of the core coolant 
as a cylindrical ring. This artifact can be removed by simulating the core region as a 
porous medium with volume porosity, but at this time STAR-CD does not have this 
capability. The lower velocity profiles are oscillating and are not symmetric. The small 
flow reversal at the inlet of the hot pool may contribute to these patterns. A porous 
medium model with volume porosity would provide more realistic flow patterns at the 
level of the small velocities. Figure III.6-3 shows the coolant velocities in the hot pool on 
a vertical plane perpendicular to the axis passing through the centers of the IHXs.  The 
flow is asymmetric and oscillating at low velocities as it is in Figure III.6-2.  
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Figures III.6-4 and III.6-5 show the temperature distribution in the hot pool. There is 
a central hot plume where the temperature is close to that of the core outlet, with a loss of 
about 2oC from the core outlet (510oC) to the top of the pool (Figure III.6-6). The small 
asymmetries in the temperature distribution are the result of the oscillating asymmetries 
in the flow distribution. 
 
There is a heat transfer through the thin redan structure from the hot pool to the cold 
pool, which reduces the sodium temperature at the inlet of the IHX by about 2oC below 
the core outlet temperature (Figure III.6-7).  Figure III.6-8 shows the temperature 
distribution in the reactor vessel. There is a significant azimuthal temperature variation in 
the section of the reactor vessel between the free surface of the cold and that of the hot 
pool, which reaches a peak temperature of 485°C in the neighborhood of the IHXs. There 
are also significant temperature variations in the redan, which may need to be considered 
in assessing its structural behavior. 
 
Figure III.6-9 shows the temperature distribution in the reactor cover. There is a 
significant variation from the center to the periphery of the cover. 
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Figure III.6-1 Velocity distribution in the lower plenum 
 
 
 
VELOCITY MAGNITUDE  
M/S                 
LOCAL MX=  7.363
LOCAL MN= 0.1655E-01
*PRESENTATION GRID*
7.363
6.838
6.314
5.789
5.264
4.739
4.215
3.690
3.165
2.640
2.116
1.591
1.066
0.5413
0.1655E-01
XY
Z
 
 
 
Figure III.6-2 Sodium velocity in the hot pool (plane passing through the IHX centers) 
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Figure III.6-3 Sodium velocity in the hot pool  
(plane perpendicular to the axis passing through the IHX centers) 
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Figure III.6-4 Temperature distribution in the hot pool  
(plane passing through the IHX centers) 
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Figure III.6-5 Temperature distribution in the hot pool  
(plane perpendicular to the axis passing through the IHX centers) 
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Figure III.6-6 Temperature distribution at the top of the hot pool 
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Figure III.6-7 Temperature distribution at the IHX inlet 
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Figure III.6-8 Temperature distribution in the reactor vessel 
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Figure III.6-9 Temperature distribution in the reactor cover 
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III.7 Safety Analysis  
 
Preliminary analyses have been completed to assess the potential safety performance 
characteristics of the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) design. The scope of the 
analyses presented here focuses on the ability of ABTR to provide inherent protection 
against damaging consequences in low probability accident sequences involving multiple 
equipment failures. 
III.7.1 Introduction and Summary 
 
Analysis Background 
 
One of the primary goals in the ABTR design is to provide not only the customary 
safety margins in design basis events, but also to deliver superior safety performance in 
beyond design basis events involving multiple equipment failures or unplanned operator 
actions. Consequently, the preliminary analyses presented here examine the behavior of 
ABTR in response to an accident initiator that is normally considered to have a low 
occurrence frequency, but potentially severe consequences, especially when engineered 
safety systems are assumed to fail. 
 
The accident initiator examined here is the total loss of normal power to the reactor 
cooling system while the plant is operating at full rated power. Within the plant, the 
effect of this initiator is the loss of normal operation of all reactor coolant pumps. 
According to design, the plant responds with a reactor scram, with activation of 
emergency power supplies (diesel generators and batteries), and with activation of the 
normal shutdown heat removal mode. The normal shutdown heat removal path is through 
the reactor coolant system and the power cycle (sodium-CO2) heat exchanger, with 
auxiliary power supplied by the emergency power supplies. As a backup, a low-capacity 
emergency heat removal system is provided to remove heat directly from the reactor 
without the need for emergency power. 
 
In the accident sequence analyzed here, the loss of power is accompanied by a 
complete failure of the emergency power supply system, resulting in a total loss of power 
to the reactor and intermediate coolant pumps. It is also assumed that the power 
generation plant immediately ceases operation, and provides no heat rejection capacity. 
The sole heat removal path following the loss of forced coolant flow is through the 
emergency heat removal system by natural circulation. This sequence was analyzed for 
the case with an immediate reactor scram, and for the case without reactor scram. These 
cases are identified as the protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) and the unprotected loss-of-flow 
(ULOF) cases respectively. The PLOF and ULOF accident sequences both assume 
multiple equipment failures, failures of safety grade protection and cooling systems, and 
no operator actions. These sequences are an extreme test of the ABTR to provide inherent 
self-protection against the consequences of the most severe accident initiators. 
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Results Summary 
 
The detailed analysis results for the PLOF and ULOF accident sequences are 
presented in Section III.7.4, below. Although both sequences simulate accidents that for 
some reactor designs may cause damage to the fuel and possibly progress into severe 
accident conditions, in the ABTR these events cause no damage. For both accident 
sequences, reactor fuel, cladding, and coolant temperatures remain below safety limits. 
 
In the PLOF sequence, the loss of forced coolant flow and normal heat removal is 
accompanied immediately by a reactor scram, which quickly brings the reactor power to 
decay heat levels. Early in the sequence, the emergency decay heat removal system does 
not have sufficient capacity to remove all the heat being produced, so system 
temperatures rise. However, due to the large heat capacity of the sodium-cooled pool-
type concept, the ABTR is able to absorb a significant amount of energy with only a 
slight temperature increase, and the natural circulation capability of the ABTR promotes 
heat removal through the available emergency heat sink. After about 5 hours, the reactor 
decay heat falls to the capacity of the emergency heat removal system, and system 
temperatures begin to decrease. The analysis predicts that short coolant and cladding 
temperature spikes occur during the transition to natural circulation, but no fuel damage 
or cladding failures would occur. 
 
In the ULOF accident, the reactor safety system fails to scram the reactor upon loss 
of forced coolant flow and normal heat removal, so the reactor remains at full power 
initially. Within the first minute, reactor temperatures increase as the coolant flow rate 
decreases, and inherent reactivity feedbacks reduce the reactor power. During this time, 
peak cladding temperatures rise to approximately 600°C. As coolant flow continues to 
decline, a second temperature peak occurs, and peak fuel and cladding temperatures reach 
approximately 660°C. This increase in temperature provides the necessary driving force 
to establish natural circulation flow. The development of natural circulation reduces the 
peak fuel and cladding temperatures back to around 600°C, after which temperatures 
remain stable. 
 
The primary significance of the analysis results for the PLOF and ULOF accident 
sequences is that no fuel damage or cladding failures would occur, even when multiple 
safety systems are assumed to malfunction. The neutronic, thermal, and hydraulic 
performance characteristics of the ABTR design provide a defensive barrier to reactor 
damage for accident initiators that otherwise progress into severe accident conditions. 
Such superior safety characteristics are inherent to a metallic-fueled, sodium-cooled, 
pool-type reactor concept. 
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III.7.2 Analysis Scope 
 
The analysis results reported here were selected on the basis that they show the 
safety margins and the inherent ability of a metallic-fueled, sodium-cooled, pool-type 
reactor system to provide protection against severe, damaging consequences. The 
accident sequences analyzed here are near the end of the spectrum of the most 
pessimistic, challenging, and potentially damaging events. The analysis results 
demonstrate the passive safety performance advantages of ABTR. This performance is 
possible because of the favorable heat transfer and reactivity feedback characteristics of 
metallic fuel, and the natural circulation shutdown heat removal capability that is possible 
with low pressure sodium coolant in a pool configuration. 
 
Accident Sequences 
 
The basic accident sequence analyzed here is the loss of normal power to the reactor 
and intermediate coolant pumps, with failure of the emergency power supplies. The result 
is an immediate loss of forced flow in the primary and intermediate coolant circuits. The 
equipment that provides a programmed flow coast down of the electromagnetic coolant 
pumps is assumed to operate. In addition, it is assumed that heat removal at the sodium-
CO2 heat exchanger ceases, so that the only heat removal path is through the emergency 
direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS). 
 
The natural circulation DRACS consists of heat exchangers located in the cold pool 
region within the reactor vessel, air dump heat exchangers located outside containment, 
and the connecting piping. The working fluid in the DRACS is NaK, and fluid flow is by 
natural circulation. Multiple independent DRACS units are provided for defense in depth. 
The DRACS is designed to remove 0.5% of full power (1250 kW) at normal operating 
temperatures assuming failure of one DRACS unit. The DRACS system operates 
continuously, with heat losses limited in normal operation by dampers on the NaK-to-air 
heat exchangers. In all the accident sequences analyzed here, one DRACS unit is 
assumed to fail, leaving a system heat rejection capacity of 1250 kW. 
 
The initial condition for the accident sequence is normal operation at full power and 
flow. With the loss of pumping power, flow in the primary circuit coasts down according 
to the programmed pump head decay. The energy for this flow coast down is provided by 
a safety grade energy storage device. Following flow coast down, natural circulation flow 
is established. 
 
With the loss of power, forced flow in the intermediate coolant system is also lost. 
Further, it is assumed that heat rejection through the sodium-CO2 heat exchanger ceases. 
The intermediate heat transport system (IHTS) is alternately a heat sink or source in the 
accident sequence, depending on its temperature and the primary system temperature at 
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the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX). During the transient, natural circulation flow in 
the IHTS may reverse, depending on transient temperature conditions. 
 
Two variations of the loss-of-flow accident sequence have been analyzed. In the 
first, it is assumed that the reactor safety system acts as designed to insert control rods 
and reduce reactor power immediately to decay heat. This sequence is called the 
protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) accident. In the second analysis, it is assumed that the 
reactor safety system fails to insert the scram control rods, and the loss of forced flow 
proceeds at full power. This sequence is called the unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF). 
 
In the PLOF sequence, the absence of normal shutdown heat removal through the 
reactor coolant system causes a slow system temperature rise following the reactor scram. 
This temperature increase occurs because the DRACS has insufficient heat removal 
capacity to overcome both the early decay heat production rate and the stored heat in the 
primary and intermediate systems. Eventually, the decay heat falls below the DRACS 
capacity, and the system temperature declines. 
 
In the ULOF sequence, the system temperature rises significantly with the flow coast 
down, but the core temperature rise introduces negative reactivity that acts to reduce the 
reactor fission power. The reactor, with its negative feedback characteristic, seeks 
equilibrium with the available heat sink by reducing power. This has the effect of 
reducing the reactor temperature and establishing a quasi-equilibrium condition. 
However, until the decay heat falls below the available heat rejection capacity, the reactor 
system will continue to heat slowly, with the long term temperature rise buffered by the 
thermal heat inertia of the system. When decay heat production falls below the DRACS 
capacity, the system temperature declines. 
 
Reactor State 
 
Safety analyses were performed for the beginning-of-equilibrium-cycle (BOEC) 
reactor conditions described in Section II.1. Only the BOEC results are reported here 
because the EOEC results are similar, even though the reactor radial power distribution 
changes with irradiation. 
 
For the BOEC safety analysis, it was assumed that sufficient irradiation had taken 
place to swell the fuel radially into contact with the cladding. Examination of EBR-II 
irradiated fuel has indicated that fuel-cladding contact will occur early in fuel life, 
depending on the initial geometry and local specific power. Fuel-cladding contact has the 
impact of lowering thermal resistance by eliminating the sodium-filled fuel-cladding gap. 
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For the PLOF analysis, the decay heat curve was taken as 100% of the ANSI 5.1 
standard for Pu-239 [1]. For the ULOF analysis, the decay heat curve was combined with 
the computed fission power calculated using the reactivity feedback parameters 
determined by the reactor physics analysis of Section II.1 for the BOEC core. 
 
III.7.3 Analysis Methods and Input Data 
 
The analytical methods used to evaluate the ABTR performance are incorporated 
into the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code [2] which was used to produce all the results 
presented here. In the following sections, the reactor and coolant system thermal-
hydraulic models are described along with key input data relevant to the determination of 
ABTR safety performance. 
 
Reactor Thermal Hydraulics 
 
The thermal-hydraulic performance of the reactor core is analyzed with a geometric 
model consisting of a number of single-pin channels. In a multiple-channel, whole-core 
model, each channel represents a single fuel pin and its associated coolant and structure. 
The single pin is assumed to characterize the average pin in a fuel subassembly, and 
subassemblies with similar reactor physics and thermal-hydraulics characteristics are 
grouped, so a number of channels are selected to represent all the pins in the reactor core. 
 
The geometry assumed in the channel thermal-hydraulic model is shown in 
Figure III.7-1. Heat generated in the fuel is assumed to travel through the cylindrically-
symmetric pin to the upward-flowing coolant. The structure field is used to represent part 
of the hexagonal duct and the wire wrap. One-dimensional, radial heat transfer 
calculations are performed at many axial locations to model heat transfer from the fuel 
through the cladding to the coolant, and from the coolant to the structure, the gas plenum, 
and the reflectors. One-dimensional (axial) coolant mass flow is modeled with a 
momentum equation solution for the axial pressure profile, and convective heat transfer 
conditions are assumed at the interfaces between the coolant and the cladding, the 
reflectors, and the structure. Temperatures are calculated at multiple radial nodes in the 
fuel, the cladding, the reflectors, and the structure. A single bulk temperature is 
calculated at each axial location. Axial heat conduction is neglected. 
 
Thermal, transport, and physical properties data for the coolant were taken as the 
temperature-dependent liquid sodium properties available in SAS4A/SASSYS-1. 
Cladding properties were taken as the HT9 data presented in Reference 3. Fuel properties 
were taken from the SSCOMP correlations in SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Version 3.0; these 
correlations are based on data generated in the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Program. 
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On the basis of the reactor physics calculations reported in Section II.1, the multiple-
channel model depicted in Figure III.7-2 was selected for safety analysis calculations. 
This model approximates the full heterogeneity of the reactor physics model by assigning 
channels to represent each fuel enrichment zone. Channels 1 and 3 represent the average 
subassemblies in the inner and outer enrichment zones respectively, while channel 2 
represents the average of the mid-core fuel test assemblies. A fourth channel represents 
all of the non-fuel subassemblies, including the mid-core materials test assemblies. A 
fifth channel is used to represent the peak-power inner-core subassembly with fresh fuel. 
 
Table III.7-1 presents geometric input data employed in the multiple-channel whole-
core model. In this data, it has been assumed that the irradiated fuel has swollen into 
contact with the cladding. 
 
 Figure III.7-3 shows the initial subassembly powers for the beginning of equilibrium 
cycle (BOEC) condition as described in Section II.1. The subassembly power for the 
peak assembly assumes fresh fuel in the peak power location. All other subassembly 
powers represent channel averages from BOEC fuel compositions at various stages of 
depletion. The initial subassembly flow rates shown in Figure III.7-4 were determined 
such that the mixed-mean coolant outlet temperature was 510°C for each region (inner 
core, outer core, fuel test, and reflectors). Flow for the peak subassembly was set so that 
the outlet temperature would be 510°C midway through depletion, with the remaining 
flow for the inner core allocated to channel 1. With fresh fuel in the peak subassembly 
location, the outlet temperature for the peak subassembly is higher than nominal. Initial 
coolant outlet temperatures at BOEC are shown in Figure III.7-5. 
 
Based on the above input conditions, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 calculates the initial, 
steady-state thermal-hydraulic conditions in the reactor core prior to the onset of a 
transient. Peak coolant outlet, peak cladding, and peak fuel temperatures are shown in 
Figure III.7-5, III.7-6, and III.7-7, respectively. Coolant, cladding, and fuel temperatures 
that arise during a transient are discussed in the relevant sections below. 
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Figure III.7-1 Single-Pin Channel Model 
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Figure III.7-2 Channel Assignment for Reactor Core Thermal-Hydraulic Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.7-3 BOEC Initial Subassembly Power (MW) 
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Table III.7-1 Fuel Assembly, Pin, and Coolant Channel Model Data 
 
Pins per Assembly 217 
Number of Fuel Assemblies 60 
 Channel 1 (Inner Core) 23 
 Channel 2 (Fuel Test) 6 
 Channel 3 (Outer Core) 30 
 Channel 5 (Peak Inner Core) 1 
Fuel Height (mm) 800 
Gas Plenum Height (mm) 1200 
Upper Reflector Height (mm) 300 
Lower Reflector Height (mm) 600 
Axial Node Height (mm)  
 Core 40 
 Gas Plenum 200 
 Upper Reflector 60 
 Lower Reflector 120 
Hydraulic Diameter (mm) 2.972 
Coolant Flow Area per Pin (mm2) 22.69 
Outer Fuel Radius (mm) 3.48 
Inner Cladding Radius (mm) 3.48 
Outer Cladding Radius (mm) 4.00 
Structure Thickness a (mm) 3.45 
Structure Perimeter b (mm) 2.46 
Reflector Thickness (mm) 2.00 
Reflector Perimeter (mm) 25.1 
a. Structure thickness includes weighted contribution 
from the inter-assembly gap. 
b. Structure perimeter includes contribution from wire 
wrap spacers. 
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Figure III.7-4 Initial Subassembly Coolant Flow (kg/s) 
 
 
 
Figure III.7-5 BOEC Initial Coolant Outlet Temperature (°C) 
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Figure III.7-6 BOEC Initial Peak Cladding Temperature (°C) 
 
 
 
Figure III.7-7 BOL Initial Peak Fuel Temperature (°C) 
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Coolant Systems Thermal Hydraulics 
 
The coolant systems thermal hydraulics model represents coolant flow and heat 
transfer in the primary and intermediate sodium systems, and in the emergency decay 
heat removal system, with a network of volumes and components connected by flow 
paths. The coolant systems model is shown in Figure III.7-8. From the inlet plenum, cold 
coolant flows through the core and is heated, then exits to the outlet plenum and travels to 
the shell side of the intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs), where it gives up its heat. Cold 
primary coolant exits the IHXs and flows to the cold pool. The primary coolant pumps 
take suction from the cold pool and deliver the coolant back to the inlet plenum. 
Emergency decay heat removal is provided by the direct reactor auxiliary cooling system 
(DRACS), a natural circulation system that removes heat by means of a heat exchanger in 
the upper region of the primary circuit cold leg and rejects heat through an air dump heat 
exchanger outside the containment. The working fluid in the DRACS system is NaK. 
 
In the primary coolant circuit, volumes 1 and 2 represent the inlet and outlet 
plenums, and volumes 3 and 4 stand for regions of the primary circuit cold leg; the 
coolant in volume 4 is essentially stagnant. Volumes 5 and 6 simulate the gas expansion 
volumes in the intermediate loop and decay heat removal system, respectively. Design 
parameters assumed for the volumes in the model are shown in Table III.7-2. All of the 
volumes in the model are perfectly mixed (i.e. characterized by a single temperature) 
except for the upper region of the cold pool, which is treated by a stratification model for 
low flow conditions. 
 
Volumes in the model are connected by one-dimensional flow segments, which are 
further subdivided into temperature elements for heat transfer calculations. Table III.7-3 
shows the parameters assumed for the liquid segments. Flow segment 1 stands for the 
core channels, and flow segment 2 represents the shell side of the IHX. The ABTR has 
two IHXs, but only a single IHX is modeled, and it is assumed in this work that both 
primary circuits behave identically. Segment 4 represents the four primary coolant pumps 
and the discharge pipes connected to the inlet plenum. Segment 5 represents the primary 
coolant flow path through the decay heat removal heat exchanger, and segment 6 
connects the upper region of the cold pool with the near stagnant lower region. Segment 7 
represents the intermediate heat transfer loop, and includes the loop piping, the 
intermediate heat exchanger, and the intermediate coolant pump. Segment 8 represents 
natural circulation flow in the DRACS loop. In normal operation, heat addition takes 
place in segment 1, and heat is rejected in segments 3 and 5. Segment 2 is thermally 
connected through the IHX to the intermediate loop, and segment 5 is thermally 
connected to the DRACS loop through the DRACS heat exchanger. 
 
In the model, liquid flow segments are divided into a number of elements for the 
purpose of heat transfer and pressure drop calculations. The liquid elements in the coolant 
systems model are described in Table III.7-4. 
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Figure III.7-8 Coolant Systems Thermal Hydraulics Model 
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Table III.7-2 Compressible Volumes Input Data 
Volume Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Volume 
Description 
Inlet 
Plenum 
Outlet 
Plenum 
Upper 
Cold 
Pool 
Region 
Lower 
Cold 
Pool 
Region 
Intermed. 
Loop 
Junction 
DRACS 
Loop 
Junction 
Total Volume 
(m3) 3.06 92.51 152.97 28.14 6.0 4.0 
Initial Gas 
Volume (m3) - 6.17 60.6 - 1.0 0.6 
Ref. Liquid 
Elevation (m) -0.75 3.0 7.0 0.0 18.3 27.0 
Liq/Gas Interface 
Area (m2) - 11.16 12.8 - 1.0 0.8 
Wall Surface 
Area (m2) 10.5 16.5 80.0 44.0 13.0 10.0 
Wall Heat 
Capacity (MJ/K) 63.5 0.66 26.87 14.14 1.075 0.707 
 
 
Table III.7-3 Liquid Segments Input Data 
Segment 
Number Description 
Compressible 
Volume 
In/Out 
Inlet 
Elevation 
(m) 
Liquid 
Element 
In/Out 
Initial Flow 
(kg/s) 
1 Reactor Sub- Assemblies 1/2  -0.60 1/1 1264.4 
2 IHX Shell Side 2/3  6.02 2/3 632.2 
3 Intra-Volume Heat Transfer 3/3 4.0 4/4 0.0 
4 Primary  Pump 3/1 3.56 5/8 316.1 
5 DHRX to Cold Pool 3/3 6.035 9/9 0.0 
6 Cold Pool Transition 3/4  -0.85 10/10 0.0 
7 Intermediate Loop 5/5 18.2 11/19 634.0 
8 DRACS Loop 6/6 28.0 20/24 0.0 
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Table III.7-4 Liquid Elements Input Data 
Element 
Number Description 
Outlet 
Elevation 
(m) 
Length 
(m) 
Flow Area 
(m2) 
Hydraulic 
Diameter 
(m) 
1 Reactor  * * * * 
2 IHX Shell  2.17 3.85 0.766 0.0186 
3 IHX Outlet 1.65 0.42 0.3 0.34 
4 Cold Pool HT 6.4 2.4 0.44 0.16 
5 Pump Inlet 3.61 0.05 0.13 0.41 
6 Primary  Pump 3.61 0.05 0.055 0.113 
7 Pump Outlet -0.77 4.38 0.132 0.34 
8 Pump Discharge -0.77 1.26 5.36 1.0 
9 DRACS HX 3.69 2.35 0.024 0.037 
10 CP Transition -.87 0.02 0.092 0.34 
11 IHTS Pipe 13.0 6.4 0.092 0.34 
12 IHTS Pipe 13.0 4.3 0.092 0.34 
13 IHTS Pipe 2.17 10.8 0.092 0.34 
14 IHX Tube 6.02 3.85 0.517 0.014 
15 IHTS Pipe 12.4 6.36 0.092 0.34 
16 IHTS Pipe 12.4 5.2 0.092 0.34 
17 IHTS Pipe 23.3 6.0 0.092 0.34 
18 Na/CO2 HX 18.3 4.0 3.6 0.0075 
19 IHTS Pump 18.3 1.0 0.092 0.34 
20 DRACS Pipe 28.0 1.0 0.016 0.14 
21 Air Dump HX 27.0 5.7 0.17 0.05 
22 DRACS Pipe 3.7 23.3 0.016 0.14 
23 Na/NaK HX 6.04 2.35 0.010 0.037 
24 DRACS Pipe 26.9 20.9 0.016 0.14 
* See core channel model in Table III.7-1. 
 
 
Flows in the primary and intermediate circuits are driven by both forced circulation 
at the pumps and by buoyancy due to heat exchange, so transient natural circulation flows 
adjust to changing heat generation and transfer conditions. The natural circulation flow in 
the DRACS loop can change due to temperature changes in the DRACS heat exchanger 
and the air dump heat exchanger, and heat transfer at the air dump heat exchanger can be 
enhanced by opening air flow dampers (normally closed). 
 
Reactor Kinetics and Reactivity Feedback 
 
A point kinetics model is employed to calculate the response of reactor fission power 
to transient reactivity feedback in unscrammed sequences. At any time, the net reactivity 
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is the sum of a number of individual reactivity feedbacks that are determined by the 
transient thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, and neutronic state of the reactor. The feedback 
reactivities considered are fuel Doppler, coolant density, fuel and cladding axial 
expansion, radial core expansion, and control rod driveline thermal expansion. In addition 
to tracking fission power, a decay heat model is integrated with the point kinetics model 
to track shutdown events in sub-critical conditions. 
 
Fuel Doppler feedback is calculated from the spatially-dependent fuel temperature 
distribution and the input spatial distribution of the fuel Doppler reactivity coefficient. In 
each single-pin channel, the axial distribution of the radial pin-average fuel temperature 
is used to calculate the reactivity feedback. 
 
Coolant density reactivity feedback is calculated from the spatially dependent 
coolant density distribution and the input distribution of the coolant density reactivity 
coefficient calculated from perturbation theory. The reactivity feedback data is entered as 
a coolant void worth (the negative of the coolant mass worth). 
 
Transient fuel and cladding temperatures are used to predict fuel and cladding axial 
dimension changes, and in each single-pin channel the reactivity feedbacks associated 
with fuel and cladding axial expansion are computed from first order perturbation theory. 
 
A simple radial core expansion model accounts for core dilation due to thermal 
expansion of the hexcan load pads and thermal expansion of the core support grid plate. 
Reactivity feedback is then calculated from the computed core dimension change and an 
input linear reactivity coefficient based on stand-alone neutronics eigenvalue 
calculations. 
 
For the control-rod driveline feedback model, it is assumed that the control rod 
drivelines are washed by the outlet coolant from the core. Thermal expansion of the 
drives due to a rise in core outlet temperature will cause the control rods to be inserted 
further into the core, providing a negative reactivity component. On the other hand, if the 
control rod drives are supported on the vessel head, and if the core is supported by the 
vessel walls, then heating the vessel walls will lower the core, leading to a positive 
reactivity component. In the present model, both control-rod driveline expansion and 
vessel wall expansion are treated. 
 
III.7.4 Analysis Results 
 
Analyses of the protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) and unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) 
accident sequences were performed with coupled heat transfer, thermal-hydraulics, and 
reactor kinetics models available in the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 code. These models have 
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been validated through many applications to EBR-II and FFTF transient tests. 
Additionally, temperature criteria for assessments of cladding damage thresholds have 
been established by results from testing of metallic fuel in EBR-II and TREAT. 
Consequently, there is high confidence that the detailed results from the PLOF and ULOF 
accident analyses presented here give a true characterization of the physical performance 
that could be obtained in the ABTR design. 
 
Protected Loss-of-Flow (PLOF) Accident Sequence 
 
Results from analysis of the PLOF accident sequence are shown in Figure III.7-9, -
10, -11 and -12. Figure III.7-9 and -10 show the history of the reactor power, the decay 
heat power, the DRACS heat removal rate and the coolant flows through the highest 
temperature subassembly (Channel 5) and an average temperature subassembly (Channel 
3). Recall that this transient is initiated by a complete loss of forced coolant flow in the 
primary and intermediate loops, save the pump coast-downs. Both the primary pumps and 
the intermediate pumps have enough inertia to give initial flow halving times of 7 
seconds. The primary pump rotors completely stop turning at about 450 seconds after the 
start of the transient, leading to a transition to natural circulation. The transition to natural 
circulation goes more smoothly in the hotter Channel 5 than in the cooler Channel 3. 
Almost immediately at initiation, the reactor control system scrams the reactor, beginning 
the power reduction to decay heat shown in Figure III.7-9, and the dampers on the 
DRACS air dump heat exchangers open, permitting the DRACS to operate at its full 
capacity of 0.5%. As the cold pool temperature rises, DRACS heat removal capacity 
increases, eventually reaching the equivalent of 0.7% of normal reactor power. Not 
indicated in this figure is the loss of heat removal to the balance-of-plant, which is 
assumed to occur after the first 10 seconds. Figure III.7-9 shows that the reactor decay 
heat power equals the DRACS heat removal capacity at about 5 hours into the transient. 
 
Figure III.7-11 shows the early reactor temperature histories during the coolant flow 
coast down and transition to natural circulation. During this and the following time, the 
only heat removal is through the DRACS. The rapid reactor power decrease due to the 
scram initially lowers the coolant and cladding temperatures in the core. Then the drop in 
core flow as the pumps coast down leads to a rise in core coolant and cladding 
temperatures. As mentioned above the transition to natural circulation is smoother in 
Channel 5 than in Channel 3. In channel 3 as the primary pumps stop turning the coolant 
flow rate temporarily drops to very low values, leading to higher peak coolant and 
cladding temperatures. This short-term cladding temperature rise may result in some fuel-
cladding chemical interaction, but no cladding failure would occur.  
 
Note that the “Cold Pool” temperature shown in Figure III.7-10 and -11 is the 
average temperature of the axial distribution computed with the volume stratification 
model. The pump inlet is in the lower part of the cold pool, and at this location the 
coolant temperature is lower than the average for the cold pool. 
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As the system temperature rises, as shown in Figure III.7-11 and -12, the DRACS 
heat removal capability increases due to an increase in NaK flow and heat rejection at the 
air dump heat exchangers. The decay heat production declines throughout the transient, 
until it becomes equal to the DRACS heat removal at 5 hours. The hot pool and cold pool 
temperatures reach long-term peak values at about this time, and then uniformly decrease 
as the whole system cools. 
 
The significance of the PLOF analysis results is emphasized in Figure III.7-11 which 
shows the initial peak cladding temperature (522°C) in channel 3, compared to the short-
term transient peak cladding temperature of 750°C and the long-term peak cladding 
temperature just above 500°C at around 4 hours. In the PLOF transient, no cladding 
failures would occur, and the long-term peak temperatures in the accident are lower than 
the normal operating temperatures. Stated in another way, the long-term temperature 
safety margins in the accident are greater than the margins at the normal operating 
conditions. This very significant result is obtained as a result of the natural circulation 
capabilities of the reactor coolant system and the DRACS. 
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Figure III.7-9 PLOF Power and Flow History, Early Times 
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Figure III.7-10 PLOF Power and Flow History, Extended Times 
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Figure III.7-11 PLOF Temperature History, Early Times 
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Figure III.7-12 PLOF Temperature History, Extended Times 
 
 
Unprotected Loss-of-Flow (ULOF) Accident Sequence 
 
The ULOF transient is initiated by the same set of failures as for the PLOF accident 
(loss of forced flow and loss of normal heat rejection). However, for the ULOF case, the 
reactor control system also fails to scram the reactor; so the accident proceeds from full 
power. All heat rejection is through the DRACS, with a design heat rejection of 0.5% of 
full power at nominal conditions. Results from the analysis of the ULOF accident 
sequence are shown in Figure III.7-13 through Figure III.7-15. 
 
Figure III.7-13 shows the histories for the total reactor power, the decay heat 
production, and the coolant flow in channel 5 (the peak inner core assembly). The power-
to-flow imbalance during the first 800 seconds results in significant transient reactor 
heating. Peak fuel, peak clad, and coolant outlet temperatures for channel 5 are shown in 
Figure III.7-14. Coolant and cladding temperatures increase to approximately 600°C 
within the first 30 seconds. This heating causes the reactivity feedbacks shown in 
Figure III.7-15. Axial and Radial expansion are the main contributors to the initial 
negative reactivity feedback, which causes power and fuel temperatures to decline. 
Reduced fuel temperatures provide a positive Doppler feedback, although the magnitude 
is modest due to the high thermal conductivity and relatively low operating temperatures 
of metallic fuel. Shortly after the onset of the transient, higher-temperature coolant begins 
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washing over and heating the control-rod drivelines. As the drivelines expand, an 
additional negative reactivity component is introduced, as shown in Figure III.7-15. 
 
The flow coast-down provided by the inertia of the primary pumps ends at 
approximately 450 seconds. At this point, natural circulation has not yet been fully 
established, and fuel, cladding, and local coolant temperatures begin to rise to form a 
second temperature peak at approximately 480 seconds. The increased temperatures 
provide the necessary driving force to establish natural circulation flow and the coolant 
flow rate in channel 5 begins to increase. While the second temperature peak also causes 
considerable thermal expansion and negative reactivity feedback, fission power has 
already been significantly reduced, and residual heating is dominated by decay heat. 
Therefore, the dramatic changes in reactivity feedback (particularly radial expansion) 
have negligible impact on subsequent transient development. 
 
As natural circulation is being established, the peak in the coolant temperature moves 
up through the core and to the subassembly outlet. While the delay in observing the 
temperature peak at the outlet is partly due to the low flow conditions, a bigger 
contributor to the delay is the large thermal inertia of the structural materials above the 
core, which must all be heated before the temperature peak reaches the outlet. 
Nevertheless, the development of natural circulation reduces peak fuel and cladding 
temperatures back to around 600°C. Beyond 800 seconds, the normalized power-to-flow 
falls below unity, and the temperature difference from inlet to outlet falls below that of 
normal operating conditions. In the long term, once the decay heat falls below the heat 
rejection capability of the DRACS, overall system temperatures will begin to decline. 
 
The significance of the ULOF accident analysis results is captured in Figure III.7-14. 
As shown for channel 5, the peak fuel, cladding, and coolant temperatures remain well 
below the coolant saturation (boiling) temperature, with a minimum margin to coolant 
boiling of nearly 300°C. The analysis suggests that the core would survive an unprotected 
loss-of-flow accident without pin failures or fuel damage. This very favorable result 
comes about because of 1) the high thermal conductivity and relatively low operating 
temperature of metallic fuel, 2) the capability of a sodium-cooled reactor in a pool-type 
primary system to remove decay heat in natural circulation, and 3) the beneficial negative 
reactivity feedback coefficients and reactor physics performance of metallic fuel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 303 
 
0.01
0.1
1
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Time (s)
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 P
ow
er
 o
r F
lo
w
Decay Power
Power
Inlet Flow
 
Figure III.7-13 ULOF Transient Total Power and Channel 5 Flow 
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Figure III.7-14 ULOF Transient Temperatures for Channel 5 
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Figure III.7-15 ULOF Transient Reactivity Feedback 
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III.8 System Response during LOF/LOHS Events 
 
As noted in Section II.6, given the overall DRACS design, engineering calculations 
were performed to verify that the shutdown heat removal system is capable of 
maintaining system temperatures at acceptably low levels during a protected loss of 
flow/loss of heat sink (LOF/LOHS) event.  This engineering analysis provided the basis 
to proceed with the detailed SASSYS safety-basis analyses described in Section III.7.  
The engineering model treats four coupled natural convection flow circuits.  As shown 
previously in Figure II.6-1, the first flow circuit is within the reactor vessel.  In this 
region, the natural convection flow path is from the core, through the redan, and then into 
the cold pool through the IHX flow paths.  The sodium then flows from the cold pool 
through the EM pumps and back to the core inlet to complete the flow circuit.  Assuming 
quasi-steady flow behavior, then Bernoulli’s equation for the flow circuit can be written 
as: 
0
pρ
2
pm
p
2fL/D)/Aloss(K2
1
c)EcpTc(Tpgβp =
•
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−− ∑ρ                     
where 
•
m  denotes mass flow rate, g is the gravitational constant, β is the linear expansion 
coefficient, E denotes elevation difference, T denotes temperature, f denotes friction 
factor, Kloss denotes form loss coefficient, L is flow length, A is flow area, and subscripts 
c, hp, and cp denote the core, hot plenum and cold plenum regions within the reactor 
vessel, respectively.  Similar equations apply to the three other flow circuits described 
below. 
  
In addition to the overall natural convection flow pattern through the core, a second 
natural convection flow circuit will also develop in the cold pool around the DRACS, 
since these units are essentially isolated ‘cold fingers’ residing in the cold pool.  The cold 
pool sodium enters each DRACS through window-type openings in the outer shroud just 
below the upper tube sheet. The sodium then flows down the shell side while depositing 
heat and returns to the cold pool at a reduced temperature through a second opening just 
above the lower tube sheet.  For this particular case, the thermal centers separation 
distance is approximately equal to the DRACS tube length (~ 2.5 m). 
 
Aside from the two flow fields inside the reactor vessel, a third natural convection 
flow field also develops in the piping system from the tube side of the DRACS to the 
tube side of the NDHX.  Finally, the fourth natural convection flow field is through the 
NDHX which serves as the final heat sink for the system.  For all the system flow paths, 
flow resistance to natural convection is modeled assuming one-dimensional flow 
behavior in which flow form and frictional losses are calculated using standard (i.e., ΣK 
+ fL/D) engineering methods. 
 
 306 
 
In addition to solving for flow rates throughout the system, the thermal response 
within the reactor vessel is determined by solving time-dependent equations for the core, 
redan, and cold plenum regions, respectively, using a lumped capacitance method in 
which each region is characterized by a mass and an effective specific heat.   In 
particular, the temperatures of these regions are calculated from the following three 
coupled ordinary differential equations: 
 
)cTcp(TpcpmdecQdt
cdT
cccm −−=
••
                                
)hpTc(Tpcpmdt
hpdT
hpchpm −=
•
                                  
)cpT
exit
dr(Tpcdrm)cpThp(Tpcpmdt
cpdT
cpccpm −+−=
••
                
 
where m denotes mass, decQ
•
 is the core decay heat level, and exitdrT  is the DRACS shell 
side sodium temperature at the HX exit.  The core decay heat level is evaluated using the 
ANS standard decay heat curve assuming a uranium core.  Heat transfer within the heat 
exchangers is evaluated using fairly detailed models that calculate the heat removal rates 
based on the current mass flowrates on the shell and tube sides of each unit.  The heat 
transfer coefficients used on the shell and tube sides of the DRACS in the transient 
analysis are identical to those used in the IHX design calculations. 
 
A summary of the model input data that has been assembled for this preliminary 
analysis is provided in Table III.8-1.  Approximate masses for the redan and cold 
plenums were developed based on the overall system design provided in Section II.6 
assuming sodium properties in these regions.  Lumped capacitance property estimates for 
the core (density, specific heat) were developed based on the core configuration data 
provided in Section II.1.1.  The initial core-average temperature was set at 520 ºC, while 
the initial temperatures of the hot and cold plenum were set equal to the nominal core full 
power inlet and outlet operating temperatures of 510 ºC and 355 ºC, respectively.  
 
 
The required data to calculate the flow pressure drop in the three regions inside the 
reactor vessel are also provided in Table III.8-1.  For the purposes of this analysis, a total 
of four EM primary reactor coolant pumps are assumed.  The DRACS and NDHX design 
parameters are taken from Tables II.6-1 and II.6-2, respectively.  The diameter of the 
secondary piping is assumed to be 7.5 cm.  The engineering data required to evaluate 
flow losses (i.e., pipe length of 10 m and total loss coefficient of 5.0) are design specific; 
representative values have been assumed here to move forward with the analysis.   
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Table III.8-1 Summary of model input parameters for transient system analysis 
 
Component Input parameters Value 
Full power rating 250 MW 
Mass, specific heat, initial temperature 14,238 kg, 520 J/kg-K, 520 ˚C 
 
Core 
Flow area, length, Dh, ΣKloss 0.32 m2, 3.05 m, 3.36 mm, 1.5 
Mass, specific heat, initial temperature  65,535 kg, 1272 J/kg-K, 510 ˚C Redan 
Flow area, length, Dh, ΣKloss 1.23 m2, 4.0 m, 1.25 m, 1.0 
Cold plenum Mass, specific heat, initial temperature 41,346 kg, 1273 J/kg-K, 355 ˚C 
EM pumps Number, flow area, length, Dh, ΣKloss 4, 0.028 m2, 5.5 m, 9.7 cm, 3.0 
Piping from pumps 
to core inlet 
Length, Dh, ΣKloss 15 cm, 0.30 m, 2.5 
Sodium properties Density, viscosity, conductivity, 
specific heat, expansion coefficient 
849 kg/m3; 2.65•10-4 kg/m-s; 69.4 
W/m-K; 1272 J/kg-K; 2.80•10-4  K-1 
Nak  properties Density, viscosity, conductivity, 
specific heat, expansion coefficient 
827 kg/m3; 3.54•10-4 kg/m-s; 24.7 
W/m-K; 915 J/kg-K; 2.80•10-4  K-1 
Air properties Density, viscosity, conductivity, 
specific heat, expansion coefficient 
1.0 kg/m3; 2.22•10-5 kg/m-s; 0.035 
W/m-K; 1012 J/kg-K; 2.1•10-3  K-1 
Number 1 or 2  
No. of tubes, tube pitch, ID, OD, 
length, thermal conductivity 
25, 3.79 cm, 2.04 cm, 2.22 cm, 2.75 
m, 28.0 W/m-K 
 
 
DRACS 
Primary (shell) and secondary (tube) 
side ΣKloss 
1.5, 1.5 
Number 2  
No. of tubes, tube pitch, ID, OD, 
length, thermal conductivity 
3300, 2.23 cm, 1.41 cm, 1.59 cm, 
4.00 m, 28.0 W/m-K 
 
 
IHX 
Primary (shell) and secondary (tube) 
side ΣKloss 
26.6, 1.5 
Secondary piping Pipe ID (Dh), length, ΣKloss 0.075 m, 10.0 m, 4.0 
Inlet duct to NDHX Pipe id (Dh), length, ΣKloss 2.0 m, 10.0 m, 4.0 
Outlet duct to 
NDHX 
Pipe id (Dh), length, ΣKloss 2.0 m, 10.0 m, 4.0 
Chimney  Pipe id (Dh), length, ΣKloss, Tair 1.62 m, 5.0 m, 1.5, 15ºC 
ΔH driving natural 
convection 
Primary system, DRACS, secondary, 
tertiary 
1.0 m, 2.87 m, 5.0 m, 5.0 m 
 
  
Given the above set of assumptions, the particular accident sequence selected for this 
preliminary evaluation of shutdown heat removal capability is a protected LOF/LOHS 
event.  In particular, at time t = 0, the reactor is scrammed from the full-power operating 
point of 250 MWt.  The primary system pumps are assumed to coast down with a 4 
second halving time until the flow rate falls below that predicted under buoyancy-driven 
natural convection conditions.  As soon as the reactor is scrammed, the dampers on the 
NDHXs open to bring the SHRS into operation.  The EM pumps on the DRACS flow 
circuits are not assumed to active upon scram, and therefore system flowrates are 
calculated solely on the basis of natural convection flow response.  For the base case, 
only on of the three DRACS systems is assumed to activate at time t = 0.  To examine the 
effect of the number of operational DRACS on the peak core temperature, a second 
calculation was performed with two DRACS activated upon scram.  The calculations 
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were carried out over a period of 1 day (24 hours).   In both cases, the core had reached 
peak temperature within this time interval and started to decline.  
 
Figure III.8-1 provides the core and plena temperature responses with either one or 
two operational DRACS, while Figure III.8-2 shows the DRACS heat removal rates for 
the same two cases.  In addition, Figures III.8-3 through III.8-5 provide other calculated 
information for the case of a single operational DRACS. As shown in Figure III.8-1, with 
one DRACS operational the maximum (lumped capacitance) core temperature is 
predicted to reach ~567 ºC at ~ 14 hours following scram, but thereafter it steadily 
declines over the balance of the transient.  For the case of two operational DRACS, the 
peak core temperature is reduced to ~ 530 ºC, which occurs ~15.3 hours after scram.  
 
As shown in Figure III.8-2, the DRACS heat removal for the base case rises to meet 
the decay heat input at ~ 15 hours into the transient.  The heat removal rate at this time 
reaches ~ 1.4 MWt.  This heat removal rate significantly exceeds the design removal rate 
of 625 kWt, which is based on limited mass flowrates of 3.1 to 4.4 kg/sec through the 
DRACS on the primary and secondary sides, respectively (see Table II.6-1).  However, 
due to the relatively open flow path of this particular reactor design, the actual flowrates 
and temperature drops through the DRACS exceed those assumed in the DRACS HX 
design analysis, and therefore the heat removal rate is quite high (see Figures III.8-4 and 
III.8-5).  In general, the results of these calculations indicate that the DRACS system is 
quite robust in terms of maintaining acceptably low temperatures inside the reactor 
vessel, even with only one unit operational.   
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Figure III.8-1 Core and plena temperatures with one or two operational DRACS 
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Figure III.8-2 Decay and DRACS heat rates with one or two operational DRACS 
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Figure III.8-3 Overall system energy balance with one operational DRACS 
 310 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Time From Scram (Hours)
M
as
s 
Fl
ow
ra
te
 (k
g/
se
c)
Core Primary Sodium Secondary NaK
Tertiary Air DRACS Shell Side
 
Figure III.8-4 System mass flowrates with one operational DRACS 
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Figure III.8-5 HX inlet and exit temperatures with one operational DRACS 
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III.9 Spent Fuel Cooling Requirements for Transfer Operations 
 
Fuel transfer operations where thermal loadings are a concern include not only the 
transfer of spent fuel from the vessel to the fuel cycle facility, but also the transfer of 
TRU-bearing fuel from the fuel facility into the reactor.  Analyses of the assembly 
cooling requirements for these two cases are presented in this Section.  
 
III.9.1 Spent Fuel Assembly Transfer 
 
Spent fuels will be transported from the reactor vessel to the fuel cycle facility with 
an inter-building cask (IBC) with gas cooling.  The decay heat level in the fuel at the time 
of the transfer operation will determine whether passive or active cooling is required.  
The ABTR design provides in-vessel storage positions for fresh as well as spent fuel.  
The cooling time in the reactor depends on not only the number of spent fuel assemblies, 
but also on the number of available storage positions.  In the current ABTR design, a total 
of 36 in-vessel positions are provided.  During each refueling operation, four driver 
assemblies and, most likely, at least one test assembly will be unloaded from the core.  
Thus, given the number in-vessel storage positions, then the assembly residence time in 
the vessel will be limited to 7 reactor cycles (28 months).  In this case, the maximum 
decay heat level of the spent fuel is estimated to be 1.5 kW per assembly, as shown in 
Figure III.9-1.  
 
To determine if active cooling is needed, an estimate of the capacity of natural 
convection cooling is required.  The relationship between the required flow rate and 
decay heat level is shown in Figure III.9-2.  There are four cases that parameterize on the 
gas coolant (air or argon), and the outside temperature of the wrapper tube (50 or 200 
°C).  The most realistic case is felt be the 200°C argon gas case since the IBC will use 
argon and there is no air conditioning system at this pre-conceptual design stage.  The 
parametric cases are provided for evaluating potential design changes to the IBC.   The 
minimum required flow rate of 0.15 Nm3/min (normal m3/min) corresponds to the 50°C 
air case.  The more realistic flow rate corresponds to the case of argon gas with a 200°C 
wrapper temperature, for which the required flow rate is 0.3 Nm3/min. 
 
The natural circulation cooling capacity depends on the pressure drop inside the 
subassembly, as well as the circulation head caused by the temperature difference 
between the inside and outside of the subassembly.  Pressure drops on the interior and 
exterior of the wrapper tube are described through the equation [1]: 
 
     
g
u
D
LfP
e 2
2
×××=Δ ρ                                                      
where        f  = friction factor, 
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Re
93=f   for laminar flow inside wrapper tube (Re<548), 
     18.0Re
17.0=f  for turbulent flow inside wrapper tube (Re>12820), 
     
Re
64=f   for laminar flow outside wrapper tube (re<2300), 
     25.0Re
3164.0=f  for turbulent flow outside wrapper tube, 
     eD = equivalent diameter, 
     L  = channel length, and 
     ρ  = coolant density. 
The calculated pressure drops inside and outside the subassembly wrapper are shown 
in Figures III.9-3 and III.9-4, respectively.  These figures indicate that the pressure drop 
outside the wrapper is negligible compared to that on the interior of the wrapper.  Natural 
circulation inside the wrapper is calculated to be in the laminar region since the Reynolds 
number lies in the range of 90 to 220.  The relation between natural circulation head and 
the wrapper interior temperature is shown in Figure III.9-5.  The maximum head is 
around 30 Pa when the outside temperature is 50 °C, and 15 Pa when the temperature is 
increased to 200 °C.  
 
When the outside pressure drop is negligible and the flow is in the laminar region, 
the flow velocity can be expressed through the following simple equation: 
 
     νρ
1
93
2 2 P
L
D
u e Δ=                                                                     
where υ is the kinematic viscosity.  The velocity and flow rate calculated from this 
equation are shown in Figures III.9-6 and III.9-7, respectively.  The flow rates for outside 
temperatures of 50 and 200°C are ~0.005 and 0.002 Nm3/min, respectively.  These results 
show that the natural convection flow rates are much smaller than the minimum required 
rate of 0.15 Nm3/min required to remove the decay heat without excessive heatup of the 
fuel.  From Figure III.9-2, it is evident that the assembly can be kept adequately cool 
when the decay heat level is at or below 0.05 kW per subassembly when the heat removal 
is limited to natural circulation alone. 
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Case 19pu131 25tru131 35pu131 47tru131 
TRU enrichment, % 18.81 24.83 34.86 46.70 
Peak discharge burnup 
(MWD/kg) 130.84 130.55 130.83 130.45 
Specfic power density (kW/kg) 59.42 59.42 120.51 120.06 
Resident time (EFPD) 2202 2197 1086 1087 
Total HM mass in core (MT) 4.03 4.03 1.98 1.98 
Total driver fuel (including test) 63 63 63 63 
HM mass per assembly (kg) 70.6 70.6 34.54 34.54 
 
Figure III.9-1 Decay heat of spent fuel 
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Figure III.9-2 Relationship between required gas flow rate and assembly decay heat level 
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Figure III.9-3 Pressure drop inside the wrapper tube 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
0 5 10
Velocity (m/s)
P
re
ss
ur
e 
D
ro
p 
(P
a)
Air50deg-C
Air200deg-C
Ar50deg-C
Ar200deg-C
 
Figure III.9-4 Pressure drop outside the wrapper tube 
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Figure III.9-5 Natural circulation head 
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Aside from natural convection, radiation heat transfer will also contribute to passive 
cooling of the assemblies.  The potential contribution of this heat transfer mechanism is 
now considered.  The simplified geometry assumed for the analysis is shown in Figure 
III.9-8. The radiant heat flux between surface 1 and 2 can be evaluated through the 
following well-known equation: 
 
( )4241
21
111
1 TTQ −
−+
= σ
εε
      
where 
σ  = Stefan-Boltzmann constant 4.88x10-8kcal/m2hr-K, 
iε  = emissivity of surface i. 
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Figure III.9-6 Natural circulation coolant velocity 
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Figure III.9-7 Volumetric flow rate due to natural circulation 
 316 
 
In this scoping analysis, gas circulation and heat conduction through the cladding on 
the interior of the wrapper are ignored.  The effective height for radiation is assumed to 
be that of the active core height which is 0.8 meters.  The radiation heat transfer depends 
on emissivity which varies widely with the material type, surface condition, and 
temperature.  For example, pure iron has an emissivity of 0.08, unoxidized carbon steel 
has an emissivity of 0.1, and oxidized steel has an emissivity of 0.8 at 260°C.  In this 
analysis, the emissivity is conservatively assumed to equal 0.1.  The relation between 
wrapper temperature, which is treated parametrically between 50 and 200°C, and decay 
heat level is shown in Figure III.9-9.  The wrapper temperature exceeds 600°C for decay 
heat levels above 0.6 kW.  This result shows that radiation heat transfer is more efficient 
than natural circulation in reducing the assembly temperature, but the decay heat level is 
still below the 1.5 kW threshold required for passive cooling assuming a 28 month 
assembly residence time inside the vessel.  This result is also in good agreement with 
reference [1], where it was found that the maximum passive cooling capacity of the EBR-
II IBC was 0.8 kW when both radiation and conduction were considered.  
 
 
 
Figure III.9-8 Simplified geometry for radiation cooling evaluation 
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Figure III.9-9 Relation between radiation cooling and wrapper tube temperature 
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III.9.2 Fresh Fuel Assembly Transfer 
 
 ABTR may use plutonium fuel for the initial core, but will gradually transfer to TRU 
fuel with minor actinide content.  The TRU fuels are expected to have a non-negligible 
decay heat level, as shown in Table III.9-1. As these data indicate, the decay heat of the 
fresh plutonium fuel is limited to 0.03 kW per assembly, but the maximum decay heat of 
the TRU fuel reaches 0.37 kW per assembly.  Although this value is much smaller than 
that of spent fuel, the maximum cladding temperature of fresh TRU fuel during 
storage/refueling operations must be kept much lower than that of spent fuel, since no 
cladding damage can be tolerated prior to core loading.  In reference [2], the maximum 
cladding temperature is limited to 375°C to stay well below the creep temperature of high 
chromium steel.  The same criterion is adopted for ABTR since the same steel type (HT-
9) will be utilized for the cladding.  The previous spent fuel cooling analysis indicated 
that the maximum assembly decay heat level that can be passively cooled by natural 
circulation alone is 0.05 kW, and when radiation heat transfer is included, this limit is 
increased to approximately 0.2 kW.  As shown in Figure III.9-9, radiation heat transfer is 
only capable of maintaining the subassembly wrapper temperature below 350°C when the 
subassembly decay heat level is at or below 0.2 kW.  This implies that the new TRU fuels 
will also require forced gas cooling during ex-vessel fuel handling operations. 
 
Table III.9-1 Decay heat level of various driver fuel compositions 
 
Case 19Pu131 35Pu131 25TRU131 47TRU131
TRU enrichment, % 18.81 34.86 24.83 46.70 
Peak discharge burnup (MWd/kg) 130.84 130.83 130.55 130.45 
Specfic power density (kW/kg) 59.42 120.51 59.42 120.06 
Resident time (EFPD) 2202 1086 2197 1087 
Total HM mass in core (MT) 4.03 1.98 4.03 1.98 
Total driver fuel (including test) 63 63 63 63 
HM mass per assembly (kg) 70.06 34.54 70.06 35.54 
Decay heat (W/kg) 0.4 0.8 5.3 9.9 
Decay heat (kW/assembly) 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.34 
III.9.3 Intra-Building Cask Transient Analysis 
 
The previous scoping calculations indicated that both spent and new TRU fuels will 
require forced cooling during ex-vessel fuel handling operations.  However, these steady 
state calculations assumed that the inner temperature of the IBC was held constant at 
200°C.   In this section, a two-dimensional transient analysis is performed in order to 
estimate the time required for the IBC to reach this elevated temperature under passive 
cooling conditions.  The radial temperature distribution is evaluated using the heat 
transfer model shown in Figure III.9-10. Heat conduction in the axial direction is also 
considered.  Heat transfer from the fuel pins to the wrapper tube, and from the wrapper 
tube to the inner surface of the IBC, is assumed to occur by radiation.  View-factor 
effects throughout the domain are neglected.  In this case, the same radiation heat 
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transport equation that was used in the previous steady state calculations can be applied.  
As discussed earlier, radiation is strongly dependent on the emissivity of the surfaces.  
Spent fuel cladding will most likely have an emissivity larger than the value of ~ 0.1 
expected for new fuel (indicative of polished steel) since dirty surfaces generally have 
higher emissivities.  In this analysis, the conservative assumption is made that the 
emissivities of both new and spent fuel claddings are ~ 0.1.   Heat transport from the IBC 
surface to the air is assumed to be by natural convection assuming the heat transfer 
coefficient is 5 W/m2-K [1].  
 
 
 
 
Figure III.9-10 Illustration of IBC transient calculational model 
 
 
Table III.9-2 IBC transient analysis input parameters and results 
 
Item Case 1 Case 2 
Fuel Type Spent New 
Decay Heat 1.5 kW 0.37 kW 
Emissivity from Fuel Pin to Wrapper Tube 0.1 0.1 
Emissivity from Wrapper Tube to IBC 0.1 0.1 
Density of Fuel 15.8 g/cm3 15.8 g/cm3 
Density of Stainless Steel 7.9 g/cm3 7.9 g/cm3 
Density of  Lead 11.4 g/cm3 11.4 g/cm3 
Specific Heat of Fuel 0.2 J/g-K 0.2 J/g-K 
Specific Heat of Stainless Steel 0.5 J/g-K 0.5 J/g-K 
Specific Heat of Lead 0.13 J/g-K 0.13 J/g-K 
Conductivity of Stainless Steel 0.15 W/cm-K 0.15 W/cm-K 
Conductivity of Lead 0.35 W/cm-K 0.353 W/cm-K 
Heat Transfer Coefficient at the IBC Surface 0.0005 W/cm2-K 0.0005 W/cm2-K 
Outside Temperature 50 °C 50 °C 
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Table III.9-2 shows the assumed input parameters.  There are two cases.  The first is 
the spent fuel case with an assumed assembly decay heat level of 1.5 kW, while the 
second case is for new TRU fuel with a decay heat level of 0.37 kW (see Table III.9-1).  
Figure III.9-11 shows the temperature transient in the case of spent fuel.  The peak 
cladding temperature reaches 800°C after ~ 1 hour.  This result is in good agreement with 
the previous rough estimate of the peak steady-state cladding temperature for spent fuel 
with passive cooling by radiation heat transfer alone (see Figure III.9-9).  Figures III.9-12 
and III.9-13 show the radial and axial temperature distribution at the end of the transient 
after the peak cladding temperature is reached.  The temperature inside the IBC is 
evaluated as 163°C.  This indicates that the assumption of a 200°C inner surface 
temperature for the IBC used in the previous steady state calculations was reasonable.  
 
Figures III.9-14, III.9-15 and III.9-16 respectively provide the temperature transient, 
radial, and axial temperature profiles across the IBC after the peak clad temperature is 
reached for the case of new TRU fuel. Peak clad temperature for this case is reduced to 
467°C.  This result is in good agreement with the previous steady state analysis that 
indicated that the temperature can exceed the creep limit of 375°C [2].  As shown in 
Figure III.9-15, the inner surface temperature of the IBC eventually reaches 77°C.  This 
indicates that the assumption of a 200°C IBC inner surface temperature in the steady state 
analysis was too conservative, but did not strongly affect the predicted cladding 
temperature.  This is due to the fact that the radiation heat transfer is determined by the 
subtraction of the fourth power of temperatures, and so the effect of the lower boundary 
temperature is small.   
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                                 Figure III.9-11 Transient temperature (case 1: spent fuel) 
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Figure III.9-12 Radial Temperature distribution in IBC (case 1: spent fuel) 
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Figure III.9-13 Axial Temperature distribution in IBC (case 1: spent fuel) 
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Figure III.9-14 Transient temperature (case 2: new TRU fuel) 
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Figure III.9-15 Radial Temperature distribution in IBC (case 2: new TRU fuel) 
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Figure III.9-16 Axial Temperature distribution in IBC (case 2: new TRU fuel) 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ANL  Argonne National Laboratory 
ANS  American Nuclear Society 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram 
                        BOC  Beginning of Cycle 
B&PV Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
CEA                Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique  
CFD                Computational Fluid Dynamics 
DBE  Design Basis Events 
DOE Department of Energy 
DRACS           Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System 
EBR-II Experimental Breeder Reactor II 
EM                  Electromagnetic 
EMAT             Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducer 
EOC                End of Cycle 
EPA Environment Protection Agency 
FFTF               Fast Flux Test Facility 
HEPA              High Efficiency Particulate Air 
HTR                High Temperature Recuperator 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
HX                  Heat Exchanger 
IBC  International Building Code 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IHTS  Intermediate Heat Transport System 
IHX  Intermediate Heat Exchanger 
ISI  In-Service Inspection 
IVIM               In-Vessel Inspection Machine  
JAPC               Japan Atomic Power Company 
JNC                 Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute 
LMR  Liquid Metal Reactor 
LRB  Laminated Rubber Bearing 
LTR                 Low Temperature Recuperator 
MOC               Middle of Cycle 
MOX               Mixed Oxide 
MWe Megawatt Electric 
NDE  Non-Destructive Examination 
NDHX             Natural Draft Heat Exchanger 
NPSH  Net Positive Suction Head 
NRC  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OBE  Operating Basis Earthquake 
OSHA             Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
PCHE              Printed Circuit Heat Exchanger 
  323
 
PHTS  Primary Heat Transport System 
PLOF              Protected Loss of Flow 
PLOHS           Protected Loss of Heat Sink 
PRISM Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module 
RBCB             Run Beyond Cladding Breach  
RCB  Remote Controlled Vehicle 
SHRS              Shutdown Heat Removal System 
ABTR             Small Modular Fast Reactor 
SS Stainless Steel 
SSE  Safe Shutdown Earthquake 
TREAT           Transient Reactor Test Facility 
TRU                Transuranic   
ULOF              Unprotected Loss of Flow 
ULOHS           Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink 
UTOP              Unprotected Transient Overpower 
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APPENDIX A Evaluation Of Safety Design Criteria 
  
This Appendix provides a survey of safety design criteria applicable to sodium 
cooled fast reactors.  Criteria selected for consideration include 1) generalized design 
criteria specified by Title 10, Part 50, Appendix A of the Code of Federal Regulations for 
application to light water nuclear power reactors, 2) American National Standard general 
safety design criteria for a liquid metal reactor nuclear power plant, and 3) U.S. 
Department of Energy nuclear reactor safety design criteria.  Considerations of design 
criteria by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in licensing and safety evaluation of 
proposed liquid metal cooled nuclear power reactor designs are reviewed.  Applicability 
of the selected set of design criteria to sodium cooled fast reactor design features and 
operational characteristics are discussed.  Recommendations are also made for 
modifications to existing safety design criteria for relevance to sodium cooled fast reactor 
designs. 
 
The safety philosophy guiding the design, construction, and operation of nuclear 
facilities in the U.S. is based on the principle of “defense in depth” [1].  The objectives of 
“defense in depth’ are first to protect the health and safety of the public and plant 
operating personnel, and second to preserve the facility investment by assuring its 
operational readiness.  In terms of physical elements, “defense in depth” is exemplified 
by multiple, successive barriers to guard against the escape of radioactivity from nuclear 
facilities.  However, in the evolution of U.S. nuclear safety philosophy, the “defense in 
depth” principle has been extended and applied to all aspects of nuclear facility design, 
construction, and operation, so that all safety critical functions are achieved by multiple 
systems/procedures/processes that are diverse and independent.  
 
In the nuclear facility design process, the “defense in depth” principle has fostered 
the development of guidelines for identifying those engineered systems that are important 
for safety.  Safety class systems are designed to be very reliable.  They are constructed 
using specifications and materials that will assure functionality.  In addition, multiple 
systems of diverse design are provided so that failure of any single safety system will not 
put people or equipment at risk. 
 
The system configurations and functional requirements for nuclear facilities are 
routinely documented early in the design process as a set of safety design criteria.   
Commercial water cooled nuclear power plants licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission must comply with general design criteria documented in the Code of Federal 
Regulations [2].  Suggestions for modifications of these criteria for application to liquid 
metal cooled reactor designs have been supplied by representatives of the nuclear power 
industry [3].  Nuclear research reactors built by the U.S. Department of Energy must 
comply with safety design criteria documented in a DOE Order [4].   
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide an evaluation of documented nuclear 
reactor safety design criteria, with the aim of identifying changes necessary for 
application to a sodium-cooled fast reactor design.  Existing general design criteria 
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developed by the USNRC for light water reactors [2], by industry for liquid metal 
reactors [3], and by USDOE for research reactors [4] are examined for relevance. 
Recommendations are made for modifications to the existing safety design criteria for 
application to sodium-cooled system designs.  
 
A.1 Safety Design Criteria Comparison 
 
In the methodological framework built on the defense-in-depth foundation, the role 
of safety design criteria is to set requirements for design performance.  During the 
formative stages of design development, safety design criteria specify the configuration 
and functional performance characteristics the design must have for it to receive 
construction and operation approvals from the regulatory agency.  Once the design is 
developed, safety analyses are performed and documented to quantify the margins 
between the safety requirements and expected performance.  After the design is 
constructed, safety tests are performed to verify design safety performance.  Therefore, it 
is necessary to establish safety design criteria early in the design process, and the 
requirements set by the safety design criteria largely determine the plant configuration, 
equipment inventory, and equipment arrangement. 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed a set of general safety 
design criteria for commercial light water-cooled nuclear power reactors [2].  These 
criteria are the base-line requirements for nuclear power reactors in the U.S.  However, 
the 10CFR50 Appendix A requirements are intended for application to light water 
reactors, and so are only partly applicable to the sodium cooled reactor designs. 
 
During the years of the U.S. sodium cooled fast reactor development program, 
industry representatives developed an American National Standards Institute standard [3] 
for safety design criteria applicable to liquid metal cooled reactors.  This set of criteria 
followed the organization and intent of 10CFR50 Appendix A, but modified certain 
criteria details for applicability to the low pressure, chemically reactive liquid metal 
coolant. 
 
The U.S. Department of Energy has developed a set of safety design criteria [4] to 
apply to USDOE reactors that are exempt from USNRC regulation.  Such reactors 
include one-of-a-kind designs built for research, and other special purpose reactors.  The 
USDOE criteria are similar in organization and intent to the 10CFR50 Appendix A 
criteria, with some variations to address generically the design variations of the USDOE 
reactors. 
 
Table A-1 contains a listing of the design criteria from 10CFR50 Appendix A, and a 
cross reference to the criteria proposed in Refs. 3 and 4.  These three sets of safety design 
criteria have been reviewed for applicability to the sodium cooled fast reactor design.  
The “Comments” column in Table A-1 references the list of comment statements that 
follow the Table and record the results of the review.  The review takes into account the 
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technical safety evaluations performed by the USNRC for the PRISM [5] and SAFR [6] 
sodium cooled fast reactor designs. 
 
 Table A-1 Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison 
 
Criterion/Requirement 10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments
I. Overall Requirements 
Single Failure   8.c.1 1,2 
Quality Standards and Records GDC 1 3.1.1 8.c.2 1 
Design Bases for Protection Against 
Natural Phenomena GDC 2 3.1.2 8.c.3 1 
Fire Protection GDC 3 3.1.3 8.c.4 1 
Protection Against Sodium and NaK 
Reactions  3.1.4  3 
Environmental and Dynamics Effects 
Design Bases GDC 4 3.1.5 
8.c.5, 
8.c.10 4 
Sharing of Structures, Systems, and 
Components GDC 5 3.1.6 8.c.6 1 
Sodium Heating Systems  3.1.7  3 
Siting   8.c.7 5 
Human Factors Engineering   8.c.9 6 
Safeguards and Security   8.c.11 6 
Reactor Decontamination and 
Decommissioning   8.c.13 6 
Support Systems   8.c.15 6 
Non-Safety Class Structures, Systems, 
and Components   8.c.16 6 
II. Protection by Multiple Fission Product Barriers 
Reactor Design GDC 10 3.2.1 8.d.3.a 1 
Reactor Inherent Protection GDC 11 3.2.2 8.d.3.b 7 
Suppression of Reactor Power 
Oscillations GDC 12 3.2.3 8.d.3.c 1 
Instrumentation and Control GDC 13 3.2.4 8.d.5.a 1 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary GDC 14 3.2.5 8.d.1.a 1 
Reactor Coolant System Design GDC 15 3.2.6 8.d.6.a 8 
Containment Design GDC 16 3.2.7 8.c.8 1 
Electric Power Systems GDC 17 3.2.8 8.d.2.a 1 
Inspection and Testing of Electric 
Power Systems GDC 18 3.2.9 8.d.2.b 1 
Control Room GDC 19 3.2.10 8.d.5.e 1 
Remote Shutdown   8.d.5.f 9 
Heating, Ventilation, and Air 
Conditioning (HVAC) Systems   8.d.7.a,b,c 10 
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Table A-1 Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison (cont.) 
 
Criterion/Requirement  10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 
Comm-
ents 
III. Protection and Reactivity Control Systems 
Protection System Functions GDC 20 3.3.1 8.d.4.a 1 
Protection System Reliability and 
Testing GDC 21 3.3.2 8.d.4.a 1 
Protection System Independence GDC 22 3.3.3 8.d.4.b 1 
Protection System Failure Modes GDC 23 3.3.4 8.d.4.c 1 
Separation of Protection and Control 
Systems GDC 24 3.3.5 8.d.4.d 1 
Protection System Requirements for 
Reactivity Control Malfunctions GDC 25 3.3.6 8.d.4.e 1 
Reactivity Control System Redundancy 
and Capability GDC 26 3.3.7 8.d.5.b 11 
Combined Reactivity Control Systems 
Capability GDC 27 3.3.8 8.d.5.c 11 
Reactivity Limits GDC 28 3.3.9 8.d.5.d 11 
Protection Against Anticipated 
Operational Occurrences GDC 29 3.3.10 8.d.4.f 1 
IV. Fluid Systems 
Assurance of Adequate Reactor Coolant 
Inventory  3.4.1  12 
Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary GDC 30 3.4.2 8.d.1.b 1 
Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant 
Pressure Boundary GDC 31 3.4.13 8.d.1.c 4 
Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary GDC 32 3.4.3 8.d.1.d 1 
Reactor Coolant Makeup GDC 33  8.d.6.c 13 
Reactor and Intermediate Coolant and 
Cover Gas Purity Control  3.4.4  14 
Intermediate Coolant System  3.4.5  14 
Inspection and Surveillance of 
Intermediate Coolant Boundary  3.4.6  14 
Residual Heat Removal GDC 34 3.4.7 8.d.6.b 1 
Emergency Core Cooling GDC 35  8.d.6.d 13 
Inspection of Emergency Core Cooling 
System GDC 36 3.4.8 8.d.6.d 15 
Testing of Emergency Core Cooling 
System GDC 37 3.4.9 8.d.6.d 15 
Containment Heat Removal GDC 38  8.c.8 16 
Inspection of Containment Heat 
Removal System GDC 39  8.c.8 16 
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Table A-1 Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison (cont.) 
 
Criterion/Requirement  10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments 
     
Testing of Containment Heat 
Removal System GDC 40  8.c.8 16 
Containment Atmosphere  Cleanup GDC 41 3.5.11 8.c.8 16 
Inspection of Containment  
Atmosphere Cleanup Systems GDC 42 3.5.12 8.c.8 16 
Testing of Containment  
Atmosphere Cleanup Systems GDC 43 3.5.13 8.c.8 16 
Cooling Water  GDC 44 3.4.10 8.d.6.e 1 
Inspection of Cooling Water  
System GDC 45 3.4.11 8.d.6.e 1 
Testing of Cooling Water System GDC 46 3.4.12 8.d.6.e 1 
V. Reactor Containment 
Containment Design Basis GDC 50 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3 8.c.8 17 
Fracture Prevention of Containment 
Pressure Boundary GDC 51 3.5.4 8.c.8 1 
Capability for Containment 
Leakage Rate Testing GDC 52 3.5.5 8.c.8 1 
Provisions for Containment Testing 
and Inspection GDC 53 3.5.6 8.c.8 1 
Piping Systems Penetrating 
Containment GDC 54 3.5.7 8.c.8 1 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 
Penetrating Containment GDC 55 3.5.8 8.c.8 1 
Primary Containment Isolation GDC 56 3.5.9 8.c.8 1 
Closed System Isolation Valves GDC 57 3.5.10 8.c.8 1 
VI. Fuel and Radioactivity Control    
Control of Releases of Radioactive 
Materials to the Environment GDC 60 3.6.1 
8.c.12.a, 
8.c.14 1 
Fuel Storage and Handling and 
Radioactivity Control GDC 61 3.6.2 
8.d.8.a, 
8.d.8.d 1 
Prevention of Criticality in Fuel 
Storage and Handling GDC 62 3.6.3 8.d.8.b 1 
Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage GDC 63 3.6.4 8.d.8.c 1 
Monitoring Radioactivity Releases GDC 64 3.6.5 8.c.12.b, 8.c.14 1 
 
Comment 1.  The relevant criteria from Refs. 2, 3, and 4 are essentially congruent in 
intent and are applicable to the liquid metal-cooled reactor design. 
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Comment 2.  The single failure criterion for safety class structures, systems, and 
components is listed as a definition applied to specified criteria in Refs. 2 and 3.  The 
single failure criterion is explicit in Ref. 4. 
 
Comment 3.  Explicit requirement for liquid metal coolant that considers the impact of 
chemical reactivity or thermophysical properties. 
 
Comment 4.  The 10CFR50 criterion addresses phenomena for a high pressure water 
system.  The criteria should be revised to address phenomena relevant to low pressure, 
chemically reactive liquid metal coolant. 
 
Comment 5.  Siting criteria are considered in 10CFR100. 
 
Comment 6.  Explicit USDOE requirement beyond the scope of 10CFR50 Appendix A. 
 
Comment 7.  In LWR designs, the requirement for a prompt, negative power coefficient 
is met by the combination of the negative fuel Doppler coefficient and the negative 
moderator density coefficient.  If the sodium cooled fast reactor coolant void coefficient 
is positive, the regulator may require additional design features to compensate, as noted 
in the PRISM [5] and SAFR [6] safety evaluation reports. 
 
Comment 8.  Systems cited should include the liquid metal heating system. 
 
Comment 9.  The USDOE separate requirement for a remote shutdown capability is 
included in GDC 19. 
 
Comment 10.  USDOE criterion for confinement superseded by containment criterion, 
GDC 16. 
 
Comment 11.  10CFR50 Appendix A criteria contain references to LWR specific 
reactivity mechanisms (Xe, cold shutdown, ECCS boron injection, rod dropout, cold 
coolant shock) that are either irrelevant or require re-interpretation for fast spectrum 
LMR.  
 
Comment 12.  Liquid metal reactor criterion for maintaining core submersion in coolant 
is the equivalent of ECCS requirement for light water reactor (GDC 33, 35). 
 
Comment 13.  10CFR50 Appendix A criterion is not applicable for liquid metal coolant. 
 
Comment 14.  Intermediate loop criteria for liquid metal cooled design. 
 
Comment 15.  The liquid metal reactor design does not include an ECCS, but inspection 
and testing requirements are applied to the residual heat removal system. 
 
Comment 16.  In the light water reactor design, the containment heat removal system is 
intended to reduce temperature and pressure following a loss-of-coolant accident.  
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Because such an accident sequence is not a design basis for the liquid metal cooled 
reactor, this criterion may not be relevant. 
 
Comment 17.  In the light water reactor design the containment design is based on loss of 
coolant accident consequences.  For the low pressure liquid metal cooled reactor, in 
which a pipe break event is much less severe (leak before break), an alternative design 
basis accident must be specified. 
A.2 Evaluation of Safety Design Criteria 
 
The cross comparison of safety design criteria in Section A.1 shows that the sets of 
design criteria defined by the USNRC [2], the ANSI [3], and the USDOE [4] are 
generally and specifically convergent with regard to scope and content.  The NRC design 
criteria are intended for application to light water cooled power reactors, and the ANSI 
criteria were proposed for sodium cooled reactors. 
 
In its safety evaluation reports for the PRISM [5] and SAFR [6] designs, the USNRC 
has provided analyses of the applicability of the criteria in Ref. 2 to specific sodium 
cooled fast reactor designs, taking Ref. 3 into account.  These analyses have been 
reviewed with a perspective of the general characteristics of a sodium cooled fast reactor 
system.  From this review, the following general statements can be made with regard to 
the applicability of the design criteria in Ref. 2 to sodium cooled systems: 
 
1. Many of the 10CFR50 Appendix A general design criteria are directly applicable 
to the sodium cooled fast reactor systems, without wording changes or 
modifications.  The intent of the design criterion is clear, and the design 
implication for application to a sodium cooled system is apparent.  Criteria 
included in this class are GDCs 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64. 
2. Some of the 10CFR50 Appendix A general design criteria are worded with 
reference to specific light water reactor design features, performance 
characteristics, or regulatory requirements.  These criteria must be reworded to 
preserve the original intent for sodium cooling.  A listing of the criteria in this 
class and suggested changes are given in Table A-2. 
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Table A-2 Suggested Changes to 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 
 for Application to Sodium Cooled Systems 
 
 
GDC No. Suggested Change 
4 This criterion is written in reference to a high pressure, water coolant, 
and includes explicit references to loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) 
and pipe ruptures.  The words should be changed 1) to include dynamic 
and environmental phenomena relevant to low pressure sodium, e.g. the 
environmental effects of aerosols and oxidation products, 2) to delete 
references to dynamic and environmental accident phenomena specific to 
water coolant, and 3) to include references to generic design basis events, 
i.e. “anticipated operational occurrences.”  
11 This criterion requires a prompt inherent nuclear feedback effect to 
compensate a rapid reactivity increase in the power operating range.  
NRC reviews of the PRISM and SAFR designs highlighted the positive 
coolant void reactivity worth as an area of significant concern for a 
beyond-design-basis loss-of-flow-without-scram accident sequence.  The 
criterion should be modified to specifically exclude or include coolant 
voiding effects, depending on the safety strategy dealing with severe 
accident. 
15 This criterion is written to require that the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary is built to withstand design basis conditions.  Reference 5 
specifically requires inclusion of the sodium heating system in the listing 
of coolant systems subject to this requirement. 
26 This criterion requires two independent reactivity control systems, one of 
which shall use control rods.  Specific control reactivity requirements are 
listed in terms of LWR performance characteristics.  The criterion should 
be rewritten in terms of equivalent sodium cooled fast reactor 
characteristics. 
27 This criterion specifies combined control reactivity requirements 
including liquid poison injection.  The criterion should be rewritten to 
eliminate the explicit mention of liquid poison addition.   
28 This criterion requires that the reactivity control system be designed to 
limit the possible rate of reactivity addition to avoid damage to the 
reactor and its associated structures, systems, and components.  Specific 
control reactivity requirements are listed in terms of LWR performance 
characteristics.  The criterion should be rewritten in terms of equivalent 
sodium cooled fast reactor characteristics. 
31 This criterion specifies conditions and phenomena to be considered in the 
design of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.  For sodium coolant, 
Ref. 5 specifies addition of coolant chemistry and mechanical properties 
degradation to the list of considered phenomena, in recognition of the 
chemically active nature of sodium.   
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Table A-2 Suggested Changes to 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria  
for Application to Sodium Cooled Systems (cont.) 
  
 GDC No. Suggested Change 
33 This criterion provides for a coolant supply system to assure reactor 
coolant inventory in the event of a small break in the coolant pressure 
boundary.  As formulated, the criterion is not relevant to low pressure 
sodium coolant.  Reference 3 specifies a replacement criterion dealing 
with assurance of adequate coolant inventory to maintain core cover 
and operation of the residual heat removal system in all cases. 
35 This criterion provides for emergency core cooling in the event of a 
loss of coolant accident.  Such an event is outside the design basis for 
the low pressure sodium coolant system.  Coolant inventory, core 
covering, and residual heat removal are assured by GDC 33 and 34. 
36 This criterion provides for inspection of the emergency core cooling 
system.  Reference 5 recommends rewriting this criterion to provide for 
inspection of the residual heat removal system (GDC 34). 
37 This criterion provides for testing of the emergency core cooling 
system.  Reference 5 recommends rewriting this criterion to provide for 
testing of the residual heat removal system (GDC 34). 
38 This criterion provides for the design of a containment heat removal 
system with the capability of rapidly reducing the temperature and 
pressure within the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident.  
The LOCA sequence is not relevant to the low pressure sodium coolant  
system.  The criterion should be rewritten with wording to replace the 
LOCA reference with the appropriate design basis accident reference. 
39 This criterion provides for inspection of the containment heat removal 
system, and includes specific reference to design features relevant to 
water cooled systems.  The criterion should be rewritten to include 
design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
40 This criterion provides for testing of the containment heat removal 
system, and includes specific reference to design features relevant to 
water cooled systems.  The criterion should be rewritten to include 
design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
41 This criterion provides for the design of a system to control fission 
gases and combustible gases in containment following a postulated 
accident.  Reference 3 recommends modification of this criterion to 
include sodium aerosols and combustion products, and to identify 
sodium leakage and interaction with concrete as events in the accident 
sequence.  The criterion should be rewritten to include design 
characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
42 This criterion provides for inspection of the containment atmosphere 
cleanup system provided by GDC 41.  The criterion should be rewritten 
to include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
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Table A-2 Suggested Changes to 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 
 for Application to Sodium Cooled Systems (cont.) 
 
 
GDC No. Suggested Change 
43 This criterion provides for testing of the containment atmosphere 
cleanup system provided by GDC 41.  The criterion should be rewritten 
to include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
50 This criterion stipulates design basis conditions and phenomena for the 
containment, and makes specific mention of loss-of-cooling accidents 
and metal-water interactions.  The criterion should be rewritten to 
include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems.  
Reference 5 recommends replacement of the LOCA sequence with the 
appropriate postulated accident, and replacement of metal-water 
interactions with phenomena relevant to sodium cooling. 
55 This criterion provides for isolation design requirements for lines 
connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary that penetrate the 
containment.  In sodium cooled systems, this criterion also applies to 
lines connected to the reactor cover gas space. 
 
 
Reference 5 identifies nine additional design criteria relevant to sodium cooled fast 
reactor designs that are not explicitly stated in 10CFR50 Appendix A.  Six of these 
additional nine criteria are also cited in Ref. 3.  These nine criteria are as follows: 
 
1. Protection Against Sodium Reactions.  (Cited in Ref. 3 as Criterion 3.1.4).  This 
criterion explicitly provides for measures to protect against the consequences of 
chemical reactions resulting from sodium leaks.  It calls for prevention, detection, 
and consequence mitigation design features, as well as measures to protect 
personnel and equipment from corrosive and potentially radioactive oxidation 
products. 
2. Sodium Heating Systems.  (Cited in Ref. 3 as Criterion 3.1.7).  This criterion 
provides safety and performance requirements for systems intended to maintain as 
a liquid.  Such systems are required to perform assuming a single failure. 
3. Heat Transport System Design.  (No corresponding Criterion in Ref. 3).  This 
requirement ensures sufficient reactor cooling for normal operation and 
anticipated operational occurrences by providing two independent coolant flow 
paths between the reactor and the heat sinks, and stipulates that the integrity of the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be maintained for postulated accidents.  
This criterion covers the same requirements as GDCs 34 (Residual Heat 
Removal), 35 (Emergency Core Cooling), and 44 (Cooling Water) in the original 
10CFR50 Appendix A. 
4. Assurance of Adequate Reactor Coolant Inventory.  (Cited as Criterion 3.4.1 in 
Ref. 3).  This criterion provides for sufficient coolant inventory to assure residual 
heat removal for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and 
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postulated accidents assuming a single failure.  The criterion has the same intent 
as the original GDC 33 (Reactor Coolant Makeup). 
5. Design of the Intermediate Coolant System.  (Cited as Criteria 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 in 
Ref. 3).  These criteria provide for the design, inspection, testing, and surveillance 
of the intermediate coolant system, and cover the intent of the original GDCs 44, 
45, and 46 (Cooling Water). 
6. Reactor and Intermediate Coolant and Cover Gas Purity Control.  (Cited as 
Criterion 3.4.4 in Ref. 3).  This criterion requires systems to monitor and maintain 
the purity of reactor and intermediate coolants and cover gases within specified 
design limits.  
7. Inspection and Testing of Residual Heat Removal Systems.  (Cited as Criteria 
3.4.8 and 3.4.9 in Ref. 3).  This criterion provides for inspection, testing, and 
surveillance of the residual heat removal system.  The intent of these criteria is the 
same as that of the original GSCs 36 and 37, which provide for inspection and 
testing of the emergency core cooling system for water cooled reactor designs. 
8. Protection Against Fuel Rod Failure Propagation.  (No corresponding Criterion in 
Ref. 3).  This criterion was proposed for early sodium cooled fast reactor designs 
for which fuel irradiation experience was limited.  As fuel irradiation experience 
was gained, confidence in fuel performance was assured, and this criterion was 
explicitly excluded in Ref. 5, which notes that fuel design limits and failure 
performance are included by GDCs 10, 27, and 35. 
9. Protection Against Coolant Flow Blockage.  (No corresponding Criterion in Ref. 
3).  This criterion requires the fuel assembly design to include specific features to 
prevent and minimize the likelihood of coolant flow blockages, so that such 
events can be eliminated from the design basis.  This consideration arises due to 
use of ducted fuel assemblies, for which inlet flow blockages or restrictions could 
lead to fuel damage or failure. 
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APPENDIX B Overall ABTR Design Requirements 
 
B.1 Base Requirements  
 
       These requirements define functional and performance characteristics of the ABTR 
plant, and code and regulatory requirements which the plant design must satisfy. They 
also define features and characteristics of fabrication and construction which are utilized 
to effect a safe, reliable, and economical design of the ABTR plant. 
 
• The ABTR plant design shall be capable of being licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  
• The ABTR plant shall be capable of being located on a remote site with 
minimal infrastructure support. 
• The reference power plant size shall provide 250 MWt (~95 MWe).  
• The ABTR plant shall utilize modular construction methods such that nuclear 
plant cost elements which have demonstrated significant instability in the past, 
specifically field labor and materials and field engineering and services, are 
minimized and maximum reliance is placed on the cost elements which have 
demonstrated stability, such as factory-produced equipment and replicated 
installation.  
• The ABTR design shall have passive means of negative reactivity insertion 
and decay heat removal sufficient to place the reactor system in a safe stable 
state for specified anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) events without 
significant damage to the core or reactor system structure. (Note: A passive 
feature is one which relies only on the laws of nature and the integrity of 
structural members; requires no sensing, switching, motive power, or human 
interaction; and is not defeated or is difficult to defeat, by human action. 
Examples of passive features include naturally circulating fluid systems, 
thermal expansion, mechanical stops, and rupture discs or double-tube steam 
generator design.)   
• The ABTR plant shall have features which minimize the probability of major 
sodium fires and minimize the damage from such fires.   
• The ABTR reactor nuclear island and balance-of-plant design shall minimize 
operator demands during operation and shall provide ease of plant inspection 
and maintenance.   
• The plant’s safety, operational, maintenance and in-service inspection features 
shall be capable of demonstration and confirmation in an affordable full-scale 
prototype to provide a credible basis for NRC design certification and user 
acceptance of the ABTR.   
• The ABTR plant shall be designed with emphasis on simplification as a prime 
consideration to enhance reliability, availability, and maintainability and shall 
integrate the following functional capabilities into the design:  
- Load following capability over the range of 25 to 100% power, including 
a 10% step load change.  
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- Rapid plant recovery following protection system actuation.  
- Sustain load rejection from rated power without reactor scram.   
• The reactor shall be designed to minimize the risk of sabotage or 
proliferation, either through design features, or by proven safeguards and 
security techniques, or a combination of the two.  
• The design life of the ABTR plant shall be 30 years with the expectation 
of life extension.  
• The design shall comply with all applicable codes and standards issued by 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Nuclear 
Society (ANS), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 
and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).  
• The ABTR shall be designed for significant margins of safety under all 
design basis events (DBE). These margins shall be such that:  
- No clad failure or structural failure shall result from the design basis 
events, including allowance for uncertainties.   
- The design allowable fatigue life cycles shall be at least twice the 
expected number of duty cycle transients.   
• The ABTR plant design shall meet NRC and DOE release requirements 
and EPA protective action guidelines and shall incorporate sufficient 
passive and engineered safety features such that the emergency response is 
not required. 
• As a minimum, the safety grade portions of the ABTR plant shall be 
designed to withstand a 0.2 to 0.3 g safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) 
seismic event without loss of function. The minimum operating basis 
earthquake (OBE) design value shall be ~ 1/3 of the SSE value.   
• Nonsafety grade portions of the plant shall be designed to the International 
Building Code (IBC) requirements such that their intended function is not 
lost as a result of IBC seismic levels. Seismic Use Group III structures and 
systems shall ensure that the safety functions of all interfacing safety 
systems are not compromised at Design Basis Seismic accelerations. 
• The ABTR shall transmute minor actinides and minimize the wastes that 
are generated during the reactor life cycle.  
• The ABTR plant shall have the capability to achieve a capacity factor 
greater than 90%.  
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B.2 Technical Requirements   
       This section contains specific engineering, technical, and/or functional requirements 
necessary to achieve the desired performance of the ABTR nuclear power plant. 
 
• Plant operating procedures and diagnostics shall be automated to the 
extent required to minimize operating and maintenance (O&M) cost, 
public risk, and operator exposure to radiation. 
• Diagnostic systems shall be provided to detect incipient accident 
conditions and to aid identification of operator actions needed to return the 
plant conditions to normal. No operator action in the control room or 
remote shutdown locations shall prevent the reactor protection system 
from performing its safety function nor inhibit the function of the passive 
safety features.   
• The plant design shall include reliable equipment for the balance of plant 
(or safety-system independence from balance of plant) to reduce the 
number of challenges to safety systems.   
• The design shall minimize required maintenance and facilitate 
maintenance when needed. The design shall minimize the manpower 
required for maintenance and minimize the skills required to keep the 
plant maintained.   
• All systems and components shall be designed so that routine maintenance 
activities may be performed during operations.   
• The design shall allow for access, viewing, inspection, and testing of 
systems and components, working and laydown space for component 
repair or replacement, and facilitate plant cleanup. Remote maintenance 
shall be minimized; where remote maintenance/inspection is required, 
proven robotic methods shall be utilized.  
• The maintenance plan shall ensure that all failures with a probability of 
occurrence greater than 10-4 per reactor year shall have a specified plan for 
corrective action. Failures with a probability of occurrence of less than 10-
4 events per reactor year shall have a feasible means of corrective action.   
• An In-service Inspection (ISI) program shall be developed which meets 
the intent of Division 3 of Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code. The ISI 
program shall ensure the nuclear safety-related structures, components, 
and systems maintain their integrity as necessary to perform their safety 
functions. The program shall be applied to safety-related components 
subject to the jurisdiction of Section III of the ASME B&PV Code. For 
areas not covered by Section III of the ASME B&PV Code, the design 
shall include inspection provisions consistent with the objective of 
maintaining safe operable conditions throughout the plant.  
• The design of systems and components shall incorporate features to 
implement required surveillance and ISI with the plant on-line to the 
greatest degree practical.  
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• Radiation protection shall be provided to maintain radiation exposure to as 
low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), in conformance with radiation 
exposure requirements of this specification and DOE/NRC requirements.   
• Provisions shall be made for handling and transporting new and spent 
cores.  
• The normal system for forced convection transfer of reactor heat to the 
sodium/CO2 heat exchanger shall be the heat transport system (consisting 
of primary and intermediate heat transport systems). The heat transport 
system shall provide sufficient capability to prevent exceeding acceptable 
fuel design limits, and to maintain ASME B&PV Section III Code Levels 
A and B design limits during conditions of normal operation. The heat 
transport system shall also be configured to ensure natural circulation 
coolant flow and to limit sodium coolant inventory loss in the event of a 
major pipe or vessel rupture.   
• The shutdown heat removal system (SHRS) shall be safety grade and shall 
be designed with sufficient capability to prevent exceeding ASME B&PV 
Code Section III Level B and fuel design limits in the event that the 
normal heat sink is unavailable.  
• The SHRS shall employ operating principles which assure passive, 
continuous decay heat removal without human intervention under all 
postulated accident conditions. It shall incorporate the necessary heat 
transfer means to prevent exceeding ASME B&PV Code Section III Level 
C design limits and fuel safety limits when normal decay heat removal 
means are unavailable. 
• The containment system, including all access openings and penetrations, 
internal compartments, and structures, shall be designed with sufficient 
margin to accommodate the calculated pressure and temperature 
conditions under normal operating conditions, DBEs, and specified 
Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS) events without exceeding 
the design leakage rate. The design shall provide a barrier against 
uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment, and to ensure that 
site release limits are not exceeded.   
• The containment system margin shall also account for: (1) the effects of 
potential energy sources, such as decay heat in fission products, potential 
spray or aerosol formation, and potential exothermic chemical reactions; 
(2) the limited experimental data available for defining accident 
phenomena and containment response; and (3) the conservatism and 
uncertainties of the models that are used.   
• The containment system and equipment shall be designed to permit 
periodic leakage rate testing and surveillance of the containment 
boundaries. 
• The containment system boundary gas leak rate shall not exceed 0.1% 
volume per day under design basis conditions.   
• The containment system shall be capable of maintaining site release limits 
in the event there is a breach in the primary system boundary.  
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• A safety grade, Class 1E reactor protection system, which is separate and 
independent from the plant control system, shall be provided to prevent 
fuel damage, limit reactor structural challenges to less than ASME B&PV 
Code Section III     Level C limits, and monitor reactor safety functions.   
• The reactor protection system equipment for monitoring safe shutdown 
conditions shall be designed to monitor selected system parameters over 
their anticipated ranges of normal operation through Design Basis 
Earthquake (DBE), specified ATWS, and bounding event conditions, 
including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, 
integrity of the reactor core, reactor coolant boundary, and containment 
and its associated systems.   
• Instrumentation for monitoring safe shutdown conditions shall be designed 
to be highly reliable and fault tolerant.   
• Two independent reactivity control systems employing different design 
principles shall be provided. Sufficient capability shall be provided in each 
system to ensure that the reactor can be maintained in a safe shutdown 
state under all operating and postulated accident conditions assuming 
failure of the other system. 
• The IHX and supercritical CO2 secondary system shall be designed such 
that any failure of the sodium/supercritical CO2 boundary in the 
supercritical CO2 heat exchanger and resulting sodium/CO2 reactions will 
not result in a breach of the IHX to the primary sodium. 
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